Studying Argumentation Behaviour[1]

Estudiando el comportamiento argumentativo

Hans V. Hansen

University of Windsor, Windsor, Canada
hhansen@uwindsor.ca

Abstract: Starting from the observation that argumentation studies have low recognition value both within and without the academy, and mindful of the current desiderata that academic research should be relevant outside the academy, I introduce the concept of an argumentation profile as a panacea for our ills. Argumentation profiles are sketches of the argumentation behaviour of either individuals or groups (such as political parties) and are based on concepts unique to argumentation studies such as argumentation schemes, dialogical roles and responsiveness. It is argued that argumentation profiles would be of interest to voters as well as political parties.

Keywords: Value of argumentation, argumentation agent, argumentation profile, argumentation schemes, dialogical roles.

Resumen: Comenzando por la observación de que los estudios de la argumentación tienen un bajo valor de reconocimiento dentro y fuera de la academia, y consciente del actual desiderátum de que la investigación académica debería ser relevante fuera de la academia, introduzco el concepto de un perfil argumentativo como un remedio a nuestros problemas. Los perfiles argumentativos son borradores del comportamiento argumentativo de sus agentes y grupos (como los partidos políticos) y están basados en conceptos particulares de los estudios argumentativos tales como esquemas argumentativos, roles dialógicos y sensibilidad argumentativa. Se sostiene que los per-

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[1] A new version of this paper will be published in a volume of Windsor Studies in Argumentation' Serie, University of Windsor, Canada, edited by Ron von Burg, Leo Groarke and Christopher Tindale.

files argumentativos deberían ser de interés para los votantes como para los partidos políticos.

Palabras clave: Valor de la argumentación, agente argumentativo, perfiles argumentativos, esquemas argumentativos, roles dialógicos.

1. Introduction

We who work in the field of argumentation studies think our subject is important and that it should be recognized as important not only by our fellow cultural workers by also by the broader public. Yet recognition of the value of our chosen field is slow in coming. Accordingly, I want to begin by posing a question that may seem rather rude, or at any rate, altogether too direct in the present volume: What is the justification for argumentation studies? What value does it have? I think we may look to three different kinds of justification, which may be distinguished as the intra-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary and social justifications of argumentation studies. It is the last one – the social source of justification – that is especially pressing these days.

2. The value of research within the academy

The intra-disciplinary justification of any field of knowledge is the growth of knowledge in that field. It is the appetite for more knowledge that drives the researcher in any discipline to learn more, to explore alternatives, and to refine methodology. Most of the efforts taking place at argumentation conferences are about expanding, organizing and re-organizing what we know about the field or discipline we call *argumentation studies*. There are friendly rivalries within the field – uncertainties or disagreements to be overcome that give impetus to further research. In all the arts and humanities we dare to hope that there may be a social benefit of the knowledge we accrue, but we are not sure what precisely that benefit is, or whether there always is one. At any rate, from the intra-disciplinary point of view, it is not the thought of the influence on society that spurs us on, but rather our desire to know more and to know better.

A further value or justification of disciplinary knowledge is when it interacts with or combines with other disciplinary knowledge. Intellectual history is replete with examples of how two distinct fields or academic subjects have profitably combined to make a new field: most famously, Descartes' combination of algebra and geometry to make analytic geometry. More recently biology and chemistry have combined to make biochemistry, and biology and geography have combined to make biogeography; mathematics, physics and aesthetics combine to make engineering and architecture. In each of these cases the combined intellectual product (knowledge) is something that neither contributing discipline could have achieved on its own. The value of such mixed-marriages is well recognized, and is now being actively encouraged at educational institutions in North America under the banners – as I understand them – of inter-disciplinarity (combining research methods to provide new perspectives on familiar fields) and trans-disciplinarity (transcending traditional disciplinary methodologies to create new research fields).

Argumentation studies is itself an amalgamated discipline, consisting at least of some logic, some rhetorical theory, and some dialectical theory, but it can also contribute to interdisciplinary research. I have tried some interdisciplinary work with Jane McLeod, an historian. We studied the kinds of arguments made by those who petitioned for printer's licenses in provincial eighteenth-century France (Hansen & McLeod, 2012; McLeod & Hansen, 2005). However, the value of these kinds of interdisciplinary ventures is still measured by their effect within the academy and its environs. They are extensions of established research techniques and are motivated by the same values that drive intra-disciplinary research: to know more and to know better.

3. Does the study of argumentation have a social value?

So far we have been concerned with the intra-mural or academic justification of argumentation research in the academy, within knowledge-seeking communities. We should now move to the next question: what payoff does argumentation studies have for the larger public, for all those outside the academy? How does or can our research benefit them?

This is not an untimely question. In the United Kingdom the way researchers go about their work is about to change, writes Andy Miah. The framework used 'for assessing the value of research will now include a new component called "impact", which requires professors to show how their research makes a direct contribution to society beyond academia.' (Miah, 2012, p. 12) There is thus "The expectation for researchers to have a presence beyond academia."

If you are applying for a research grant from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC – one of the main funders of academic research in Canada) then, under the heading of "Summary of Proposed Research," you are asked to indicate "the potential contribution of the research both in terms of the advancement of knowledge, and of *the wider social benefit*, etc." (emphasis added). At the University of Windsor, the strategic plan outlining our goals for the next few years, requires that we "foster research excellence and the greatest *societal impact* of research and creative activity through the encouragement of intra- and interdisciplinary research (. . .)" (University of Windsor, 2012). Here again the emphasis is on *societal impact* of research. We then must ask, what is the social impact of argumentation studies? What direct contribution to society beyond academia do argumentation studies make? What is the wider social benefit of our work?

This is a fair question to ask. Obviously, research in the sciences upon which medicine rests has great social benefits in lessening suffering and increasing health. Environmental science gives us the means to manage our planet and its resources in a sustainable way (if only the public would appreciate them). Research in sociology and anthropology enables us to act constructively in lessening conflict and disruption when cultures come into conflict. Research in logic and mathematics has contributed to the development of computers, which, as we know, has affected society, immeasurably. How then does the study of argumentation serve society outside the walls of the university? How does it serve those who do not have an interest in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake?

I have no doubts about the value of argumentation studies for the general public. In teaching the values and techniques of good argumentation we benefit individual men and women directly, and hence society indirectly. Johnson and Blair describe the benefit rather broadly as making us

more discriminating consumers of all the arguments that face us in our daily lives, including those about what to buy, where to live, and whom to marry (Johnson & Blair, 1983, p. xiii). Thomas Hollihan, in his keynote address at the 2011 Alta Conference on Argumentation, identifies a narrower aim: "By properly educating arguers our field claimed it could change the character of deliberative argument and help democratic reasoning flourish" (Hollihan, 2011, p. 8). What greater boon could an academic discipline bestow on society?

Despite our lofty goals and good intentions, however, we are faced with two important challenges. The one is admitted by Hollihan: "There is little evidence that our persistent admonitions about the appropriate conduct and character of public argument have impacted arguers' behaviour, at least in the political sphere" (Hollihan, 2011, p. 9). We do not have much to show for our efforts so far, despite our idealism and hard work.

The second challenge is that the unique contribution of argumentation studies does not stand out distinctly in the public's mind. Even within the academy, we may not be thought of as being particularly unique. The skills and values that we champion in argumentation studies are incorporated to a significant degree in the teaching of other subjects as well. Historians teach critical thinking about the evidentiary import of documents; scientists instill the rigorous methods of scientific inquiry in their students; professors of politics teach caution in the analysis of political events and platforms; philosophers study and criticize the values and means of deliberative democracy; departments of English teach argumentative writing and analysis; law schools train their students in the art of dialectical argumentation. This ubiquitous usurpation of *our* subject matter is cause for celebration since it shows how pervasive our specialty is; on the other hand, it is cause for despair because the general public outside the academy cannot distinguish our contribution to good argumentation practices from that of other disciplines that have higher recognition value: history, physics, chemistry, political studies, English, and law. Even in the minds of many of those within the academy our specialty – argumentation studies – does not stand out in sharp relief. If our concern is to justify argumentation studies by its impact on society outside the academy (as well as within it), then, it appears that we have a public relations problem. We need to increase our visibility.

Hollihan makes five suggestions about how "we might increase the impact of our academic scholarship, our values, and our pedagogy on contemporary argument practices and on our standing in the academy *and the broader community*" (5, emphasis added). Among his suggestions are that we should "increase the impact of our discipline within the academy by focusing on our connections to other academic disciplines" (18); that we should examine the implications of new communication technology; that we should investigate the neurosciences; and that we should reinvigorate argumentation pedagogy. But most importantly, for present considerations, is what Hollihan says about our public role:

> *[W]e need to significantly increase the public profile of our discipline...* Scholars of argumentation need to be more forthright in commenting in praise and in blame about the discourse surrounding us, and we need to do so not only in academic journals and conference presentations but also in public media... Our scholarship should be more overtly practical and engaged (Hollihan, 2011, pp. 16-17, emphasis added).

Here again, I am happy to follow Hollihan – but only part of the way.

4. Argumentation Profiles

My suggestion is that we make a unique and identifiable contribution to society by the development of what may (tentatively) be called *argumentation profiles*. By an 'argumentation profile' I mean a description or characterization of argumentation behaviour over time as exhibited by an argumentation agent. By an 'argumentation agent' I mean an individual, group, party, or collective that makes and takes responsibility for arguments.

How can argumentation profiles be of social value? Argumentation-behaviour is important for democracy; we want to elect people who will not only argue well, but also argue openly, fairly, and productively. Past argumentation-behaviour encapsulated in an argumentation profile may be considered a predictor of future argumentation-behaviour, much as past moral and prudential behaviour is considered an index of future moral and prudential behaviour.

Argumentation profiles may also be a window through which we can

come to understand an argument agent's true political attitudes. Richard Weaver, in his 1952 work, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, wrote that "[a] reasoner reveals his philosophical position by the source of arguments which appears most often in his major premise because the major premise tells us how he is thinking about the world" (55) and that "a man's method of argument is a truer index in his beliefs than is an explicit profession of principles" (58). In other words, we can learn something about a person's political beliefs and deep-seated attitudes by looking at the record of his or her argumentation.

Weaver maintained that the eighteenth century political theorist, Edmund Burke, whom we recall as a conservative, mostly used the argument from circumstance in his speeches and writings, a kind of argument more appropriate to expediency and liberal politics than to conservatism. In contrast he associates the argument from genus with Abraham Lincoln, a kind of argument usually associated with conservatism and the *status quo*; yet Lincoln is cherished as a pragmatic and liberal politician.

So, what we may take from Weaver is that the arguments agents make tell us something important, perhaps revealing and surprising about that agent. Weaver's insight can be extended by taking political parties as subjects, not just individuals, and by expanding the number of indexes (beyond major premises) that can contribute to characterizations of argumentation agents – to profiles. The work attempted so far focuses on the profiles that can be made of agents engaged in political argumentation, but profiles could also be made of argumentation agents in other fields like science, law, and religion.

Elaine Cassel has 'profiled' the argumentation behaviour of members of the United States Supreme Court during the recent hearings about Obamacare. She found, through looking at their argumentation behaviour, that some of the judges showed empathy and compassion for poor people, some were of even temperament, some showed an authoritarian approach to legislation, some kept their politics out of their argumentation and stuck to legal arguments, some remained aloof from the fray. Cassel claims to have learned something about the judges by studying their argumentation (Cassel, 2012).

Some people have identified a male way of conducting argumentation, and found it objectionable. A generalization about the way men argue is

implicitly a rough argumentation profile of men. That there are such gen-eralizations is an indication that there is a coarse, or intuitive, idea of ar-gumentation profiles already at large. The present proposal aims to give shape and character to such profiles.

A notable aspect of argumentation profiles is that they do not charac-terize argument agents on the basis of isolated episodes of argumentation behaviour – a particularly ingenious analogy, or an atrocious fallacy, for examples – but on their argumentation behaviour over an extended period of time. Thus, the import of profiles is that they will indicate how agents have been disposed to engage in argumentation in the past, and how they may be inclined to argue in the future.

5. Concepts Put to Work

An *argumentation profile* of an argumentation agent should be based on an analysis of the agent's argumentation-behaviour over a period of time and constructed from the concepts unique to the study of argumentation. Thus, when making profiles of argumentation behaviour in political con-texts it is not the usual issue-oriented categories we need such as views on the economy, education, energy, the environment, and health care. The concepts needed for argumentation profiles will be quite different. They do not have to do with policies or platforms, or party philosophies. Which concepts in particular will be useful for making profiles is something we will have to find out through experimentation, but it is reasonable to begin by utilizing some of the concepts argumentation workers already have to hand.

Doug Walton and I have finished one pilot study of the argumentation in political campaigns, and we are now engaged in a second one. We stud-ied the Ontario provincial election held in September-October 2011 (see Hansen & Walton, 2012; Hansen & Walton, 2013) and have finished gath-ering data on the provincial election held in Alberta, March-April, 2012. For the Alberta election we have about 600 newspaper reports to consider; we hope to complete the analysis sometime in the coming fall. Our work is similar to that of William Benoit who has studied the argumentation in the nomination acceptance speeches by presidential candidates in the United

States from 1960 to 1996. In one of his studies, Benoit recognized three basic functions in the speeches, distinguished as acclaiming, attacking and defending:

> Themes that portray the sponsoring candidate or party in a favorable light are acclaims. Themes that portray the opposing candidate or party in an unfavorable light are attacks. Themes that explicitly respond to a prior attack on the candidate or party are defenses (Benoit 1999, p. 254).

Benoit's leading research question was, "What is the relative frequency of use of the functions of acclaiming, attacking and defending?" (253). He found that the Democratic Party nominees engaged in acclaiming slightly more than the Republican party nominee did (77% to 68%) but that the roles were reversed when it came to attacking (30% to 23%) as well as defending (16% to 3%). Clearly, Benoit's interests and approach are consonant with our programme of creating argumentation profiles by studying the argumentation behaviour of argument agents. Our approach differs from his, however, in that we focus on arguments as the basic unit of interest, and we consider more indexes of argumentation behavior than he does.

In our first study, Walton and I sketched profiles on the basis of which kinds of arguments and dialectical roles were utilized most frequently by the agents. In our second study we are modifying and enlarging our inventory of argument kinds and roles, and adding some other categories whose utility we want to test. We are experimenting to find out which factors and categories can contribute to the making of useful argumentation profiles. The following list of concepts is being considered:

1. *Argument kinds*: The primary classification tool we have is a list of kinds of arguments, also called argument schemes. The schemes are, roughly, definitions of different kinds of arguments, sorted on the basis of the kinds of reasons being brought to bear on a conclusion. A comprehensive list of the kinds of arguments that occur in political argumentation will help shape a picture of an agent's inclinations in argumentation. In our first study we used the basic inventory of schemes identified in Walton's *Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation*. In our next study we will employ the following list of schemes:

(1) argument from position to know; (2) argument from appeal to expert opinion; (3) argument from general acceptance; (4) argument from lack of knowledge; (5) argument from consistent commitment; (6) argument from inconsistent commitments; (7) argument from character (ad hominem); (8) argument from positive consequences; (9) argument from negative consequences; (10) argument practical reasoning – recommending/ justifying course of action; (11) argument from misplaced priorities; (12) argument from analogy; (13) argument from sign; (14) argument from distinction / classification; (15) argument from correlation to cause.

In constructing argumentation profiles, one looks to see which kinds of arguments are preferred by the argument agent. A key methodological question for us is, what is the optimal list of argument schemes that should be used for making argumentation profiles of agents engaged in political argumentation?

2. *Pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes*: It is also possible to classify arguments broadly on the basis of the kind of conduit they provide from premises to conclusions. Pragma-dialectical theory offers a three-fold classification in this category: symptomatic argumentation, instrumental argumentation, and similarity argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 94 ff.). Even though there are only three 'schemes' here they have the advantage that they are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, or at least appear to be so. (The same cannot be said for the informal logic schemes; with them it is possible that an argument could instance two or more schemes, and then a decision has to be made about which scheme is the best fit for the argument.) However, because there are only three schemes in this typology, we can expect only very general information to come from this classification. But, as before, one is curious to see if an argument agent prefers one kind of scheme to the others.

3. *Aristotle's pisteis*: Aristotle's three artificial means of persuasion might also give us some insight into the argumentation proclivities of agents (See *Rhet*. 1356a). We will supplement the argumentation profiles by classifying arguments on the basis of whether it is *logos* (evidence), *ethos* (character) or *pathos* (emotion) that is brought to bear.

These first three categories of classification (kinds, schemes, *pisteis*) have to do with non-relational aspects of the arguments themselves – they are ways of classifying either the kind of reasons brought to bear, or the way that the reasons are related to the conclusion. It is also possible to study the external (relational) properties of arguments in political discourse, in particular to consider the roles, or functions, of the arguments in the ongoing discussions.

4. *Dialectical roles*: Argument agents have purposes they want to achieve by the use of their arguments and thus the arguments are instrumental to their ends. Hence, given a context like that of a provincial or national election, arguments may be seen as being used for certain purposes by the agents in the argument exchanges. There is no determinate list of ends that arguers have in using arguments, and so no definitive catalogue of roles that can be determined. Walton and I felt free to invent a short list of four dialectical roles, which we noticed recurring in the data of political campaign arguments. These were the policy-positive role (used to defend a statement or policy), the policy-critical role (used to criticize a statement or policy), the person-critical role (used to criticize an opponent rather than his/her position), and the defensive role (used to deflect criticisms). After reading Benoit (*op. cit.*) we added a fifth by dividing his category of acclaiming into positive and negative roles, allowing us to add a person-positive role.

Studying an argument agent's choice of roles will tell us something not only of his/her/ its resources, but also about the possibilities it sees for advancing its cause. The analysis of dialectical roles must, however, be tempered by the following two dialogical considerations.

5. *Dialogical roles*: Is an argument being used to initiate discussion of an issue, or is it a response-argument, made as a reply or alternative to an argument or policy already before the public? My hunch is that response arguments are more likely to be cast in a negative role than arguments that introduce a new topic or policy. But it is not impossible that a response argument has a positive role or that an initiating argument has a negative one. This is a factor to take into consideration when constructing argumentation profiles.

6. *Dialogical position*: Whether an argument agent is the incumbent party or a challenger establishes his/her/its dialogical position, something which may well affect the choice of dialectical roles an agent gives to arguments. My inkling is that an incumbent party is more likely to have occasion to use the defensive role, clarifying misinterpretations, and defending policies. Challengers we would expect to be on the attack, being critical of both policies and incumbents. Of course, both sides will likely make arguments in all the roles, but certain roles may predominate for an agent during the course of a campaign. In sum, in constructing the argumentation profiles, both the dialogical positions of the agents, and the dialogical roles of their arguments, must be taken into consideration.

The above concepts are suggested as being of value to argumentation workers who attempt to make argumentation profiles. Additions, deletions and refinements, are solicited.

6. Illustration

Suppose we obtained the following result for three parties during an election campaign:

Table 1.

Priority rankings	Party A	Party B	Party C
Argument kinds	Practical reasoning, positive consequences; fairness	Negative consequences; direct ad hominem; misplaced priorities	Fairness; Analogy; Sympathy
PD schemes	instrumental	symptomatic	similarity
Pisteis	ethos	logos	pathos
Dialectical role	policy +; person +; defensive	person − ; policy +; policy −	policy +; person −; person +
Dialogical role	response; initiator	initiator; response	initiator; response
Dialogical position	incumbent	challenger	challenger

What might we say about these results? We might venture these thumbnail sketches:

Party A: Problem-solution oriented but balanced with considerations of

fairness; depends on credibility of agent; stresses the advantages of own policies and leadership; corrects misinterpretations and deflects criticism.

Party B: Depicts incumbent party as having bad policies, and attacks character of its members; wants to establish alternative goals; sees policies of government as indication of corruption; appeals to statistics and public opinion; puts priority on criticizing opponents over promoting own policies; initiates lines of discussion (criticism) more so than responding to the ideas of others, indicating an attempt to control the discussion.

Party C: Primarily concerned with social justice; makes case by drawing comparisons to other more vivid injustices; appeals to sympathy of electorate; initiates lines of argument stressing value of its own policies and is somewhat critical of incumbent and other opponent; tries to change agenda to discuss its own issues; depicts itself as having a high moral character.

Notice that these argumentation profiles are descriptive, not evaluative. Some argumentation workers would go further and, from a distant point of view, evaluate the arguments and argumentation of each of the agents, and thus make *evaluative* argumentation profiles of agents. Christian Kock (2011), for example, urges that the argumentation of politicians should be evaluated from the point of view of whether it meets the needs of the voting public in its quest to make an informed decision at the ballot box (14). And Hollihan (2011), as we saw, suggested that we should be more visible "in commenting in praise and in blame about the discourse surrounding us," especially in public media. Certainly, those who are good at evaluating argumentation should further benefit the political process by entering the fray with their findings. But what is being promoted in this essay is the construction of profiles, not the evaluation of arguments. These are different endeavours and although they are related, they put argumentation workers in different roles: creating profiles is largely empirical work; moreover, although it is not yet wholly clear what evaluating profiles might entail, it will primarily be the evaluation of argument agents, not arguments. There are different ways of engaging the public and stimulating the democratic process. The publication of the evaluation of political argumentation requires a different skill set than does profiling and a wide acquaintance

with historical, cultural and politically relevant facts. Argumentation pro-filing is not meant to compete with argumentation evaluation but rather to offer another a way of learning about political agents. Political discourse is already heavy on argued opinions advising people what to believe and how to vote. The suggestion here is that we prime the public's interest in the democratic process by presenting it with findings about argument agents that citizens can use in their own contemplation and decision making.

7. Social Justification / Impact

The problem taken up in this paper is whether the study of argumenta-tion can be justified by its impact on society. In order to be validated in society's eyes, argumentation studies will have to become more visible as a socially useful field, and one way it might do this, I am suggesting, is by doing something no one else can do – to wit, create argumentation profiles of argumentation agents whose behaviour is of interest and importance to society. Some of the concepts that could be the building blocks of such pro-files have been suggested, but the development of this project is still in its early stages. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the development of argu-mentation profiles can have an impact on society.

A. *Value to voters*. Voters will want to take profiles into consideration when preparing to vote: not only do we want to support politicians who advo-cate policies we approve of, we also want to elect people who will conduct themselves in an intellectually capable and responsibly manner, if they are elected. Traits relevant to these values can be captured in argumentation profiles and be indicators of future argumentation behaviour.

B. *Value to the media*. Voters will find out about argumentation profiles through the traditional news media and the Internet. Profiles of parties (or individual politicians) can be tailored for consumption in the public media, e.g., newspapers, radio, television, blogs, etc., either during a campaign or shortly afterwards, as long as public interest endures. Walton and I have done this (Hansen and Walton, 2012). In general the media will welcome this new and different kind of analysis of political behaviour. However, if

the findings are to be of value to the larger public then they should be presented in categories understood by the general public. Most people do not care to distinguish three kinds of *ad hominem* arguments or two kinds of slippery slopes. In general, technical language and stipulative definitions should be avoided. Thus the categories and language used for making argumentation profiles and discussing them with colleagues will not be the same as the categories and language used for reporting the profiles to the general public.

C. *Value to political parties*. Citizens, media and politicians exist in a symbiotic relationship: they all need each other. Political parties will be interested in their own argumentation profiles as they appear in the media, as well as those of their opponents. This is so especially to the extent that the public takes the view that it wants its politicians to behave in an intellectually responsible manner. Both individual politicians and their parties will want to know how they can improve their own profiles and how they can take advantage of their opponents' weaknesses as revealed in their profiles. There is thus a possibility of argumentation specialists working with argumentation agents in private-public co-operative ventures.

8. Externalities

There are, in addition, a number of spin-offs, or externalities, of doing argumentation profiles that can be felt within the academy; that is, there are intra- and inter-disciplinary payoffs in our attempt to serve the extramural community.

D. *Concept testing*. Argumentation studies will gain some intra-disciplinary benefit from the pursuit of argumentation profiles. An example of this lies in the development of the informal-logic argument schemes. Whereas textbooks look for arguments they can use to illustrate schemes, we look for a list of schemes that will be adequate to the identification and classification of *all* the arguments in a given field of discourse. What is optimal here? We need a balance between what is informative and manageable. Our work in this direction can lead to textbooks that are a better fit with the argu-

mentation reality for which they wish to offer guidance. This means that we must renew our efforts to develop a list of argument kinds (schemes) that will be comprehensive enough to allow classification of all the arguments found in the discourse, but which is not so fine-grained that it introduces minute distinctions that have little or no consequence for argument evaluation and the making of argumentation profiles..

E. *Inter-disciplinary cooperation*. Argumentation workers need the cooperation of at least three other fields in order to make argumentation profiles sound and valuable. (1) The profiles will be given greater content by incorporating other rhetorical factors which contribute to the character of argumentation behaviour; for example, choice of language, responsibility with regard to the burden of proof, etc.; hence, coordination with communication workers with complementary interests will make the argumentation profiles more complete. (2) One of the research questions that we are faced with is what to make of the patterns of argumentation behaviour once they have been identified. Our analyses can be enriched by the cooperation and participation of social psychologists, people who study personality, group behaviour, and social cognition. (3) Creating profile of political behaviour invites participation and cooperation with colleagues in political studies. They can give context and analysis of political argumentation that lies beyond the reach of the argumentation specialist *qua* argumentation specialist. We should engage the collaboration of workers from these other disciplines, thus creating a new inter-disciplinary research project, one that can be justified in terms of the public interest and benefit. But we should always keep the argumentation concepts as the key elements of argumentation profiles, as the central, unifying components.

F. *Student participation*. Training students is a necessary condition, in many cases, of getting research grants. Student participation in gathering, classifying and analysing the arguments used in the creation of the profiles not only has the benefit that it trains them in their field and in research, in the case of argumentation profiles of political argumentation agents it may also stimulate their interest in civic issues and good argumentation. An additional value in having student involved is that it forces us to clarify concepts and methods from the researchers' side (in addition to the au-

dience side, as above), so that our conceptual tools become functionally adequate. If these instruments cannot be used by university students at the upper undergraduate level, or the beginning graduate level, then we have lost sight of an important goal of informal logic viz., to provide tools of analysis and evaluation useful to the public in general. In gathering the information needed for making the profiles, we can observe how well our students do with the materials we provide for them to work with, and make adjustments as needed.

This completes my case for seeking the involvement of fellow argumentation workers in the study of political campaigns, and the value of making argumentation profiles.

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