Orientations to Interpersonal Arguing in Chile and Around the World

Orientaciones sobre la argumentación interperosanal en Chile y alrededor del mundo

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Abstract: This paper summarizes a recent program of cross-cultural research on interpersonal arguing. Nations surveyed include Chile, the United States, Portugal, China, Malaysia, and India. Constructs chosen to characterize people's understandings of interpersonal arguing included argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and personalization of conflict. Results showed differences from nation to nation, with Chile having a relatively constructive profile for face-to-face arguing. Substantial and unexpected differences were found when comparing various nations' motivation systems to one another. Sex differences also appeared in surprising patterns. Further research needs to be conducted under the guidance of scholars who have intuitive insights into non-U.S. cultures.

Keywords: Interpersonal arguing, argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, taking conflict personally.

Resumen: Este trabajo sintetiza un reciente programa de investigación de comparación cultural sobre argumentación interpersonal. Las naciones encuestadas incluyen Chile, Estados Unidos, Portugal, China, Malasia e India. Los parámetros escogidos para caracterizar el entendimiento de la gente de la argumentación interpersonal incluyó argumentatividad, agresividad verbal, marcos argumentativos, y la personalización de conflictos. Los resultados mostraron diferencias de nación a nación, con un Chile exhibiendo un perfil relativamente positivo sobre la argumentación cara a cara. Diferencias substanciales e inesperadas se observaron cuando se compraron los sistemas de motivaciones para argumentar en las diferentes naciones. Las diferencias a partir de sexo también mostraron patrones llamativos. Más investigación se necesita

desarrollar bajo la guía de investigadores que tienen un idea intuitiva en las culturas fuera de los Estados Unidos.

Palabras clave: Argumentación interpersonal, argumentatividad, agresividad verbal, marcos argumentativos, personalizar conflictos.

1. Introduction

Argumentation is an international field of inquiry. Recurring conferences and substantial proceedings devoted to argumentation research originate in Amsterdam (Netherlands), Santiago (Chile), Windsor (Canada), Tokyo (Japan), Alta (Utah, U.S.), and in various sites used by the European Conference on Argumentation. A glance at these conferences' programs or proceedings immediately shows that argumentation scholars work in places across the globe. A great deal of their writing is philosophical or rhetorical in its orientation. Several nations have come to be identified with particular approaches, for instance the pragma-dialectical theory developed in Amsterdam (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) and the informal logic approach that was born in Canada (Blair, 2011).

The study of interpersonal arguing originated in, and is still dominated by, the U.S. (Hample, in press). This research involves a great deal of work concentrated on intrapersonal matters, such as personality traits (Rancer & Avtgis, 2014) and expectations and emotional reactions concerning arguing (Hample, 2005). Interpersonal argumentative exchanges have also been studied in the U.S., both generally (O'Keefe, 1977) and more specifically in terms of conversational behaviors either in dyads (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980) or small groups (Meyers & Brashers, 1998).

Like any other nation or culture, however, the United States has plenty of distinctiveness and idiosyncrasy. Even more, within the U.S. the bulk of empirical research has used undergraduates as respondents or participants, and they are an even more specialized slice of humanity (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). We know perfectly well that national cultures are easily differentiated on fundamental values (Hofstede, 2001), and we have examples of essential argument-related ideas that may well be unique to one culture or another (e.g., Katriel, 1986, esp. ch. 2; Sun, 1991). This raises the fundamental question of whether or not it is reasonable to export U.S. theories, conclusions, and research methods to other nations.

In about the last decade, this question has been taken up with some seriousness. U.S. ideas and instrumentation regarding interpersonal arguing have now been carried into many other nations. Stephen Croucher (e.g., 2013; Croucher, *et al.*, 2013), an American working in Finland, has been a leader in this movement. I have also been involved in a number of international investigations, and those studies' results form the basis of this paper. In my own work, my colleagues and I have often had fundamental translation problems, especially with words like "argue," "debate," and "argument." In English, these terms have an inventory of somewhat inconsistent meanings, but our instrumentation nonetheless uses them as basic vocabulary. We have done our best to capture (or sometimes, just to distinguish) the tensions between quarrel v. reason, attack v. deliberate, explain v. justify, and other nuances. One of the contributions of the work my colleagues have done has been to render basic U.S. instrumentation into Spanish, Mandarin, Portuguese, Malay, and French. The translation problems my colleagues encountered are not minor issues, because a nation's vocabulary displays what people are alert to, what they project, and what they are poised to understand regarding arguing.

Therefore, hesitation about the simple assumption that something true in the U.S. will also be true in Columbia or Japan is eminently justified. Many of the U.S. results have replicated abroad, but others have not, either in kind or in degree. In this paper, I will report some of those results. I will begin by explaining the basic theories and instruments that we used in an effort to typify and compare different nations in regard to how interpersonal arguing is naturally understood. Then I will move on to show the similarities and differences from nation to nation. I will feature Chile as a point of comparison in all this, but will also be providing data on the U.S., Portugal, China, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and India.

2. Ideas, Theories, and Instruments

The motivating question in all the studies to be summarized here was, How do people in different nations understand interpersonal arguing? "Interpersonal arguing" refers to exchanging reasons face to face. Sometimes, as we all know, arguments derail and degenerate into nasty, hostile episodes.

However, this research regards that sort of outcome as no more than a possibility and it is not part of the definition of interpersonal arguing. Reasons – their provision, critique, defense, and exchange – are the defining attributes of an argument.

The understandings that my colleagues and I have tried to explicate are in three general categories.

2.1. Motivations

First, we wanted to know about the motivations for arguing. People in every culture often encounter social moments that invite arguing or disagreement, but sometimes they argue and sometimes they find a way to move on without comment. Are people in some nations more eager to argue than people elsewhere? Do people everywhere have essentially the same relevant motivational impulses, and if so, do those impulses work the same way everywhere?

We pursued these motivational questions by using the two most common ideas and sets of instrumentation used in the U.S. These are argumentativeness (Infante & Rancer, 1982) and verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Wigley, 1986). Both are personality traits, and both represent kinds of interpersonal aggression. However, the targets of the aggression are critically different. Argumentativeness refers to taking a controversial position, or attacking the other person's evidence, reasons, or case. The aggression is aimed at the other person's reasons, in other words. Verbal aggressiveness involves attacking the other person's character, background, or identity, rather than his or her reasons. Thus, verbal aggressiveness can be understood as the proclivity to generate *ad hominem* attacks.

An important fact for the story I will tell here is that both argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness are measured with two subscales each (Infante & Rancer, 1982; Infante & Wigley, 1986). In the U.S., these pairs were conceived of as opposites, and this assumption has been so fundamental that it has even been involved in the arithmetic generation of scores for argumentativeness or verbal aggressiveness. For argumentativeness, the subscales are *argument-approach* and *argument-avoid*. Sample items in English are "I am energetic and enthusiastic when I argue" (approach) and "I get an unpleasant feeling when I realize I am about to get into an

argument" (avoid). Argumentativeness scores are traditionally calculated by subtracting the avoid score from the approach total. That will not be done here for reasons that will become evident, and subscale totals will be reported separately. The two subscales for verbal aggressiveness are *antisocial* and *prosocial*. Example items are "When individuals are very stubborn, I use insults to soften the stubbornness" (antisocial) and "When others do things I regard as stupid, I try to be extremely gentle with them" (prosocial). Traditionally, a person's verbal aggressiveness score is his or her prosocial score subtracted from the antisocial total. Here, too, I will report the subscales separately. The reason for this, as readers will see, is that the subscales do not always turn out to be opposites in every nation.

2.2. Understanding Interpersonal Arguing

The second main question has been, What do people think is the essential nature of interpersonal arguing? This is obviously quite a large question, and many different approaches could have been taken to it. We chose the idea of argument frames, a research program that was designed from the beginning to explore what people think is going on when they argue (Hample, 2003, 2005). Frames are conceptual borders for something. They direct attention to what is inside the frame and divert focus away from what is outside. So argument frames are the conceptual outlines of arguing. They specify what people think is going on inside the activity of exchanging reasons.

The argument frames are in three categories. The first consists of self-oriented matters, and they summarize people's goals for arguing. Four goals are studied: *utility* (arguing to gain or protect some benefit), *identity* (arguing to display some prized aspect of self), *dominance* (arguing to assert one's superiority over the other person), and *play* (arguing for entertainment). All these are personal goals. Although another arguer is necessary for the goals to be achieved, the other person is no more than a means to goal fulfillment. The second category is other-oriented, and it has three scales. The first is *blurting*. Blurters say whatever they think, and do not take the other person into account when they do it. *Cooperation* is a way of connecting with another person in a way that respects the other's values and goals. It is contrasted to competition, where the arguer notices

the other's values, but denies or exploits them to get what the first arguer wants. The last scale in this second category is *civility*. This is a report of whether the respondent thinks that arguing is polite, well-reasoned, and constructive – or not. The third large category, reflective sophistication, only has one scale. This is called *professional contrast*, because it asks respondents to choose between a series of two contrasting views. One view is held by argumentation scholars, and the other is common among ordinary actors. For instance, is arguing corrosive or beneficial to personal relationships? Is it a precursor to violence, or an alternative to it? Does it contain unrestrained emotionality or quiet reason? High scores here indicate that the respondent tends to agree with scholars.

Together, these frame instruments can define an argument profile of a group of people. Why do they argue? How do they argue together? Do they have crude or advanced understandings of arguing's affordances? Certainly scholars can generate other ways to capture these and other fundamental understandings of the activity, but these measures seem to be at least a first step in characterizing how nations might differ in their understandings and involvements in interpersonal arguing.

2.3. Emotional Experience of Arguing

The third main question that we have pursued in our international studies has been, What does it feel like to be in an argument? Here we have chosen to measure taking conflict personally (TCP), a battery of measurements that assesses people's reactions to being in arguments (Hample & Dallinger, 1995; Hample & Cionea, 2010). Many of the scales in this instrument ask people to report their feelings about participating in interpersonal conflicts, but two of them ask for cognitive projections of conflict's effects.

Six scales are involved here. *Direct personalization* is the most straightforward measure of whether people personalize conflicts ("I usually take criticisms personally"). *Persecution feelings* are more specific, and here the respondent can say whether he or she believes that others engage in conflicts in order to victimize the person ("I think that some of the people that I often have conflict discussions with really like to pick on me"). *Stress reactions* are also more specific than direct personalization. Here, people indicate whether conflicts result in psychological or physiological stress for

them ("Sometimes when there are a lot of conflicts in a week, I feel like I'm getting an ulcer"). The next two scales are a pair, and they are the ones that solicit expectations about conflict's effects. They are *positive relational effects* ("Conflict can really help a relationship") and *negative relational effects* ("Conflict can really hurt a relationship"). These two scales need to be separate because people can have one, both, or neither belief about interpersonal arguing. The last scale is *valence*, which refers to whether people generally like or dislike being in conflicts ("I often enjoy conflicts").

As with our other choices, different approaches to studying the feelings people experience when arguing could have been followed. However, these scales have a nice body of research behind them in the U.S. (see the review by Hample & Cionea, 2010), and they offer at least an initial platform for understanding people's emotional orientations to the prospect of engaging in reasoned disagreement.

2.4. Summary

Our aim was to choose ideas and well-established instrumentation that could be used to outline some basic elements of how people regard the project of arguing with one another. All three research programs have generated very large numbers of associated constructs and behavioral observations that may suggest what next steps might be interesting for researchers concentrating one or more nations. Together, these instruments yield insights into people's motivations, understandings, and feelings regarding interpersonal arguing. So these were the measures we carried from the U.S. into a number of other nations.

3. Results of Our Investigations

I am summarizing the results from a number of separate studies, and the original papers can be inspected for details that I am omitting here. The same self-report instruments were used throughout the studies (often with translation). The original response scales varied (e.g., $1 - 5$, 1- 7), but all the data have been converted to a $1 - 10$ metric here, to make comparisons simpler. I am reporting data on Chile (Spanish; Santibáñez & Hample, 2015), Portugal (Portuguese; Hample, Lewinski, Sàágua, & Mohammed, 2015),

southern China (Mandarin; Xie, Hample, & Wang, in press), the United Arab Emirates (Arabic and English; Rapanta & Hample, 2015), India (English; Hample & Anagondahalli, 2015), Malaysia (Malay and English; Waheed & Hample, 2016), and the U.S. (English; Hample & Irions, 2015). The India investigation also contains a sample of U.S. adults, which will be reported separately from the undergraduate sample in Hample and Irions.

The measures used here are those already discussed: argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and taking conflict personally. In spite of similar publication dates, the projects developed over a period of years, a time in which some of the U.S. instrumentation was still under development. We also made some different decisions about what to measure in the earlier projects. Therefore, some of the constructs are missing for several of the nations. Nonetheless, there are substantial grounds for comparison among countries.

My summary is divided into three parts, each focusing on a separate question of interest. The first is perhaps the most obvious: How do nations compare on their typical responses for each construct? We will answer this question by simply comparing national means on each instrument. The second question is, Do different nations have the same connections among the constructs? This is a theoretically deeper question than the first. It involves seeing if the variables relate to one another in the same or different ways. These construct dynamics will be studied by reporting correlations among the instruments. The third issue was not an original focus, but results have pressed it upon us. The question is, Do nations display the same sex differences? We will compare scores for men and women in each nation.

3.1. National Averages

The first issue is whether the nations have noticeably different scores on the various measures. I will report data separately for the three categories of measures: motivations, frames, and TCP.

The motivations data (argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness) are reported in Table 1. The table shows considerable variability in national means. Avoidance of arguing was lowest in Chile and Portugal, and the other nations had higher but comparable scores. Approach motivations were highest for Chile, Portugal, and India, with other nations lower but gener-

ally similar to one another. Antisocial verbal aggressiveness was lowest in Chile, Portugal, and among U.S. adults, and these scores were clearly different from those in most of the other samples. Prosociality was somewhat lower in Chile, Portugal, Malaysia, and among U.S. undergraduates. Since a 1 – 10 scale has a theoretical midpoint of 5.5, we can see that all the nations were higher than the midpoint on argument-approach and prosociality, and that antisocial verbal aggressiveness and argument avoidance were middling or lower. Chilean respondents, compared to other nations, tended to have higher argument-approach scores (and lower argument-avoid ones), and to be relatively lower on both subscales of verbal aggressiveness. It is worth noting, because we will see it again, that Chile and Portugal had similar national profiles on these measures.

Table 1. National Averages for Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggressiveness.

	Chile	US Univ	Portugal	China	UAE	Malaysia	India Adults	US Adults
Arg-Avoid	**3.74**	5.77	**3.74**	5.31	5.60	5.86	6.22	5.71
Arg-Apprch	**6.66**	5.76	**6.78**	5.91	6.09	5.72	**6.66**	5.27
VA-antisoc	**3.91**	4.58	**3.04**	7.38	4.68	5.50	5.70	**3.77**
VA-prosoc	**6.42**	6.36	**6.40**	7.38	6.74	**5.97**	6.75	6.60

Our second comparison of national averages concerns argument frames. Table 2 reports the results, and these also show noticeable differences from nation to nation on their citizens' immediate understandings of the goals, personal connections, and nature for interpersonal arguing. Some of the instruments were not yet finalized in the U.S. when we did these studies, and therefore a few results are missing for Chile and China. The first four measures reflect the salience of the personal goals for arguing: utility, identity, dominance, and play. Here, we see that Chile had unusually high sensitivity to the identity and play goals, but was relatively low for dominance. Portugal, which will prove to parallel Chile throughout these analyses, had low scores for utility. Chileans, in other words, oriented most clearly to positive social goals (identity display and play) and had less

interest in aggressive goals (dominance, and perhaps utility). The second group of frames concerns how people expect interpersonal relationships to be expressed while arguing. Chileans were higher than other nations for both cooperation and civility. Portugal was somewhat low for blurting. This suggests that interpersonal arguing in Chile tends to be cooperative and pleasant. We did not collect data on the third frame, professional contrast, in Chile. Here we see that the most sophisticated understandings of face-to-face arguing appeared in Portugal and Malaysia. Given its frequent parallels to Portugal and its high scores on cooperation and civility, I would project a high level of reflective awareness about arguing in Chile. In sum, arguing in Chile appears to be well conducted socially, with little evidence that hostile derailments would be common.

Table 2. National Averages for Argument Frames.

	Chile	US Univ	Portu-gal	China	UAE	Malay-sia	India	US Adults
Utility	--	5.32	5.14	--	5.09	6.27	6.56	5.16
Identity	**7.55**	6.57	**6.90**	6.36	5.79	**7.21**	**6.95**	6.17
Domin	**3.98**	4.44	**3.92**	**3.97**	4.12	4.75	6.13	4.18
Play	**5.49**	4.44	**5.52**	4.80	4.33	**6.33**	**6.07**	3.92
Blurt	--	5.11	4.20	--	5.03	5.41	6.42	5.17
Coop	**7.85**	6.83	**7.76**	**8.05**	6.76	6.88	7.13	6.99
Civility	**7.23**	6.26	**7.82**	5.24	5.72	6.18	5.70	6.04
Prof	--	6.29	8.09	6.93	6.51	7.23	6.91	6.69

The final set of results regarding national averages concerns taking conflict personally, which we did not measure in Chile. Results are in Table 3. There, we can see that the lowest levels of personalization (direct personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reactions) were found in Portugal, China, the U.S. undergraduates, and the United Arab Emirates. The most pessimistic expectations about relational consequences (positive and nega-

tive relational effects) were in Portugal and the U.S. adult sample. Finally, the nation with the most positive valence for engaging in interpersonal conflicts was Portugal, though we should notice that no nation had an average valence score as high as the theoretical midpoint of the scale, 5.5.

Table 3. National Averages for Taking Conflict Personally.

	Chile	US Univ	Portu-gal	China	UAE	Malay-sia	India	US Adults
Direct	--	5.82	**4.78**	**4.57**	5.15	5.85	5.98	5.82
Persec	--	**4.59**	**4.15**	4.91	5.16	5.65	6.08	4.94
Stress	--	**5.70**	5.24	**5.55**	**5.59**	5.09	**5.75**	4.93
PosRel	--	6.02	**5.11**	6.59	6.04	5.79	6.12	**5.41**
NegRel	--	6.06	**6.78**	4.83	6.19	6.05	**6.59**	**6.85**
Valence	--	4.12	**5.28**	**4.99**	4.69	**5.03**	**5.01**	3.78

What can we say about Chile's average scores? Chilean respondents were relatively eager to engage in arguments, and were low in both avoidance and antisocial impulses. They showed high sensitivity to identity displays, and fully expected cooperation and civility in their face-to-face arguments. Overall, this is a constructive profile that suggests that interpersonal arguing in Chile is more pleasant and constructive than in most other nations studied here.

3.2. National Correlations

Our second main issue is whether our constructs have the same dynamics in each nation. This is an important question, because we often have theoretical expectations that two constructs will move in parallel to one another, move in opposite directions, or be essentially irrelevant to one another. This is basic conceptual material for building causal theories of how various argument understandings and behaviors will be related to one another. Conceptually, we have two distinct possibilities. The first is that the variables are inherently connected regardless of culture because these

matters are so fundamental to human social experience that everyone everywhere participates in the same causal system. The second possibility is that different countries connect these constructs differently because their national cultures differentially shape how people understand the activity of interpersonal arguing.

For the most part, each nation had correlations among the constructs that were recognizably similar. Rather than ask readers to examine many tables of essentially null differences, I refer you to the original papers for these details. Instead, I want to concentrate here on the clearest divergence that we found. This is a fundamental difference from country to country, and I believe it necessitates a re-theorizing of some basic ideas, both in the U.S. and throughout the world. That difference concerns the correlations between argument-approach and argument-avoid, and the correlations between the antisocial and prosocial subscales of verbal aggressiveness. The correlations are in Table 4. There, readers will see that data from several other nations have been added to our own results. German correlations are from Blickle (1995), Suzuki and Rancer (1994) provided the Japanese data, and the Turkey results were taken from Croucher *et al.* (2013).

As I mentioned earlier, the originating theories for both constructs postulated that the subscales would be opposites. In fact, they are scored that way – data for one subscale will often be reverse-scored to get one total and one measure of internal consistency. Statistically, this means that the correlation between argument-approach and argument-avoid should be negative and very large, and similarly for prosocial and antisocial. The idea, which has always seemed sensible to Americans, is that a person who approaches arguing will not avoid it, and a person who is antisocial will not also be prosocial.

As Table 4 shows, the U.S.-expected results appear for the U.S., Germany, China, Portugal, Japan, and Turkey. However, they did not appear for Chile, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, or India. In the case of Chile, the correlations were negative, but not nearly large enough in magnitude to justify the conclusion that the subscales are opposites. In the U.A.E., Malaysia, and India, the correlations were actually positive, definitely indicating that the subscales were not measuring opposite impulses in those nations. So for one set of nations, we see approach/avoid oppositions for both arguing and verbal aggressiveness. For another group of countries we do not.

Table 4. Correlations Between Subscales of Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggressiveness.

	Arg Approach-Avoid	VA antisocial-prosocial
US Undergraduates	-.35	-.31
US Adults	-.54	-.43
Germany	-.64	--
China	-.40	-.31
Portugal	-.34	-.21
Japan	-.34	-.24
Turkey	-.31	--
Chile	**-.16**	**-.16**
UAE	**.02**	**.15**
Malaysia	**.16**	**.20**
India	**.17**	**.27**

From my American vantage point, the second group of countries is the one that indicates a need to re-theorize these basic constructs. Engagement in argument or *ad hominem* attacks is not the result of conflicting impulses in those nations. Instead, it appears that in those nations the motivations to argue or to generate personal attacks are the sum of the two impulses. This suggests that we think about an idea like total motivational energy rather than subtracted motivational differences. Reasoning originating from entirely different considerations produced a suggestion of this sort in Hamilton and Hample (2011). There, we found with U.S. data that the sums of approach and avoid or of prosocial and antisocial explained various other results.

I have made some effort to connect these varying correlations to other potentially relevant constructs, in hopes of finding clues. I looked to two sources: Hofstede's (2001; http://geert-hofstede.com) studies of national values, and another project that measures world values and attitudes, the World Values Survey (Welzel, 2013; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp).

My thought was to correlate the coefficients in Table 4 with relevant-

seeming values results. All the nations could not be included, but enough had results in either the Hofstede or WVS projects to produce some hints. Hofstede's power distance construct reflects the degree to which people are comfortable with power and status differences in society. The correlation between national averages for power difference and the coefficients in Table 4 was r = .73 for the argumentativeness subscales, and r = .70 for the verbal aggressiveness measures. So the more accepting people were of status differences, the more the approach and avoid impulses were positively associated. This seems to imply that docility in the face of superiority/subordination differences permits people to have approach and avoid impulses that do not contradict one another. I did a similar thing with the most recent WVS measure of equality. This is an "emancipation" measure related to self-expression and self-determination. The correlation between national scores on equality and the argumentativeness correlations was r = -.71, and the correlations between equality and the verbal aggressiveness associations was r = -.82. So the more a nation valued equality, the more starkly it saw the oppositions between approach and avoidance. This is very roughly consistent with the power distance results. Therefore one clue about the U.S.-unexpected correlations in Table 4 is that the oppositions between approach and avoid seem to appear in nations that are egalitarian, and to evaporate in nations that accept clear status differences across society. I am not sure why this should be so, but the empirical results are so marked that we should pursue these ideas.

Thinking about sums rather than differences for these pairs of scales is only one suggestion, although I do not have any others at this point. Two things are quite clear, however. One is that we need to re-theorize the argument motivation system from its most basic foundations. The other conclusion is that people in different nations have distinct motivational systems for arguing. I am open to the possibility that we may need separate motivational theories for every culture, or perhaps for distinguishable groups of them. Such a project will proceed far more effectively if people who live in those other nations take the lead on this empirical and theoretical project, instead of having it directed by people who find another culture's motivational system to be natural.

3.3. Sex Differences

Biological sex is a fundamental social category. It is one of the first things we notice about another person and is a basic construct in dealing with others. For nearly everyone, it is a core part of self-concept. It also affects the standard socialization practices for children in different societies. In the U.S. clear and consistent patterns of sex differences have appeared for all of our constructs. We can summarize those patterns by saying that men are more aggressive and women are more nurturing and sensitive. So we find men, compared to women, more inclined to approach arguments, be antisocial, and endorse nearly any goal for arguing. Women are more cooperative and perceptive about the social implications of arguing, but also feel more uncomfortable and stressed by interpersonal conflict.

But by now, readers should realize that we should not have expected these same patterns to appear everywhere in the world. We analyzed sex differences for all our constructs in our original research reports, and readers can inspect those papers for the details of the sex differences we found or did not discover. The sex differences we actually found almost always conformed to the U.S. pattern. If there were differences, the men were more aggressive and the women were more perceptive, pleasant, or stressed. Here I think a more global analysis will reveal the key points. I simply counted how many sex differences we found in each nation. As many as 18 constructs were measured in the various nations, and I recorded the percentage of sex differences we found. Those results are in Table 5.

What Table 5 immediately shows is that sex differences are much more marked in some countries than others. Chile and the U.S. have the most contrast between men and women, followed by China. Sex differences are relatively rare in Portugal, Malaysia, and the U.A.E., and completely disappear in India.

To explain this, I returned to the World Values Survey and its equality measure. I expected those nations with greater commitment to equality to be the ones with the fewest sex differences. I found the opposite result, and it was dramatically opposite to what I was expecting. The correlation between the percentages in Table 5 and those nations' equality averages was

$r = .96$. In other words, the more a nation agreed that men and women are equal, the more clearly distinct the sexes were on our measures.

Table 5. Percentages of Sex Differences in Each Nation.

	Percentage of Sex Differences
Chile	67
US University	83
US Adults	67
China	44
Portugal	22
Malaysia	22
United Arab Emirates	11
India	0

Puzzled, I asked colleagues for help. David Godden relayed to me the suggestion of his wife, Robyn Bluhm (both are philosophy professors at Michigan State University). She suggested I consider the results and arguments of Bradley and Charles (2009). They studied men and women's choice of university majors in 44 nations. Some majors tend to be sex-typed: men are drawn to engineering and women to education, for instance. They found that women chose sex-typed majors more often in Western nations than in others. Western nations, of course, are usually those in the vanguard of women's rights and sexual equality. But those are the very countries in which women concentrated themselves in traditionally feminine fields of study. Their study needs to be read in detail, but a gross summary of their conclusion is that in countries where women had freer choices, they enrolled in majors that expressed or reflected their femininity rather than an aggressive insistence on equality. Bradley and Charles say that egalitarianism and self-expression permit and encourage a culture's traditional gender-essentialist stereotypes to be individually exhibited.

Our patterns of differences for arguing more or less match Bradley and Charles' results for educational choices. The nations that intuitively seem to be least Western (Malaysia, the U.A.E., and India) are those with the

fewest sex differences. China is intermediate. Chile is the only nation in Table 5 that really conforms to the U.S. pattern. This is all very tentative, of course, but it suggests again the need to theorize beyond the results and assumptions taken for granted in the U.S.

4. Conclusions

Our research program points to several conclusions regarding interpersonal arguing. Most obviously, we found many nation-to-nation differences. At the most general level, this was not especially surprising. But the particular differences we found were rarely expected, partly because of the paucity of this sort of research in other nations. We found differences in average scores that were large enough that they do not immediately suggest that they appeared because of sampling error or translation peculiarities. We discovered a fundamental difference in how argument motivations work in various parts of the world. And we observed clear differences in the degree to which men and women understand arguing differently from nation to nation. These national differences need to be pursued by scholars in nations other than the U.S. Perhaps our clearest general conclusion is that it will be a mistake if the argumentation community continues to leave the theory of interpersonal arguing solely in American hands. I personally found many of our results to be surprising and am still not confident that I understand why all of them occurred. Local scholars with immediate intuitive insight into their own national culture need to take a strong hand in developing local theories of interpersonal arguing.

Our results also suggest some characterizations of Chilean arguing, compared to arguing elsewhere. Arguing in Chile was seen as an unusually positive experience. Chilean respondents had low avoidance and high approach motivations for having arguments on the merits of a case. They had comparatively little instinctive interest in *ad hominem* attacks. They were quite cooperative and had a clear expectation that arguments will be civil. This is a constructive national profile. Chilean scholars might productively interrogate their own culture to try to find explanations for Chile's comparatively constructive motivations and understandings of interpersonal arguing.

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