THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN THE GENESIS OF KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY[1]

Bruno Bueno Poli
brunopolibueno@gmail.com
PUC- São Paulo

Abstract: *The issue of determining the factors that motivated Kant's critical turn in 1769-70 is a historical one. There have been at least ten different theses put forward on this matter. In this paper, we aim to provide a detailed examination of one of these theses, specifically Klaus Reich's proposal that the mind-body problem was one motivator. We approach this by first outlining the fundamental premises underlying studies of Kant's critical turn and explaining our chosen methodology, a developmental account (Entwiklungsgeschichte). Next, we offer a brief contextualization of the mind-body problem, tracing its origins to Descartes' metaphysical dualism. We describe the set of premises that give rise to this problem and introduce the theories that emerged in early 18th-century German philosophy as attempts to address it, namely, pre-established harmony and physical influx. Finally, we delve into Kant's pre-critical works to demonstrate how two major premises connected to the mind-body problem develop in these earlier writings, ultimately leading to their resolution in Kant's critical turn, as evident in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770: dualism and the spatiality of the soul.*

Keywords: *Kant, mind-body problem, physical influx, critical turn, pre-established harmony.*

1 This work was funded by FAPESP, process n. 2022/12074-8.

1. Introduction

The objective of this paper is to defend the hypothesis that the Mind-Body Problem (MBP, hereafter) influenced Kant's critical turn, something suggested but not developed by Klaus Reich (1958, p. XIV-XV). The paper will be structured into three main parts: the first will provide an overview of the theoretical framework of our work, including its premises and methodology. The second section will examine the historical-philosophical context in which this hypothesis holds significance. The third section will present an analysis of Kant's development to support and defend our thesis.

Our hypothesis posits the existence of something referred to in Kantian literature as the *critical turn* (*Umwälzung*). This event is typically dated to occur around 1769-70. While there are varying interpretations of how to characterize this phenomenon, with some viewing it as a series of breakthroughs and others as one singular transformation, a substantial number of scholars, following the German tradition initiated by Kuno Fischer (Fischer, 2010 [1858]), concur that there is indeed a *turn* around this period. If one accepts this as a premise, then two further questions arise: (a) What did the *turn* consist of? and (b) What factors influenced Kant to undertake it? The former can be addressed by examining the two primary new theses introduced in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770), namely, the ideality and subjectivity of space and time (ISST), and the distinction of nature between two different faculties, sensibility and understanding (SENS-UND), opposed to its logical distinction, as was the case in Leibniz and Wolff.

The latter question has sparked numerous debates in the literature, and, to the best of our knowledge, there are at least nine different theses, excluding Reich's, supported by various authors. Some argue that a specific problem prompted Kant's critical turn, such as the antinomies (Riehl, 1876, p. 272-3; Erdmann, 1878, p. LXXXVI), the conflict between the grounds of knowledge (Tonelli, 1963, p. 369), or the foundations of mathematics (Fischer, 1869, p. 305). Others propose that a particular author was the decisive factor, for instance, Hume (Paulsen, 1875, p. 126) or Leibniz (Windelband, 1880, p. 37). Finally, some endorse a combination of both, considering factors like the antinomies and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (Cassirer, 1907, p. 491; Vaihinger, 1892, p. 531), the antinomies and Hume (Ertl, 2002, p. 618; Kreimendahl, 1990, p. 5; Kuehn, 1983, p. 185), the antinomies and ancient philosophy (Wundt, 1924, p. 164), and the antinomies and Spinozism (Heimsoeth, 1956, p. 118; 1984, p. 217).

As one can see from this enumeration, the most accepted thesis, though presented in distinct ways, suggests that the antinomies played a central role in influencing Kant. This is not fortuitous but has its grounds in some references that Kant himself made about his own development (see R5037 AA 18: 69; AA 12: 257-8; AA 4: 338). The latest contribution to this hypothesis is the one by Kreimendahl, Kuehn, and Ertl, which delves into the specific connections between the antinomies and Hume. Kant explicitly acknowledges in the *Prolegomena* that Hume played a decisive role in his own intellectual development (AA 4:

260). Consequently, the challenge arises of establishing the linkage between the antinomies and Hume. The three authors attempt to demonstrate that Kant likely encountered the antinomies *via* Hume, thereby suggesting that the reference to both is one and the same (Ertl, 2002, p. 618; Kreimendahl, 1990, p. 5; Kuehn, 1983, p. 185). They support this argument by asserting that Section 1.4.7. of Hume's *Treatise* contained references to something akin to the antinomies (contradictions between principles of reason), that it was translated into German by Hamann, and was probably read by Kant in 1769, thus influencing the critical turn of 1769-70 (Kreimendahl, 1990, p. 191-2).

This layer of Kant's self-reference is absent in the hypotheses presented by Fischer, Windelband, Paulsen, Tonelli, partially in the works of Wundt and Heimsoeth, in that of Reich, and in our defense. In all of these instances, these authors attempt to demonstrate, through a genetic approach, how some specific problem or philosopher influenced Kant throughout his philosophical development leading up to the critical turn, showing that these would be a sufficient condition to explicate it. This method is often referred to as *Entwicklungsgeschichte* or *developmental analysis*[2]. As Dieter Henrich (1965, p. 253) suggests, it is hermeneutical tool, and when applied to Kant, it aims to reconstruct his intellectual development from his initial work, *Living Forces* (1747), through the *Inaugural Dissertation* (1770) and beyond, seeking to interpret the latter within the context of the former. This is the method we will employ here, but with one addition: to fully understand the MBP in Kant's development, it is essential to comprehend his philosophical background related to this problem, something Henrich noted was lacking in the strict genetic approach. Without this understanding, Kant's various responses to the MBP would remain incomprehensible. For example, questions such as why Kant believes that substances are monads with powers or why he accepts certain, to us, peculiar causal theories as contenders in this debate, like physical influx and pre-established harmony, would lack meaning. With this perspective in mind, we must trace the origins of the problem back to Descartes and the beginnings of 18th-century German philosophy.

Our paper will serve several purposes. Firstly, it aims to partially address the void in the literature recently highlighted by Falkenburg, who lamented that "Reich's sketchy proposal for an interpretation of Kant's development [...] has unfortunately never been followed up in detail by other leading Kant scholars" (Falkenburg, 2020, p. 113). Secondly, if successful, our study will underscore the value of the developmental account, showing that Kant's self-reference documents constitute just one layer of possible evidence supporting the various hypotheses. Thirdly, since we will show that a metaphysical (and, as we will see, ethical) problem, has directly influenced critical philosophy, our work somewhat aligns with metaphysical and ontological interpretations of Kant3. Finally, it is crucial to clarify

2 For the English term, see Allison (2020).

3 E.g., F. Paulsen, N. Hartmann, H. Heimsoeth, G. Martin, M. Wundt.

that our thesis does not seek to refute, for instance, the influence of the antinomies and Hume on Kant. On the contrary, we contend that Kant's critical turn was likely shaped by a combination of various problems, which are related in a conjunction (*x* and *y* and *z*…) rather than an exclusive disjunction (*x* or *y* or *z*…)4. This implies that even if our study proves successful, it will complement rather than contradict the recent thesis developed by Kreimendahl, Kuehn, and Ertl.

2. The Mind-Body Problem and Its Canonical Solutions

In its classical form, the MBP can be traced back to Descartes with the introduction of substantial dualism. Substantial dualism posits that there are only two fundamental types of entities in the world: *res cogitans*, characterized by the attribute of thought, and *res extensa*, characterized by extension (*Principia* II.8, 53, 56 AT 9-2:28, 48, 49). All their specific manifestations, some particular thought, as, for example, the sensation of the brightness of the monitor in which I am writing, or the monitor's shape and size, are modes of these completely heterogeneous substances. The question that emerges, and one which was initially raised to Descartes by figures like Gassendi (AT, VII: 344) and Princess Elisabeth (AT, III: 661), is how these two substances can interact causally with each other.

Notice that, even when we take for granted that the problem should arise, it does so only under the implicit premise that can be termed *proportionality between cause and effe*ct. This premise stipulates that in any causal relation, the cause and effect must be qualitatively similar (see Crusius, *Entwurf* § 65, 73). This assumption will be a prevalent presupposition throughout the debate, not only in Germany but in modern philosophy as a whole5. Consequently, the mind-body problem can be analyzed into the assertion of three contradictory premises: (i) strict dualism; (ii) the requirement of proportionality between cause and effect; (iii) the claim that the mind and body do interact causally. Thus, its resolution must entail, at the very least, the negation of one or more of these premises.

Three canonical theories emerged as solutions to the MBP by the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th: occasionalism, pre-established harmony, and physical influx. Originally proposed by de La Forge and Cordemoy and later mostly associated with Malebranche, occasionalism was virtually absent in the 18th-century German-speaking philosophy (see Goldenbaum, 2021, p. 39; Dyck, forthcoming, p. 10). Hence, its discussion will be omitted here. The debate, therefore, predominantly centered around pre-established harmony and physical influx.

---

4 This is akin to the defense that there is not one critical turn but many of them that occur throughout time (see Hinske, 1970, p. 10-12, Zammito, 2002, p. 259-60, Trevisan, 2016, p. 440).

5 Historically speaking, what explains its wide acceptance is the fact that modern physics seemed to demand it, especially in the early days of mechanism, where change was supposed to be explained only by contact (not by force, as was later going to be the case with Newtonianism).

We can summarize pre-established harmony with three premises: (a) substances are active; (b) there is no *inter*-substantial but only *intra*-substantial causality, meaning substances do not act upon each other but only upon themselves; (c) God created substances in such a way that there is a harmony in their states. This theory was initially introduced by Leibniz within the context of his monadology, a dynamic metaphysical system where substances are referred to as monads. Monads are entities with only representational states and the inherent power to change them autonomously (see *Specimen* GM, VI, pp. 235-6; *Système nouveau* GP, IV, p. 472; *De ipsa natura* GP, IV, p. 505; *Theodicy* GP, VI, pp. 149-50; *Monadology* GP, VI, pp. 608-9). Physical bodies, in their turn, are grounded in the representational states of monads and are not fundamentally real. Using his analogy provided to Foucher (GP. IV, p. 498), Leibniz compares all monads to clocks that, operating independently, display the same time, synchronization of which is established by God on creation (*De ipsa natura* GP, IV, p. 510). Thus, Leibniz rejects premises (i), strict dualism, and (iii), which concerns causal interaction, not just between mind and body, but among substances in general. Leibniz's version of pre-established harmony was widely discussed across Europe, and it would later be discussed in the German-speaking world through Christian Wolff's version.

Physical influx can be summarized as a theory that asserts (a), akin to pre-established harmony, that substances are active, and (b') that there is *inter*-substantial causality – varying among authors whether *inter*-substancial is combined with *intra*-substancial causality. Within the context of 18th-century German philosophy, there were two groups of proponents of physical influx: the anti-Wolffian Pietists, who primarily advocated the theory to circumvent what they perceived as moral issues associated with pre-established harmony (Joachim Lange, Rüdiger, Hoffmann, and Crusius), and the Leibniz-Wolffians, who developed a theoretical approach for defending the theory (such as Gottsched and Knutzen). Kant, positioned between both parties, supported physical influx from the very onset of his philosophical career, extending this position until the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and beyond.

3. The Mind-Body Problem in Kant's Development

In Kant's first published work, the *Living Forces* (1747), three main features related to the MBP can be identified. First, Kant supports physical influx (AA 01: 20). Secondly, Kant upholds the spatiality of the soul (AA 01: 21), something which was not a novelty to 18th-century German philosophy but also endorsed by figures like Knutzen (SC §37), Baumgarten (M §§ 398-9), and Crusius (*Entwurf* §§402, 431) as a means of addressing the MBP. Finally, Kant advocates a form of monism in order to oppose Wolffian metaphysical dualism (AA 1: 17). He posits that all substances are endowed with the same force (*vis activa*), allowing them to interact through an *indeterminate* action. Given his monist stance, thought and movement, or *soul* and *body*, are considered appearances of this more fundamental force, which, in itself, is neither of them (Nierhaus, 1962, p. 17; Tonelli, 1959, p. 14; see also Bueno Poli

y Porta, 2022, pp. 30-31). Kant thus aligns here from a systematical standpoint with double-aspect metaphysical theories, such as Spinoza's (see Skrbina, 2013, pp. 230-7). Within this framework, Kant rejects strict dualism to avoid the heterogeneity between mind and body while accepting the proportionality between cause and effect and the mind-body causal interaction.

In the 1750s, three main works coalesce into a unified whole: *Universal History* (1755), *Physical Monadology* (1756), and *New Elucidation* (1755). In the third chapter of *Universal History*, Kant asserts:

> Despite the infinite distance [*des unendlichen Abstandes*] between the capacity to think and the motion of matter, between the reasoning mind and the body, it is nonetheless certain that the human being, who derives all his concepts and ideas from the impressions the universe stimulates in his soul through his body, depends totally on the constitution of this matter to which the creator has bound him for both their clarity as well as the skill to connect and compare them, which we call the faculty to think. (AA 01: 355)

Kant appears to introduce not only a form of dualism involving the "infinite distance" between mind and body (Schmucker, 1961, p. 33; Forschner, 1974, p. 36; Nierhaus, 1962) but also to assert a complete dependence of the soul's representational states on its own body. Why would Kant shift from the monist perspective of the *Living Forces* to the dualist perspective in *Universal History*?

Goldenbaum (2021, p. 47) recently suggested that, in the *Living Forces*, Kant is already dealing with what she calls the *Pietistic problem*, namely, one of the MBP's moral strands, of how mechanism can be reconciled with freedom. This, however, is ungrounded, because the work of 1747 does not contain any reference at all to moral problems. Thus, one can speculate, but cannot be sure about it. Moral problems related to the MBP appear to Kant for the first time in *Universal History*, and the answer to why he introduces dualism seems to be rooted in his insistence on the immortality of the soul, though he does not present arguments to support it (see AA 01: 321-2, 367). If the soul was just a phenomenon of a more indeterminate force, as was the case in the *Living Forces*, to say that it is immortal in the usual sense of preserving an identity of its representational states would be at least strange because these are not real in their own right. Thus, active force could perhaps be preserved, but not its representational states. With dualism, this picture changes in that representations are fundamental. Since *Universal History* already hints at an ethics that is realized in the transcendent world (Schmucker, 1962, p. 39, 49), the distinction between soul and body seems to be aimed at ensuring that "the immortal spirit, liberated from dependence on finite things and in the company of the infinite being, will find the enjoyment of true happiness" (AA 01: 322; see Polonoff, 1973, p. 132; Nierhaus, 1962, p. 44; Wundt, 1924, p. 116) However,

these ideas are somewhat vague in *Universal History*, and it is not entirely clear what Kant's precise conception of soul and body is at this stage since they cannot be just manifestations of a more fundamental force anymore.

The *Physical Monadology* (1756) provides us with further insights into Kant's metaphysical stance at this point. This work introduces a theory of matter, marking the first time Kant explicitly aligns with the monadological tradition rooted in Leibniz. The *Physical Monadology* holds two central elements concerning the MBP: first, Kant characterizes substances as monads, subsistent and simple entities possessing both internal and external determinations (AA 01: 481). Second, the *vis activa* of the *Living Forces* is dissected into two distinct physical forces: the force of repulsion (impenetrability) and the force of attraction (AA 01: 482, 483-4). Kant clarifies that external determinations are grounded on both forces, and stand for relational, spatial, and dynamic properties. However, the internal properties remain somewhat obscure within this context, being merely described as "the subject of the external determinations" (AA 01: 481).

In the *New Elucidation* we receive confirmation that at least some of these internal properties are perceptions and thus mental states (AA 01: 411-12), and Kant now appears to attribute substances with an internal, representational force (AA 01: 415). This implies that all monads are, in a way, psycho-physical compounds, endowed with two kinds of forces and determinations. Therefore, when considering Kant's concept of the soul at this stage, it appears to be an *embodied soul*, which of course implies that the spatiality of the soul is retained from *Living Forces* (Svare, 2006; Sytnik-Czetwertyński, 2013; Shell, 1996). In the *New Elucidation*, Kant also introduces a novel defense of physical influx, positing that monads interact through the forces of repulsion and attraction, which, in turn, dictate the behavior of the representational force. This means that if we suppose two kinds of substances, *a* and *b*, and two kinds of forces, *fa* and *fb*, their interaction would not follow the causal scheme of "*fa* causing state *x* in *b*", but rather "*fa* modifying/activating *fb* to cause state *x* in *b*". More specifically, if *fa* is a physical force, *x* is a representation, and *fb* is a force of representation, the result would be "*fa* modifying/activating *fb* to cause representation *x* in *b*". This aligns with the ideas already advocated in Knutzen's and Crusius' versions of physical influx6 and it is a way to maintain some form of strict dualism – at the level of substantial forces– while also preserving the proportionality between cause and effect.

In summary then, the theory from the 1750s suggests that substances possess both forces of representation (the immediate grounds for internal determinations and perceptions) and physical forces, such as repulsion and attraction (the immediate grounds for external determinations and spatial relations). Physical influx signifies that substances interact with each other through these physical forces, which determine the changes in perceptions produced by the representational forces.

---

6 See SC §44, and *Gewissheit*, §79, 81.

There are two problems with this theory. First, in the *New Elucidation*, Kant reiterates the claimed dependency of the soul on its body as presented in the *Universal History*. He states, then, that the theory

> we have adduced may be suspected of wrong-headedness on account of the indissolubility of the connection with which the human soul is thus bound with matter in carrying out its internal functions of thought, a view which seems not that remote from the pernicious opinion of the materialists (AA 01: 412).

This indissoluble connection renders *Universal History*'s defense of the immortality of the soul incomprehensible, for how could the soul retain some kind of representational state in the afterlife if it depends on matter? Thus, for reasons other than the ones from *Living Forces*, the theory presented in the 1750's also does not cope well with this premise. Second, although Kant defends dualism, it is not entirely clear whether he can articulate it coherently. If every substance is simple, possesses internal and external/spatial properties, and is endowed with the same forces, it seems that there is a lack of distinguishing criteria between the soul and the body. More specifically, although Kant introduced dualism, he is unable to distinguish both substances because he preserves the spatial nature of the soul, namely, that it is endowed with physical forces and properties. From the point of view of both problems, the soul maintains an excessively close connection to the natural world. What follows in the 1760s is a progressive development and deepening of this dualism to avoid this consequence.

The first thing we observe in the *Preisschrift* (1762-4) is an acknowledgment of the criteria deficiency: "I admit that the proof we have in our possession for establishing that the soul is not matter is a good one. *But take care that you do not infer from this that the soul is not of a material nature*" (AA 02: 293 [emphasis added]). In this context, that the soul is *not matter* simply means that it is *a non-composite being*. However, being a non-composite entity does not necessarily imply that it is not material in nature. As he says in *Herder Metaphysics'* (1762-4), one must inquire: "is the soul a material or immaterial monad? Without this difference, the simple soul could be a body monad" (AA 28: 47). Kant now explicitly introduces the distinction between material and immaterial monads, which, in the theory of the 1750s, was at best implied.

In another passage, he also clarifies *why* this could pose a problem:

> Question: the soul is a simple substance; is it, nevertheless, present in space in the same way as a simple part of the body under the laws of impenetrability? Response: in that case it would suffer 1) its freedom, which is determined internally; and it would then be determined materially by other [things]. Therefore, my soul is an apart being [*Meine Seele ist also ein apartes Wesen*] (AA 28: 145).

The conclusion that the soul is a being apart (from the material world) hinges on the underlying assumption that the soul is free. Kant reiterates this later, stating, "freedom therefore removes the soul from the ranks of all other corporeal beings [*Die Freiheit nimt* [sic] *also die Seele aus der Reihe aller andern körperlichen Wesen*]" (AA 28: 147). Already endorsed within the context of the *New Elucidation* (AA 01: 399-402) 7, freedom here is spontaneity (see AA 28: 100). As in the original Leibnizian sense (see *Theodicy* GP, VI p. 288, p. 296), to say that some action is *spontaneous* is to say that it is determined by reasons internal to the agent itself and not external – if they are external, the action is *coerced* (GP, VII, p.108). For instance, an action *x* of the will is spontaneous if and only if the determining element *a* is internal to the agent, such as a clear representation that something is good, and not external, such as someone threatening the agent to perform the action. Thus, Kant is saying that if we consider the soul to have a material nature, it would be incapable of determining its own states independently (it would not be spontaneous), and, as he suggests, it would be subject to coercion due to the influence of the laws of impenetrability (physical laws). Within the metaphysical framework of the *Herder Metaphysics*, which closely resembles the ideas of the 1750s, being determined by the laws of impenetrability implies being endowed with physical forces such as repulsion (impenetrability) and attraction, which grounds the presence of monads in space.

Two key points can be observed here: firstly, Kant makes evident that dualism is, at least in part, endorsed for moral reasons. This dualism is not only related to the immortality of the soul but also to the concept of the soul's freedom, conceived as spontaneity at this point. Secondly, Kant says:

> the concept of spirit does not allow us to think of a cubic inch [*Cubickzoll*] of spirits: we should think of them [i.e., we would be able to think of them], however, if they occupied [*einnehmen*] space like the simple parts of bodies and thus formed an *extensum impenetrabile* (the internal state is not in question here, since we do not understand it in relation to matter either): If there are, then, spirits: then they could not be in space like this [*so können sie im Raum nicht so sein*] (AA 28: 145).

Through this thought experiment, Kant establishes that souls cannot be in space in the same way body monads are. If we assume that the soul is immaterial in nature, it must not be present in space through physical forces. Consequently, it becomes clear that if the soul is spatial, it must relate to space differently, particularly without relying on the force of repulsion and, therefore, impenetrability. This leads to the conclusion that there must be a distinct relationship between material and immaterial monads to space. The sole way in which the

---

7 See also Tonelli (1959, p. 140), Grillenzoni (2020, p. 78), Forschner (1974), Byrd (2006, p. 71), Insole (2013, p. 64-5), Schmucker (1961, p. 30), Allison (2020, p. 20).

soul can exist in space without violating its moral properties is by *actively occupying an area of space that other beings can penetrate* (AA 28: 146). Given the absence of alternative criteria for distinguishing between soul and body, this distinction appears also to be their specific difference. Thus, at this point, we have a further development of the dualism initially proposed in *Universal History* through the different relationships of bodies and souls to space. The problem that emerges now lies in the distinction between the epistemological access we have to the way bodies (impenetrability) and souls (penetrability) should be in space. The former is accessed through experience intuitively, while the latter just through concepts, symbolically (AA 28: 146).

This marks the starting point of the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766), in which Kant asks, as he described to Mendelssohn, "how is the soul present in the world, both to material natures and to others of their kind [?]" (AA 10: 72). There, he will reiterate the same line of reasoning presented in *Herder Metaphysics*. However, he will conclude that, while we can legitimately attribute the force of repulsion to bodies because it can be grounded in experience (AA 02: 322), *the soul's presence in the world cannot be based on any kind of force*. This is because there is no "immaterial" force related to space accessible through experience, and one also cannot derive it from the principle of identity, because the concept of force, being a causal relation, presupposes two *relata* that do not maintain an identity relation (AA 02: 322-3, 370). Since these are the only two epistemological grounds at this point in Kant's philosophical development, he establishes that any attempt to attribute a force to the soul's relation to the world will remain arbitrary (*willkürlich*) (AA 02: 333-4, 370).

This, nonetheless, does not imply that we cannot *think* about it, because the soul's activity "cannot be regarded as a known impossibility, precisely because the opposite is equally incomprehensible in its possibility" (AA 02: 323). If one cannot prove its contradiction, one can at least think about it. There are two relevant consequences to this, one of which is moral and the other theoretical. The moral significance aligns with the same reasons that will later apply in Kant's critical philosophy, namely, that even though the concept of the soul may be deemed ungrounded from a knowledge perspective, it can still hold ethical significance.

This is evident in the initial sketch of the concept of the intelligible world (*mundus intelligibilis*) delineated for the first time in the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. This concept is derived from the "highly hypothetical" (from a theoretical standpoint) concept of soul and spirit (AA 02: 333) and refers to a realm of immaterial, spontaneous (*selbstätig*) beings, "whose specific causal laws are termed pneumatics" and "that are closely connected with one another, perhaps forming a grand whole [...]" (AA 02: 329-30). Kant clarifies that "this community would not be based on the conditions which limit the relationship of bodies. It would be a community in which distance in space and separation in time, which constitute the great chasm in the visible world which cancels all community, would vanish." (AA 02: 332). He connects this concept to morals by suggesting that it could explain our moral sentiment (*sittliche Gefühl*): just as bodies are subject to specific physical laws by taking part

of the physical world, like the law of gravity, souls and spirits would be subject to a pneumatical law, e.g., the aspiration to align our individual will with the general will, by taking part in the intelligible world, something expressed through the moral sentiment (AA 02: 334-5)8. While the concept of the intelligible world is only probable, it is a fiction (*Erdichtung*) (AA 02: 352), but it is already here *necessary* for reason, as Tonelli (1974, p. 259) notes. This is why Kant mentions that even though we cannot make claims of knowledge about it, "questions concerning the spirit-nature, freedom, predestination, the future state, and such like, initially activate all the powers of the understanding […]" (AA 02: 369) and it instills in us a "hope for the future" (*Hoffnung der Zukunft*) (AA 02: 349-50).

On the other hand, from the strict theoretical perspective, what holds relevance is the very *fact* that the soul's activity in space can only be *thought* but *not intuited*. In conjunction with the fact that there is another phenomenon that can only be *intuited* but *not thought* or conceptually grasped – namely, the incongruent counterparts9– we are led to the conclusion that there are two distinct modes of representing things: one through concepts and the other through intuitions (see Reich, 1958, p. XV). If there are two different ways of representing things which are not reducible to each other, there must be, in the jargon of early modern philosophy, two faculties associated with it.

Upon reaching the *Inaugural Dissertation*, Kant introduces this differentiation through (SENS-UND), coupled with (ISST). This marks the pinnacle of Kant's dualism during the period being examined. While it indeed constitutes a form of strict dualism, it does not encompass primarily metaphysical dualism but rather an epistemological one (see AA 02: 392). Consequently, the treatment of the MBP is inevitably altered. At this juncture, it is not only that the soul, now conceived as a pure object of the understanding, is liberated from the constraints of nature in its spatiotemporal dimension, but *it also becomes meaningless to assert the spatiality of the soul*. Doing so would imply a confusion between the conditions of these two faculties. In Kant's own words, introducing (SENS-UND) resolves "those idle questions about the places in the corporeal universe of immaterial substances, [...] and about the seat of the soul" (AA 02: 414).

Finally, the concept of the intelligible world is preserved in the *Inaugural Dissertation*, but it appears to have shed the moral significance found in the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, resembling more closely its purely cosmological counterpart in the *New Elucidation*. However, when we examine some of Kant's Reflections from that period, we can see that he was still developing this connection, moving toward something that bears a clearer relationship to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (see R 4225 AA 17: 464; R4349 AA 17: 516).

---

8 He is of course being influenced by Rousseau (see Schmucker, 1961; Allison, 2020; Verlkley, 1989, pp. 108-9).

9 The incongruent counterpart's problem concerns the property of chirality, and it is exemplified by our inability to conceptually account for the distinction between, for instance, two opposing hands, a right and a left one, even though it can still be visually discerned (AA 02: 377-83).

4. Conclusion

The path we have followed is intended to demonstrate that the MBP has led especially to the defense of (SENS-UND). As illustrated, this can be substantiated by the mediation of two premises, namely, the spatiality of the soul and dualism. The former has been present in Kant's thought since its inception and became a central issue in the 1760s, while the latter is continuously reformulated from *Universal History* to the *Inaugural Dissertation*, taking on an epistemological form. If the soul occupies space in the same manner as physical bodies, it appears challenging to maintain at least two of its moral properties, namely, immortality and freedom. Conversely, if it is not spatial in the same sense as physical entities, one can perhaps preserve its moral properties, but there will be no theoretical grounds for asserting its spatial characteristics. However, when removed from the category of natural beings and considered as a pure object of the understanding, both issues are resolved. Since space and time are forms of sensibility, which, in the context of the *Inaugural Dissertation*, are entirely separate from the understanding, it becomes meaningless to inquire about the spatial conditions of an object whose nature cannot be subordinated to spatial conditions. Moreover, liberated from spatial constraints, the soul can retain its moral properties, albeit in the intelligible world, rather than the sensible one. Thus, we think one can claim that, in addressing and offering a solution to the MBP as it was posed in 18th century German philosophy, Kant's critical turn can be seen as being influenced by it.

If our exposition is accurate, then Reich's hypothesis is further substantiated. However, it is important to reiterate that this does not imply that the MBP was the sole problem influencing Kant's critical turn. Rather, as we stressed at the beginning of our presentation, it is our opinion that it played at least *some* role in it, most probably being combined with other motives, most notably the antinomies and Hume.

Bibliography:

Allison, H. E. (2020). *Kant's Conception of Freedom: A Developmental and Critical Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baumgarten, A. (1739/1743/1750). *Metaphysica*. Halae Magdeburg.

Byrd, J. (2008). Kant's Compatibilism in the New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition. *Kant-Studien*, 99(1), 68–79.

Cassirer, E. (1907). *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, Bd. 2. Berlin: Verlag von Bruno Cassirer.

Crusius, C. A. (1965-1987). *Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntnis* [Gewissheit]. In: *Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, Vol. 1-4.1*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Crusius, C. A. (1965-1987). *Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzt werden* [Entwurf]. In: *Die philosophischen Hauptwerke, Vol. 1-4.1*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.

Descartes, R. (1964–74). *Oeuvres de Descartes* [AT]. Ed., Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Vol 1-11. Paris: CNRS/Vrin.

Dyck, C. W. (forthcoming). *Power, Harmony, and Freedom: Debating Causation in 18th Century Germany*. In: Frederick Beiser, Brandon Look (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Eighteenth Century German Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.

Erdmann, B. (1878). *Einleitung zu Immanuel Kant's Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*. Hg. und historisch erklärt von B. E., p. I-CXIV. Leipzig.

Ertl, W. (2002). Hume's antinomy and Kant's critical turn. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 10(4), 617-631.

Falkenburg, B. (2020). *Kant's Cosmology: From the Pre-Critical System to the Antinomy of Pure Reason. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.*

Fischer, K. (1869). *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. Bd III. Kant's Vernunftkritik und deren Entstehung. 2*. rev. Aufl. Heidelberg: Verlagsbuchhandlung von Friedrich Bassermann.

Fischer, K. (2010). *Clavis Kantiana* (1858). Übers. und einl. von Schmitt, A. In: Busche, H. (Hrsg), *Kant als Bezugspunkt philosophischen Denkens: Festschrift für Peter Baumanns zum 75. Geburtstag*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Forschner, M. (1974). *Gesetz und Freiheit. Zum Problem der Autonomie bei I. Kant*. Salzburg: Verlagsbuchhandlung Anton Pustet.

Goldenbaum, U. (2021). *How Kant was Never a Wolffian, or Estimating Forces to Enforce Influxus Physicus*. In B. C. Look (Ed.), *Leibniz and Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Grillenzoni, P. (2020). Determinismus und Freiheit in Kants Nova dilucidatio (1755). In: *Revista de Estudios Kantianos*, vol. 5, n. 1, pp. 65-88.

Heimsoeth, H. (1956). *Der Kampf um den Raum -in der Metaphysik der Neuzeit* (1925). In: *Studien zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants*. Köln: Kölner Universitäts-Verlag.

Heimsoeth, H. (1960). *Atom, Seele, Monade: Historische Ursprünge und Hintergründe von Kants Antinomie der Teilung*. Mainz: Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.

Henrich, D. (1965). Über Kants Entwicklungsgeschichte. In: *Philosophische Rundschau*, 13(3/4), 252-263.

Hinske, N. (1970). *Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie. Der dreißigjährige Kant*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Insole, C. (2013). *Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1900–). *Gesammelte Schriften*. Die Deutsche (before: Königlich-Preußische) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vols. 1–29. Berlin.

Knutzen, M. (1745). *Systema causarum seu commentatio philosophica de commercio mentis et corporis per influxum physicum explicando, ipsis illustris leibnitii principiis* [SC]. Leipzig.

Kreimendahl, L. (1990). *Kant - der Durchbruch von 1769*. Köln: Dinter.

Kuehn, M. (1983). Kant's Conception of "Hume's Problem". In: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 21(2), 175-193.

Lange, J. (1723). *Modesta disquisitio novi philosophiae systematis de deo, mundo et homine et praesertim de harmonia commercii inter animam et corpus praestabilita*… [MD]. Halle.

Leibniz, G. W. (1849-1863). *Die mathematische Schriften* [GM]. Ed. Gerhardt, C. I., 7 vols. Berlin: A. Asher/H. W. Schmidt.

Leibniz, G. W. (1875–1890). *Die philosophische Schriften* [GP]. Ed. Gerhardt, C. I. 7 vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

Leibniz, G. W. (1969). *Philosophical Papers and Letters*. Trad. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Nierhaus, F. (1962). *Das Problem der psychophysischen Kommerziums in der Entwicklung der Kantische Philosophie*. PhD dissertation. Köln.

Paulsen, F. (1875). *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie*. Leipzig.

Poli, B. B.; Porta, M. A. G. (2022). A primeira tentativa de Kant na resolução do problema do comércio psicofísico (1747). *Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea*, 10(1), p. 13–33.

Polonoff, I. I. (1973). *Force, Cosmos, Monads and Other Themes of Kant's Early Thought*. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.

Reich, K. (1958). *Über das Verhältnis der Dissertation und der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Entstehung der kantischen Raumlehre*. In: Kant, I. *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Riehl, A. (1876). *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, Bd. 1. Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann.

Russell, B. (1937). *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*. London: Routledge.

Schmucker, J. (1961). *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen*. Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain KG.

Schmucker, J. (1976). Was entzündete in Kant das grosse Licht von 1769? In: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 58(4), 393.

Shell, S. M. (1996). *The embodiment of reason*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Skrbina, D. (2013). *Dualism, Dual-Aspectism, and the Mind*. In: Lacazza, A. & Robinson, H. (Eds.), *Contemporary Dualism: A Defense*. New York: Routledge.

Svare, H. (2006). *Body and practice in Kant*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Sytnik-Czetwertyński, J. (2013). Some Eighteenth-Century Contributions to the Mind–Body Problem (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant). In: *Axiomathes*, 23(3), 567-577.

Tonelli, G. (1959). *Elementi metodologici e metafisici in Kant dal 1745 al 1768*. Torino: Edizione di "Filosofia".

Tonelli, G. (1963). Die Umwälzung von 1769 bei Kant. In: *Kant-Studien*, 54(1-4), 369-375.

Tonelli, G. (1974). *Kant's Ethics as a part of Metaphysics: a possible Newtonian Suggestion? With Some Comments on Kant's "Dreams of a Seer"*. In: Walton, C. & Anton, J. P. (Eds.), *Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts: Essays Presented to Herbert W. Schneider*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Trevisan, D. K. (2016). Os pensamentos sobre a verdadeira estimação das forças vivas e o surgimento de motivos críticos no pensamento de Kant. *Revista Filosófica Aurora*, 28, 433-457.

Vaihinger, H. (1892). *Commentar zu Kants "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*. Bd 1I. Stuttgart/ Berlin/Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft.

Velkley, R. (1989). *Freedom and the End of Reason. On the moral foundations of Kant's critical philosophy*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Windelband, W. (1880). *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der allgemeinen Cultur und den besonderen Wissenschaften*, vol. 2. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.

Wundt, M. (1924). *Kant als Metaphysiker: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie im 18. Jahrhundert.* Stuttgart: Verlag von Ferdinand Enke.

Zammito, J. (2002). *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.