

## **RADICALIZING THE COPERNICAN TURN. CHANCES AND CHALLENGES OF RICHARD HÖNIGSWALD'S NEO-KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTALISM**

**DR. ANKE REDECKER**

University of Cologne  
[anke.redecker@uni-koeln.de](mailto:anke.redecker@uni-koeln.de)

*By establishing a transcendental theory of concrete subjectivity, the new-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönigswald radicalized Kant's Copernican turn and described the human body as principle and factum in a manifold cultural philosophy. For this purpose, he had to overcome his close relationship to the realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism of Riehl and Liebmann, who fell behind Kant's Copernican turn and his rejection of epistemological relevant things in themselves. Thus, Hönigswald went through his own Copernican turn, before he refined the Kantian concept.*

*Localizing the Kantian 'I think' in the concrete human-being offers the possibility to combine several parts and aspects of the Kantian philosophy and its components like ethics, aesthetics, and anthropology. Here Hönigswald concentrates on the capacities of human-beings who explore and form their living world, while Kant's Copernican turn shows their ambivalences of freedom and determination, understanding and alienness. To regard these ambivalences, we can look ahead in philosophical body theory and refer to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and today's postphenomenological approaches that stress alienation and contingency by highlighting human-beings' entanglement with the world.*

*In this process postphenomenology partly tries to go beyond the Copernican turn by establishing a praxeology that rejects the constitutive relevance of intentionality. If we go back to Hönigswald's radicalization of the Kantian turn we can highlight, that each way of problematizing practices and theories needs a problematizing subject and thus intentionality in its bodily representation.*

**Keywords:** *Philosophy, Kant, Hönigswald, Copernican turn, concrete subjectivity, body*

*Al desarrollar una teoría trascendental de la subjetividad concreta, el filósofo neokantiano Richard Höningwald radicalizó el giro copernicano de Kant, posicionando al cuerpo humano como principio y factum dentro de una filosofía cultural multifacética. Para lograr esto, Höningwald tuvo que superar su estrecha relación con el neokantismo realista-metafísico de Riehl y Liebmann, quienes retrocedieron frente al giro copernicano de Kant al mantener la relevancia epistemológica de las cosas en sí mismas. Así, Höningwald experimentó su propio giro copernicano antes de refinar y ampliar el concepto kantiano.*

*Situar el „yo pienso“ kantiano en el ser humano concreto permite integrar múltiples dimensiones de la filosofía kantiana y sus componentes, como la ética, la estética y la antropología. En este contexto, Höningwald se centra en las capacidades del ser humano para explorar y dar forma a su mundo vivido, mientras que el giro copernicano de Kant resalta las ambivalencias entre libertad y determinación, comprensión y alienación. Para abordar estas ambivalencias, es posible recurrir a la teoría filosófica del cuerpo, como la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty, y a los enfoques postfenomenológicos contemporáneos, que enfatizan la alienación y la contingencia al destacar la implicación del ser humano con el mundo.*

*En este proceso, el postfenomenologismo intenta, en parte, superar el giro copernicano mediante el establecimiento de una praxeología que rechaza la relevancia constitutiva de la intencionalidad. Sin embargo, al regresar a la radicalización del giro kantiano realizada por Höningwald, se resalta un punto crucial: toda forma de problematizar prácticas y teorías requiere un sujeto problematizador, y, por ende, la intencionalidad en su representación corporal sigue siendo indispensable.*

**Palabras clave:** *Filosofía, Kant, Höningwald, giro copernicano, subjetividad concreta, cuerpo*

## 1. Introduction

This article tries to shed light on the relevance of Kant's Copernican turn for the neo-Kantian approach of Richard Höningwald (1875-1947) and the chances of Höningwald's current reception. No longer interested in a metaphysical foundation of epistemology, Kant concentrated on the way we put ourselves into relation to our objects. By rejecting the epistemic relevance of things in themselves in his Copernican turn (Kant 1787/1998, A 359, B XVI-XVII), he highlighted the observing transcendental subject. If we are not entitled to claim knowledge about what things are, we can problematize especially and exclusively how they can be observed by us.

Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as the fundamental starting point for neo-Kantian reflections on activities of experiencing, thinking, judging, shaping, and expressing relations between human-beings and their world. These relations were thematized in manifold ways. While the founder of the genuine logical orientated Marburg neo-Kantianism Hermann Cohen focused on a logic of pure reason (Cohen 1922), Ernst Cassirer overcame Coehn's approach by developing his philosophy of symbolic forms (Cassirer 1923, 1926, 1929) and regarding the worldly human-being's manifold cultural settings in fields like language, arts, and myth. Even the axiological southwest-German neo-Kantian direction highlighted the transcendental subject in several regions of knowing and judging, as we can see in Heinrich Rickert's theory of values (Rickert 1921).

A third essential direction in neo-Kantianism can be characterized as realistic and metaphysical, because it still sticks to things in themselves as references of our knowledge. Although we are not able to experience things in themselves, they are seen as sources of knowledge that affect our ways of observing. This attitude beyond Kant's Copernican turn can be criticized as a heavily epistemic throwback. With Richard Höningwald we can find a seldom regarded protagonist of the younger neo-Kantianism (Marck 1987, 20; Ollig 1979, 73; Zeidler 1995) who established and elaborated a groundbreaking theory of concrete subjectivity, although he initially was heavily influenced by the metaphysical and realistic neo-Kantianism (Zeidler 2002, 182; Noras 2020, 413).

The following argumentation starts with the characterization of Kant's Copernican turn as a fundamental source of transcendental orientation in epistemology. Highlighting its concentration on the concretely observing subject, we can ask with Höningwald how this subject can be described to overcome a Kantian gap between the empirical and transcendental subject (2.). A second argumentative step sheds light on Höningwald's development from his early realistic-metaphysical to the later transcendental orientation. To build up and establish his cultural theory of the body, Höningwald had to go through his own Copernican turn with the effect of radicalizing Kant's Copernican revolution (3.).

Like Cassirer, Höningwald goes beyond a merely logical orientations in philosophy. Thus, Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as an inspiring concept to shape a neo-Kantian theory of subjectivity that does not only regard ethical and aesthetical, but manifold

further cultural forms of a bodily manifested being in the world (Hönigswald 1931/1997, 1937/1970). In this context we can see not only chances of the concrete subject, stressed by Hönigswald. Rather, human-beings can be problematized in ambivalent scenarios of freedom and determination, capacity, and limitation (4.). Finally, reading Kant's Copernican turn with Hönigswald can lead to a critical reflection of (post)phenomenological approaches that problematize intentionality in (digital) scenarios of describing and shaping cultural scenarios. In this contexts Hönigswald's neo-Kantianism can be acknowledged in its bridging position between (neo-)Kantian and praxeological approaches that do not neglect critical activity of concrete subjects in the relevant practices (5.).

## 2. Kant's Copernican Turn and Hönigswald's Epistemology of Concrete Subjectivity

Following Kant's path from metaphysics to transcendental idealism, epistemology does not determine, how things are; it tries to observe how they can be described with human capacities. Thus, Kant's critical point of view restricts the transcendental subject's competence of claiming true knowledge:

„I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuitions, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.”  
(Kant 1787/1998, A 369)

If appearances are seen as “mere representations” and if space and time are described as “only sensible forms of intuitions” (Kant 1787/1998, A 369), the transcendental subject can be addressed as a merely restricted epistemological factor. On the other hand, the transcendental subject is esteemed as an active constructor of experience. Overcoming an epistemology of things in themselves, Kant highlights the constructive capacities of observing subjects –

“just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. [...] If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself.” (Kant 1787/1998, B XVIII)

With this Copernican turn Kant avoids extreme epistemological positions like objectivism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other hand. Neither things in themselves nor reality constructing human-beings can find a place in his concept. Rejecting the subject's capacity to know anything about things in themselves these subjects are not only restricted, but, far away from passive figures, they can be seen as constructive explorers.

„Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy reconceives what we know by claiming that it depends on the activity of the observer.” (Altman 2018, 6)

This observer is not just registering and absorbing what she or he is confronted with. If objects were regarded as things in themselves, observing subjects could just be internalizing recipients. Their constructive engagement would be quite limited and restricted. Thus, overcoming the metaphysics of things in themselves, Kant stresses not only limitations, but also constructive chances of observing subjects in manifold ways:

„The 'Copernican revolution', such as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, consists in the idea that the – eminently epistemological – project of grounding a priori knowledge demands, on the ontological level, that this 'knowledge' be born not by the 'things' such as they are in themselves, but on 'objects' understood as phenomena, i. e., insofar as they appear as a result of the pure forms of sensibility and insofar as they are synthesized (unified) by the categories of the understanding. These 'objects' are dependent on the 'transcendental subject' which Kant analyzes with respect to its faculties, among which sensibility, understanding, and imagination play a leading role in accounting for the conditions of the possibility of any and all knowledge.” (Schnell 2020, 392)

Kant's Copernican turn does not inevitably lead to an ontological concept, because he wants to problematize preconditions of understanding and not those of being, but we can highlight with Schnell manifold involved human faculties that enable sensations, comprehension, judgment, and creativity. If we want to deal coherently and consequently with our objects in these manifold ways, we must synthesize our experiences and reflections in our own consciousness. Here we can take up Kant's 'I think', that he describes as a consciousness in general ('Bewusstsein überhaupt') by explaining it as a transcendental precondition for experience and reflection (Kant 1787/1998, B 133f.). Kant assumes that "the *I think* must *be able* to accompany all my representations" (Kant 1787/1998, B131). Experiences and thoughts are those of a certain subject who constitutes and combines them. With the 'I think' Kant paves the way to concrete subjectivity in transcendental philosophy without intending an empirization of the consciousness in general (Krijnen 2008, 267).

“All my representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in an apperception, through the general expression I think.” (Kant 1787/1998, B138)

Hönigswald overcomes Kant’s merely formal consciousness, characterized by the just “general expression I think” (Kant 1787/1998, B138); he takes up the ‘I think’ as a factuality. If all experiences must be somebody’s (e.g. my) experiences, all my referring to something must be a referring to myself as well. Otherwise, these experiences would not be my experiences. That each referring to something also needs a constitutive referring to the subject that refers to that something is expressed by Hönigswald in a row of self-reference (‘Ich-Reihe’: “die Reihe ‘ich weiß’, ‘ich weiß, daß ich weiß usf.’ als Bewußtheitseinheit” (Hönigswald 1965, 106)). Monika Witsch calls this “the sequence of presence of the ‘I’ that knows about its re-presence in the form of ‘Me’” (Witsch 2016, 161). If I must refer to myself to be able to refer to something does not mean self-knowledge, but self-coherence. as a pre-condition for coherent and methodical experiencing and thinking, judging, and planning.

Provided that an object of observing must be observed by somebody (‘I’), we can describe Kant’s Copernican turn as a starting point for Hönigswald’s correlation between is-determination (Ist-Bestimmtheit) and I-determination (Ich-Bestimmtheit), object- and subject-determination (Hönigswald 1927, 37), in which both are determined by each other. While Kant describes the ‘I think’ as a strictly formal precondition for observing something, Hönigswald locates it in the concretely observing human-being.

“The human is *principle* and *factum*, because experiencing has the structure of ‘I-to me’, ‘I-me.’” (Witsch 2016, 162)

If we consider with Hönigswald, that we always live and act in the present moment, we must combine our thoughts and experiences by back reference and anticipation. Otherwise, there would not be a coherent thinking and experiencing. Thus, according to Hönigswald there must be a continuity of self-reference to overcome the punctuality of the present moment.

„Verständnis ist immer auch Vorwegnahme des durch die Empfindungsdrücke vermittelten Sinns, freilich immer auch erneut Korrektur des sinnhaft vorweggenommenen durch das sinnbezogene Gegebene“ (Hönigswald 1937/1970, 394).

Observers need a spatial location of their consciousness that can cope with the fleetingness of the present moment. This can be seen as a precondition to combine intuitions over time in acts of back reference and anticipation. With Hönigswald we can ask, in how far Kant’s

‘I think’ needs an extended bodily representation (Hönigswald 1931a/1997, 1931b/1982) in an organic system, comparable to the natural teleology Kant described in his “Critique of the Power of Judgment” (Kant 2002). In this context Hönigswald establishes the human organism as a transcendental principle to locate the constitutive activity of the observer. The observing human-being needs not just any body, but the own organism as a precondition for experiencing something coherently in the ongoing correlation of self-reference and the relation to that something. Thus, my organism offers me the possibility to avoid a subjection to the present moment, isolated from past and future. It can be seen as the precondition for being a constructive Copernican subject.

„Dem Vollzug im Sinne des ‚jetzt‘ entspricht eben ein ‚hier‘ mit jeweils verschiedenen, nach dem gewählten Bezugssystem wechselnden Größen. Das ‚Jetzt‘ erfordert m.a.W. einen Zeitort im Raume, – ein Naturobjekt von spezifischem Gefüge; ein Naturobjekt, dessen Kontext mit allen anderen unangetastet bleibt, das sich aber *vor* allen anderen durch die Funktion auszeichnet, den ‚Zeitort‘ jenes ‚jetzt‘ darzustellen.“ (Hönigswald 1970, 6)

Hönigswald’s concept can be valued as an often-neglected approach to a meanwhile established combination of Kant’s ‘I think’ (Kant 1787/1998, B 132-34) with the concrete subject (Nussbaum 2010, Nida-Rümelin 2013). Founding his transcendentalism in a bodily relationality, Hönigswald overcomes the merely formal Kantian ‘I think’ and focuses on the actual human-being. This concrete subject can be described as a philosophical principle, not despite of, but because of its factuality.

### 3. Hönigswald’s Copernican Turn as a Radicalization of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

Reading Kant’s Copernican turn with Hönigswald’s transcendentalism can be seen as a radicalization of this turn. By stressing the activity of the observer, Kant gives the starting point for concentrating not primarily on the is-determination (Ist-Bestimmtheit), but also on the I-determination (Ich-Bestimmtheit) of the epistemological correlation between object and subject. But before Hönigswald started this radicalization, he had to go through his own Copernican turn. Following his academic teacher Alois Riehl and the metaphysical approach of Liebmann, the young Hönigswald stucked to a realistic-metaphysical new-Kantianism that still claimed the epistemic relevance of things in themselves (Hönigswald 1903, 1904, 1906, 1910; Riehl 1876; Liebmann 1880), before he grounded his theory of organism in a transcendental-philosophical approach (Hönigswald 1931a/1997, 1931b/1982; Zeidler 1995; Redecker 2001). Consequently, his theory of the organism has two sources – a realistic and a transcendental one. Before he characterized the human organism as principle and factum of transcendental philosophy, Hönigswald had to overcome metaphysical and realistic influences of new-Kantian approaches, mainly represented by Riehl and Liebmann.

In his third volume of “Critical Philosophy, Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics” (1887) Riehl argues, that “sensation reveals something which does not originate exclusively with ourselves” and that they “point to a reality outside ourselves, so that through them and their relations we get a mediate knowledge of things themselves” (Riehl 1894, 42). This meets the position of Liebmann, who came back to claiming the epistemic relevance of things in themselves (Liebmann 1880, 1904, Überweg 1923) after spreading his early slogan ‘Back to Kant!’. While this slogan can be seen as a request to come back to the Copernican turn of transcendental philosophy ((Liebmann 1865, Heidenreich 2022), Liebmann fell back to things in themselves. This can be seen as a seldom regarded example of an inconsistent, partly retrograde reception of the Copernican turn during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Positioning Riehl and Liebmann in the context of neo-Kantianism, their sticking to things in themselves can be characterized as a dramatical throw-back. It is contradictory to Kant’s transcendental-idealistic argumentation, that

“everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself” (Kant 1787/1998, A 491/B 519).

Regarding the dynamic activity of subjects shown in Kant’s Copernican turn, we also must acknowledge the dynamics human-beings can show, if they go through several stages of observation. Revitalizing the Copernican metaphor, we can describe observers who move around their objects as movers of perspectivity and ongoing proving. They do not stop questioning what they have proved. This also concerns Hönigswald. That he is localized in different, partly contradicting philosophical traditions and directions can be a sign for the necessity to regard his thinking in its multi-perspectivity and dynamics. If we stick to Hönigswald’s early stage, we can see him in the direction of realistic Neo-Kantianism, like Andrzej J. Noras (2020) does, while at the same time he calls Hönigswald a post-neo-Kantian philosopher. In contrast, Helmut Holzhey (2004, 117-122) stresses Hönigswald’s affinity to the southwest German direction of neo-Kantianism, while Iwona Alechnowicz does not want to call him a neo-Kantian thinker at all and stresses his genuine Kantian position (Alechnowicz 2007, 56f., Noras 2020, 413).

By criticizing the threatening dogmatism of scientific schools (Hönigswald 1913, 245), Hönigswald developed his original approach. In his critical-eclectic manner he proved, chose, and refined several elements of philosophical concepts. Criticizing his early realistic-metaphysical orientation, we can go beyond a location of his relation to Kant in an ontological direction (Breil 1992) and acknowledge his later transcendental-philosophical theory of organism. This later approach results from Hönigswald’s own Copernican turn in overcoming the early reference to Riehl and Liebmann.

If we take into consideration that the Copernican dynamic shows observers in motion, every new answer that is found can offer new questions to doubt previous answers. To make this ongoing proving and investigating possible, human-beings need an almost partly coherent consciousness and its localization in their own organism, as Hönigswald pointed out. This can be seen as a radicalization of the Kantian turn by Hönigswald's own Copernican revolution. Hönigswald's concept of concrete subjectivity now offers the possibility to combine the subject of philosophy with the subject of psychology. The human Copernican observer comes into interest.

#### 4. Ambivalences and Contingency in Cultural Scenarios – Recognizing the Creativity and Dignity of 'crooked woods'

Hönigswald's further development of Kant's Copernican turn beyond objectivism and subjectivism lead him to a bodily grounded correlation of is- determination and I-determination. According to this correlation, things in themselves are neither realistic fundaments of our knowledge nor epistemically relevant imaginations of an abstract logic. In the correlation of is-determination and I-determination Hönigswald did not only reject an objectivism that can be built on things in themselves. He also denied an overstressing of the subject's capacity of pure thinking, as we can find it in the Marburg approach of neo-Kantianism (Cohen 1922). Like Cassirer, Hönigswald overcame a merely logical direction of neo-Kantianism and problematized concrete human-beings in various ways of being in their lifeworld and putting themselves into relation to it (Redecker 2005). In his "Essay on Man" Cassirer points out his overcoming of the merely logical orientated 'animal rationale' by a culturally omnipresent 'animal symbolicum'. Shifting from a preferred logical theory to a neo-Kantian philosophy of concrete subjectivity, manifold acting human-beings come into interest. The Copernican turn becomes a matter of cultural philosophy.

„Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man – the way to civilization.“ (Cassirer 1944, 44)

Overcoming a preferred glance on the 'animal rationale,' we can ask with Hönigswald how the 'animal symbolicum' can be described. This leads us to Hönigswald's theory of organism as the manifestation of the not only observing, but also judging, expressing, constituting, creating, and shaping subject in several cultural fields of research like language (Hönigswald 1937/1970), arts (Hönigswald 1961), pedagogy (Hönigswald 1927), morality, rights, and religion (Hönigswald 1931/1997). Our body enables us to combine, express and evaluate impressions, experiences, emotions, and thoughts. This offers Hönigswald the possibility to

combine several elements of the Kantian approach, referring to aesthetical, ethical, anthropological, and biological relevant reflections. According to the subject of Kant's Copernican turn, Hönigswald shows a dynamic activity in dealing with Kantian objects of interest. This is initiated and prepared by Kant whose Copernican turn leads him to a transcendental subject beyond a preferred focus on theoretical philosophy. With the Copernican turn, the subject of morality and ethics comes into special interest.

„Kant's ultimate 'Copernican' hypothesis is that our pure practical reason makes up for the otherwise seemingly pointless spinning of the excess rationality in general that reason, as one complex but unified faculty, brings with it, and that makes our species fundamentally unlike all others on earth." (Ameriks 2013, 71)

In the Copernican turn we can find a fundamental link between several ways of regarding human beings in their manifold capacities, e.g. as subjects of theoretical and practical reason. This can also be stressed with Pradelle (2020, 379), who points out that „the Copernican revolution carried out in the theoretical realm is also valid in the practical realm; just, indeed, as the a priori structures of the object were supposed to follow the formal structures of the finite subject, so here the form of the categorical imperativeness proper to the moral law follows the finite character of the will. This principle of the Copernican reversal is just as valid for the analysis of respect: to the extent to which it has an effect on sensibility, the respect for the moral law presupposes, as a moral feeling, that the being endowed with reason is also endowed with sensibility”.

In the ethic relevance of the Copernican turn we can find sensitive, vulnerable and responsible subjects who have the possibility and duty to make use of their practical reason and “treat humanity” in their “*own person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*“ (Kant 1786, 66), Referring to the Categorical Imperative, Kant's Copernican turn shows ambivalences of moral subjects who have to be moral not only because of their dignity, but also because of their desires. Without their limitations they would not be addressees of a categorical imperative. While Hönigswald stresses subjects of capacities, we can also focus their restrictions and ambivalences in referring to Kant.

Taking into consideration that “nothing entirely straight can be fashioned from the crooked wood of which humankind is made” (Kant 1784, 8:23), human-beings have the possibility to act against a senseful and responsible orientation and thus must think about moral questions. These ‘crooked woods’ are autonomous and determined (Esser 2001, Konhardt 2004; Redecker 2018), while they are dealing with capacities and restrictions (Bielefeld 2001, Himmelmann 2009), duty and desire (Höffe 1983), reflection and emotion (Kant 1764/2007, Recki 2001, Ameriks 2004). Subjects of the Copernican turn are subjects who face freedom and contingency (Sturma 2004), distance and involvement (Böhme 2012, Klemme 2006, Schönecker 2014, Loidoldt 2014, Esser 2014), progress and

perspectivity (Höffe 1989, Waldenfels 2011), responsibility and restriction (Gerhardt 2002, Sturma 2001). These ambivalences seem to be constitutive for their condition as ‘crooked woods’ with dignity.

Focusing human-beings as a connective factor of several topics in Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, concrete subject can be seen in their ambivalences, not only regarding capacities, but also limitations, vulnerability, contingency and finiteness. As human-beings in motion (Altman 2018, 6), who try to put themselves into relation to their objects (Ameriks 2013), these ‘crooked woods’ are principle and factum, subject and object of recognition at once. They must be acknowledged because of their vulnerability (Redecker 2018) and treated as “an end in itself”, because they have an “inner worth, that is, dignity” and are “elevated above all price” (Kant 1786, 77).

If we interpret Hönigswald’s definition of the concrete subject as principle and factum of philosophy, we can highlight human ambivalences with the aim of rejecting a postmodern view on modernity that neglects the modern sources of postmodernity and characterizes postmodernity as totally different from modernity. Beyond a manifold disputation on the question, whether Kant had a real Copernican or Ptolemaic concept of the turn (Gerhardt 1987; Miles 2006; Brandt 2007; Schönecker et al. 2011; Lemanski 2012), we can refer to the mentioned ambivalences of the Copernican turn to avoid a Ptolemaic interpretation that glorifies human-beings as self-sufficient subjects of domination who put themselves into the middle of an anthropocentric universe.

If we regard the factuality of concrete subjects and if we stress, that they can be seen as philosophical principles, because they are facts, we can come to a differentiated problematization of their ambivalences and ambiguities, their alienness and concealments with the aim of dealing with Kant’s Copernican revolution as an “ongoing project” (Vater 2018, 759). This project can consider Hönigswald’s reflection of the Copernican turn, especially if we take into consideration that Hönigswald’s systematical concept of philosophy is open-ended (Meder 1995, 287) and can be reflected and problematized even in new fields of interest and concern.

## **5. Looking ahead – Kant, Hönigswald and (post)phenomenological Approaches**

With Kant’s Copernican turn intentionality comes into a special interest. While the relevance of intentionality combines Hönigswald’s approach with Husserl’s phenomenology (Orth 1993), Hönigswald’s theory of organism overcame the Cartesian *Ego cogito* that is still constitutive in Husserl’s early philosophy (Husserl 1987). Constituting and combining my experiences, I need my bodily extension. This can be stressed with Hönigswald not only against a neo-Kantian philosophy of pure thinking (Cohen 1922), but also against a phenomenology that neglects the bodily manifestation of (inter-)subjectivity. With his theory of organism Hönigswald avoids difficulties of the early Husserlian phenomenology, that does not acknowledge the bodily foundation of (inter-)subjectivity.

Highlighting bodily experience, we can find more and closer relations between Richard Höningwald and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1984, 1986) than between Höningwald and Husserl, but in contrast to Höningwald, Merleau-Ponty stresses the contingency of a bodily being in the world by explaining a phenomenological interconnectedness of subject and object that goes beyond Höningwald's correlation of is-determination and I-determination. Merleau-Ponty and postphenomenological approaches that refer to him focus ambivalences of human capacities and restrictions in a very elaborated and differentiated manner. Experiencing subjects are described as part of and entangled with the world they are dealing with (Merleau-Ponty 1984, 1986; Verbeek 2005b; Rosenberger 2020; Ritter 2021), facing perspectivity and limitation. Thus, Merleau-Ponty considers, that our bodily experience is pervaded by alienness, unconsciousness and contingency (Waldenfels 2005, 2009; Welsch 2012).

This approach is shared in today's postphenomenological positions (Verbeek 2005b; Rosenberger 2020; Ritter 2021) that are explicitly situated in the tradition of phenomenology (Verbeek 2005a; Ritter 2021), especially Merleau-Ponty (Ihde in Ihde/Kaminski 2020, 274). Postphenomenologists thematize human-technology relations (in digital scenarios) and stress the technical mediated interwovenness of man and world (Ihde/Kaminski 2020; Richardson 2020). Here the Copernican turn is transformed into an approach that describes the observing subject as determined by technical mediation. This subject is no longer a subject of knowledge, but of plausibility. Thus, postphenomenologists try to understand the world without demanding to reach the truth.

Besides the question, whether the observing subject is described as a knowing or just explaining subject, this observing subject needs intentionality to do so (Redecker 2024) and thus can rather be seen in the tradition of Kant's Copernican turn than in an ontological direction, while some thinkers of post-phenomenology leave the phenomenological tradition (Verbeek 2005b) and try to overcome intentionality as a basic element of phenomenology. Ritter stresses that

“postphenomenology has gradually diverged from phenomenology. With its inter-relational ontology, postphenomenology now pays attention to relations rather than intentionality.” (Ritter 2021, 1512; cf. Ihde 2022)

Leaving the Copernican direction by neglecting the observing subject can lead to a praxeology that does not acknowledge human-beings' possibility to put themselves into relation to the practices they are involved in (Redecker 2019). They are rather seen as objects of subjectivation than as subjects of reasoning, critique, and resistance, while even postphenomenologists characterize the experience of a mediated world as a typical human one (Rosenberger/Verbeek 2015; Richardson 2020). If “it is impossible to speak about the world in the absence of human involvement with it” (Verbeek 2005b, 110), this human involve-

ment can be problematized to revitalize Hönigswald's concentration on critical thinking. With Hönigswald we can remember the bodily founded subject of sensitivity, reason, and creative imagination as a precondition for problematizing practices and praxeology, while even praxeologists need their intentionality, if they want to investigate practices.

If we consider that our way of referring to objects is permeated by alienness, we can regard ourselves rather as questioning subjects than as knowing subjects. To admit to that we can go back to Kant's rejection of things in themselves in the Copernican turn, its radicalization in Hönigswald's theory of the organism and its transformation in phenomenological theories of alienation. If we interpret Hönigswald's and (post)phenomenological approaches in reference to Kant's Copernican turn, we can highlight the relevance of intentionality and argue against the rejection of a "transcendental and 'Anthropocene' pushback" (Ihde 2022, 853) in postphenomenology, because even this rejection is one of a concrete subject, a limited subject in motion (Redecker 2022).

## 6. Conclusions

Based on Kant's Copernican turn the argumentation showed Hönigswald's theory of concrete subjectivity as a radicalization of the turn. By locating the Kantian 'I think' in the concrete human-being, Hönigswald's approach offers the possibility to combine several elements and aspects of the Kantian philosophy in a cultural theory that stresses diverse capacities of the acting human-being in fields like arts, language, pedagogy, morality, and rights. If we also consider limitations and restrictions of human-beings, we can address them as 'crooked woods', who are free and determined at once, while they put themselves into relation to others, the other and themselves in various cultural fields. Thus, Cassirer's turn from the 'animal rationale' to the 'animal symbolicum' can be grounded on Hönigswald's theory of organism, that offers a bodily foundation of cultural theory.

Hönigswald describes the organism as spatial location of a concrete consciousness that is bound to the present moment of experience and thus needs its extended body that offers the possibility to combine experiences by referring to past experiences and trying to anticipate new ones. To establish his transcendental theory of bodily subjectivity, Hönigswald had to go through his own Copernican turn by overcoming his early stage of realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism. His originality can widely be seen in his later separation from Riehl's and Liebmann's epistemology of things-in themselves. While Riehl and Liebman fall back behind Kant's Copernican turn, Hönigswald radicalizes it by describing the bodily subject of experience as principle and factum of critical philosophy.

This radicalization of the Copernican turn overcomes a Cartesian *Ego cogito* and thus a Husserlian phenomenology that is not able to regard the fundamental relevance of concrete (inter-)subjectivity. Remembering that Kant's Copernican turn puts emphasis on ambivalences of observing subjects who are restricted and constructive at once, Hönigswald's focus on the knowing subject of autonomy can be enriched by regarding aspects of limitation,

contingency and vulnerability. The subject of Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as a constructive observer and actor, far from knowing things in themselves. Kant's subjects of dignity are 'crooked woods', who are esteemed in their imperfectness and vulnerability.

While Hönigswald preferably stresses the capacity of human-beings, we can refer to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body to acknowledge even restrictions of bodily experience and human capacities. That both approaches refer to intentionality as an essential factor in the attempt to understand and explain objects of interest shows Hönigswald's and Merleau-Ponty's connection to Kant's Copernican turn. In contrast, several postphenomenological approaches try to explain relations between man and world without intentionality. Here we can argue with Hönigswald's theory of the concrete bodily subject of intentionality. This subject, although restricted and limited, is indispensable to problematize practices and theories. Hönigswald's approach can remind us of the importance of Kant's Copernican turn and its ongoing critical reflection.

## 7. Bibliography:

- Alechnowicz I. (2007). *Filozofia na Uniwersytecie Wrocławskim w latach 1895–1935*. Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski.
- Altman, M. C. (2018). Introduction: Kant the Revolutionary. In M. C. Altman (Ed.), *The Palgrave Kant Handbook* (1-7). London: Palgrave.
- Ameriks, K. (2004). Kant und das Problem der moralischen Motivation. In K. Ameriks & D. Sturma (Eds.), *Kants Ethik* (98-116). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Ameriks, K. (2013). Kant's Ambivalent Cosmopolitanism. In *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Band 1*. Im Auftrag der Kant-Gesellschaft herausgegeben von Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca und Margit Ruffing (55-72). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Böhme, G. (2012). *Ich-Selbst. Über die Formation des Subjekts*. München: Brill.
- Brandt, R. (2007). *Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant*. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Breil, R. (1991). *Hönigswald und Kant. Transzendentalphilosophische Untersuchungen zur Letztbegründung und Gegenstandskonstitution*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Breil, R. (2021). Zum Einfluss von Alois Riehl auf Richard Hönigswald. In R. Meer & G. Motta (Eds.), *Kant in Österreich. Alois Riehl und der Weg zum kritischen Realismus* (323-346). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
- Cassirer, E. (1923). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. Bd. 1: *Die Sprache*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer.
- Cassirer, E. (1925). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. Bd. 2: *Das mythische Denken*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer.
- Cassirer, E. (1929). *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. Bd. 3: *Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer.

- Cassirer E. (1944). *An essay on man. An introduction to a philosophy of human culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cohen, H. (1922). *System der Philosophie: Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer.
- Esser, A. (2001). Kant und moralische Konflikte. In V. Gerhardt, R.-P. Horstmann & R. Schumacher (Eds.), *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Bd. 1 (194-201)*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
- Esser, A. (2014). Die Bedeutung von Gefühlen in Kants Moralphilosophie und die Möglichkeit ihrer phänomenologischen Erweiterung. In I. Römer (Ed.), *Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie* (145-171). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Gerhardt, V. (1987). Kants kopernikanische Wende. Friedrich Kaulbach zum 75. Geburtstag. *Kant-Studien* 78, 133-153.
- Gerhardt, V. (1999). *Selbstbestimmung. Das Prinzip der Individualität*. Stuttgart: Reclam.
- Gerhardt, V. (2002). *Immanuel Kant. Vernunft und Leben*. Stuttgart; Reclam.
- Heidenreich, H. (2022). Materialisten, Neukantianer, Spiritisten. Kant-Rezeptionen um 1900. In H. Heidenreich & F. Stengel (Eds.), *Kant um 1900* (7-41). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Himmelfmann, B. (2009). Über Grenzen der Selbstbestimmung. In J.-C. Heilinger, C. King & H. Wittwer (Eds.), *Individualität und Selbstbestimmung* (325-338). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Höffe, O. (1983). *Immanuel Kant*. München: Beck.
- Höffe, O. (1989). Kants nientempirische Verallgemeinerung: zum Rechtsbeispiel des falschen Versprechens. In O. Höffe (Ed.), *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar* (206-233). Frankfurt: Klostermann.
- Hönigswald, R. (1903). Empirischer und kritischer Idealismus. *Allgem. Zeitung, Beilage Nr. 201*, 5. 9. 1903, 449-453.
- Hönigswald, R. (1904). *Über die Lehre Hume's von der Realität der Aussendinge*. Halle: Schwetschke.
- Hönigswald, R. (1906). *Beiträge zur Erkenntnistheorie und Methodenlehre*. Leipzig: Fock.
- Hönigswald, R. (1910). Zu Leibmanns Kritik der Lehre vom psychophysischen Parallelismus. *Kant-Studien* 15/1, 94-114.
- Hönigswald, R. (1913). Prinzipienfragen der Denkpsychologie. *Kant-Studien* 18, 205-245
- Hönigswald, R. (1927). Über die Grundlagen der Pädagogik. Ein Beitrag zur Frage des pädagogischen Universitätsunterrichts, 2. umgearbeitete Auflage, München: Reinhardt.
- Hönigswald, R. (1931a/1997). *Grundfragen der Erkenntnistheorie*. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Hönigswald, R. (1931b/1982). Philosophie als Theorie der Gegenständlichkeit. In H.-L. Ollig (Ed.), *Neukantianismus* (355-396). Stuttgart: Reclam.
- Hönigswald, R. (1937/1970). *Philosophie und Sprache. Problematik und System*. Nachdruck der Ausgabe Basel 1937, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Hönigswald, R. (1961). *Wissenschaft und Kunst*. Schriften aus dem Nachlaß, Bd. 4, hrsg. v. Gerd Wolandt. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

- Hönigswald, R. (1965). *Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Hönigswald, R. (1970). *Die Grundlagen der allgemeinen Methodenlehre. 2. Teil*. Schriften aus dem Nachlaß. Bd. 8 Hg. v. Hariolf Oberer, Bonn: Bouvier.
- Holzhey H (2004). Der Neukantianismus. In *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Hrsg. von W. Röd. Bd. 12: H. Holzhey, W. Röd, *Die Philosophie des ausgehenden 19. und des 20. Jahrhunderts. 2: Neukantianismus, Idealismus, Realismus, Phänomenologie* (13-129). München: Beck.
- Husserl, E. (1987). *Cartesianische Meditationen. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie*, edited by Elisabeth Ströker. 2. Edition. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Ihde, D. (2022). Postphenomenology, the Empirical Turn and “Transcendentality”. *Foundations of Science* 27, 851-854, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-020-09741-6>
- Ihde, D./Kaminski, A. (2020). What is postphenomenological philosophy of technology? Autonomie und Unheimlichkeit. *Jahrbuch Technikphilosophie* 6, edited by Alexander Friedrich, Petra Gehring, Christoph Hubig, Andreas Kaminski, and Alfred Nordmann (261-287). Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Kant, I. (1764/2007). Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764). Trans. Paul Guyer. In G. Zöllner & R. B. Loudon (Eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education* (23-62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1784/2007). Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784). Trans. Allen W. Wood. In G. Zöllner & R. B. Loudon (Eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education* (108-120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1786). *Groundlaying toward the Metaphysics of Morals*. 2nd. Edition. Riga: Hartknoch.
- Kant, I. (1787/1998). *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787). Trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (2002). *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klemme, H. F. (2006). Praktische Gründe und moralische Motivation. Eine deontologische Perspektive. In H. F. Klemme, M. Kühn & D. Schönecker (Eds.), *Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen* (113-153). Hamburg: Meiner.
- Konhardt, K. (2004). *Endlichkeit und Vernunftanspruch. Die Urkonstellation des Menschen im Lichte der Philosophie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt.
- Krijnen, C. (2008). Kants Subjektstheorie und die Grundlegung einer philosophischen Anthropologie. *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 62/2, 254-273.
- Lemanski, J. (2012). Die Königin der Revolution. Zur Rettung und Erhaltung der Kopernikanischen Wende. *Kant-Studien* 103, 448-471.
- Liebmann, O. (1865). *Kant und die Epigonen. Eine kritische Abhandlung*. Stuttgart: Schober.
- Liebmann, O. (1880). *Analysis der Wirklichkeit. Eine Erörterung der Grundprobleme der Philosophie*. Straßburg: Trübner.
- Liebmann, O. (1904). *Gedanken und Thatsachen*. Bd.2. Straßburg: Trübner.

- Loidoldt, S. (2014). Achten, Durchfühlen, Ansinnen. Affektive Begegnisweisen der praktischen Vernunft. In I. Römer (Ed.), *Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie* (205-220). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Marck S. (1987). Am Ausgang des jüngeren Neukantianismus. Ein Gedenkblatt für Richard Höningwald und Jonas Cohn. In H.-L. Ollig (Ed.), *Materialien zur Neukantianismus-Diskussion* (19-43). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Meder, N. (1997). Die Abbildung von Sachverhalten in die Zeit. Reflexion auf die philosophische Grundlegung der Pädagogik und die pädagogische Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie. In W. Schmied-Kowarzik (Ed.), *Erkennen – Monas – Sprache. Internationales Richard-Höningwald-Symposion Kassel 1995. Studien und Materialien zum Neukantianismus; Bd.9* (277-289). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1984). *Das Auge und der Geist. Philosophische Essays*. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Hans Werner Arndt. Hamburg: Meiner.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. (1986). *Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare – gefolgt von Arbeitsnotizen*. Hrsg. u. mit einem Vor- und Nachwort versehen von Claude Lefort, aus dem Französischen von Regula Giuliani und Bernhard Waldenfels. München: Fink.
- Miles, M. (2006). Kant's 'Copernican Revolution': Toward Rehabilitation of a Concept and Provision of a Framework for the Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason. *Kant-Studien* 97, 1-32.
- Nida-Rümelin, J. (2013). *Philosophie einer humanen Bildung*. Hamburg: Edition Körber-Stiftung.
- Noras, A. J. (2020). *Geschichte des Neukantianismus*. Übersetzt von Tomasz Kubalica. Berlin: Lang.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2010). *Die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit. Behinderung, Normalität und Spezieszugehörigkeit*. Aus dem Amerikanischen v. Robin Celikates u. Eva Engels. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Ollig H.-L. (1979). *Der Neukantianismus*. Stuttgart: Metzler.
- Orth, W. (1993). Richard Höningwalds Neukantianismus und Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie als Hintergrund des Denkens von Edith Stein. *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 26/27, Studien zur Philosophie von Edith Stein: Internationales Edith-Stein-Symposion Eichstätt 1991, 16-52.
- Pradelle, D. (2020). A Phenomenological Critique of Kantian Ethics. In I. Apostolescu & C. Serban (Eds.), *Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology* (359-387). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
- Recki, B. (2001). *Ästhetik der Sitten. Die Affinität von ästhetischem Gefühl und praktischer Vernunft bei Kant*. Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann.
- Redecker, A. (2001). *Korrelation und Kontinuität. Zur Genese und Kritik der Erkenntnispsychologie Richard Höningwalds vor dem Hintergrund der Theoriekonzepte des Marburger Neukantianismus*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

- Redecker, A. (2005). Erziehung zur Grundlagenforschung. Die Aktualität Richard Höningswalds. *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 81, 282-300.
- Redecker, A. (2018). *Das kritische Selbst. Bildungstheoretische Reflexionen im Anschluss an Hugo Gaudig, Marian Heitger, Käte Meyer-Drawe und Immanuel Kant*. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz
- Redecker, A. (2019) Von der Gegenständlichkeit zur Widerständigkeit. Überlegungen zu einer nachpostmodernen Pädagogik in Auseinandersetzung mit Richard Höningswald. In C. Swertz, R. Breil, N. Meder, St. Nachtsheim, W. Schmied-Kowarzik & K. W. Zeidler (Eds.), *Heimkehr des Logos, Beiträge anlässlich des 70. Todestages von Richard Höningswald an 11. Juni 1947* (S. 145-178). Köln: Janus.
- Redecker, A. (2022). Subjektivierung in der Bildung. Fragestellungen – Fachbezüge – Forschungsthemen. In D. Kergel & B. Heidkamp-Kergel (Eds.), *Handbuch Interdisziplinäre Bildungsforschung* (S. 312-338). Weinheim/Basel: Beltz.
- Redecker, A. (2024). After Phenomenology? Digital Subjects and the Relevance of Experience. In M. Bohlmann & P. Breil (Eds.), *Postphenomenology and Technologies Within Educational Settings*. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield (in press)
- Richardson, I. (2020). Postphenomenology, Ethnography, and the Sensory Intimacy of Mobile Media. In G. Miller & A. Shew (Eds.), *Reimagining Philosophy and Technology, Reinventing Ihde (159-174)*. Cham: Springer.
- Rickert, H. (1921). *System der Philosophie, Bd. 1*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Riehl, A. (1876). *Der philosophische Krizicismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft, Bd. 1, Geschichte und Methode des philosophischen Krizicismus*, Leipzig: Engelmann.
- Riehl, A. (1894/1887), *The Principles of the Critical Philosophy: Introduction to The Theory of Science and Metaphysics*, trans. Arthur Fairbanks, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner.
- Ritter, M. (2021). Philosophical Potencies of Postphenomenology. *Philosophy & Technology* 34,1501-1516.
- Rosenberger, R. (2020). On variational cross-examination: a method for postphenomenological multistability. *AI and Society*, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-01050-7>
- Rosenberger R. & Verbeek, P. P. (Eds.) (2015). *Postphenomenological investigations*. Lexington: Lanham.
- Schnell, S. (2020). Is There a “Copernican” or an “Anti-Copernican” Revolution in Phenomenology? In I. Apostolescu & C. Serban (Eds.), *Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology* (391-409). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.
- ŷchönecker, D. (2014). Das gefühlte Faktum der Vernunft. Skizze einer Interpretation und Verteidigung. In I. Römer (Ed.), *Affektivität und Ethik bei Kant und in der Phänomenologie* (55-77). Berlin: De Gruyter.

- Schönecker, D., Schulting, D. & Strobach, N. (2011). Kants kopernikanisch-newtonsche Analogie. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 59, 497-518.
- Sturma, D. (2001). Person und Menschenrechte. In D. Sturma (Ed.), *Person. Philosophiegeschichte – Theoretische Philosophie – Praktische Philosophie* (337-362). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Sturma, D. (2004). Kants Ethik der Autonomie. In K. Ameriks & D. Sturma (Eds.), *Kants Ethik* (160-177). Paderborn: Mentis.
- Überweg, F. (1923). *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Vierter Teil. Die deutsche Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart*. Zwölfte, mit einem Philosophen-Register versehene Auflage. Völlig neu bearbeitet von Dr. Traugott Konstantin Österreich. Berlin: Mittler
- Vater, M. (2018). Kant after Kant: The Indispensable Philosopher, In M. C. Altman (Ed.), *The Palgrave Kant Handbook* (731-760). London: Palgrave.
- Verbeek, P. P. (2005a). *What Things Do. Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and Design*, translated by Robert P. Crease. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press.
- Verbeek, P. P. (2005b). Postphenomenology. In P. P. Verbeek, *What Things Do. Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency and Design*, translated by Robert Crease (99-119). Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press.
- Waldenfels, B. (2005). *Idiome des Denkens*. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp
- Waldenfels, B. (2009). Lehren und Lernen im Wirkungsfeld der Aufmerksamkeit. In N. Ricken, H. Röhr, J. Ruhloff & K. Schaller (Eds.), *Umlernen. Festschrift für Käthe Meyer-Drawe* (23-33). München: Fink.
- Waldenfels, B. (2011). In place of the Other. *Continental Philosophy Revue* 44, 151-164.
- Welsch, W. (2012). *Homo mundanus. Jenseits der anthropischen Denkform der Moderne*. Weilerswist: Velbrück.
- Witsch, M. (2016). The Subject in Hönigswald's New Kantian Transcendental Philosophy – or Why Culture and Subject are one. In M. A. Peters & A. de Albam (Eds.), *Subjects in Process. Diversity, Mobility, and the Politics of Subjectivity in the 21st Century* (151-166). London/New York: Routledge.
- Zeidler, K. W. (1995). *Kritische Dialektik und Transzendentalontologie*. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Zeidler K. W. (2002). Versuche einer kritischen Aneignung der Dialektik bei Hönigswald und Bauch. In D. Patzold & C. Krijnen (Eds.), *Der Neukantianismus und das Erbe des deutschen Idealismus: die philosophische Methode* (181-194). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Zeidler, K. W. (2021). ‚Realistischer Kritizismus‘ und ‚Österreichischer Neukantianismus‘. In R. Meer & G. Motta (Eds.), *Kant in Österreich. Alois Riehl und der Weg zum kritischen Realismus* (347-370). Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter.