

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 20TH CENTURY

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Resumen: *La “separación de los caminos” debe constituir un tema central en la reflexión historiográfica acerca de la filosofía del siglo XX, una vez que condicionó en gran medida el tratamiento de temas y procesos característicos de la misma. Como estudio de caso, el debate en torno al psicologismo (Psychologismusstreit) es analizado en esta perspectiva, mostrándose cómo la “separación de los caminos” condicionó visiones anacrónicas de este proceso y, al mismo tiempo, llevó a dejar de lado momentos fundamentales del mismo.*

Palabras claves: *separación de los caminos; psicologismo; neokantismo; escuela de Brentano; Husserl; Frege; filosofía analítica.*

Abstract: *The parting of the ways must constitute a central theme in the historiographic reflection on the philosophy of the 20th century since it has largely conditioned the treatment of characteristic themes and processes of the same. As a case study, the debate about psychologism (Psychologismusstreit) is analyzed from this perspective, showing how the parting of the ways has conditioned anachronistic visions of this process and at the same time leading to leaving aside fundamental moments of it.*

Keywords: *parting of the ways; psychologism; neokantism; Brentano school; Husserl; Frege; analytical philosophy.*

Certainly, throughout the history of philosophy, there have always been divergent schools and tendencies. However, the existence of something akin to two philosophical traditions that developed in almost absolute independence from one another is a singular phenomenon of 20th-century philosophy. Without fully endorsing Friedman's (2000) particular interpretation of this phenomenon, we will briefly refer to it as *the parting of the ways*.

The parting of the ways should be a central theme in a historiographical reflection on 20th-century philosophy, if only because:

1. First, it is reflected in the way one views the history of philosophy (keywords: ahistoricism vs. historicism) and potentially constructs it (keywords: rational reconstruction vs. historical contextualism).
2. Second, it has specifically influenced the way in which the history of 20th-century philosophy has been written.
3. Third, it determines how one engages with *the parting of the ways* itself.

The impact of *the parting of the ways* on the history of 20th-century philosophy has taken on three characteristic forms:

1. First, recounting two separate histories, thereby overlooking a broad and rich field of thematic parallels and systematic—if not actual—points of contact.
2. Second, anachronistically projecting *the parting of the ways* onto the understanding of processes that took place prior to it.
3. Third, overlooking or rather reductionistic considering other philosophical currents.

If the preceding observations are correct, then it makes sense to highlight the importance and necessity of transversal perspectives on 20th-century philosophy—perspectives that should reveal how certain themes and problems cut across various traditions. Since, as already noted, *the parting of the ways*, despite being a very significant phenomenon, does not exhaust everything that occurred in 20th-century philosophy (one might think, for instance, of Neo-Kantianism, the Brentano School, Marxism, and *Lebensphilosophie*), it is also necessary to show that transversal perspectives are useful for understanding the relationships of these traditions both to *the parting of the ways* and to one another.

The list of possible transversal themes is certainly not small and includes, among many others, the theme of intuition. To indicate what is at stake: the distancing of the scientific worldview from intuition constitutes a shared problem for Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, neopositivism, hermeneutics, and *Lebensphilosophie*. Each of these directions offers a distinctly characteristic response to this issue, sometimes in the form of an actual critical dialogue with other currents.

However, in order to avoid remaining at the level of abstract programmatic statements or merely listing examples, I wish to illustrate this proposed program through a concrete case, at least in outline—namely, the Psychologism debate (*Psychologismustreit*).

As I now turn to the Psychologism debate as a case study, it is important to recall certain facts:

1. First, there can be no doubt that the Psychologism debate played a decisive role in the emergence of both analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy, and, beyond that, in the prior and simultaneous development of Neo-Kantianism and the Brentano School. This involved not only thematic parallels and systematic points of contact but also actual interactions and a shared development up to a certain point—one that was often forgotten or disregarded due to *the parting of the ways*.
2. Second, *the parting of the ways* has manifested itself in this topic in a characteristic manner, leading to the aforementioned isolating and anachronistic perspectives. Here, I will mention three paradigmatic cases.

a) Husserl and Frege

The studies on the relationship between Frege and Husserl, initiated by Føllesdal (1950), have been strongly influenced by the works of Mohanty (1962, 2003), which many other researchers sympathetic to Husserl have followed. The essence of this perspective is to analyze the relations and differences between the two authors primarily through the lens of the opposition between language and intentionality. The result, broadly speaking, is a simplistic all-or-nothing view, wherein Husserl addresses and definitively resolves a problem to which Frege, who remains within the framework of naturalism, is supposedly insensitive (González Porta, 1999).

It is true that Frege's anti-psychologism begins with a merely negative distinction between logic and psychology in *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. However, it is also true that precisely the critical resistance he faced from his anti-psychologist opponents—particularly Kerry (1887; cf. González Porta, 2016a)—compelled him to deepen his diagnosis of psychologism in *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, ultimately understanding psychologism not merely as the result of a simple confusion but as a consequence of a mistaken conception of subjectivity (González Porta, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2021a). According to Frege, this conception of subjectivity was “epistemological idealism” (Frege [1897] 1980, 42, 136), i.e., the erroneous assumption that my only direct and immediate objects are my ideas (Frege, 1893, pp. xviii–xxii). If this is the case, then psychologism can only be overcome by rejecting its fundamental thesis—something already accomplished in *Basic Laws*—and ultimately refuting it, as occurs in *The Thought* (González Porta, 2009). The idea that thinking is “the

grasping of thoughts” is a revolutionary thesis within the context of 19th-century German philosophy, marking the culmination of a complex development.

If Frege, in his refutation of psychologism, arrives at significant theses regarding subjectivity, these nonetheless remain without any methodological foundation. The point at which Frege arrives becomes the point from which Husserl departs—now equipped with a powerful new methodological tool for developing a theory of the subject adequate to logical realism: phenomenology (González Porta, 2022a). In short, the anti-psychologisms of Frege and Husserl are not separated by an unbridgeable gap but rather form a continuity, precisely because both confront related problems and attempt similar solutions (González Porta, 2015a). As a passing remark, it should be noted that Exner (1833) had already explicitly posed this problem to Bolzano, though Bolzano ultimately failed to provide a satisfactory solution (González Porta, 2002/2003).

b) Moore’s Refutation of Idealism

The works of many analytic philosophers—paradigmatically, Klemke (2009)—on Moore’s *Refutation of Idealism* follow the same anachronistic trajectory as Mohanty’s studies on Frege and Husserl. Since it is often assumed that this refutation represents the first step toward linguistic analysis—an idea that Russell retrospectively introduced in his *Autobiography* (1967)—scholars have repeatedly overlooked the fact that Moore explicitly resisted being classified as a linguistic-analytical philosopher (González Porta, 2016b, 2022a).

As a result, *Refutation of Idealism* is frequently interpreted as a typical analytic argument that should and can be rationally reconstructed using the tools of mathematical logic. However, this approach simply disregards Moore’s own text, which, in its argumentation, fundamentally appeals to a *phenomenological* method. To convince his reader that the relation between an act and its object is not a part-whole relation and, consequently, that intentionality is something singular and irreducible, Moore explicitly invites them to: “See!” (Moore, 1903, 450). Overlooking this undeniable fact also leads to neglecting Moore’s connections to Stout and, through him, to Brentano. We will return to this point later.

c) Wittgenstein

Thirdly, it is worth mentioning the often-forgotten fact that the debate on psychologism undergoes a significant shift in analytic philosophy from Wittgenstein onward—a shift that, among other things, changes the very concept of psychologism itself (González Porta, 2021c, 2022a). As is well known, Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning does not conceive of meaning as something related to ideal entities and a correspondingly private understanding but rather as a socially communicative event. Psychologism is now no longer primarily associated with relativism but rather with “mentalism,” “solipsism,” and “private language.” However, with few exceptions, scholars tend to overlook this decisive shift and, now under the inspiration of later Wittgensteinian thought, once again project

anachronistic perspectives onto authors such as Frege, Moore, or Russell (cf. Haack, 1978, and González Porta, 2015b, 2022a).

Yet, in reality, Wittgenstein returns to the identification of psychologism with introspectionism, which was already at the core of the early debates on psychologism in France. This identification made it plausible for behaviorist psychology to be understood as an alternative to psychologism—something that certainly would have made no sense for either Frege or Husserl.

We could analyze these three cases more deeply and possibly add others, examining each in exhaustive detail. However, we will pursue a different strategy: we will attempt to provide an overarching perspective that not only corrects particular one-sided or anachronistic views but also offers a more comprehensive and complete outlook on the entire topic. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized from the outset that this remains merely a sketch, which does not claim to be exhaustive and may thus require supplementation in various respects.

Let us sketch, then, how a history of 20th-century philosophy regarding the debate on psychologism should appear—one that takes into account and seeks to overcome the historiographical consequences of the *parting of the ways*, so as to avoid the kinds of errors already mentioned.

First, it is crucial to understand that, in order to properly situate the trends of the 20th century, we must broaden our scope and turn our attention to the 19th century, since certain phenomena are simply prolongations of processes that began in the 19th century (González Porta: 2019b, 2020a, 2021c). In this regard, it is important to recognize:

- that the debate on psychologism (*ps*) was actually a debate.
- that the debate on psychologism (*ps*) was actually not one debate (González Porta, 2020a).

In the 19th century, there were three fundamental variants of anti-psychologism, which we could designate as:

- Normativist: Herbart (1813), Lotze (1874, 1881), Brentano (1874, 1884–1885, 1956, 1962) (González Porta, 2019c, 2019/20, 2022b, 2022d, 2023a, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b).
- Transcendental-Idealist: Cohen (1871, 1883), Natorp (1887a, 1887b, 1888, 1897, 1912), Windelband (1884), Rickert (1892, 1909) (González Porta, 2006, 2017a, 2021b).
- Logical-Realist: Bolzano (1837a, 1837b), Frege (1884, 1893, 1897), Husserl (1900/01, 1913a, 1913b, 1923/24) (González Porta, 2002–2003, 2014a, 2015a, 2017b, 2022c).

Now, among these different strands of anti-psychologism, there are numerous points of contact as well as differences. The differences arose from their divergent programs and systematic motivations, which led each strand to identify a particular form of psychologism as its primary target of critique. Normativism had to contend first with Benecke and later with Czolbe; Neo-Kantianism with Benecke, Fries, Lange, and Helmholtz; logical realism with Mill, Erdmann, Sigwart, Wundt, and Lipps. Consequently, each of the aforementioned strands developed a distinctive form of anti-psychologism (González Porta, 2017a, 2021b, 2022a, 2023a, 2024a, 2024b).

Whereas the normativist approach ultimately rested on the fundamental idea of an originally normative consciousness, the other two approaches were primarily shaped by different conceptions of the *a priori*, which, in turn, were reflected in their characteristic conceptions of logic. For Neo-Kantianism, “logic” was synonymous with epistemology; for logical realism, it encompassed epistemology but also fundamentally formal/general logic and semantics. While for the Neo-Kantians, there are only empirical objects and all *a priori* knowledge was conceivable solely as a condition for the possibility of empirical cognition, for logical realism, there are also abstract objects. Consequently, whereas for Neo-Kantianism, *a priori* knowledge was possible only through transcendental reflection, for logical realism, direct *a priori* knowledge was possible through something akin to a special logical source of knowledge or a categorial intuition.

Despite all their differences, the three aforementioned tendencies faced a similar, yet characteristically differentiated challenge posed by their specific psychological opponents: namely, the task of developing a positive conception of subjectivity that was coherent with their anti-psychologism. In the normativist case, this involved combating any form of naturalistic reductionism that conceived of the psychic as a blindly causal process while affirming a spontaneous and free subjectivity for which normative consciousness was original (González Porta, 2006, 2015c, 2019c, 2019/20, 2024a, 2024b). This problem was not entirely foreign to the other two tendencies, though they each had their own specific difficulties. In the Neo-Kantian case, the challenge lay in clarifying the relationship between the transcendental and an ultimately concrete subjectivity—that is, in developing a psychology compatible with the transcendental method (Natorp, 1912, 1918; González Porta 2006, 2017a). In the logical-realist case, the issue concerned the clarification of how a real and ultimately temporal subject could have access to absolutely transcendent and atemporal objects (González Porta, 2002/03, 2006, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a).

Lotze, Frege, and Natorp are the three figures who, in each of the directions, provided the initial impulse for a response to the psychological challenge—a response that, due to the specificity of their anti-psychologism and the corresponding psychological critique, was characteristically distinct. However, there was another major difference. Whereas Lotze (1881) and Natorp (1912) offered the most mature response to the problem of their specific anti-psychologism—such that their responses were not fundamentally altered later—Frege

only took the first step in that he rejected the principle of immanence, thereby opening promising perspectives. It would ultimately be Husserl who, in *Logical Investigations*, fully completed the task of providing an adequate conception of subjectivity for logical realism.

If one pays attention to this process, it becomes clear that the debate on psychologism was not merely exhausted in the sharp separation between logic and psychology—which constituted only its negative aspect—but that one of its essential outcomes was a decisive renewal of the theory of subjectivity, which reached its peak in Husserl's phenomenology.

At this point, clarification is necessary. It has been repeatedly stated that Husserl's *Prolegomena* definitively refuted psychologism. This claim, if not outright false, is at least superficial. Certainly, the *Prolegomena* provide the first extensive and systematic treatment of the problem of psychologism. However, the argumentative or purely logical refutation of psychologism—which identifies it with relativism and ultimately demonstrates relativism as self-contradictory—was far from marking the end of the debate, nor was it even Husserl's own final word on the matter. Crucial and decisive for overcoming psychologism is the dissolution of its theory of subjectivity, which is carried out through the phenomenological-intentional conception of subjectivity developed in the second volume of *Logical Investigations* (González Porta, 2011, 2022c).

By paying attention to the foregoing, one is able to correct a second widespread error (González Porta, 2011). The question of the relationship between psychology and phenomenology is one that Husserl would engage with until the end of his life, continuously offering new perspectives on the matter.

For precisely this reason, Husserl's critique of psychologism continues to develop after the *Logical Investigations*, specifically in the direction of surpassing mere argumentative refutation through an actual overcoming. From this perspective, the idealistic-transcendental turn now signals a new decisive moment. Only with and after the transcendental reduction, i.e., with the definitive overcoming of naturalism, does Husserl believe himself capable of achieving the final overcoming of psychologism—namely, its transcendental form. However, for this to happen, psychology itself must take on its ultimate form, namely the phenomenological one, which will only be possible after the development of transcendental phenomenology (González Porta, 2011).

Nevertheless, the transcendental-phenomenological turn is by no means Husserl's final word in the debate on psychologism. Despite all differences with Neo-Kantianism regarding the conception of transcendental philosophy—differences that concentrate on the opposition between phenomenological intuition and transcendental method—Husserl, with the transcendental turn, returns to a problem that Natorp had already identified and attempted to solve in a different direction: namely, by dissolving the rigid opposition between subject and object through the idea of two modes of considering the same phenomenon—subjectivation and objectivation. Whereas the *Logical Investigations* provided a theory of subjectivity consistent with logical realism, addressing the psycholo-

gists' persistent demand for clarification of how a psychological subject could have access to abstract objects, the transcendental turn now raises the problem of the relationship between transcendental and concrete subjectivity. It is now clear that a solution like Natorp's is entirely excluded for an intuitive transcendental phenomenology. Husserl consciously seeks to account for this. Fundamental concepts such as spatialization, temporalization, individuation, or monad express Husserl's concern with mediating the distance between transcendental and concrete subjectivity.

However, this is still not the end. After defining phenomenology as descriptive psychology, as eidetic psychology, and as transcendental phenomenology—always emphasizing the separation between phenomenology and psychology—the supposed definitive overcoming of naturalism leads to the overcoming of Cartesianism and to the identification of transcendental phenomenology with pure phenomenological psychology (González Porta, 2011). Other paths were certainly possible, and it is well known that Heidegger (Biemel, 1955) pursued a different path to its conclusion when, in his article for the *British Encyclopedia*, he ultimately asserts that the fundamental task consists in demonstrating that the true transcendental subject is the factual subject in its facticity (González Porta, 2010).

Let us now return to other developments that are not entirely unrelated to the previous discussion. If Frege, on the one hand, takes the first step on a path that Husserl follows to its conclusion, there is another aspect of his anti-psychologism that points in a different direction. In fact, we must distinguish in Frege between an epistemological and a methodological anti-psychologism—or between the rejection of a psychologism based on a false thesis and a psychologism that results from confusion (González Porta, 2022a). That is: we must distinguish between Frege's reflective diagnosis and refutation of psychologism and the way he actually conducts logical analysis with the absolutely essential assistance of the new logic. Methodological anti-psychologism consists in consistently eliminating all psychological considerations from logical argumentation. Thus, while in the first sense Frege takes the first step, in the second he provides a clear example of a mature, elaborated procedure.

It is this second anti-psychologism that will have a decisive impact on analytic philosophy (González Porta, 2022a), something that is particularly evident in Wittgenstein's ambivalent relationship with Frege and, specifically, with Frege's *Der Gedanke*. Two crucial moments must be distinguished in this regard: Russell and Carnap. On the one hand, Russell (1903) certainly operates within the horizon of Moore's refutation of idealism, which plays a decisive role in the turn toward analysis. However, in the way he conducts this analysis, he stands closer to Frege, which is paradigmatically demonstrated in his discussion with Cassirer, marking a distinct turning point. While Cassirer, without abandoning anti-psychologism and following Natorp's teaching, emphasizes the necessary complementarity of the subjective and objective perspectives, Russell demands the complete exclusion of all subjective perspectives from the logical foundation of mathematics and insists on developing it using purely logical resources.

Russell's methodological perspective is extended by Carnap (1928) from mathematics to the logical reconstruction of the language of science as a whole. The logical reconstruction of scientific language now appears as an analytic variant of the theory of constitution, which, as such, also has specific phenomenological and Neo-Kantian variants in Husserl and Cassirer. However, Carnap's claim to carry out a purely logical reconstruction of the language of science cannot entirely dispense with its starting point in basic propositions and thus cannot absolutely avoid the problem of psychology.

If the psychologism debate extends across various traditions, it also brings with it themes that constitute specific moments of the controversy, such as the relationship between act, content, and object (González Porta, 2015c). It is little known that not only Lotze but also Brentano played a decisive role in English philosophy at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The most significant figure of English Brentanism is undoubtedly Stout, who, not coincidentally, anticipated Twardowski's critique of Brentano (1893) by a year and advocated the separation of content and object. Stout exerted an important influence on both Russell and Moore. It is Stout (1892, 1896) who stands in the background of Moore's intentionalist critique of idealism. However, this does not mean that Moore simply reproduces Stout's conception of intentionality. In fact, there is a discussion between Moore and Stout, as Moore denies any role for content and seeks to understand intentionality as a simple act-object relation. However, with this direct realism, the possibilities for developing a theory of the foundational relationship of acts become limited.

Something similar occurs within the Brentano School itself (González Porta, 2019c, 2019/20). When Twardowski introduces the distinction between content and object, he nevertheless holds onto the idea that every act has an object, thereby leading to a doctrine of different types of objects. While Husserl, starting from Brentano's notion of intentionality, aims at a complication of act theory, Meinong develops another variant that focuses on a complication of the structure of the object. In this way, Brentano's descriptive psychology develops into Meinong's theory of objects (Meinong, 1904, 1907, 1921). This development within the school would not occur without resistance, as is particularly evident in the Höfler (1906) – Marty (1908) polemic (González Porta, 2022b). This debate makes it clear that anti-psychologism, which neither party wished to abandon, could lead to two possible final outcomes: either to a reformulation of the psychological method that is not incompatible with the acceptance of transcendent entities, or to a theory of objects that ultimately abandons the psychological method altogether and should thus be regarded not only as anti-psychologistic but as genuinely a-psychologistic.

This development of anti-psychologism into objectivism takes place not only within the Brentano School but also within Neo-Kantianism, specifically through authors such as Lask (1912) and Bauch (1925). In particular, the latter explicitly accuses the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School of a refined psychologism, which provokes Natorp's reaction, leading to an explicit polemic between the two (González Porta, 1989).

However, the late objectivism of some Neo-Kantians is only one of the possible developments of their anti-psychologism. It coexists, in fact, with another development that moves in the opposite direction and is radically embodied in Hönigswald (1913, 1921) (González Porta, 2023c). Hönigswald starts from Natorp and considers that the origin of psychologism lies in a false idea of subjectivity. However, against Natorp, he also points out that this false idea of subjectivity is a consequence of a one-sided, natural-scientific concept of experience. The Neo-Kantian concept of experience is now identified with the concept of experience in the natural sciences, emphasizing that it is based on this concept that the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental was established—a distinction that has played a decisive role in the entire Neo-Kantian struggle against psychologism. However, given the development of scientific psychology, the exclusive dominance of the natural-scientific concept of experience should be called into question. For Hönigswald, this development is paradigmatically illustrated by the empirical-experimental method of the Würzburg School's psychology of thinking. It is based on such an analysis that Hönigswald asserts that the empirical and the transcendental are not mutually exclusive, as there are facts that are simultaneously principles, such as the self and language (González Porta, 2023c).

As early as Stumpf (1892), in a polemic with Cohen and Windelband and in the spirit of the psychological method and Brentano's descriptive psychology, the fundamental thesis was formulated that something cannot be both transcendently true and psychologically false. In doing so, he anticipated major problems that any form of anti-psychologism would have to face in the coming decades—not only within Neo-Kantianism but also within phenomenology.

Husserl had formed his idea of psychology in the nineteenth century, with psychophysiology as the model of scientific psychology, and had shown little interest in later developments in psychology that took place in the twentieth century, such as the aforementioned psychology of thinking or the even more well-known and influential Gestalt theory. His student Gurwitsch (1829; cf. Soares 2021) had already drawn the master's attention to the necessity of serious reflection on these developments but without much success. In doing so, Gurwitsch opened the possibility for a critique of Husserl, which contemporaries like Cassirer would undertake and which Merleau-Ponty would later develop intensively (Soares/González Porta, 2022e), with the latter leading phenomenology in a direction that was less transcendental and more empirically oriented (González Porta, 2020a).

Looking back at the interconnected development of phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, and the Brentano School, it must be said that while psychologism was philosophy's main adversary, subjectivity also became its central theme—albeit in different forms and through different approaches. Those who sought to exclude subjectivity from philosophy were clearly in the minority. In this regard, something quite different happens within analytic philosophy.

For the development and future of the analytic treatment of psychologism, not only is Wittgenstein's (1980, 580) already mentioned anti-mentalism decisive, but also his critique

of psychology. As is well known, Wittgenstein argues in the *Philosophical Investigations* that the state of psychology cannot be compared to the infancy of physics because psychology involves not only experimental difficulties but also conceptual confusions. This Wittgensteinian diagnosis synthesizes the necessity of conceptual clarification as the foundation of all psychology and the substitution of any properly philosophical analysis of the subject with an analysis of the semantics of attributing propositional attitudes. In this context, the idea emerges that the philosophy of mind should be nothing other than an inquiry into our concepts of mind (Crane, 2014). The peak of analytic philosophy, or more precisely, of the linguistic-analytic method, thus has decisive implications for the question of psychologism (see Haack, 1978, and cf. González Porta, 2015b).

If certain things are set in motion within the phenomenological–Neo-Kantian tradition, this movement would intersect with developments in analytic philosophy that originally had entirely different origins. With Quine’s challenge to the *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* (1969), the fundamental assumptions of classical linguistic analysis were called into question, paving the way for naturalism and, with it, a new stage in the discussion between psychologism and anti-psychologism. It is not without reason that in recent years there has been talk of a revival of psychologism. However, this psychologism is sometimes not a true revival but rather a transformation of its meaning, which places the philosophy of mind as a respectable analytic topic on the agenda, as in the case of Tim Crane (2014).

Naturalism today is a phenomenon that has given an entirely new shape to the linguistic-analytic tradition and has, frequently, gained dominance in the Anglo-Saxon sphere. What is interesting, however, is that what might initially be considered a characteristic development of analytic philosophy proves to be no less significant for phenomenology. Naturalized phenomenology—or at least a fundamental discussion of phenomenology with naturalism, possibly accompanied by less enthusiasm for transcendentalism—is a tendency that can be observed today. Certainly, such developments are not merely the result of philosophical considerations but have been decisively influenced by advances in the cognitive sciences and neuroscience.

Finally, it should be noted: a history of twentieth-century philosophy that consciously seeks to engage with the *parting of the ways* cannot simply accept the idea of a “history of analytic philosophy” without question but must critically examine it—an inquiry that should be an essential part of a deeper discussion on the historiography of twentieth-century philosophy.

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