Cogency

Towards the Definition of Logical Competence

2021-09-29T20:41:31-03:00

According to logical psychologism that was popular in the nineteenth century, logic was regarded as a natural ability of human psychology. Consequently, logical competence as a realization of logic knowledge was treated as one of the innate features of human thinking. Nevertheless, within cognitive science, it was experimentally proved that our thinking is not free from cognitive biases, and to the same extent, our reasoning is not free from logical fallacies. Hence, we are forced to consciously clear the thinking of possible distortions to follow logical norms and to realize logical competence thereby. In the paper, it is shown that some cognitive biases are observed even at the level of cellular reactions to the environment and then at the level of animal behavior. Therefore not logic, but cognitive biases are a natural (biological) mechanism of human thinking. So, the problem of defining logical competence arises. In this paper, there are some arguments that logical competence has once appeared as an especial social practice and it has then been developed for a long time before the first treatises on logic.

Sàágua and Baumtrog on practical rationality

2022-01-26T19:22:56-03:00

In “Practical Rationality at Work – A New Argumentation Model” (2018, pp.193-230) Sàágua and Baumtrog offer what they call “a new ideal model of integrated practical reasoning and argumentation.” I will argue that their only really original contribution is a reconceptualization of argumentation schemes as producing pro tanto reasons, and such a reconceptualization is both wrong-headed in itself and makes their model less integrated than other models, not more. In fact, their work is itself an example of bad practical reasoning.

Pragmática y arquitectura mental: una propuesta desde la modularidad masiva de la mente

2021-10-07T16:40:33-03:00

Uno de los problemas fundamentales respecto de la naturaleza cognitiva de la pragmática se refiere al lugar que ocupa ella en la arquitectura de la mente. Al respecto existen varias propuestas. Una de ellas sostiene que forma parte de los sistemas centrales en el marco de la teoría de modular de Jerry Fodor. Sin embargo, Asa Kasher plantea una hipótesis basada en la arquitectura modula de Fodor, pero sí otorga un carácter modular al menos a algunos aspectos de la interpretación pragmática. En este trabajo sostenemos que ambas propuestas son incorrectas debido a inconsistencias con los hallazgos empíricos sobre procesamiento pragmático. Por el contrario, se aboga por una hipótesis basada en la modularidad masiva de la mente, en donde consideraciones evolutivas llevaron a que emerja un submódulo pragmático que es parte de un módulo más general de teoría de la mente.

El rol del razonamiento abductivo en el razonamiento probatorio del derecho: una perspectiva orientada hacia la práctica

2022-01-26T19:46:41-03:00

El presente artículo parte de una revisión y relativización de la tajante distinción entre contexto de descubrimiento y contexto de justificación, originada en la filosofía de la ciencia del empirismo lógico y presente como un presupuesto de varios estudios sobre la argumentación jurídica. A continuación, analiza la propuesta de desarrollar una lógica del descubrimiento para el contexto de descubrimiento, una de cuyas principales herramientas sería el razonamiento abductivo. Finalmente, aplica los alcances de tal discusión al razonamiento probatorio jurídico, a partir del análisis de algunos casos.

How universal generalization works according to natural reason

2021-08-06T16:34:33-04:00

Universal Generalization, if it is not the most poorly understood inference rule in natural deduction, then it is the least well explained or justified. The inference rule is, prima facie, quite ambitious: on the basis of a fact established of one thing, I may infer that the fact holds of every thing in the class to which the one belongs—a class which may contain indefinitely many things. How can such an inference be made with any confidence as to its validity or ability to preserve truth from premise to conclusion? My goal in this paper is to explain how Universal Generalization works in a way that makes sense of its ability to preserve truth. In doing so, I shall review common accounts of Universal Generalization and explain why they are inadequate or are explanatorily unsatisfying. Happily, my account makes no ontological or epistemological presumptions and therefore should be compatible with whichever ontological or epistemological schemes the reader prefers.