Cogency

Introducción a System and Complexity in Classical German Philosophy, vol. 2

2025-06-28T20:16:25-04:00

"The Absolute Idea" in the Science of Logic. Methodological Resources for Fulfilling the Destiny of the Idea

2024-08-05T17:16:14-04:00

The Chapter "The Absolute Idea" concludes Hegel's Science of Logic by presenting the method of pure thinking. In this paper, I aim to defend the thesis that the absolute method introduced therein fulfills one of the central tasks of the absolute idea: the reconciliation of the subjective and objective poles of the idea. This reconciliation will be demonstrated by showing that the development of the method reveals two distinct dimensions: a methodological dimension and an operational dimension. In other words, the method will first be revealed as the methodological or procedural dynamics of the Logic. Second, the method will be shown as the operations and very nature of thinking, which ultimately coincides with the internal dynamics of every object. However, for this articulation to be successful, it is essential to account for the connection between the absolute method (that is, the absolute idea) and the preceding logical course that leads to the deduction of the absolute idea. Failure in this regard would result in several problematic issues, most notably establishing a new division between the development of the object of pure thinking and the structure of this pure thinking itself.

The Logic of Primal Willing in Schelling’s Freedom Essay

2025-06-28T10:20:56-04:00

Schelling’s famous Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom is regularly presented as an enigmatic work that transcends reason and thereby eschews any systematic comprehension. However, Schelling’s Freedom Essay neither endorses irrationalism, nor does it call us to abandon systematic thinking. While it is true that the Absolute exceeds the powers of the understanding, Schelling boldly endorses the view that the Absolute is inherently rational and can be successfully known by means of reason. Because Schelling identifies reason as that power in virtue of which we know the absolute, he infers that “Reason is not activity but rather indifference” and “the general place of truth.” Since the Absolute is indifference, and indifference is what constitutes reason, the Absolute is reason itself. Far from denying that the Absolute is rational, the truths that Schelling uncovers in the Freedom Essay only appear within the domain of reason. Schelling himself insists upon this, for the “renunciation of reason and science” is “self-castration” that is constituted by a “bleak and wild enthusiasm.” I begin by reconstructing the metaphysics of Schelling’s logic of “primal willing” from which I demonstrate that the logic of freedom transcends the understanding but cannot transcend reason. Without acknowledging the fundamental difference between the understanding and reason in Schelling’s Freedom Essay, we overlook its significance for systematic thinking, and maim his commitment to absolute knowledge.

Fractal Complexity in the System of Pure Reason. Unity, Truth and Perfection as structural Moments of transcendental Critique of Reason

2025-06-28T18:46:35-04:00

The specific manner in which transcendental philosophy deals with the complexity of reality has itself led to both sophisticated and complex systems whose unity are difficult to see. This applies in particular to Kant's philosophy, which not without reason has the reputation that its sub-areas are only loosely and at best externally held together by the Kantian method. I firmly oppose this view. Kant's philosophy is not characterized by the fact that it considers a system of contingent sub-areas of human existence, but rather by the strict development of a single principle. This principle is that of an apperceptive reason, i.e. an ultimate cause that must be grasped as such through itself. It is striking that each of the three critiques of reason pick up the thread of the investigation precisely where the previous one dropped it. In accordance with the synthetic-syllogistic structure of conceptual determination, reason thus passes through three interwoven lines of reasoning in order to be able to expose its own concept as the basis of all knowledge in the course of the third critique. However, Kant's efforts in the Opus Postumum point to the fact that there is still a gap here, as well as to the possibility of closing it.

Identity-Monism or the Dark Night of the Absolute?

2025-06-28T09:34:33-04:00

The year 1801 marked an important year for Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling’s (1775-1854) philosophical thought. It saw the publication of Schelling’s Presentation of My System of Philosophy which would stand as the marker of a new era of idealism, that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) would coin as objective idealism. The 1801 Presentation represents a clear shift away from Schelling’s seminal System of Transcendental Idealism; and the official beginning of Schelling’s own Identity Philosophy which occurred through several major works from 1801 to 1806. The Presentation also characterizes a decisive genesis in Schelling’s mature metaphysics of identity. The metaphysics of identity’s central aim was to capture the concept of absolute identity realized as the totality of the cosmos. Using Spinoza’s (1632-1677) Ethics as his guide and model, Schelling revealed a meticulous systematic philosophy that offered distinct propositions and definitions, each following one another to develop an elaborate organic whole.

However, the works that makeup Schelling’s identity philosophy would receive a series of philosophical backlashes from several of his interlocuters, which included: Karl August von Eschenmayer (1768-1852), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. This criticism would reach forward into the contemporary scholarship. The accusations made against Schelling were directed at his monistic system and surrounded his conception of the absolute. According to Schelling’s critics, his systematic concept of the absolute swallowed reality into a homogenous whole leaving no room for philosophical difference. These erroneous accusations would have several implications which would cast a long shadow on Schelling’s identity philosophy with the infamous remarks describing Schelling’s project eclipsed in the dark night of the absolute.

The following paper is divided in two main parts. The first, will evaluate the historical context and philosophical importance behind the structure of Schelling’s 1801 Presentation. The second, will addresses Schelling’s numerous critics and attempt to explicate the essence behind Schelling’s metaphysics of identity. This paper will thus conclude by showing how difference plays an integral part for Schelling, as the realm of finitude, and the ground of all phenomena. These important parts of the whole system are connected in a subterranean like fashion in primordial identity. Thus, grounding Schelling’s own novel, philosophical creation, an identity-monism.

Critique and Complex System in the Late Marx in His Confrontation with Hegel

2025-06-28T19:17:58-04:00

The numerous studies on Marx’s theory of social formation often find an interpretive horizon in Marx’s relationship with Hegel. This article focuses on understanding the account of political economy as a critical endeavour and on examining this account through particular interpretations of the systematic construction of categories. Contemporary interpreters of Marx continue to engage in extensive debates over the possibility of reading a critical methodology in his writings on the nature of capital, and over whether the texts that address the judgment of the economy as such may contribute to a specific epistemology. To this end, the concepts of complexity and dialectics are analysed.

How Should Nature Be Studied Philosophically? A Hegelian Response

2025-06-28T20:35:24-04:00

This paper addresses the question of how nature should be philosophically studied within a
Hegelian framework. The focus is epistemological: it examines the relationship between philosophy
and the empirical sciences in the constitution of natural categories. I argue that this relationship is
neither strictly a priori nor strictly a posteriori but unfolds through a speculative interplay between
an a priori philosophical principle of unity and an a posteriori attentiveness to empirical discovery.
To support this view, I engage with prominent positions in the secondary literature – namely, Alison
Stone’s strong a priorism and John Burbidge’s a posteriorism. After addressing two key problems in
these interpretations, I show how both mistakenly attempt to read Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature
through the rigid Kantian dichotomy of a priori and a posteriori, which speculative thought seeks to
overcome. Drawing on the work of Brigitte Falkenburg, Cinzia Ferrini, and Sebastian Rand, I
propose that natural categories should be understood as the result of empirical content that is
reorganized, a posteriori, in accordance with an a priori principle of systematic unity. This
interpretation not only aligns with Hegel’s own texts but also highlights the dynamic and active
character of his philosophy.

Reseña: "Harald Bluhm: Las formas del saber en torno a la comunicabilidad universal: aproximaciones desde Kant y Jean Paul."

2025-04-08T00:54:39-04:00