https://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/issue/feedCogency2025-01-28T15:17:01-03:00Jacinto Páez Bonifaci[email protected]Open Journal Systems<p><em>Cogency </em>es una revista internacional dedicada a la investigación y trabajo académico en torno al razonamiento y la argumentación. La revista busca ser un referente que elucide nuestro entendimiento sobre estos campos de estudio, con un particular interés en la dimensión filosófica. Su objetivo es contribuir tanto a la teoría como a la práctica, tomando en cuenta perspectivas originadas en la filosofía, lógica forma e informal, retórica, lingüística y psicología. Cogency publica artículos y comentarios de libros.</p> <p>Los artículos de Cogency están indexados o resumidos en: Scopus; Latindex; ERIH+; Dialnet; The<br />Philosopher's Index; International Directory of Philosophy (Centro de Documentación Filosófica);<br />Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek ezb (Biblioteca de Revistas Electrónicas); Genamics Journal<br />Seek; NewJour. Electronic Journals & Newsletters; Revistas filosóficas en la red;<br />WorldCat oclc.</p>https://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/434On Kant's Copernican Revolution and the Practical Transformation of Metaphysics2024-07-14T16:35:15-04:00Wei Tan[email protected]<p>It is an important concern for Kant to render the metaphysics to transition from the speculative to the practical domain. In the second edition preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stated that we can securely guide the metaphysics along the path of a science through a revolution in philosophy, in which the revolution is generally called Copernican Revolution. Since Kant divided metaphysics into metaphysics of nature and of morals, the revolution for the path of a science should aim not merely at metaphysics of nature but also at metaphysics of morals. However, the critique of the traditional metaphysics of nature does not directly lead to the systematic construction of the metaphysics of morals. It contains a transition. Yet, we cannot reach this transition based on the classical understanding of the Copernican Revolution, which disregards the historical context in astronomy. To contextualize the revolution within Kant’s philosophy, we will reveal the essence of the Kantian Copernican Revolution. It shows that the essence of the revolution should not be a reversal of cognition and objects but a transformation in the cognitive faculties itself. Through the new interpretation of the Copernican Revolution we can illustrate how did Kant achieved the transition. It presents as a progressively practical transformation process and ultimately provides the groundwork for constructing the metaphysics of morals.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Wei Tanhttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/435Revisting Kant and Husserl on the Copernican Turn2024-07-15T14:33:55-04:00Michael Blezy[email protected]<p>In the following paper, I argue that none of the recent criticisms of Kant’s transcendental idealism offered on behalf of Husserl scholars such as Dominque Pradelle give us reason to think that Husserlian phenomenology moves beyond Kant’s Copernican turn. I begin by first providing an interpretation of Kant’s Copernican turn before outlining three issues with Kant’s transcendental idealism that scholars like Pradelle (following Husserl) take as reason to reject Kant’s revolution in philosophy: it makes the reference to the thing-it-itself, Kant construes the subject of the turn along psychological lines, and Kant’s transcendental idealism results in skepticism. I then provide reasons why these supposed issues with Kant’s theory ought not motivate us to think that Husserl’s phenomenology does not operate with the underlying assumption of the turn or move beyond it. Finally, I make the case that if we take into the consideration the role played by the unity of apperception in Kant’s account of object constitution, then Kant and Husserl, far from differing on the turn, are in fact, and contra thinkers like Pradelle, closer on the topic of objects of consciousness than is typically appreciated.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Michael Blezyhttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/426Conceptual Content after the Copernican Turn2025-01-05T11:01:53-03:00Maximilian Edwards[email protected]<p>Kant announces a ‘Copernican turn’ in philosophy, but the model of cognition from which he claims to be ‘turning’ resurfaces in his own constructive account of empirical conceptual content. For Kant, no less than for his ‘pre-Copernican’ predecessors, empirical concepts are a species of representation that ‘conform to’ their objects. But if Kant does not excise the pre Copernican model of cognition from his positive picture, in what does his turn from it consist? I argue that Kant’s target is not the legitimacy but the explanatory sufficiency of the pre Copernican model. Kant’s critical gesture towards that model consists in showing that cognition can only exhibit the structure envisaged by the pre-Copernican system if it is underwritten by a kind of content - viz. transcendental content - which cannot be modeled in pre-Copernican terms. A full appreciation of Kant’s Copernicanism thus requires an account of transcendental conceptual content, and its relation to empirical conceptual content. Drawing on Kant’s account of the transcendental object and other neglected textual resources, I develop such an account.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Maximilian Edwardshttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/425Kant’s Copernican Turn in Kudryavtsev-Platonov’s System of Transcendental Monism2024-07-04T05:29:06-04:00David Rozhin[email protected]<p><em>Kudryavtsev-Platonov is an outstanding representative of Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy, who stands out from his colleagues in that he often refers to Kantian philosophy in his works. There is no doubt that the formation of his epistemological conception was influenced by the Kantian Copernican turn, but what exactly this influence consisted in has not yet been investigated. To answer this question I first determine under what circumstances Kudryavtsev’s acquaintance with Kant’s epistemology occurred. In particular, I analyzed Kudryavtsev’s previously unpublished manuscript materials for lectures on metaphysics and the history of New Philosophy from the early period of his teaching career at the Moscow Theological Academy. One may conclude from this that the Russian philosopher was more likely to have been exposed to the ideas of Kantian philosophy through interpreters, who popularized Kant’s philosophy, as well as through historical-philosophical literature and critical writings of later Kantians. I then conduct a comparative analysis between Kudryavtsev’s transcendental monism and Kant’s doctrine of space, time and categories of understanding. As a result, I show that Kant’s Copernican turn is one of the key principles in Kudryavtsev’s transcendental monism, but not the only one. In particular, Kudryavtsev utilized Kant’s concepts of apriorism and subjectivity of cognitive forms, whereby he concentrated on the philosophical ideas of F.A. Trendelenburg and W.T. Krug’s transcendental syntheticism in mind</em>.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 David Rozhinhttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/430Radicalizing the Copernican Turn. Chances and Challenges of Richard Hönigswald's Neo-Kantian Transcendentalism2025-01-05T11:20:18-03:00Anke Redecker[email protected]<p>By establishing a transcendental theory of concrete subjectivity, the new-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönigswald radicalized Kant’s Copernican turn and described the human body as principle and factum in a manifold cultural philosophy. For this purpose, he had to overcome his close relationship to the realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism of Riehl and Liebmann, who fell behind Kant’s Copernican turn and his rejection of epistemological relevant things in themselves. Thus, Hönigswald went through his own Copernican turn, before he refined the Kantian concept.</p> <p><br />Localizing the Kantian ‘I think’ in the concrete human-being offers the possibility to combine several parts and aspects of the Kantian philosophy and its components like ethics, aesthetics, and anthropology. Here Hönigswald concentrates on the capacities of human beings who explore and form their living world, while Kant’s Copernican turn shows their ambivalences of freedom and determination, understanding and alienness. To regard these ambivalences, we can look ahead in philosophical body theory and refer to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and today’s postphenomenological approaches that stress alienation and contingency by highlighting humanbeings’ entanglement with the world.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Anke Redeckerhttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/414El rol normativo de la paraconsistencia2024-04-19T11:01:28-04:00Diego Tajer[email protected]<p>En este artículo, analizo el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. En pocas palabras, este argumento plantea que un agente podría creer una contradicción sin estar necesariamente comprometido con toda oración, y que por eso deberíamos rechazar el principio lógico de Explosión. Aquí, describo las críticas hechas por Steinberger (2014), quien considera que el argumento es erróneo. Steinberger afirma que este argumento deja de funcionar cuando admitimos que la normatividad de la lógica es de “alcance amplio”, es decir, que siempre tenemos la opción de abandonar las premisas o aceptar la conclusión. En este artículo doy una respuesta a Steinberger, tomando en cuenta algunos conceptos normativos que fueron ignorados en esta discusión: el concepto de <em>compromiso</em>, y el concepto de <em>permiso inferencial</em>. Muestro que una vez que tomamos estas nociones en cuenta, el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia vuelve a funcionar. Esto a se debe a que tanto el compromiso como los permisos inferenciales funcionan con “alcance estrecho”. Es decir, uno se compromete a ciertas creencias a partir de otras, y uno infiere ciertas oraciones a partir de otras. Si expresamos la normatividad de la lógica con estos conceptos, podemos volver a cuestionar el principio lógico de Explosión, ya que no es razonable que creer una contradicción nos comprometa con toda oración, o sirva de base para inferir cualquier oración.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Diego Tajerhttps://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/407La complejidad en textos argumentativos: estado de la cuestión (2017-2022)2024-05-22T17:07:17-04:00Diego Vargas[email protected]Ligia Ochoa[email protected]<p>La complejidad lingüística se ha desarrollado como un tema cada vez más relevante en diferentes áreas teóricas y aplicadas de los estudios del lenguaje, incluso, en interface con la educación. Como son diversas las concepciones de complejidad, este artículo de revisión bibliográfica busca presentar un estado de la cuestión, construido con artículos producidos entre 2017 y 2022, sobre los estudios del campo específicamente dedicados al análisis de textos argumentativos, en los últimos cinco años. Para ello, se adoptó una metodología cualitativa descriptiva-interpretativa de tipo documental, principalmente centrada en el análisis de contenido. Se encontró que la mayoría de las investigaciones trabajan sobre lo que se conoce en la literatura como complejidad relativa y que los criterios empleados con mayor frecuencia son los sintácticos, aunque se presentan investigaciones dedicadas a la complejidad argumentativa en otros niveles lingüísticos (textuales y pragmáticos, por ejemplo). La mayoría de los trabajos se dedican a la escritura en nivel académico, con un énfasis en la competencia argumentativa en lenguas extranjeras o L2. Se encuentra poca investigación en niños, jóvenes y poblaciones no escolares y sobre la enseñanza de la argumentación en lengua materna, lo que nos abre caminos de investigación sobre la construcción del discurso argumentativo y de sus complejidades en diferentes contextos.</p>2025-01-28T00:00:00-03:00Derechos de autor 2025 Diego Vargas, Ligia Ochoa