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
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Contenidos

ON KANT'S COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AND THE PRACTICAL TRANSFORMATION OF METAPHYSICS[1,2]

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It is an important concern for Kant to render the metaphysics to transition from the speculative to the practical domain. In the second edition preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, *Kant stated that we can securely guide the metaphysics along the path of a science through a revolution in philosophy, in which the revolution is generally called Copernican Revolution. Since Kant divided metaphysics into metaphysics of nature and of morals, the revolution for the path of a science should aim not merely at metaphysics of nature but also at metaphysics of morals. However, the critique of the traditional metaphysics of nature does not directly lead to the systematic construction of the metaphysics of morals. It contains a transition. Yet, we cannot reach this transition based on the classical understanding of the Copernican Revolution, which disregards the historical context in astronomy. To contextualize the revolution within Kant's philosophy, we will reveal the essence of the Kantian Copernican Revolution. It shows that the essence of the revolution should not be a reversal of cognition and objects but a transformation in the cognitive faculties itself. Through the new interpretation of the Copernican Revolution we can illustrate how did Kant achieved the transition. It presents as a progressively practical transformation process and ultimately provides the groundwork for constructing the metaphysics of morals.*

Keywords: *philosophy; metaphysics of morals; metaphysics of nature; Copernican Revolution; faculty of mind; Newtonian Mechanics*

Una de las principales preocupaciones de Kant es posibilitar que la metafísica transite del ámbito especulativo al práctico. En el prefacio de la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón *pura, Kant afirma que la metafísica puede orientarse de manera segura hacia el camino de la ciencia mediante una revolución en la filosofía, conocida comúnmente como la Revolución Copernicana. Dado que Kant divide la metafísica en metafísica de la naturaleza y metafísica de la moral, dicha revolución debe dirigirse no solo a la metafísica de la naturaleza, sino también a la de la moral. Sin embargo, la crítica a la metafísica tradicional de la naturaleza no conduce directamente a la construcción sistemática de la metafísica de la moral; entre ambas se encuentra una transición. Esta transición no puede comprenderse desde la interpretación clásica de la Revolución Copernicana, que pasa por alto el contexto histórico de la astronomía. Para contextualizar esta revolución en la filosofía kantiana, es necesario desvelar su esencia. Demostraremos que esta esencia no reside en una simple inversión entre cognición y objetos, sino en una transformación fundamental de las facultades cognitivas. A partir de esta nueva interpretación de la Revolución Copernicana, es posible esclarecer cómo Kant logra esta transición, presentada como un proceso progresivo de transformación práctica, que finalmente sienta las bases para la construcción de la metafísica de la moral.*

Palabras clave: *filosofía; metafísica de la moral; metafísica de la naturaleza; Revolución Copernicana; facultades cognitivas; mecánica newtoniana*

1.Introduction

In the second edition's preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (the first *Critique,* hereafter), Kant asserts that we can render metaphysics to become a science through a revolution in the field of philosophy, in which the revolution is commonly called Copernican Revolution. This task consists of two steps: the first step is to criticize the traditional dogmatic metaphysics; the second step is to construct a scientific system of metaphysics. The former serves as the method or the outline of science, which is the main content of Kant's first *Critique* (*KrV*, BXXII). But for the latter, since metaphysics in Kant's system is constituted by two parts, namely metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals, the task of constructing a scientific system of metaphysics can be divided into answering two questions: (i) How to render the metaphysics of nature to become a science through the Copernican Revolution? (ii) How to render the metaphysics of morals to become a science through the Copernican Revolution?

In regard of the first question, because traditional metaphysics contains merely the metaphysics of nature in the narrow sense, if Kant successfully criticized the traditional dogmatic metaphysics, the scientific system of metaphysics can reasonably be derived from the uncriticized part. In the first *Critique*, Kant distinguishes two constructions of metaphysics of nature based on different principles: In the "Transcendental Methodology", metaphysics of nature includes transcendental philosophy and the natural science of pure reason, the latter of which is divided into rational physics, rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology. In contrast, in the "Transcendental Dialectic" it is divided into rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, in which he demonstrated that the super-sensible knowledge in these three parts is merely transcendental illusion (*KrV*, A845-A847/B873-B875). Thus, the remaining uncriticized part is rational physics, which is precisely the content to be constructed in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.* Therefore, the transition from negative critique to positive systematical construction does not raise the question of how to make the transition.[3]

However, it seems to be entirely a different issue in view of the second question. Since metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals belong to two completely heterogeneous fields: while the former concerns the issue of "is" in theoretical dimension, the latter concerns the issue of "ought" in practical dimension. Hence, even if we accept that Kant successfully criticized traditional metaphysics, it does not directly lead to the construction of a systematical metaphysics of morals, which is in opposite to the situation in metaphysics of nature. It involves a transition from metaphysics of nature to metaphysics of morals. The problem is: since Kant believes that the Copernican Revolution in philosophy can also make the metaphysics of morals become a science, this revolution must also afford to explain this "transition". But if the Copernican Revolution is in generally understood as the inversion

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3 We will not talk about if Kant's viewpoint is right or not. A skeptical idea about it see, De Boer (2020, pp. 232-238).

from "cognition conforming to objects" to "objects conforming to cognition", the best result Kant can reach is the unknowability of the super-sensible objects in metaphysics of nature, without extending beyond speculative philosophy to moral philosophy. Therefore it leads to the following problem: how to achieve this "transition" through the Copernican Revolution, so as to make the metaphysics of morals become a science?

Due to the longstanding misinterpretation of the Copernican Revolution in philosophy as merely an inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects, the issue of the "transition" has remained unaddressed. In recent times, some scholars have pointed out that the Copernican Revolution pertains not only to Kant's theoretical philosophy but also to his moral philosophy. These researchers have contributed to a deeper understanding of the "revolution", yet they have not addressed the issue of the "transition" within the framework of metaphysics (Blumenberg, 1985, pp. 691-713; Brandt, 2007, pp.223-258; Schönecker, Schulting, and Strobach, 2011). A Chinese researcher Anqing Deng was the first to highlight this ignored issue and has conducted some highly insightful research (Deng, 2009; Deng, 2014, pp.81-100). Deng proposed two solutions to this question: Solution one posits that the essence of the Copernican Revolution is not an epistemological inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects but a shift in thinking attitudes, which should be understood as the shift from the old type of speculative metaphysics concerning knowledge to the metaphysics of morals concerned with action. Solution two suggests that this shift in thinking attitudes is a transformation from a natural attitude to a reflective philosophical attitude. The philosophical attitude, which directs at the cognitive faculties themselves, inherently contains the inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects. Thus, Kant can achieve the practical turn of metaphysics.

But Deng's first solution directly equates the essence of the Copernican Revolution with the aforementioned "transition", thereby negating the fundamental meaning of the "revolution" as an inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects. The second solution, which advances beyond solution one, is much more effective. But it regards the philosophical attitude as a correction of the natural attitude, so that it restricts itself in the transcendental faculties and can't enter the practical dimension. Moreover, all the above research neglects the historical contexts of astronomy and philosophy in which the Copernican Revolution occurred, and thus missed the opportunity to grasp the real essence of the Copernican Revolution. It turns out to be fail to achieve a real breakthrough on that "transition".

Inspired by Deng's thoughts, I will try to solve the "transition-problem" by reinterpreting the Copernican Revolution. Firstly, I will examine Kant's summarized essay about his critical philosophy, which is contributed to the prize essay contest announced by the Royal Academy of Science in Berlin and will demonstrate that the "transition-problem" is not only logically inherent in his system but also historically on his own concern. Then, by tracing the historical contexts of the history of astronomy and philosophy, I will clarify that

the astronomical Copernican Revolution is not equivalent to the Copernican hypothesis in Copernicus' time, but rather the entire process initiated by Copernicus and completed in Newton's theory of mechanics. By combining Kant's texts and drawing analogies to the astronomy, we can reveal the essence of the Copernican Revolution in Kant's text. It indicates that its essence lies in a transformation within the cognitive faculties themselves and further extends its implications to the practical realm. Finally, by employing the reinterpreted Copernican Revolution I will demonstrate how does Kant transition from the metaphysics of nature to the metaphysics of morals. It turns out to be that this transition unfolds as a step-by-step progress of transformation to the practical realm, thereby laying the groundwork for the systematic construction of the metaphysics of morals.

2. A Quasi-transition of metaphysics in the *Progress of Metaphysics*

In his published works Kant did not specifically address the issue of the "transition" within the systematic framework of metaphysics. The only related discussion appears in an essay Kant wrote for prize essay contest announced by the Royal Academy of Science in Berlin. The essay, which is edited and published afterwards by his students, was titled "What real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?" (Hereafter *Progress of Metaphysics*). It contains the claims relevant to the issue of the "transition" and corroborates Kant's intention to address the issue of "transition" and makes partial progress.

From the title we find that the theme of the prize essay contest is closely related to Kant's statements on metaphysics in the prefaces of both editions of the first *Critique*. And the date of the Academy's prize essay contest (1788) is precisely after the publication of both editions of the first *Critique* (1781, 1787). This is not a coincidence. In fact, the competition was specifically aimed at Kant's first *Critique*. So, Kant's response could be seen as a further elaboration of the relevant points made in the prefaces of the first *Critique*. However, *Progress of Metaphysics* did not provide an answer to the issue of "transition". This may be partly because he had not yet written the *Metaphysics of Morals* when Kant completed the essay (1793). But the most important reason lies in the constraints of the theme. As a named essay, Kant needed to limit his discussion to the scope specified by the Academy. So, he should talk about his own advancements in comparison with those of the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy. This constraint prevented Kant from delving deeply into some issues. But we can still discern traces of the "transition" of metaphysics in his discussion.

The difference between Academy's requirements and Kant's own concerns lies in that the Academy restricts the theme within the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy, whereas Kant's revolutionary transition in metaphysics pertains to all metaphysical theories in history. It forces Kant to discuss the progress in metaphysics based on the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy. The metaphysics in it is defined as "the science progressing from sensory knowledge to super-sensory knowledge through reason" (AA 20:260). But Kant thinks that this defini-

tion limits metaphysics to the realm of theoretical philosophy, which excludes the practical doctrine of pure reason. Kant's dissatisfaction with this definition is more evident in his discussion about the real progress of metaphysics. He stated that:

> It must certainly be borne in mind from the outset, that throughout this whole treatise, in accordance with the problem posed by Academy, metaphysics is intended merely as a theoretical science, or, as it can also be called, a metaphysics of Nature; which means that its transition to the super-sensible must not be understood as a step into a quite different rational science, the morally-practical, which can be called meta-physic of morals. For this would be to stray into a wholly different field, even though the latter also has as its object something super-sensible, namely freedom, albeit not in respect of what it is by nature, but rather in virtue of what is grounds for practical principle, in regard to action and omission. (AA 20:293)

This statement indicates that the progress of metaphysics into practical domain would be missed under the constraint due to the Academy's requirement. To comply with the requirement, Kant refrained from discussing this theme in the essay. However, he simultaneously pointed out that the real progress also involves the transition from metaphysics of nature to metaphysics of morals. It can be anticipated that the solution of the "transition-problem" would have been one of Kant's tasks in examining the real progress of metaphysics if the theme was not restricted.

But even under the restriction, Kant did not merely repeat the content from the second edition preface of the first *Critique* when he clarified the progress of metaphysics. Instead, he provided a partial advancement beyond it. Specifically, Kant divided the progress of metaphysics into three stages. The first stage was termed as the theoretical-dogmatic stage, which corresponded to traditional ontology and the "Transcendental Analytic" in Kant's first *Critique*. In this part he discussed several main categories in comparison with the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy. The second stage was called the skeptical-suspension stage, which corresponded to the "Transcendental Dialectic", in which he mainly criticized some problems within his "Traditional Cosmology". The third stage was named the practical-dogmatic stage. In this stage he demonstrated how the three ideas of theoretical reason (soul, world and God) attained reality in the practical dimension. These three ideas are also the three postulates of pure practical reason in the *Critique of practical Reason*. However, Kant argued that since they originate from general but not pure practical reason in the practical dimension, they still belong to metaphysics of nature. The content of the first and second stages does not extend beyond the scope of the first *Critique*. The difference lies in the third stage. After criticized the unknowability of super-sensible objects in traditional metaphysics, the first *Critique* further points out that these rational ideas have otherwise a regulative use. Although these regulative ideas still hold value, they do not possess objective reality.

But in this prize essay Kant posited that the three rational ideas could regain their reality and not just as regulative use in the practical realm according to the third stage. Although due to the constraints of the Academy's task, the progress in metaphysics Kant made does not yet extend to the domain of the "transition", it constitutes a preparatory stage and suggests the possibility of achieving this "transition".

3. A reinterpretation of the Copernican Revolution based on the historical context

To solve the issue of "transition", we should reveal the real essence of Kant's Copernican Revolution. It is widely accepted that Kant has made a Copernican Revolution in the field of philosophy. This revolution is generally defined by Kant's following classic statement:

> Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get father with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. (*KrV*, BXVI)

According to this statement, the core meaning of the philosophical Copernican Revolution lies in the inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects, namely from the original "cognition conforms to objects" to the "objects conform to cognition". This inversion is further illustrated by analogy with the astronomical Copernican Revolution, where the heliocentric model replaced the geocentric model, as a reversal of the relationship between the cognitive subject and its objects.

However, this classic understanding has caused two main correlated problems: Firstly, it is generally believed that Copernicus transitioned from the geocentric model to the heliocentric model, while Kant, conversely, transitioned from "cognition conforms to objects" to "objects conform to cognition". Therefore, Kant's transition should not be seen as a kind of Copernican Revolution, but rather as an **"Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution"**. This criticism, first raised by S. Alexander and has persisted as a challenging critique to Kant (Smith, 1918, pp.22-23; Russell, 1948, p.9; Meillassoux, 2008, p.118). Secondly, this revolution, if we follow the classic understanding, can only be applied within Kant's theoretical philosophy and does not pertain to his practical philosophy. Consequently, it fails to explain how the revolution enables metaphysics to transition to the moral domain.

These problems indicate that the classic understanding of the Kantian Copernican Revolution is not plausible. In fact, it contains two unexamined presuppositions: first, that Copernicus indeed initiated a revolution in the history of astronomy; second, that Kant ini-

tiated a corresponding revolution in the field of philosophy, too. Both presuppositions arise from neglecting the historical-genetic context. By clarifying the superimposed errors due to the ignorance of the historical contexts in philosophy and astronomy, and by situating the doctrine of Copernicus within a broader scientific historical context, we will elucidate the real meaning of the astronomical Copernican Revolution. By this clarification we can reveal the essence of Kant's philosophical Copernican Revolution by means of placing it into Kant's textual context. It shows that its essence does not lie in the inversion of the relationship between cognition and objects but in the transformation of our own mental faculties. With the help of this work, we will then demonstrate the specific manifestations of the revolution in both theoretical and practical dimensions.

3.1 The astronomical Copernican Revolution under the historical Context
Although the Copernican Revolution is widely recognized, research by notable historians of science such as T. S. Kuhn and I. B. Cohen indicate that, according to the *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (De Revolutionibus orbium coelestium)*, Copernicus did not subjectively intend to initiate a revolution in the history of astronomy. On the contrary, his primary goal was to improve the classical Ptolemaic system of astronomy. Thus, in terms of the viewpoints and the astronomical terminology in his theory, Copernicus should be considered as a successor to traditional astronomy. Regarding the hypothesis commonly seen as the essence of the Copernican Revolution (the heliocentric model replacing the geocentric model), Copernicus proposed this hypothesis because it could better explain various astronomical phenomena, rather than create a new system of astronomy. Moreover, Copernicus was not the originator of the hypothesis of the earth's motion and heliocentrism; similar views had been proposed by ancient astronomers before him (Kuhn, 1957, p.144). Copernicus's main contribution was regarded as introducing more precise mathematical demonstrations for this hypothesis. Furthermore, after the publication of his *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, Copernicus's ideas were not widely accepted as revolutionary for more than half a century. Due to the extensive mathematical knowledge and technical work, his thought primarily attracted attention only from the professional astronomers, who were interested in it not for the heliocentric hypothesis itself but for the useful mathematical tools it provided (Kuhn, 1957, pp.185-228). Therefore, it seems overstated to consider the Copernican hypothesis as a revolution in astronomy from the historical standpoint.

With the development of astronomy and natural sciences over several centuries, by the time Kant was writing his *Critique of Pure Reason*, the view that Copernicus's work had sparked an astronomical revolution was widely accepted. Kant was undoubtedly familiar with this saying. But it does not mean that he proposed a corresponding philosophical Copernican Revolution by analogy with astronomical revolution. In fact, Kant did not label his metaphysical transition as the name of "Copernican Revolution" (Hanson, 1959,

pp.274–281). Kant did aim to the revolution in metaphysics by emulating the revolution of mathematics and natural science and did associate it with Copernicus's hypothesis, but he carefully used the term "the first thoughts of Copernicus" („die erste Gedanken des Kopernikus") rather than "Copernican Revolution". According to Cohen's textual research, early interpreters of Kant's philosophy like Reinhold did not summarize Kant's theory as a Copernican Revolution in philosophy. This kind of interpretation was first introduced by some French scholars after a time (Cohen, 1985, pp.237-254).

Kant's reviews of the revolution in natural sciences strongly suggest that he did not view Copernicus' hypothesis as a revolution in astronomy. So, we can drive from it that the revolution in metaphysics did not come from the analogy with "the first thoughts of Copernicus". According to the preface of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the revolution in the way of thinking within natural science was influenced by Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Although the exact initiator of this revolution cannot be pinpointed, Kant believed that natural scientists with a clear sense of this revolution included Galilei (1564-1642), Torricelli (1608-1647), and Stahl (1659- 1734). Therefore, the revolution in natural sciences occurred sometime between Bacon and Galileo according to this time-order. Given that Copernicus' *On the Revolutions* was published in 1543, which is well before Bacon's mature ideas, and considering that astronomy is a branch of natural sciences, it is unlikely that Kant viewed Copernicus' work as a revolution in astronomy. Thus, it is untenable to say that Kant has achieved a philosophical Copernican Revolution by analogy with Copernicus' astronomy.

Let us turn back to the discussion of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy. Although Copernicus' own theory cannot be seen as revolutionary, if we stretch the development line of history, its value and impact unfolded over time and eventually leaded to a revolution in the history of astronomy. As T. Kuhn noted: "the significance of the *De Revolutionibus* lies, then, less in what it says itself than in what it caused others to say. The book gave rise to a revolution that it had scarcely enunciated. It is a revolution-making rather than a revolutionary text." (Kuhn,1957, p.135) According to Kuhn, when viewed within a broader historical context, Copernicus' theory has gradually showed its value and influence by the development of other astronomers such as Brahe, Kepler, Galileo. And at the end in Newtonian physics as its mature form, it created a new cosmology fundamentally different from the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic worldview. Thus, the book *On the Revolutions* carried content that transcended the text itself, and its meaning generated continually over time. Its impact enlarged from the astronomy to various natural sciences and eventually society. From this perspective, a Copernican Revolution indeed occurred in the history of astronomy.

But how did the meaning of the Copernican hypothesis (heliocentrism replacing geocentrism) change during this process? Copernicus initially proposed his hypothesis within the Ptolemaic tradition and his theory retained many remnants of Ptolemaic system. Then Kepler

radicalized the Copernican hypothesis, developed it fully according to heliocentric principles and discovered the laws of planetary motion, which confirmed the reliability of the Copernican hypothesis. However, once this seemingly counter-intuitive hypothesis was confirmed, it raised a series of new scientific problems. While traditional cosmology had its own explanations based on geocentrism, once the geocentrism be negated, traditional cosmology can not then solve these scientific problems. It promotes scientists to develop new theories. Newtonian mechanics emerged in this context. It has not only solved these problems but also formed a new cosmology that replaced the old one. So, the heliocentric hypothesis led to the discovery of the Newtonian theory of attraction and ultimately completed the astronomical revolution. Concurrently, Newton's cosmology, within a new worldview, endowed the Copernican hypothesis with new meaning. Therefore, it was not the heliocentric hypothesis itself that represented the astronomical revolution, but rather that the Copernican hypothesis induced and triggered the revolution and subsequently gained new meaning under the new cosmology.

We can now understand why it has been persistently claimed that Kant has initiated a philosophical Copernican Revolution, even though he never explicitly stated it. Because it is due to a historical-genetic misunderstanding. Although Copernicus did not himself initiate an astronomical revolution, his theory triggered one that eventually shaped a new cosmology. When we reviewed the theory of Copernicus through this new cosmology, it is natural to attribute the entire thinking structure of this cosmology to Copernicus and leads to the belief that the astronomical revolution has been done by him. Similarly, when Kant's discussion of Copernicus' hypothesis is placed within this context, the Copernican Revolution is attributed directly to Kant by way of neglecting the historical-genetic context. But after clarifying the reasons of this misunderstanding, we can connect the astronomical revolution that initiated by Copernicus and completed by Newton to Kant's revolution in philosophy, so that to endow it with the name of a philosophical Copernican Revolution.

3.2 The essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution

Based on the historical-genetic context, we have revealed the real meaning of the astronomical Copernican Revolution. Following this, we will show that Kant's system also encompasses a philosophical Copernican Revolution. By replying on Kant's statements about the astronomical Copernican Revolution and comparing them with the content of his critical philosophy, we aim to uncover the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution. Then we will explain its implications and manifestations in Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Just as the astronomical Copernican Revolution was not achieved by Copernicus himself but by subsequent astronomers, when Kant introduced the "first thoughts of Copernicus" in the preface of the first *Critique*, his purpose was merely to prepare for entering a doctrine. This introductory statement itself did not yet signify a revolution in philosophy. The philosophical Copernican Revolution can only be fully understood based on Kant's critical system per se. Kant was clearly aware of this. In a footnote of the preface, he has stated that:

> In this preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking presented in criticism merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order to draw our notice to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding. (*KrV*, BXXII)

This statement shows that the transformation of revolution in Kant's philosophy, which is progressed from an attempt or hypothesis in the preface to the apodictically proof in his *Critiques*, is just like the astronomical revolution, which is progressed from Copernicus' hypothesis to the apodictically proof in Newton's system. Thus, by drawing a parallel between the astronomy and philosophy, we can ascribe the term "Copernican Revolution" to Kant by an analogy with the astronomical Copernican Revolution.

The next task is to reveal the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution. Since the preface of the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not clarify the revolution's essence and the main part of the *Critique* only elaborates on the revolution, where can we find a summary of the essence of it? Fortunately, in the same footnote as the previous quote, Kant's explanation of the astronomical Copernican Revolution indirectly suggests this essence. Kant claimed that:

> the central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainly what Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they proved the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe, which would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but in their observer. (*KrV*, BXXII)

Unlike the preface, which serves as an introduction to the main part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, this footnote is not merely a supplement to the body content of the preface. In the preface, Kant only presented "the first thoughts of Copernicus" as a hypothesis, but here he asserted that the hypothesis had achieved indubitable proof. And he has also mentioned Newton's theory of attraction. Since Newton's system provided definitive proof and explanation for Copernicus' hypothesis and Kant juxtaposed the situations in philosophy and astronomy in this footnote, and consider that, the main part of the first *Critique* is also apodictically the proof to the hypothesis of the body content of its preface, by comparing this quote with the main part the first *Critique* and the body content of its preface, we can reveal the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution.

Let's analyse two important details in the above quote. First, the term "the motion of heavenly bodies" in the quote translated from "Die Bewegung der Himmelsköper", whereas

when Kant in the preface discussed about "the first thoughts of Copernicus", he used the term "Himmelsbewegung", which should be translated as "heavenly motion" rather than "celestial motion" (*KrV*, BXVI)[4]. This difference seems not so important at the first glance, but they belong to two different types of cosmology. In Copernicus' era, astronomers believed that the heavens consisted of a large heavenly spheres with stars embedded in them. Copernicus endorsed this view, hence his book was named *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* rather than *On the Revolutions of Celestial Spheres*.[5] Under the Cosmology in Copernicus' era, the motion of heavenly spheres is not the motion of stars in the sky as we understand it today, but the motion of the heavens themselves as spheres. In contrast, modern astronomy eliminated the hypothesis of the motion of celestial spheres and instead care about the motion of heavenly bodies. When Kant uses "heavenly motion" in the body part of the preface, he means the motion of heavenly spheres. This shows that he treats the "first thoughts of Copernicus" in the preface in accordance with Copernicus' original idea. But when he uses "the motion of heavenly bodies" in the footnote, he had shifted from the cosmology from Copernicus' viewpoint to the modern one. Additionally, the "central laws" of the motion mentioned in the footnote were not proposed by Copernicus, as the laws of celestial motion were established by Kepler and further developed by Newton. Therefore, these central laws referred to in the footnote originated from Kepler or Newton, not from Copernicus.

Second, the expression "first man" from the "if Copernicus ("the first man") had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses ..." is often assumed to refer to Copernicus, so that the English and Chinese translations replace it directly with "Copernicus". But this replacement is questionable. When Kant described the revolution in mathematics, he used a similar expression. Considering the statement "the first person (man) who demonstrated the isosceles triangle" (*CpR*, BXI), "the first man" in it represent the person who led to a revolution in the way of thinking in mathematics. According to this analogy, the "first man" in astronomy should correspondingly refer to the person who led to a revolution in the way of thinking in astronomy. According to Kant, as previously mentioned, this man would not be Copernicus. Moreover, Copernicus' theory continued the traditional Ptolemaic system, which followed mathematical astronomy rather than modern physical astronomy. Copernicus' proposition of the heliocentric hypothesis was just used for mathematical calculations. It is not his primary concern to talk about contradictions with our senses. For astronomers of his time, making assumptions contrary to the senses was not unreasonable.

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4   The Cambridge version translation is "celestial motion", which is an error.

5   This difference has in the later time always been ignored by researchers. So the early version of English translation of the book's title was *On the Revolutions of Celestial Spheres*(by Charles Glenn Wallis in 1939), which was later corrected as *On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres*. The same error appears also in the German version which was first translated as *Kreisbewegungen der Weltkörper* (by Carl Ludolf Menzzer im 1879) but then corrected as *Vom Umschwung der himmlischen der Kugelschalen.*

Hence, When the first man did his research in the manner of contradictory to senses, he transferred or was transferring from the classic view of cosmology to the modern view of cosmology. So, regarding the "first man" as Copernicus is inappropriate, much less to mention that the heliocentric hypothesis was not Copernicus' original idea.

These points indicate that Kant was aware of the historical distance between Copernicus' theory and the subsequent astronomical theories. When he was discussing the topic of the astronomical Copernican Revolution in the previous footnote, he had already transitioned from the historical context of Copernicus' era to the modern astronomical perspective and treated Copernicus' original hypothesis from the background of modern astronomy. Because the distance between the attempt in analogy with Copernicus in the second preface and the actual revolution within his critical philosophy is just like the distance between Copernicus and Post-Copernicus Astronomy, we can transpose his view on the astronomical Copernican Revolution in this footnote to his critical system itself and reveal the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution by an analogy with the astronomy.

As we know from the above quote, that Copernicus' hypothesis was validated through the laws of motion of heavenly bodies, which were further proven and explained by Newtonian mechanics. Therefore, Kant also considered Newton's system as the mature form of the astronomical Copernican Revolution, just like we have earlier overviewed. According to Newton's Mathematical *Principles of Natural Philosophy*, the foundation of the Newtonian physics is his theory of mechanics and in the cosmology is his theory of attraction. And Newton used the theory of attraction to explain the structure of the cosmos and the laws of the motion of heavenly bodies. Hence, based on Kant's viewpoint of astronomy, Newton's theory of attraction can be seen as the essence of the astronomical Copernican Revolution. Let us make an analogy of this relation with Kant's philosophy. We need to find the "invisible force" (unsichtbare Kraft) equivalent to Newton's attraction, which similarly serves as the foundation of Kant's critical System. This "force" should be our cognitive faculties, since the concepts of "force" (Kraft) and "faculty" (Vermögen) are closely related and often interchangeable in Kant's philosophy (*Kant-Lexikon*, 2015, pp.2481-2483). And the cognitive faculties indeed form the foundation of Kant's critical philosophy, as they are the structural basis of the three *Critiques*. And just as Newton's theory of attraction provided definitive proof and explanation for Copernicus' hypothesis, Kant's critical system based on cognitive faculties provided definitive proof and explanation for the "first thoughts of Copernicus", too. Moreover, this analogy is consistent with Kant's analogy of the "first thoughts of Copernicus". In the latter Kant compared the reversal of the relationship between cognition and objects to Copernicus' hypothesis, in which the "cognition" referred to our cognitive faculties. Hence when Kant elaborates on the attempt, he indeed explains how the relationship between cognition and objects is inverted through the three cognitive faculties, namely

sensibility, understanding and reason (*KrV*, B XVII-XVIII).[6] Here the cognitive faculties are further regarded as the essence of this revolution.

Furthermore, since the "invisible force" in natural science constructs the laws of nature, correspondingly, cognitive faculties in philosophy should construct the laws of nature as the sum total of all empirical objects. Kant's discussion of the role of the faculty of understanding can precisely confirm this point. Just as Newtonian mechanics demonstrated the general laws of nature and the laws of celestial motion, Kant believed that our faculty of understanding provides a priori laws for the sum total of empirical objects, as all phenomena are a priori contained within these faculties and become possible only through this faculty. Therefore, the phenomena in the empirical world must conform to the a priori form of understanding. This is generally called "the understanding legislates for the nature". Thus, for Kant, the "invisible force" that binds the universe in philosophy is our faculty of understanding. This is in accordance with the function of Newtonian attraction as an "invisible force", which also binds the universe. The difference lies in the fact that Kant examines the formal unity of nature under metaphysics, while Newton investigates the empirical laws of nature within the realm of physics.

Therefore, the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution lies in the transformation within our faculties of mind. According to the critical philosophy, this transformation can be outlined as the shift of the cognitive faculties from the merely passive capacities engaged in judgment and reasoning to the "force" that possess spontaneity and legislative functions. Specifically, in theoretical philosophy, since cognitive faculties are the capacities for judgment and reasoning that are applied in general logic, and the spontaneous and legislative functions the force that is applied in transcendental logic, this transformation in cognitive faculties can be particularly outlined as a shift from their applications in the general logic to their transcendental applications.

Admittedly, the above analogy may seem inappropriate in the super-sensible realm, because Newton's attraction is a mechanical force in nature, which is applicable only to the sensible realm, whereas Kant's faculties of understanding and reason are spontaneous capacities that pertain to the super-sensible realm and relate to the laws of freedom. But the key point of this analogy lies in the discovery process of the two "forces" and their roles in binding the universe, rather than in the coherence of their intrinsic nature. Just as the Copernican hypothesis in astronomy and its corresponding analogy in philosophy are not entirely synonymous, Kant did not avoid comparing the laws of freedom with Newton's theory of gravitational attraction. In the *Opus Postumum* Kant asserted that: "Newton's

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6 It is evident that the word "cognition" cannot be understood as concrete knowledge which contains cognitive content expressed in the form of judgments, as this would inevitably lead to a circular, because it will use the "cognition" as a result of the revolution as an element within the revolution's process. Since cognition always involves both cognitive faculties and objects, it should represent the cognitive faculties.

attraction through empty space and human freedom are analogous concepts..."(AA 21: 35). Notably, R. Brandt has conducted a detailed analysis based on this analogy, exploring the relationship between Newton's laws of gravitational attraction and Kant's laws of freedom(Brandt, 2007, pp.232-239).

Up to now, we have revealed the essence of the philosophical Copernican Revolution. And we then explained its implications and manifestations in Kant's theoretical philosophy. Reviewing on the first problem posed at the beginning, it is now evident that it's not plausible to say that Kant's philosophical revolution must be an "Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution". On the contrary, we should rather call it a post-Copernican "Copernican-Newtonian Revolution" (Schönecher, Schulting, Strocach, 2011, p.498; p.514.).

We can now turn to address the second problem posed at the Introduction of this text. By "translating" the astronomical revolution that revealed the laws of the starry heavens *above us* into practical philosophy, we will thereby clarify the real meaning of the revolution, which will let the moral law *within us* be discovered.

3.3 The Revolution in Moral Philosophy

Let us turn to the Copernican Revolution in Kant's practical philosophy. Reviewing the preface of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant's discussion is primarily confined to the realm of speculative philosophy. But after discussing the role of the attempt or experiment analogous to the Copernican hypothesis in speculative philosophy, he briefly touches upon its relationship with practical philosophy. This is the only place in the preface where this issue is directly addressed, which will be particularly important for expanding the extension of the revolution to the practical realm. Kant says that:

> Now, after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the super-sensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions a priori that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. (*KrV*, BXXI)

When we compare this quotation with the classic statement which was regarded as the definition Copernican Revolution by Kant, we will find the parallel relation between them. Here Kant mentions that after the first *attempt or try* (Versuche) conducted in theoretical philosophy (see. B xvi), another *attempt* (to try/ zu versuchen) can be conducted in the practical realm. Since the purpose of Kant's attempt is to lead to the genuine revolution, this indicates that Kant's plan for the revolution of metaphysics is not limited to the theoretical dimension but also involves the construction of metaphysics of morals. Therefore, the

extension of the revolution to the practical realm is not merely our subjective analogy but is inherently included in Kant's thought.[7]

Regarding the extension of the revolution, although Kant does not explicitly point it out, we can derive it from the meaning of it in his theoretical philosophy. Since it begins with an "attempt", just as in the theoretical dimension the attempt to reverse the relationship between cognition and objects leads to a revolution, we can also start from examining the relationship between cognition and objects in the practical dimension. The key to understand the reveal of cognition and objects in practical philosophy lies in the meaning of the "practical knowledge" (praktische Erkenntnis) mentioned in the quotation. Contrary to our general ideas, besides the narrow sense of theoretical knowledge, Kant also endows "knowledge" a broad meaning. Broadly defined, knowledge includes both theoretical and practical knowledge. While theoretical knowledge concerns "what something is", practical knowledge concerns "what ought to be", i.e. the possibilities of action for the acting subject, which is expressed as imperatives. Since imperatives can be either categorical or hypothetical, practical knowledge includes both categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The former are a priori synthetic judgments in practical philosophy (AA 04: 414). Thus, just as the "cognition" (which leads to knowledge) in the reversal of the relationship between cognition and objects in theoretical philosophy refers to theoretical cognitive faculties, in practical philosophy, it should refer to practical cognitive faculties related to desire, with the corresponding "objects" being the objects of desire.

Certainly, the reversal of the relationship between cognition and objects as an attempt only provides the premise for exploring the essence of the revolution. It is not the essence of the revolution per se. As previously mentioned, the real essence of the revolution lies in the transformation of cognitive faculties analogous to Newtonian attraction. We can limit this general explanation to the practical dimension. By this analogy, the "invisible force" in practical philosophy should be the practical cognitive faculties. Therefore, the essence of the Copernican Revolution in the practical dimension lies in the transformation of the practical cognitive faculties themselves. This transformation involves the cognitive faculties shifting from its merely general practical application to another pure practical application besides it. Similar to theoretical philosophy, we can verify this analogy through Kant's discussion of the pure practical application of faculties of reason. Kant believes that pure practical reason can by itself serve as the determining ground for the will, thereby becoming originally legislative. The laws it establishes are the laws of pure practical reason or moral laws. This function of practical reason is usually called as "reason legislating for itself". Moral laws also indicate an intelligible world and actively determine this world. This intelligible world has previously only a negative meaning in theoretical philosophy. Hence, the reason in its

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pure practical use is thus the "invisible force", which binds the super-sensible world, just like Newtonian attraction as the "invisible force" that binds the sensible world.

4. The practical transformation of metaphysics through the Copernican Revolution

We have demonstrated that the essence of the Copernican Revolution lies in the transformation within the faculties of mind, and we have extended this transformation from the speculative dimension to the practical dimension. Now we can return to the problem posed at the beginning: how can Kant through the Copernican Revolution make the transition of metaphysics from the speculative to the practical dimension, so as to make the metaphysics of morals become a science? We will solve this problem by answering three questions: (1) Is metaphysics in general sense possible? (2) How does one transition from metaphysics of nature to metaphysics of morals? (3) How can metaphysics of morals be grounded to become a science? We will show that the answer to each of these questions relies on the Copernican Revolution, in which the faculties of mind manifest successively as the transcendental and practical uses of understanding and reason. Based on their different manifestations the "transition" will be presented as a progressive transformation to the practical dimension.

4.1 The transcendental use of the understanding and the possibility of metaphysics

Given that Kant considers all historical attempts to make metaphysics to be a science to have failed, so the foremost question we should answer is: if the metaphysics can in a sense still be possible? Since "metaphysics only deals with synthetic a priori propositions" (AA 04: 274), the question can be changed into: if the a priori synthetic judgments are possible? If they are possible, then the metaphysical knowledge as a specific category thereof is also possible. Kant addresses this question through the Copernican Revolution, but the way this revolution is presented is much more complex than commonly understood. Specifically, since judgment is a function of the understanding, this revolution naturally first occurs within the faculty of understanding. Kant provides a detailed analysis of it in the B-Deduction of the first *Critique*. According to Henrich, the proof structure of this Deduction consists of two steps that marked by §20 and §21, which together form the basis for demonstrating the possibility of metaphysics (Henrich,1969; see also Allison,2004, pp.159-201). We can now link the two steps with the Copernican Revolution.

In the first step, Kant reveals the essence of the Copernican Revolution within the faculty of understanding through the Deduction: all the manifold of intuition necessarily is subject to the categories of the understanding. The Ground for the "one" („Eine") manifold in intuition is not found within the intuition itself, but in the transcendental unity of apperception of the understanding. In other words, the essence of the revolution is the shift of the faculty of understanding from merely representing the relations between concepts in judgments to unifying the manifold in intuition into the objective unity of apperception, i.e. from the application in the general logic to the application in the transcendental

logic, in which Kant has abstracted from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given. In the second step, the revolution makes a priori synthetic judgments possible: By incorporating the way in which the manifold for the intuition is given, Kant indicated that the unity imposed on the manifold for the intuition is precisely the unity to be found in our empirical intuition. The result is that empirical objects conform to our faculty of understanding rather than the understanding conforms to empirical objects. This is a deepened version from the classical standpoint of the Copernican Revolution. Yet it is the manifestation of the revolution but not its essence. Consequently, the question of how a priori synthetic judgments (as they pertain to empirical objects) are possible is answered through these two steps of the Deduction. However, since the spontaneity of the understanding in this place is not pure, the categories can only be applied to empirical objects. Given that Kant demonstrates in the transcendental deduction of the categories that their super-sensible use is invalid, and since the fundamental characteristic of metaphysical knowledge is precisely concerned with the super-sensible object, although Kant's revolution has proved the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, it has simultaneously proved that all metaphysics of nature in a positive sense are impossible due to the limitations of the use of the understanding.

Despite that Kant has negated the possibility of metaphysics of nature through the Copernican Revolution, it also leaves room for the possibility of metaphysics in some other form. Let's revisit the first step of the B-Deduction mentioned above. In the first step, the way in which the manifold for the empirical intuition is given is abstracted away. Yet the understanding must still relate to objects even though the way of given is abstracted away, because thinking is merely the act of linking given intuition to an object. The difference is that in this concern the object is not empirical but transcendental (*KrV*, A247/B304).[8] Therefore, based on the use of the understanding, we can distinguish two types of objects, namely empirical and transcendental objects. The transcendental object "cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object" (*KrV*, A109). Since the categories of the understanding can only determine empirical objects but not transcendental ones, the transcendental object remains as an indeterminate thought. It can be understood negatively as the object that not of sensory intuition, which is called negative noumenon, in contrast to a positive noumenon. Here the revolution once again inverts the relationship between knowledge and objects: it shifts from the understanding conforming to general objects to transcendental object conforming to the understanding. Since a transcendental object is merely the unity encountered in the manifold of intuition

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8 The term "transcendental object" is ambiguous, in the B edition of the first *Critique*, it is replaced by terms such as negative noumenon, but for our purpose, it suffices to understand that it arises from the transcendental use of the understanding and is used by Kant equivalently with intelligible object or negative noumenon.

according to the categories of the understanding, this "conforming" does not imply that the object is determined by the cognitive faculties but that its existence is posited by them.

Since there are indeterminate and indeterminable objects, then the a priori knowledge that related to these objects will be possible, as long as these indeterminate objects can be determined elsewhere. And as super-sensible objects, they align with the requirement of metaphysics to be based on cognitive faculties without recourse to any experience. Therefore, metaphysics is possible in some other form. Considering that the world formed by the intelligible object is the intelligible world, and that the intelligible or transcendental object is the object that we "have no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all appearances" (*KrV*, A253), there are no multiple types of intellectual object. And the term "world" merely refers to the totality of objects. Thus, the relationship between transcendental or intelligible object and the intelligible world is not one part to a whole but is identical with each other. So, like the intelligible object, the intelligible world is indeterminate but thinkable. And based on the same reason, metaphysics is possible in some other form within the realm of the intelligible world.

4.2 The practical use of the understanding, the transcendental use of reason, and the transition to metaphysics of morals

Given that metaphysics is possible, and as we have demonstrated that it cannot be metaphysics of nature, according to Kant's division of the system of metaphysics, it can only be metaphysics of morals. Therefore, there is a transition from metaphysics of nature to metaphysics of morals. The problem is: how can Kant realize this transition? We will show that the Copernican Revolution is also the key to answer this question. To this end, we need foremost to assume that metaphysics of morals is possible, so that the moral laws can directly determine the will. And this assumption will be substantiated in the next subsection.

Now considering the equivalence between transcendental object and the intelligible world, there are two equivalent ways to prove the transition: (i) To prove that the pure practical reason can determine the transcendental object that remain undetermined and indeterminable within theoretical philosophy. (ii) To prove that the undetermined and merely thinkable intelligible world in theoretical philosophy can be determined in the practical realm, thus filling the realm left indeterminate in theoretical philosophy with the intelligible world of practical philosophy. The first proof is a challenge for us because the practical use of reason is about the determination of the will and therefore does not directly relate to any specific objects. In the second proof, the intelligible world is nothing more than the pure intelligible form of the unity of apperception. Thus, when the possibility of metaphysics of morals is presupposed, this intelligible world will be determined in the practical realm, because the moral law "points to a pure world of the understanding and indeed, even determines it and let us cognize something of it" (AA 05: 43). Therefore, the above question can be adopted as the following form: why can the moral law determine the

intelligible world? This is equivalent to: Why do the categories of the understanding have a super-sensible use in the practical realm? This is because the understanding not only has a relation with objects in theoretical knowledge but also relates to the faculty of desire in the practical knowledge. Since the faculty of desire is the will, the pure understanding here is identical the pure will (AA 05: 55). It means that all categories of the understanding are included in the pure will and so they will also have their practical use.

But it leads to the problem that the categories of understanding in the practical philosophy have to be used to the super-sensible realm. This problem can also be solved through the Copernican Revolution. As mentioned in the previous section, the B-Deduction has two steps: the first step suspends the way in which the manifold for the intuition is given, and the second step adds it again to the manifold for the intuition. We can now feel the importance of it. In the first step, since the origin of the categories is independent of all sensory conditions, it means that the categories must not necessarily be limited to sensory objects. Unlike the second step of the B-Deduction, as long as they are not limited to phenomena in their theoretical use, they can also be applied to the intelligible object or intelligible world. Thus, the transcendental unity of the categories produced by the Copernican Revolution can be utilized in the practical realm, whereas in theoretical philosophy the super-sensible use of the categories can only lead to illusion (AA 05: 55-56). Consequently, (ii) has been proven. So, the transition to metaphysics of morals is possible through the Copernican Revolution. Moreover, the revolution inverts the relationship between knowledge and objects once again: through the revolution the intelligible object (intelligible world) conforms to cognition (pure practical reason), whereas before the revolution the empirically conditioned reason autocratically determines the will and it causes the cognition (general practical reason) to conform to the objects (material objects). This inversion progresses beyond the inversion in the previous section, as the merely posited transcendental object now becomes determined by our cognitive faculty.

In addition to proving the possibility of this transition, we must also demonstrate its necessity. Since the faculty of reason can operate separately without relating to empirical objects and it is present as the faculty that always seeks the unconditioned from the conditioned. It will constitute the driving power of the transition: Firstly, for the speculative reason, when it seeks the unconditioned for the sensibly conditioned, it prevents metaphysics from descending into skepticism, although it leads to a series of transcendental illusions. Because the reason, despite its failures, never abandons the quest for some certain form of metaphysics, it even urges us to use the practical reason to fulfill the vacancy remained in theoretical philosophy (*KrV,* BXXII). More importantly, the unity of practical reason requires rational beings to seeks absolute unconditional laws for its actions. Although the practical reason also cannot reach the unconditioned, its infinite ascending does not lead to illusion but continually motivates us to act according to pure practical knowledge under the guidance of how things ought to happen (AA 04: 463). Furthermore, the primary of prac-

tical reason allows it to proceed where theoretical reason halts. Thus, the faculty of reason ensures the necessity of the transition. Thus, the discovery of this capacity of reason also stems from the Copernican Revolution, which is similar to that of the understanding. As we know, the general or logical use of reason is the indirectly inferential ability. But the reason in its real use shows that it "contains the origin of certain concepts and principles , which it derives neither from senses nor from the understanding" (*KrV*, A299/B355). It presents the transcendental use of reason instead of its general use that characterized by the capability to generate concepts or principles on its own. Similar to the faculty of understanding, reason transfers from its general use that passively receives concepts and relies on them for the inferences to its transcendental use that generates its own concepts and their objects. This is the Copernican Revolution within the faculty of reason.

4.3 The practical use of reason and the groundwork of metaphysics of morals
Now we turn to the last question: how can metaphysics of morals be grounded so as to become a science? We can divide this question into two questions: first, how can metaphysics of morals be possible? Second, how can metaphysics of morals become actual? We will demonstrate that both questions can be answered through the extended version of the Copernican Revolution in moral philosophy. It should be noted in advance that when we talk about the "groundwork of metaphysics of morals", we often refer to Kant's book by the same name. But because in this groundwork the *Critique of Practical Reason* can more prominently show the role of the Copernican Revolution, we will focus on the second *Critique*.

Just like to prove the possibility of metaphysics of nature is equivalent to prove the possibility of the knowledge of the pure theoretical reason, to prove the possibility of metaphysics of morals is the same as to prove the possibility of the knowledge of pure practical reason. It involves two steps: first, to provide the ground for the existence of the moral law; second, to provide the ground why the moral law can directly determinate the Will. In the first step, since freedom is the *radio essendi* of the moral law (AA 05: 4), so the question is: how can freedom be possible? In the first part of this section, by use of the revolution within the cognitive faculties we have distinguished the world into the sensible world and intelligible world. And it is the intelligible world that preserves the possibility of the idea of freedom, so freedom can be possible through the Copernican Revolution. In the second step, Kant argues that by "adding a positive determination to a causality thought only negatively, the possibility of which was incomprehensible to speculative reason, which was nevertheless forced to assume it" (AA 05: 48), the objective reality of the moral law can be demonstrated. In this quote, "the speculative reason had to assume" is called transcendental freedom, and the "positive determination" is no other than the self-legislation of the Will. Since the possibility of freedom has been demonstrated, the question can be raised in the following form: how can the self-legislation or autonomy of the Will be possible? Kant's

answer to this question is quite brief and dogmatic. He considers it is a fact of reason that does not require any external conditions to prove it. Although we cannot further ask for the ground of it, its reality is indisputable and thus its possibility is evident. It reveals the a priori legislation of practical reason, which illustrates the "revolution" within practical reason. Reason in the practical realm transitions from the faculty that is merely passively deriving the determining ground of the Will from empirical material to the faculty that is able to determine the Will on its own. Or simply speaking, it transitions from a general practical use to a pure practical use. Moreover, because the pure practical use of reason is based on the possibility of freedom, which is preserved by the "revolution" in the theoretical dimension, the "revolution" within practical reason is also based on the "revolution" within theoretical philosophy. Therefore, the Copernican Revolution makes the moral law and its objective reality possible, thereby making metaphysics of morals possible.

Let's turn to the question of the actuality of the metaphysics of morals. Unlike theoretical knowledge, in which objects are directly given in sensory intuition, pure practical knowledge requires making this object actual without the help of any experience. It becomes actual by determining the will through the law and prompting the subject to take actions that actualize the object. But what is the ground for pure practical knowledge to make objects actual? Kant believes that this ground must also come from our faculty of reason. In its pure practical use, reason not only has a priori legislative capacity but also imposes coercion on us to act according to its legislation, which makes the moral law be a categorical imperative. Kant argues that the coercion of the law is undeniable, because by examining the lawfulness of one's actions we can find that "whatever inclination may say to the contrary, their reason, incorruptible and self-constrained, always holds the maxim of the will in an action up to the pure will" (AA 05: 32). Thus, through its original legislation the pure practical reason demands us to act according the law: What I will, I command. Nevertheless, Kant has only described this phenomenon and did not provide a detailed explanation of why reason has coercive force and of how his coercion operates through our cognitive faculties. A more thorough explanation of them can be found in Fichte's theory of science. Until now, just as the laws of heavenly motion confirm the "invisible force" that binds the structure of the world, the moral laws confirm the "invisible force" within reason that dictates how the world ought to exist. So the basis for how things ought to happen is not found in the objects of the world but within the cognitive faculties of subject. This force within reason causes the fourth inversion of the relationship between knowledge and objects: from the heteronomy in previous theories of morals, in which the Will (as cognitive faculty) was determined by empirical objects, to the autonomy in Kant's moral philosophy, in which the morals laws directly determine the Will (as the legislative capacity of reason) and produce actual objects through this determination in action. Through this new inversion, metaphysics of morals achieves its actuality.

5.Conclusion

By a reinterpretation of the Copernican Revolution we have clarified the practical transformation of metaphysics with a step-by-step progress. We can hold that the "transition-problem" of the metaphysics has been solved. Besides it we can then draw some conclusions on our topic:

Firstly, as referred in the introduction, the central issue addressed in this paper was initially proposed by Anqing Deng. Regarding Deng's fundamental view on this issue, our research defends his insight that Kantian ethics can be integrated with metaphysics, so to render ethics to be the first philosophy. His two solutions include two different aspects: the first regards the revolution itself as the transformation from metaphysics of nature to metaphysics of morals, while the second is deemed to be the revolution to achieve a metaphysical transformation, which can be characterized as a conversion process (although he does not exactly present this idea). Our research attempts to deepen the second one, namely, to present the "transition" of metaphysics as a progressive process of practical transformation.

Secondly, considering the development of Kant's own thoughts, the construction of metaphysics of morals was a central target throughout his philosophical career. From his promise to Herder in the 1760s about a book named *Metaphysics of Morals* to the accomplishment of that book in the 1790s, it spanned about 30 years long. Kant's critical works during this period can be seen as the by-products of this target. Therefore, we should stand at a systematic perspective to understand Kant's main works. It means that we should holistically examine the interrelations between the various branches of Kant's works, rather than fragmentarily involve in a certain part like epistemology, ethics or philosophy of science, and so on. This is the core concern of our research.

Lastly, regarding the topic of metaphysics itself, contemporary metaphysics has suffered under severe criticism and rejection. It is mainly due to the development of the modern natural sciences. Natural sciences reveal natural laws through empirical method, which stands in contrast to the super-sensible nature of metaphysics. However, Kant emulated the methods of natural sciences to reveal that metaphysics can be a science in its practical dimension, thereby promoting the practical transformation of metaphysics. This provides us with a different perspective for rethinking the contemporary fate of metaphysics, whose value warrants further research.

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CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AFTER THE COPERNICAN TURN[1][2]

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Kant announces a 'Copernican turn' in philosophy, but the model of cognition from which he claims to be 'turning' resurfaces in his own constructive account of empirical conceptual content. For Kant, no less than for his 'pre-Copernican' predecessors, empirical concepts are a species of representation that 'conform to' their objects. But if Kant does not excise the pre-Copernican model of cognition from his positive picture, in what does his turn from it consist? I argue that Kant's target is not the legitimacy *but the* explanatory sufficiency *of the pre-Copernican model. Kant's critical gesture towards that model consists in showing that cognition can only exhibit the structure envisaged by the pre-Copernican system if it is underwritten by a kind of content - viz. transcendental content - which cannot be modeled in pre-Copernican terms. A full appreciation of Kant's Copernicanism thus requires an account of transcendental conceptual content, and its relation to empirical conceptual content. Drawing on Kant's account of the transcendental object and other neglected textual resources, I develop such an account.*

Keywords: *Philosophy, Conceptual content, transcendental object, Kant, empirical concepts, Copernican Turn.*

Kant anuncia un "giro copernicano" en la filosofía, pero el modelo de conocimiento del que afirma estar "girando" resurge en su propio enfoque constructivo sobre el contenido conceptual empírico. Para Kant, al igual que para sus predecesores "pre-copernicanos", los conceptos empíricos son una especie de representación que "se ajusta" a sus objetos. Pero si Kant no elimina el modelo pre-copernicano de cognición en su perspectiva positiva, ¿en qué consiste su giro respecto a él? Sostengo que el objetivo de Kant no es la legitimidad, sino la suficiencia explicativa del modelo pre-copernicano. El gesto crítico de Kant hacia ese modelo consiste en mostrar que la cognición solo puede exhibir la estructura imaginada por el sistema pre-copernicano si está sustentada por un tipo de contenido —a saber, el contenido trascendental— que no puede ser modelado en términos pre-copernicanos. Una comprensión completa del copernicanismo de Kant, por lo tanto, requiere una explicación del contenido conceptual trascendental y su relación con el contenido conceptual empírico. Basándome en la noción kantiana del objeto trascendental y otros recursos textuales poco considerados, desarrollo tal explicación.

Palabras clave: *Filosofía, contenido conceptual, objeto trascendental, Kant, conceptos empíricos, giro copernicano.*

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant articulates what he takes to be the fundamental originality of his philosophical project in terms of the now famous contrast between the 'Copernican' and 'pre-Copernican' philosophical systems. Whereas the pre-Copernican philosopher assumes a theory of cognition on which '…all our cognition must conform to objects…', the Copernican philosopher assumes instead 'that the object must conform to our cognition' (Bxvi).[3] Of course, Kant's so-called 'Copernican turn' is one of the most familiar features of the first Critique. Nevertheless, I will argue in what follows that this well-trodden interpretative territory still promises to shed new light on important and difficult Kantian doctrines. Specifically, I will argue that attention to the nature and scope of Kant's critique of the pre-Copernican system clarifies three otherwise obscure topics: his account of conceptual content, the status of the concept of the transcendental object, and the argumentative strategy of the so-called 'subjective deduction' in the first edition. These clarifications will emerge as I motivate the main thesis of this paper: namely, that Kant's departure from the pre-Copernican paradigm is not nearly as total as the language of a 'turn' might suggest. Kant's target is not the legitimacy, but the explanatory sufficiency of the pre-Copernican model of cognition. His point is not to deny that cognition exhibits the structure envisaged by the pre-Copernican system, but rather to show that it only exhibits this structure insofar as it also involves a kind of conceptual content which cannot be modelled in pre-Copernican terms.

In order to reach this conclusion, the paper divides into five sections. In section 1 I introduce the pre-Copernican theory of cognition, arguing that it is motivated by a certain realist conception of the manner in which the objects of our cognition possess their properties. This conception, together with an important assumption about the nature of cognition, which Kant shares, entails what I will call the 'conformist' model of cognition, on which the paradigmatic cognitive relation is one in which the features of the representation are explained by facts about the features of the represented object. In section 2 I show how the Aesthetic initiates the Copernican turn by undermining the realist conception of property-possession that made the conformist model seem obligatory. Nevertheless, I argue that the Aesthetic can only be understood as clearing space for rather than accomplishing the turn, because its results are compatible with a conformist model of cognition. Moreover, I show in section 3 that Kant himself accepts this model in his account of empirical cognition. This accordingly lays down an interpretative constraint on any reading of the Copernican turn: while the turn must involve more than merely the rejection of the realist conception of property possession, it cannot consist in the complete excision of the conformist model of cognition. In section 4 I show how Kant's doctrine of the 'transcendental content' of the categories points the way towards the articulation of a genuinely non-conformist model of

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3   Here and throughout, the first Critique will be cited by the standard A/B pagination, and I refer to the Guyer and Wood translation (Kant 1781/87; 1998).

cognition, and then show how the results of section 4 together with the interpretative constraint laid down in section 3 seem to force on us an interpretation of the Copernican turn on which it is *only* a priori cognition that is remodelled in non-conformist terms. In section 5, however, I show, through a reading of the strategy of the transcendental deduction, that this is not so: remodelling a priori cognition *ipso facto* remodels empirical cognition, because Kant can only execute a transcendental deduction of the categories if he can show that there is a 'pure thinking in every experience' (A96). Establishing this result requires showing that empirical conceptual content is dependent upon the transcendental content of the categories, and it is in this thesis about conceptual content that I shall argue that Kant's Copernicanism resides.

1. The Nature and Source of the Pre-Copernican Model

The pre-Copernican paradigm assumes that '…all our cognition must conform to the objects' (Bxvi); thus the pre-Copernican philosopher operates with an implicit theory of cognition. Here and throughout, I will restrict myself to the following commonplaces about Kant's conception of cognition: cognition, at least in theoretical domain, involves both sensible, intuitive representation and intellectual, conceptual representation (A51/B75-A52/B76); that it consists in a determinate relation of these representations to an object (B137); and that this relation is sufficiently robust to prove the real possibility of the object, thus differing from the purely intellectual relation to objects engendered in mere thought (Bxxvi). A theory of cognition will specify the general form of this relation; such a theory will stand in entailment relations with theories of mind and theories of the nature of objects: theories that make intelligible how it is that mind and world are fitted to stand in the kinds of relations envisaged in the theory of cognition. The implicit pre-Copernican theory of cognition holds that the general form of the cognitive relation is one in which the cognition 'conforms' to the object. Thus, in order to understand what would be involved in a departure from this paradigm, we need to understand what this claim amounts to and how it is motivated. In this section I suggest that the claim is motivated by the combination of two theses, one concerning the objects of cognition, the other embodying an explanatory constraint on a theory of cognition.

The first thesis is a claim about the manner in which the objects of human cognition possess their properties. According to this thesis, the objects of our cognition exhibit what I will call 'cognition-independence' in respect of a central class of their properties. Cognition-independence will be understood as follows:

(CI) A property F of an object O is cognition-independent if and only if O's possession of F is explanatorily independent of the subjective conditions of its being cognized as F.

I will take the 'subjective conditions' of cognition of an object as possessing a given property as including whichever mental states or processes that must occur in a subject in order for the relevant cognitive relation to obtain. An object satisfies CI in respect of its

possession of a property F only if information concerning the subjective conditions of its cognition as F is absent from an explanation of how it possess F. I will argue in this section that the pre-Copernican paradigm rests on the thesis that this sort of explanatory profile is exhibited by a central class of the properties we can cognize objects as possessing.[4]

The second thesis embodies a claim about the necessary conditions of cognition, which Kant endorses. This is the claim that in order for a representation to count as cognition of an object, a dependence-relation of a certain kind must run in one of two directions, either from the object to the representation, or vice versa:

> 'There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible.' (A92/B124-5)

With regard to the second direction of dependence, Kant stresses that the relation he is envisaging is not one in which the representation makes the object possible as to its existence. That kind of dependence-relation can only hold in the case of practical cognition, and '…we are not here talking about its [the representation's] causality by means of the will…' (A92/B125). Rather, we should understand the representation as determinant of the object, not if the object owes its existence to the representation, but rather if it owes its *possession of a certain property* to the manner in which it is represented as having that property. In view of Kant's metaphor of a 'meeting' of representation and object, we can call this second thesis 'Cognitive Contact' (CC):

CC: A representation R of an object O as F counts as cognition of O as F only if: either A) O's being F makes R possible, or B) R makes O's being F possible.

Here is not the place for an evaluation of CC;[5] the point to note is rather that, if one accepts CC together with the first thesis presented above, a pre-Copernican theory of cognition becomes obligatory. Suppose one holds that a central class of the properties we can cognize

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4 The reason for restricting the class of such properties is that I will take it that properties such as *meets the subjective conditions of cognition* (assuming them to be properties) trivially violate CI, and that Kant would hardly have expected his predecessors to have denied that claim (thanks to Andrew Stephenson for pointing this out). As will become clear, however, further specification of exactly how the relevant class of properties is to be limited will not be necessary for my presentation of the difference between the pre-Copernican and Copernican paradigms.

5 Regarding an explanation of Kant's advocacy of CC: there is at least one place in the Critique in which Kant considers a purported theory of cognition that rejects CC, namely in his consideration of the 'preformation-system' at the close of the B-Deduction (B167-8). This system holds that representations and objects, though isomorphic with one another, play no role in making one another possible, each owing their constitution instead to a divine 'author'. Understanding and assessing the grounds on which Kant advocates CC will thus partly involve determining the nature of his objection to the preformation-system.

objects as possessing satisfy CI, and one also treats CC as imposing a legitimate constraint on a theory of cognition. Then, there is only one way of making intelligible how those properties can be cognized: by appealing to a relation of type-A above, on which the object's possession of the property makes possible its representation as possessing the property. Any properties that enter into cognition in virtue of a type-B relation, since they are made possible by their representation, violate CI; hence, acceptance of the first thesis excludes type-B relations from an account of cognition, at least with respect to a central class of the properties we can cognize. Accordingly, since the only other relations mandated by CC are type-A relations, such relations become paradigmatic in an account of the possibility of cognition. This, I suggest, is the core commitment of the pre-Copernican paradigm:

Representational Conformity: In the paradigm case, a representation *R* of an object *O* as *F* counts as cognition of *O* as *F* only if *O*'s being *F* makes *R* possible.

Thus, the pre-Copernican system links the conditions of a state's possession of representational content and the conditions of its status as cognition in a particular way. According to Conformity, it is standardly only states whose representational content is fundamentally explained by appeal to facts about the represented objects that are candidates for the status of cognition. In what follows, I will call any account of cognition that respects Representational Conformity a *conformist* account of cognition.

Now, if this picture of cognition is the one that Kant wishes to abandon, and if it is forced on us by the two theses presented above, then, given Kant's acceptance of CC, he must deny that the objects of cognition exhibit CI, at least in respect of a central class of their properties. In the next section, I argue that this is precisely the task undertaken in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Completion of this task, however, does not realize the Copernican turn, but only makes space for it: having rejected the pre-Copernican conception of the objects of our cognition, Kant must also articulate an alternative non-conformist account of cognition. In order to show that these are two genuinely distinct steps, I will show in the next two sections that the results of the Aesthetic are consistent with a conception of cognition that remains fundamentally pre-Copernican. Moreover, as I will show in section 3, this conformist model of cognition, as applied to empirical concepts, is one that Kant not only could, but apparently does, embrace. As we will see in section 4, this gives rise to a question about the nature and extent of Kant's Copernican turn which it will be the purpose of the remainder of the paper to answer.

2. The Aesthetic as Necessary but Insufficient Condition of the Copernican Turn

The Critique opens with the claim that the human cognitive capacity is constituted out of two mutually irreducible capacities: *sensibility*, a receptive, sensible capacity through which objects are given to the mind, and *understanding*, the spontaneous, intellectual capacity through which they are thought (A19/B33). As given to sensibility, an object is intuited; as thought through the understanding it is represented through concepts as exercised in

judgement (A19/B33; A50/B74-A52/B76; A68/B93-A69/B94). Transcendental aesthetic would be a science that studies sensibility in its a priori constitution (A21/B35), and Kant undertakes to establish and execute such a science in the section of the Critique of that name.

If the argument of the Aesthetic is successful, the objects of human cognition violate CI in respect of their spatiotemporal properties. The Aesthetic argues that objects, insofar as they are to appear in human sensibility, must possess spatiotemporal properties. But Kant goes further than this: he holds that objects do not possess spatiotemporal properties independently of their meeting the conditions of appearing in human sensibility: it is only insofar as they are subject to space and time as a priori forms of human intuition that objects possess spatiotemporal predicates at all, and such predicates accordingly cannot be conceived of as 'determination[s]… that attach…to objects and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of intuition' (A26/B42; see also A30/B46 for the claim about time). Thus, Kant holds that objects do not possess spatiotemporal properties independently of meeting the sensible conditions of representation; since cognition requires sensible representation, the conditions of sensible intuition are at the same time conditions of cognition; and accordingly it follows that objects of cognition violate CI in respect of their spatiotemporal properties.

The point ramifies to any property that must be intuited to be cognized. Recall that a property violates CI if information regarding the subjective conditions under which it can be cognized is present in an account of the conditions under which it possesses the property. Now, if appearances (the objects of empirical intuition) are essentially spatiotemporal, then they can only possess properties insofar as those properties are spatiotemporally realized. This means that for any given property of an appearance, the fact that the appearance possesses spatiotemporal properties must always be cited as part of an explanation of how it possesses the specific property in question. But if we accept the central claim of the Aesthetic, the appearance's possession of spatiotemporal properties is possible only if it is subject to the a priori forms of intuition. Thus, by the transitivity of the condition-of-possibility relation, every property of the appearance that is made possible by its possession of spatiotemporal properties will also be made possible by its being subject to the forms of intuition. If, in addition, the appearance must be subject to the a priori forms of intuition in order to be cognized as possessing the property in question, then facts concerning the subjective conditions of cognition of the property will be present in the list of conditions of possibility of the object's possession of the property, and CI will be violated. It follows that any property of appearances that must be intuited to be cognized violates CI.

Now, my purpose here is not to evaluate Kant's arguments, but rather to understand the commitments taken on vis-à-vis the rejection of the pre-Copernican paradigm if one accepts their conclusions. It is clear that the arguments of the Aesthetic, if accepted, completely dismantle the first thesis undergirding the pre-Copernican theory of cognition, at

least as that thesis was presented in part 1. Kant presumably holds that a central class of the properties that we can cognize objects as possessing must be intuited in order to be cognized; since all such properties violate CI, it cannot be true that a central class of the properties registered in cognition satisfy CI.

However, this does not spell the end for the pre-Copernican theory, because the results of the Aesthetic are compatible with a modified variant of the first thesis, which, if accepted, would open the way to a rearticulation of the pre-Copernican cognitive paradigm, albeit one that took place against the idealist backdrop of Kant's theory of cognition. Kant claims that the subjective conditions of cognition include both sensory and intellectual conditions. Now, for all the Aesthetic has shown, spatiotemporal objects could possess their sensible properties quite independently of meeting the *intellectual* conditions of cognition; in this case, although these properties would not exhibit cognition-independence, they *would* exhibit 'thought-independence', understood as follows:

(TI) A property *F* of an object *O* is thought-independent if and only if *O*'s possession of *F* is explanatorily independent of the subjective conditions of its being thought as *F*.

In this case, the first pre-Copernican thesis would resurface as the claim that objects of our cognition satisfy TI in respect of a central class of their properties. If we accepted this thesis, and continued to endorse CC, then we would be compelled to adopt a conformist account of the conditions under which judgement qualifies as cognition. If objects satisfy TI in respect of the properties we judge them to possess, then an act of judgement could not make possible the object's possession of the property, for this would violate TI. Given CC, cognition is only possible when there is a relation of dependence in one of two directions between the judgement and the object; since the relation cannot run from the judgement to the object on pain of violating TI, we will be forced to hold that judgement, insofar as it is to deliver cognition, is made possible by the state of the object. In this case, we will not have departed from the central pre-Copernican thesis of Representational Conformity, according to which the kind of representational relationship in which cognition is possible is one that is fundamentally to be explained by appeal to facts concerning the represented object. To borrow a phrase from Béatrice Longuenesse (1998, 17), we will be left with an 'internalization within representation' of precisely the account of cognition from which Kant claims to be turning. The Aesthetic, then, facilitates but does not accomplish the Copernican turn.

3. Empirical Content and the Model of Subsumption

Not only are the arguments of the Aesthetic *consistent* with a conformist account of cognition; as I will argue in this section, Kant makes direct appeal to the conformist model in his account of empirical conceptual content. If this is correct, then whilst the Copernican turn cannot consist in the mere rejection of CI, neither can it require the outright abandonment of the conformist model, and it will be the aim of the latter part of this essay to develop an interpretation that respects these constraints. The aim of the present section is to show how

Kant draws on the model of conformity in his account of empirical cognition and empirical conceptual content more generally.

In order to begin, it will be worth developing an account of Kant's understanding of the nature of conceptual content in general. In the sense of the term 'content' at play in the Critique, the content of a concept contrasts with its logical form:

'For every concept there is requisite, first, the logical form of a concept (of thinking) in general, and then, second, the possibility of giving it an object to which it is related. Without this latter it has no sense, and is entirely empty of content, even though it may still contain the logical function for making a concept out of whatever sort of *data* there are.' A239/B298

The possibility of bringing a logical form into relation with an object is a condition of its possessing content; and one obvious explanation here is that the content of a concept *just is* the relation it bears to an object in virtue of which it counts as a concept rather than a mere logical form. This explanation is consonant with Kant's repeated equation in the Critique of the content of a concept with its relation to an object.[6] On this account, then, a logical form can be a concept just insofar as it can be brought into certain relations with an object. How are we to understand these conceptuality-conferring relations? A representation is a concept insofar as it is the predicate of a possible judgement (A69/B94), and judgements may serve the purposes either of cognition or of thought. A concept can feature in cognition insofar as it can 'determine' or 'subsume' an object in sensory intuition; it can feature in thought insofar as it is compossible with other concepts to form a non-contradictory thought (Bxxvi). Now, Kant in the Phenomena and Noumena chapter loosely associates a concept's capacity to subsume an object with its possession of *use*, and its capacity to feature in thought with its possession of *significance*, and it will be congenial to adopt these terms in what follows. Thus, we can say that a mere logical form will count as a concept just insofar as it can be brought into relation with objects in such a way that it acquires either use or significance: distinctively *conceptual* content is that relation to objects in virtue of which logical forms acquire use or significance.

Now, Kant claims that the faculty by which concepts are put to use in cognition is the power of judgement, which is presented in the first Critique as a capacity for discerning rule-governed unity in the given manifold (A132/B171). Moreover, concepts are only fit for use by the power of judgement insofar as they are associated with 'schemata'. For a concept to subsume an object, it must be 'schematized', and it is 'schematized' when it is brought into 'homogoneity' with an object that is given in intuition. Roughly, the idea is that a concept is homogenous with an object in intuition when it is possible to view the intuited object

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6 See, eg, A57/B81, and Tolley (2012b) for further citations and compelling argument for the association of the two notions.

as instantiating the 'marks' or properties abstractly thought together in the concept. This homogeneity is made possible by the schema of the concept, which guides the power of judgement in its efforts to discern unity in the sensible manifold. In the case of empirical concepts, this guidance is supplied by a rule for the construction and recognition of a sensible image that 'corresponds' to the concept. Here, the schema is a specific rule governing the 'apprehension' and 'reproduction' of the given manifold, whereby one recognises certain ways in which the manifold unfolds as tending towards an image that corresponds to the concept. Thus, the schematism of the empirical concept sensitizes the subject to certain distinctive sensible trajectories.[7]

A proper treatment of Kant's doctrine of schematism, and the complex theory of transcendental imagination in terms of which it is parsed, goes well beyond the scope of the present essay. For present purposes all that is important is the claim that the schema of an empirical concept sensitizes the subject to certain distinctive combinations of sensation, and allows the subject to mark these salient combinations by thinking them under the schematized concept. What is important is thus that, insofar as they are associated with schemata, empirical concepts constitute *discriminatory capacities*; and hence it is only as discriminatory capacities that empirical concepts possess one central kind of conceptual content, namely that through which they can be granted a use. We can attribute this claim to Kant absent an interpretation of the complex mechanisms by which such capacities are instituted and sustained.

Now, insofar as they are associated with schemata, empirical concepts constitute an ability to attribute an object properties on the basis of the way in which it is present in sensation. Thus, the possibility of the object's being cognized through schematized empirical concepts is to be explained partly by appeal to the manner in which its properties are manifested in sensation; and since sensations are present in sensibility independently of their being thought under concepts, it follows that the sensible properties cognized through empirical concepts are properties that satisfy TI: properties that an appearance possesses independently of the conditions of its being thought. In this case, empirical cognition, to the extent that it acquaints us with properties of an object that are given through sensation, must be understood as a kind of cognition that is made possible by and hence conforms to the object. And this is exactly what Kant claims. In the passage in which he introduces the requirement of Cognitive Contact, Kant claims that the cognition-enabling dependence runs from the object to the conceptual representation of the object 'with appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation' (A92/B125). It thus seems that the pre-Copernican model plays a central role in Kant's account of empirical cognition.

In fact, the model of conformity informs Kant's account of empirical conceptual content *uberhaupt*. Above it was claimed that logical forms possess conceptual content only insofar as they can be related to objects in such a way as to possess *use* (a role in cognition) or *significance* (a role in thinking). It is plausible that at least a central class of empirical concepts also rely on their schemata as a condition of their possession, not only of use, but also of significance. That is to say, if one abstracted from the association of an empirical concept with a schema, it could no longer contribute to the representational content of an act of thinking. Now, for this claim to have any textual or philosophical plausibility, we must be clear about the sense in which schema and concept must be related. The claim here is not that an empirical concept can only feature in thought insofar as it is *currently being schematized*. Kant is not committed to the absurd claim that, eg, 'the table is red' can only express a thought as long as I take my current perceptual experience to present me with a red table. This sentence can express a thought whether or not I take myself to be undergoing experiences which present me with the relevant objects; hence its constituent concepts can possess significance in abstraction from their *being schematized*. However, it is less clear that they can possess significance in abstraction from their very *association with schemata*. Considered in this manner, the concepts do not constitute discriminatory capacities, and thus crediting a subject with a grasp of the concepts so understood would not involve crediting the subject with the capacity to indicate in intuition the kind of object she is thinking about when she uses the concepts. *Can* such a subject think with these concepts? Does such a subject express a thought with the sentence 'the table is red'? Now, Kant states in the Preface that we can think using concepts provided that we can combine them in a non-contradictory manner in judgement (Bxxvi). Clearly, the subject under consideration is combining concepts in a non-contradictory manner, and hence succeeds in thinking *something* with the sentence under consideration, but what is less clear is that the concepts <table> and <red> are making any distinctive contribution to what is being thought. Given that the subject cannot indicate in intuition the kinds of things she is talking about, it seems that there is nothing left to distinguish her thought from the very general thought that there is a substance which possesses a property. But since concepts such as <substance> and <property> are thought as constituent marks of all empirical concepts, there will be nothing left to distinguish the empirical concepts <table> and <red>, as they feature in this subject's thinking, from others. Thus there is nothing left of *these particular* concepts to feature in thought: there is no thinking left to be done which would count as an exercise of these empirical concepts as opposed to others. In this case, empirical concepts lose their capacity to make a distinctive contribution to the representational content of a thought when they are considered in abstraction from their association with schemata.[8]

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7 For recent interpretations along these lines, which associate empirical schemata with rules governing the apprehension and reproduction of the manifold of sensation, see Allison (2004, 208-210) Longuenesse, (1998, 50), and Pendelbury (1995, especially 785).

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8 Thanks to James Kreines for pressing me to clarify this point. It must be admitted that it is difficult to find direct textual evidence to supplement the systematic basis presented above for attributing this doctrine to Kant. However, one

Thus, removing the condition of use of empirical concepts at the same time removes their condition of significance. In this case, it is only insofar as they are associated with schemata that empirical concepts possess conceptual content at all. This makes for a unitary notion of empirical content, which can be understood on the conformist paradigm. Empirical concepts relate to objects in the manner required for them to possess content just insofar as they are capable through their schemata of tracking the sensibly manifested properties of objects. Since empirical schemata may only be generated if an object manifests sensible properties, and since empirical concepts owe their content to their association with schemata, empirical conceptual content would be impossible if objects were not present in sensibility. This yields a clear sense in which empirical concepts are a species of representation made possible by the object, as the conformist model requires. Thus it appears that, consistently with the results of the Aesthetic, Kant can and does model empirical conceptual content on the paradigm of conformity.

In what follows, I will call the kind of content possessed by empirical concepts 'subsumptive content'. Rather than identifying empirical and subsumptive content, I will treat empirical conceptual content as a species of subsumptive content. A concept has such content if and only if it owes both its use and significance to its capacity to track sensibly given features of objects; a being capable of registering features of objects in a priori sensibility could therefore possess subsumptive a priori concepts. On the assumption that the subsumptive model gives us the only intelligible explanation of how a concept could depend on an object for its very possibility, I will also assume that *only* concepts that possess subsumtpive content stand in a conformist relation to objects.

4. The Transcendental Content of the Pure Categories

Now, this establishes that the Copernican turn cannot consist in the complete excision of the conformist paradigm. Nevertheless, it must involve more than the mere rejection of the thesis that objects of cognition satisfy CI in respect of their cognizable properties. First, we have just seen that this result alone is compatible with a theory of cognition that bears all the hallmarks of the conformist account. Second, Kant explicitly states in the Preface that the Copernican turn cannot stop with intuitions, but must also be extended to concepts (Bxvii), thus we could hardly expect the turn to be completed in the Aesthetic, before Kant's analysis of conceptual representation has even begun. The challenge is thus to see how Kant can extend his Copernicanism into his account of conceptual representation consistently with the conformist presuppositions of his account of empirical conceptual content.

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promising textual source is in the Schematism chapter, A141/B180, in which Kant claims that empirical concepts are '…always immediately related to the schema of the imagination', and appears to distinguish empirical concepts from both categories and pure sensible concepts on this basis.

As a first step to meeting this challenge, I argue in this section that Kant at least intends to augment his account of content by allowing for a kind of content which cannot be understood on the subsumptive model. In the Phenomenna and Noumena chapter, Kant claims that the coincidence of conditions of use and significance seen to obtain for empirical concepts does not obtain in the case of the categories. Explaining how these conditions diverge requires positing a new kind of conceptual content for the pure categories which Kant calls 'transcendental significance' and also 'transcendental content'. The concept of the transcendental object has its origin in a specification of this distinctive kind of content.

The categories are a priori concepts of objects. Their empirical use consists in their representing intuited objects in such a way that it is determined which logical place in judgement the representation of that object should occupy. Here is Kant's example in relation to the concept <body>:

> 'They [the categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as **determined** with regard to one of the **logical functions** for judgements… Through the category of substance… if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate…' (B128-9)

Just as in the case of empirical concepts, the categories are of use in cognizing given objects insofar as they are associated with their schemata, which Kant identifies as 'transcendental time determinations'. Thus, to pursue the present example, the schema for substance is persistence of the real in time: by recognizing something as a permanent substratum, which endures while other things change, one recognizes it as the sort of thing that can only be represented in the subject-position in judgement, and thereby schematizes the category of substance (A144/B183).

If one abstracts away from the association of the category with its schema, one is left with the 'pure category', in which abstraction is made from the specifically temporal form of human intuition (A245). Thus, for example, the concept of substance as permanence of the real in time contracts to become the bare representation of 'something that can occur only as subject (without being a predicate of anything)' (A242/B300).

What is the status of the pure categories? While Kant is at pains to insist that they are deprived of any empirical use, he nevertheless grants them in the Phenomena and Noumena chapter what he calls 'transcendental significance' (A248/B305). As we will see, this has implications for our understanding of the nature of conceptual content in general.

In the case of empirical concepts, use and significance are biconditionally related, and both obtain in virtue of a concept's capacity to subsume an object. This made for a unitary notion of empirical conceptual content on the model of conformity to an intuitively given object, which I called subsumptive content. Now Kant has granted the categories transcen-

dental significance in the absence of empirical use. In order to save the unitary notion of conceptual content in the present case, therefore, we would have to say that, though the pure categories do not subsume a sensible object, they *do* subsume a non-sensible object, one that is given to the intellect alone. This would explain the possibility of a non-empirical significance of the categories in a manner that salvaged the connection between the possibility of cognitive content and the possibility of subsumption of an object: we could explain the possibility of a transcendental significance of the categories by attributing them a transcendental use. But Kant's claim is precisely that the pure categories 'have merely transcendental significance, but are not of any transcendental use' (A248/B305; cf. A139/B178). It is precisely Kant's aim in the Phenomena and Noumena chapter to explain the non-empirical significance of the categories without claiming that they subsume a special non-empirical object.

In order to do this, Kant challenges the identification of conceptual content *per se* with the possibility of subsumption of an object. Though content and the possibility of subsumption are biconditionally related in the case of empirical concepts, this relationship does not hold in the case of the categories. Attention to the case of empirical concepts tempted us to equate the very notion of relation to objects with that of (possible) subsumption of objects. However, against this Kant argues that subsumption of objects is only a species of which relation to objects is the genus. There is also another kind of purely intellectual relation to objects that can obtain independently of the possibility of subsumption of objects. Concepts that possess this kind of relation will be capable of figuring in thought and will thus possess significance, but since the relation is not subsumptive they will not thereby possess use. Thus, in the case of the categories the conditions of significance depart from the conditions of use, and there is a special kind of content that accrues to the categories merely in virtue of their possession of significance. This special kind of content Kant calls transcendental significance (A248/B305), and elsewhere, 'transcendental content' (A79/B105).

Only in the context of Kant's account of transcendental significance can we understand the significance of the concept of the transcendental object. This, I suggest, is a concept that has its origin in a specification of the distinctive nature of tsranscendental content. It was claimed above that conceptual content is a kind of relation between representations and objects. Thus, specifying kinds of conceptual content will be a matter of specifying the nature of the relation, and, connectedly, the nature of its relata. Now, some of the concepts under which we can bring an object present the object just insofar as it is fit to be the relatum of certain kinds of conceptual content. These concepts, although they concern the object, are themselves internal to the specification of the nature of a kind of content: they present an object in such a way as to make intelligible how it is suited to supply a certain kind of content to a representation. Now, the kinds of concepts under which we can bring the objects in this manner will depend on the kinds of concepts under which we bring the associated cognitive relation. For example, when the relation in question is

subsumptive, the concept will need to specify an object in terms of those features in virtue of which it is apt to be represented through an act of subsumption. Clearly, an object would not be apt to supply a concept with empirical subsumptive content if it was not presented in intuition, and thus concepts that present an object as given in intuition will be internal to the specification of subsumptive content. Thus, for example, the concept <appearance>, since it is the concept of an object as presented in empirical intuition (A20/B34), must be part of the specification of empirical subsumptive significance, since part of what is involved in an object's being susceptible of empirical subsumption is its being given in empirical intuition. Likewise, if the pure categories were related to objects through subsumption of an object given in non-sensible intuition, then the proper concept with which to specify the object of transcendental significance, just insofar as it is such an object, would be a concept that presented the object as given to non-sensible intuition – the (positive)[9] concept of a noumenon (A249/B305).

Thus, the concepts <appearance> and <noumenon> cannot be appealed to in a specification of the nature of transcendental content. Of course, it may very well be that objects that fall under the concepts <appearance> and <noumenon> are among the objects to which the categories are related in their transcendental significance. The point is simply that, since the pure categories possess transcendental significance without subsuming given objects, it cannot be the case that the objects of transcendental significance, just insofar as they are such objects, can be given to intuition. Thus, it cannot be the case that objects fall under concepts such as <appearance> or <noumenon> just insofar as they are topics of transcendental significance; hence, such concepts cannot be internal to the specification of transcendental significance. Kant's Copernican articulation of a new kind of relation to objects accordingly demands a new concept of the object.

That this is the concept of the transcendental object is made clear in the following important passage:

> 'Thinking is the action of relating given intuitions to an object. If the manner of this intuition is not given in any way [i.e if we abstract from the sensible schemata of concepts], then the object is merely transcendental… Now through a pure category, in which abstraction is made from any condition of sensible intuition as the only one that is possible for us, no object is determined, rather only the thought of an object in general is expressed in accordance with different *modi*.' (A247/B304)

Insofar as it is the relatum of pure transcendental significance, the object is 'merely transcendental': the concept of the transcendental object is thus the concept under which we bring an object just insofar as we view it as susceptible of representation through the pure

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9 See B307.

categories. This is not a concept that presents the object as given to intuition: it merely presents the object as possessing the features of an 'object in general'. But if the fundamental features of an object 'in general' are thought through the pure categories, and the pure categories present an object insofar as it is thinkable through logical functions, it follows that the features of an object in general are those in virtue of which it is a possible topic of judgement. Thus, the object is thought under the concept of the transcendental object just insofar as it is thought as a possible topic of judgement.[10]

Thus, the categories, by relating to the transcendental object, are transcendentally related to all possible objects of judgement. But this relation to the transcendental object is not instituted through an act of subsumption. The concept <transcendental object> does not denote a special entity which comes before the intellect, to be subsumed under the pure categories: it is '…no object of cognition in itself' (A250), and hence '…cannot be called the **noumenon**' (A253).[11] How, then, is the relation to the transcendental object set into place? The pure categories depict objects as regards their form as possible objects of judgement; if they are not related to their objects through an act of subsumption, this means that they do not acquaint us with the form of objects by recognising that form as instantiated in some given object of pure intellectual subsumption. That is to say, the categories do not represent the form of possible objects in virtue of a capacity to conform to those objects. Rather than registering the form of possible objects, as manifested in a noumenal object, the categories '…*anticipate* the form of a possible experience in general…' (A246/B303, my emphasis). It is in virtue of their capacity to anticipate objects rather than to subsume them that the categories can signify the forms of possible objects of judgement. Now, an *anticipatory* representational relation to the object does not sound like a relation that is fundamentally to be explained by appeal to facts about the object. If we could make sense of cognition on the model of anticipation, therefore, we would have the makings of a non-conformist model of cognition. Thus, the pure categories testify to a fundamentally

new kind of representational relationship with objects, and to the extent that this relationship could be understood as yielding cognition, we have the materials for a non-conformist model of cognition.

The distinctive kind of content in virtue of which the categories are related to the transcendental object is referred to by Kant as transcendental significance, and elsewhere as transcendental content. Now, it is plausible to regard the discipline that Kant entitled 'transcendental logic' as a study of this distinctive kind of content. In the introduction to the Transcendental Analytic, Kant introduces the idea of a transcendental logic by contrasting it with its 'general' counterpart (A55/B79-A57/B82). Although both logics take thought as their subject-matter, transcendental logic lifts an abstraction that is present in general logic: transcendental logic does not abstract from the fact that thought has 'content' (A55/B80). That is, transcendental logic does not abstract from the fact that thought is related to objects.[12] Nevertheless, transcendental logic focusses on the content that pertains to the 'pure thinking of objects', and in focussing on this kind of content, it *thereby* excludes all cognitions that possess 'empirical content'. This suggests that the content of pure thinking is different in kind to that of empirical thinking, and the present interpretation of the pure categories has an explanation here: the content of empirical thinking is a kind of representational relation that is fundamentally, although only in part, to be explained by appeal to the sensible presence of the object; the content of pure thinking through the categories is a kind of representational relationship which cannot be explained by appeal to the intuitive presence of the object. And indeed this is exactly what Kant claims: *in* concerning itself with the 'rules of the pure thinking of an object', transcendental logic *thereby* i) excludes cognitions that are of empirical content, and ii) addresses '…the origin of our cognition of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects…' (A56/B80). Insofar as our cognition does not owe itself to the presence of the object, it is founded on an act of anticipation: transcendental logic is a study of the anticipatory content of the pure categories. Thus, the two disciplines of transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic correspond to the two steps of Kant's Copernican turn: while the Aesthetic rejects the conception of property-possession which made a conformist model of cognition seem obligatory, it is only through transcendental logic that Kant develops the explanatory resources for a positive articulation of a non-conformist model of cognition.

Though this resolves the question of where in the text we can expect the Copernican turn to be completed, it leaves unsettled questions about the scope of the turn, and indeed superficially suggests an answer that I will reject in the next section. In the Preface, the chief motivation for departing from the conformist paradigm is that, according to Kant, it cannot

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10 This reading has significant affinities with that developed by George in his unduly neglected (1974). George claims that the concept of the transcendental object is the most fundamental concept under which we bring an object insofar as we conceive of it as the referent of concepts as they feature in acts of empirical judgement (1974, 189-90). I am in substantial agreement with George here, though I deny that the concept merely designates an entity insofar as it is the topic of *empirical* judgement; then it would have to designate the entity as subsumed. Rather, it designates an entity just insofar as it is the topic of *any* kind of judgement, and this is why it specifies the kind of entity thought through the pure categories. Nevertheless, I owe to George my basic interpretative strategy of viewing the concept <transcendental object> as one under which we bring objects just insofar as we conceive of them as possessing certain distinctive relations to our cognitive capacity – a strategy George extends to the concept <thing in itself>, which he presents as the most fundamental concept under which we bring an entity when we conceive of it as the cause of our experience (1974, 189-90). However, neither George nor any of the commentators on the transcendental object with whom I am familiar makes explicit the connection of the concept with Kant's doctrine of the pure categories (cf. Allison (1968), Bird (1962), Paton (1936)).

11 See also Kant's claim at A157/B196 that there is no 'pure object' in relation to which the agreement of pure concepts in a synthetic a priori proposition could be grounded.

12 Note that even if one wishes to contest the claim that the content as relation to objects conception is consistently employed throughout the Critique, there can be little doubt that it is operative in the present passage: Kant has explicitly glossed the notion of content in these terms two sentences earlier.

make sense of the possibility of a priori cognition of objects (Bxvi). This makes it appear that Kant's complaint against the conformist paradigm is restricted to its treatment of a priori knowledge-claims; in this case, perhaps Kant only seeks to depart from the conformist model as regards a priori cognition. The fact that Kant restricts transcendental logic to a study of the *pure* thinking of objects seems to encourage this picture. Moreover, we saw in the last section that Kant's Copernican philosophy *does* make appeal to the conformist model in its account of empirical cognition. In this case, then, it might be tempting to hive off Kant's account of empirical knowledge from his account of a priori knowledge, and claim that the Copernican turn consists in the rejection of CI together with the articulation of a non-conformist account of a priori cognition, but leaves intact the conformist model with regard to empirical cognition. This is the kind of reading that Engstrom (2006, 7) calls a 'cut-and-paste' reading of the Copernican philosophy, and it might seem to be forced on us by the apparent restriction of transcendental logic, and the apparent centrality of the model of subsumption in Kant's account of empirical cognition.

Our present question about the scope of Kant's Copernican turn is thus also a question about the scope of transcendental logic. Clinton Tolley (2012a) has recently asked whether transcendental logic should be granted the same generality as general logic, or whether it should be restricted to some sub-region of human thought – a priori as opposed to a posteriori knowledge-claims; or synthetic as opposed to analytic judgement; or thought that is restricted in some way to the spatiotemporal manifold given in human intuition. Now, it is only in regard to thinking that exhibits the transcendental content studied by transcendental logic that Kant has the resources to articulate a non-conformist paradigm of cognition. Thus, restricting the scope of his transcendental logic thereby restricts the scope of his Copernican turn. Tolley produces compelling grounds for viewing the generality of transcendental logic as every bit as unrestricted as that of general logic. But if we are to accept this conclusion, we must also show that Kant applied a non-conformist paradigm to all possible cognition. The aim of the final part of this essay is to show just this, and to do so in a manner that respects the role of the pre-Copernican paradigm in Kant's account of empirical cognition. I will do so by appeal to a reading of the aims and basic strategy of the transcendental deduction, with particular focus on the role of the transcendental object in the first-edition Deduction.

5. The Transcendental Deduction and the Possibility of Subsumption

The distinction between subsumptive and transcendental content sheds light on the purpose of the transcendental deduction: the primary task of the transcendental deduction of the categories is to show that and how empirical thought is possible. This initially sounds surprising: the avowed task of the deduction is to prove that the categories have legitimate application to the objects of experience (A89-91/B122-23). But the two tasks come to the same thing. This becomes clear when we consider the relationship between transcendental

and subsumptive content. It was claimed above that an entity is a topic of transcendental significance and hence falls under the concept of the transcendental object just insofar as it is fit to be the subject-matter of judgement. Now, concepts only possess content insofar as they can be exercised in judgement, and hence objects can only supply concepts with content if they are fit to be represented by those concepts through judgement. The object of subsumptive significance, insofar as it is the kind of entity that can be present in empirical intuition, is an appearance. However, for this object to supply representations with *conceptual* significance, it must also be a possible topic of judgement, and hence must fall under the concept of the transcendental object. Thus, showing that appearances are among the objects to which the categories are related in their transcendental significance is of a piece with showing how appearances could supply the input to empirical conceptual content.

Given that appearances violate CI, they possess properties in virtue of meeting the conditions of their being cognized. One of the conditions of appearances' being cognized is their being given in a certain way in empirical intuition, and they possess many of their properties in virtue of meeting this condition. These are the properties tracked by empirical concepts in their subsumptive significance, and accordingly it is possible to verify the objective validity of an empirical concept simply by consulting experience to see whether it does in fact exhibit the sensory properties thought in the concept. With regard to such concepts '…we always have experience at hand ready to prove their objective reality.' (A84/B117)

It is crucial to note, however, that appearances cannot fall under the concept of the transcendental object in virtue of their way of being given in intuition; for this would be inconsistent with the transcendental significance of the categories, as is made clear by the following considerations. When an object falls under a concept in virtue of its way of being given in intuition, it satisfies TI, which, together with CC, entails that cognition of the object be conformist in character, and Kant applies the conformist model to empirical cognition with his subsumptive model of content. Thus, if appearances fell under the concept of the transcendental object in virtue of their way of being given, then the categories, insofar as they allowed us to think appearances under the concept of the transcendental object, would be subsumptive in character. However, I claimed above that concepts which possess subsumptive content in this manner are not fit for use in thought in abstraction from their association with schemata; but the central point of the Phenomena and Noumena section is that the categories *are* fit for use in thought in abstraction from their schemata. Thus, any objective concept under which appearances fall in virtue of their way of being given, since it cannot possess significance independently of the conditions of its empirical use, *is not* the concept of the transcendental object, and any concepts that allow us to cognize appearances as falling under such an objective concept are *not* the categories, at least as they are presented in the Phenomena and Noumena section.

The fact that the transcendental object cannot be understood as applying to experiences in virtue of picking out some feature of sensation, I suggest, is what Kant is attempting

to flag when he says that it is equal to 'X' (A104-5, A109). The object is equal to X because there is no isolable element of the empirical manifold to which we are responding in our use of the concept, with which we could equate the transcendental object; just as it was a mistake to view the transcendental object as being a topic of cognition in virtue of being given in intellectual intuition, it would be a mistake to claim that it is a topic of cognition in virtue of being given in empirical intuition. It is rather a concept that '…cannot contain any determinate intuition at all' (A109). Thus, to the extent that appearances are cognizable under the concept, they cannot be so cognizable in virtue of features of the way in which they are given in intuition.

So, we have the following result: if appearances fall under the concept of the transcendental object, then, given that they violate CI, they must do so in virtue of their conditions of being cognized; but they cannot do so in virtue of their sensible conditions of being cognized, for insofar as an object falls under a concept in virtue of its sensible conditions of cognition, it can only be brought under concepts that possess subsumptive content, and the categories possess transcendental content. Now, this means that the only possible route to showing that appearances fall under the concept is showing that they do so in virtue of some non-sensible condition of their cognition; that is, if appearances are to fall under the concept of the transcendental object, they must do so, not in virtue of their way of being given, but in virtue of their way of being thought. Since they are thought through acts of subsumption, Kant must investigate the nature of subsumption in order to show that, just in virtue of the manner in which they are subsumed, appearances are thought as falling under the concept of the transcendental object.

This strategy is most clearly on display in the propaedeutic presentation of the deduction in the first-edition (A99-114). There, in his discussion of the threefold synthesis (A98-104), Kant presents an elaborate characterisation of the discriminatory processes by which appearances are subsumed under empirical concepts. Then, Kant attempts to show that, just in virtue of the form of the activity of subsumption, we think appearances under the concept of the transcendental object, that is, represent them as yielding a possible topic for judgement. Kant's claim is that we think appearances this way just when we become conscious in a certain way of the status of our acts of subsumption. We think appearances under the concept of the transcendental object just insofar as we view the rule governing their subsumption as one that could be indefinitely reapplied (A105), and one which, in some manner, represents the sensory elements of the manifold as necessarily connected with one another (A106). The concept of the transcendental object, Kant claims, is thought through our empirical predicates whenever those predicate are applied to the appearance on the basis of a rule of which we are conscious in this manner. Moreover, this way of becoming conscious of the rule of subsumption is not optional: it is only by becoming conscious of the rule in this manner that the subject can think its necessary self-identity (A107-8), and

hence it is only by being subsumed in this manner that appearances can belong to a single experience.

Clearly, an assessment or even a full presentation of this intricate argument goes well beyond the scope of the present work. The point to note is that it is in the transcendental deduction that Kant must articulate a non-conformist account of the relation of cognition to its object, and the subjective deduction is well understood if viewed in this light. Kant in the subjective deduction is trying to show how an anticipation of the form of the object as possible topic of judgement is built in to the very form of subsumptive awareness. In order to complete the transcendental deduction, Kant must show that appearances are thinkable under the concept of the transcendental object in virtue of their meeting the conditions of cognition. Nevertheless, in order to respect the transcendental significance of the categories, Kant cannot claim appearances are so thinkable in virtue of their way of being given. Thus, Kant must show i) that appearances are thinkable under the concept of the transcendental object in virtue of an act of thought that is contained within the act of subsumption; and ii) that this act is itself a condition of the possibility of experience. He executes this strategy in the passage cited above by i) tracing the representation of the transcendental object to our consciousness of the unity of the rule of subsumption; and ii) claiming that this consciousness is a condition of brining representations to the original unity of apperception. Whatever we are to make of i) and ii), by situating the Deduction in the context of the Copernican turn we can at least make sense of why Kant should be arguing for these claims at this point in the text.

Hence, the Copernican turn will be consummated, if at all, in the transcendental deduction. Once completed, the Copernican turn will show that appearances can provide empirical thought with subsumptive content only if subsumption itself involves a spontaneous act of thought which determines the appearance in accordance with the concept of the transcendental object.

Conclusion

Kant's Copernican turn consists in showing that intuited objects acquire the properties in virtue of which they are topics of possible judgement through an act of thought, which I have called an anticipation in accordance with the categories. Since empirical thinking and cognition can only take place in relation to a possible object of judgement, it follows that such thinking must itself incorporate an act of anticipation, and it is the purpose of the transcendental deduction is to show how this could be so. Accordingly, empirical thought is remodelled in terms unavailable in the pre-Copernican system, because it is understood as incorporating a kind of representational content – transcendental content – which cannot be explained by citing the sensibly given features of objects. Nevertheless, this does not spell the end of the conformist model of empirical cognition: to the extent that the object

is the subject-matter of judgement, it conforms to our mode of cognition; but to the extent that it exhibits a sensory profile in intuition, it is that to which our cognition must conform.

Kant sometimes expresses this balance by emphasizing that this idealism is purely 'formal' (B519n): while the mind is responsible for the basic forms of objects, qua intuited and thought about, it is not the originator of their sensible matter: we cannot view the mind as supplying itself with the sensations that are present in intuition, and to the extent that it registers the sensibly given features of objects, it stands in a genuinely conformist relation to its object. The task of the deduction is to show how this conformist relation to the object can co-exist with, and indeed constitutively involve, an anticipation of the form of the object in accordance with the concept of the transcendental object. Thus, Kant's Copernican turn, if successful, will achieve a sublation of the very distinction in terms of which it is introduced: he will have shown that the object must conform to the mind as a condition of the mind's conforming to the object.

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REVISITING KANT AND HUSSERL'S ON THE COPERNICAN TURN

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In the following paper, I argue that none of the recent criticisms of Kant's transcendental idealism offered on behalf of Husserl scholars such as Dominque Pradelle give us reason to think that Husserlian phenomenology moves beyond Kant's Copernican turn. I begin by first providing an interpretation of Kant's Copernican turn before outlining three issues with Kant's transcendental idealism that scholars like Pradelle (following Husserl) take as reason to reject Kant's revolution in philosophy: it makes the reference to the thing-it-itself, Kant construes the subject of the turn along psychological lines, and Kant's transcendental idealism results in skepticism. I then provide reasons why these supposed issues with Kant's theory ought not motivate us to think that Husserl's phenomenology does not operate with the underlying assumption of the turn or move beyond it. Finally, I make the case that if we take into the consideration the role played by the unity of apperception in Kant's account of object constitution, then Kant and Husserl, far from differing on the turn, are in fact, and contra thinkers like Pradelle, closer on the topic of objects of consciousness than is typically appreciated.

Keywords: *Philosophy, Kant, Copernican Turn, Husserl, Phenomenology, Transcendental Philosophy*

En el presente artículo, argumento que ninguna de las críticas recientes al idealismo trascendental de Kant ofrecidas por académicos husserlianos como Dominique Pradelle nos da razones para pensar que la fenomenología husserliana supera el giro copernicano de Kant. Comienzo proporcionando una interpretación del giro copernicano de Kant antes de delinear tres problemas con el idealismo trascendental kantiano que académicos como Pradelle (siguiendo a Husserl) consideran motivos para rechazar la revolución kantiana en filosofía: la referencia a la cosa en sí misma, la interpretación de Kant del sujeto del giro en términos psicológicos y el supuesto escepticismo resultante del idealismo trascendental kantiano. Posteriormente, presento razones por las cuales estos supuestos problemas con la teoría de Kant no deberían motivarnos a pensar que la fenomenología husserliana no opera bajo el supuesto fundamental del giro ni lo supera. Finalmente, sostengo que, si consideramos el papel desempeñado por la unidad de la apercepción en la explicación kantiana de la constitución del objeto, entonces Kant y Husserl, lejos de diferir en cuanto al giro, están, en contra de lo que afirman pensadores como Pradelle, más cercanos en cuanto al tema de los objetos de la conciencia de lo que generalmente se reconoce.

Palabras clave: *Filosofía, Kant, Giro Copernicano, Husserl, Fenomenología, Filosofía Trascendental*

Introduction

> *Kant's oeuvre contains gold in rich abundance. But one must break it and melt it in the fire of radical critique in order to bring out this content. (Husserl – from a manuscript ca. 1917)*

Throughout the development of his phenomenology, particularly beginning with and following his summer lecture course of 1907 (published posthumously as *Thing and Space*), Edmund Husserl finds himself in constant philosophical dialogue with Immanuel Kant. However, as is evident from the many references to Kant's work found throughout Husserl's corpus—in everything from his published works to his letters and lecture notes—Husserl's relationship with Kant over the course of 1907-1938 is anything but straightforward.

On the one hand, the signs of Kant's positive influence are unmistakable. Already in 1908, Husserl not only characterizes his investigations into the nature of consciousness as "transcendental" (Husserl, 1988, p. 234), but claims that his phenomenology is to be understood as a kind of "transcendental idealism"; a philosophical position Husserl ascribes to and labors under for the rest of his philosophical career. In *First Philosophy* (1923), Husserl claims that he was motivated to adopt the transcendental approach insofar as the "revolution" in the natural way of thinking accomplished by Kant's transcendental idealism provided the breakthrough needed to solve "all meaningful problems" in philosophy (Husserl, 1956, p. 237). And, in 1925, looking back at and recounting the development of his phenomenology in a letter to Ernst Cassirer, Husserl describes how his readings of Kant led him to continually appreciate the deep affinities between his own phenomenology and Kant's critical project (Husserl, 1994a, p. 54).

On the other hand, there are numerous criticisms and misgivings found throughout Husserl's writings about Kant and what the Kantian transcendental idealism in particular is capable of accomplishing. While his Neo-Kantian colleagues were calling for a return "back to Kant," Husserl instead famously called for a return to the "things" or "matters" themselves, where, in part, he has in mind descriptions of what is originally given in intuition, where these descriptions would be uninfluenced by precisely the kind of philosophical commitments that we find accompanying Kant's critical philosophy. In a letter to addressed to A. Metzger in 1919, Husserl places great emphasis on the differences between his phenomenology and Kant's transcendental idealism, stressing the slogan "back to Kant" had always remained foreign to him and claiming that he "had learned incomparably more from Hume than from Kant, against whom I had the deepest antipathies." (Husserl, 1994b, pp. 411-412).

This ambivalence has provoked a wealth of scholarly debates on the Kant-Husserl relationship, in particular the extent to which Husserl embraces a Kantian form of transcendental idealism. While the differences and similarities between Kant and Husserl's accounts of transcendental idealism have been explored on many fronts, an issue that has yet to be

resolved is whether and to what extant Husserlian phenomenology is a philosophy that embraces the Copernican "revolution" or "turn" that Kant took to be so central to his new approach. Specifically, Husserl scholars such as Dominique Pradelle have sought to make the case that Husserl's phenomenology, far from following Kant's in this regard, actually provides a number of challenges to Kant's turn, and that in fact we should understand one of the advances of Husserlian phenomenology over Kantian transcendental idealism to lie precisely in phenomenology's "anti-Copernican" stance.

According to scholars such as Pradelle, Husserl's phenomenology is a rejection of the Copernican turn not only because it is supposedly based on a number of unwarranted assumptions, but, more importantly, because of the way it fundamentally misconstrues the nature of object constitution. They argue that Husserl's various criticisms regarding the way Kant's turn understands objects of consciousness give us at least three main reasons to deny that phenomenology operates within the theoretical space opened up by Kant's turn. These reasons are, namely, that the turn (i) commits us to thing-in-itself, (ii) is inappropriately construed along psychological lines and (iii) results in subjective idealism and, thus, scepticism.

I want to make the argument that, although there are substantiative philosophical differences between Kant and Husserl, these three reasons cannot support the claim that Husserlian phenomenology departs from Kant's Copernican turn. In fact, when we look at the details regarding what Kant himself has to say about each of these issues, we see that Kant's position on consciousness ends up being much closer to Husserl's than perhaps even Husserl himself realized. Specifically, I want to make the case that if we understand Kant's account of object constitution in light of what he has to say about the unity of apperception and the way it contributes to structuring given objects, we will see that Husserlian phenomenology very much marks a further elaboration in of the kind of transcendental approach inaugurated by the turn.

I will proceed in the following way. I will begin, in section I, by first offering a brief interpretation of what I understand by Kant's Copernican turn and outline the issues with Kant's transcendental idealism that scholars like Pradelle (following Husserl) take as reason to reject the turn. In section II, I will defend Kant's appearance/thing in itself distinction, before making the case that Kant should not be interpreted along psychological or skeptical lines. It is here in the second half of section II, that I will provide a reading of the unity of apperception and demonstrate its importance for establishing Kant's account of the possibility of the objectivity of objects, as well as how, in the end, we should understand Kant's account of object constitution as not all that different than Husserl's. I will thus make the case in section II that if we give Kant's views full consideration, none of the criticisms offered by scholars like Pradelle give us a compelling reason to think Husserl and Kant should disagree on the issue of the Copernican turn. Finally, I will conclude by comparing Kant and Husserl's different versions of transcendental idealism. It is in this last discussion that I will give reasons why I think, despite their methodological differences, Husserl and

Kant are ultimately closer than they seem when it comes the central feature of transcendental idealism: the mind's contribution to the constitution of given objects initiated by the turn and its new "altered way of thinking" (Bxviii).

I.

Given Husserl's numerous references to the influence of Kant's Copernican turn on his phenomenology, Pradelle argument faces an uphill battle. In a lecture from 1923-4, for instance, after praising Kant and emphasizing the essential connection between Kant's philosophy and his own, Husserl makes it clear that it is the Copernican turn in particular that is to be celebrated as Kant's major philosophical contribution. Indeed, as Husserl himself argues, the turn is responsible for two giant steps forward in philosophy: first, it is responsible for overcoming the naïve realist attitude toward objects of consciousness and, second, points to what Husserl calls "the transcendental attitude" that his phenomenology, as a transcendental science, will itself draw upon and makes use of in its investigations. As Husserl states:

> The lasting meaning [of Kant's philosophy] lies in the frequently discussed and little understood "Copernican" turn to a fundamentally new and strictly scientific interpretation of the world as well as in the first articulation of the "entirely new" transcendental science that belongs to it. (Husserl, 1956, p. 240)

Along similar lines, in a letter from April 14, 1937 to R. Pannwitz, Husserl mentions the "true" Copernican revolution, which Husserl seems to directly equate with the re-orientation towards objects that is also at work in his famous "phenomenological reduction":

> [T]he topic of [my] second article: starting out from a critique of "presuppositions" in Kant's theories … and from there the motivation for the true "Copernican revolution"– the "phenomenological reduction" that has never been understood. (Husserl, 1994b, p. 227)

As Pradelle is well aware, however, statements such as these do not conclusively show that Husserlian phenomenology is committed to the Copernican turn or, if it is committed to some version of it, that Husserl necessarily understands the turn along Kantian lines. Not only is it difficult to neatly separate Husserl's positive views regarding the Copernican turn from his historical recounting of Kant's contributions to philosophy, but it is not at all clear that when Husserl makes use of Kantian concepts, he understands them in precisely the same way as did Kant. Indeed, as we so often find when a philosopher draws upon the work of an earlier thinker, it may entirely be the case that when Husserl draws parallels between Kant's philosophy and phenomenology (e.g., such as likening the Copernican revolution to the phenomenological reduction) he does so precisely in order to highlight the innovative character of his own re-thinking of the concept.

The question regarding the status of the Copernican turn in Husserl's work then, will not be resolved by reference to Husserl's favourable appraisals of Kant as part of his retelling of the history of philosophy; nor will it be decided by the fact that Husserl makes comparisons to or utilizes Kantian terminology and concepts to characterize his own positions. Rather, the fundamental issue is one that comes down to Husserl and Kant's very conceptions of transcendental idealism. Namely, how do Husserl and Kant construe the mind's relation to objects? Put otherwise: is Husserlian phenomenology, modeled on Kant's turn, committed to the idea that the mind not only conforms to objects, but that (at least in some sense) objects conform to the mind? Or is it case the reversal in the mind's relation with objects that characterizes Kant's turn is in some sense overcome in the transcendental philosophy that is phenomenology?

The key to resolving this issue lies in coming to a precise account of how it is Kant and Husserl understand the nature of object constitution. Indeed, thinkers like Pradelle make the case that Husserl's issue with the Copernican turn lies not just in its being based on a number of unwarranted assumptions, but, more importantly, the way it misconstrues the structuring of objects insofar as they are made available to consciousness. But in order to properly evaluate whether or not their arguments have any bearing on the turn and, further, motivate the conclusion that phenomenology can move beyond it, a more basic set of questions first need answering. In what precise way is the turn supposed to "revolutionize" the way we think about the relation between mind and object? And how does this shift change the way we understand objects? In other words: what did Kant understand by the Copernican turn and why did he deem it so revolutionary?

A generally correct but easily misinterpreted account of Kant's turn is that

amounts to the insight that our experience of given objects and the possibility of knowing them involves more than the mind simply mirroring a pre-existing world. Rather, our experience of objects and our coming to know them necessarily involves reference to a cognitive subject insofar as the cognitive subject that experiences and knows also accounts for a number of conditions that allow objects to appear in the first place: transcendental conditions or conditions of possibility that enable objects to be given, as well as thought.

As these transcendental conditions are of two fundamental kinds – those governing the passive receptivity of objects and those governing the activity of representing objects in thought – the possibility of objects appearing in the first place must necessarily refer back the cognitive subject in a twofold way. First, objects must be given in accordance with the form of sensibility (space and time) and, second, these given objects must themselves be thought in accordance with forms understanding (the categories). Insofar as these conditions *condition* objects, they are responsible for an *a priori* structure of objects that lies necessarily at the basis of and presupposed by any and all acquaintance with them.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant famously presents what he takes to be his philosophical innovation here by providing his readers a comparison: the idea that the possibility of objects being given and thought necessarily presupposing certain cognitive conditions is not unlike the reversal experienced by astronomers regarding the relationship between the earth and sun after Copernicus's discovery that the former revolves around the latter. Supposedly, after having made little headway in explaining the celestial motions, Copernicus was able to make his breakthrough by calling into question the long-standing assumption that the rest of the celestial system orbited around the observer on earth. In a similar way, Kant characterizes his revolutionary breakthrough in terms of objects – that is, the objects given under the conditions of sensibility and thought according to understanding – needing to "conform" to the cognitive conditions of our mind, as opposed to the other way around in order to even be experienced (Bxvi).

Kant takes the insight that in order for objects to be possibly experienced and known they must first appear in light of these cognitive conditions to be a monumental one, for, by demonstrating that the appearance of even given objects requires that we must take into account the subject's cognitive capacities, it brings about a reversal in the very way we understand one of the most basic of philosophical commitments: the relationship between subject and object.

This reversal has at least two significant consequences. Not only does the nominal theory of truth ("the agreement of cognition with its object" (A58/B82; A237/B296)) need to be supplemented by a transcendental theory regarding the possible appearance of the objects that provide the measure or standard for our knowledge, but, as there are truths regarding these conditions of possibility themselves, the reversal opens up a whole new realm of philosophical investigation and knowledge ("transcendental philosophy"). The pre-critical search for knowledge of reality and its fundamentals properties is transformed by Kant's turn into a reflection on the conditions that objects must satisfy in order for them to appear for the mind at all, as well as provide the objects of its knowledge. The project of the first *Critique* at least, is to discover the transcendental conditions and expound, in principles, the necessary, *a priori* contributions these conditions make to the representation of objects; a project that will simultaneously rethink genuine metaphysical knowledge and its possibility as transcendental philosophy and distinguish this well-grounded "scientific" form of metaphysics from earlier, pre-revolutionary forms.

Now, I want to flag that this general outline of Kant's turn is easily misinterpreted. Many thinkers have misconstrued Kant's talk about objects "conforming" to our cognition and taken the comparison with the Copernicus' revolution as evidence that Kant's transcendental idealism is to be interpreted among psychological and idealist lines that, despite Kant's claims to secure the possibility of knowledge, forever puts knowledge out of reach.

Specifically, there are three main issues that arise from Kantian reversal between the subject and object, and subsequently the account object constitution, that supposedly motivate Husserl to reject Kant's Copernican turn. What is more, they claim that successfully overcoming these perceived inadequacies and moving beyond the Kantian revolution is

what distinguishes Husserl's phenomenology, as a form of transcendental idealism, from that of Kant's. These three issues are that the turn:

    i.   Commits us to thing-in-itself

    ii. Construes the subject along psychological lines

    iii. Results in subjective idealism and scepticism

To say a bit regarding what Pradelle takes to be Husserl's issues here, it is claimed that the idealism that results from Kant's turn is inherently problematic insofar as Kantian transcendental idealism, in its effort to outline the transcendental conditions according to which objects appear for consciousness, makes reference to what is entirely independent of consciousness and its conditions. This "thing-in-itself," apparently referring to that which is independent of the consciousness and its conditions, is integral to the rethinking of the subject-object relation inaugurated by the Copernican turn, and so is something Kant must commit to if his transcendental idealism is to even get off the ground. However, to mark off transcendental conditions and establish their limits by drawing upon a distinction between the way things are according to and beyond these conditions (i.e., the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction) is a hopeless task, for it is not possible for consciousness to help itself to knowledge of something that cannot function as one of its intentional correlates (indeed, Husserl famously claims the distinction is "mythology" or "myth" (Husserl 1956, p. 235)

    Further, establishing of the conditions according to which objects appear and conform to experience in and through a transcendental account of the subject's cognitive make-up such that, as Kant put it, we "cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put into them" (Bxviii), ends up misconstruing what should precisely be the *a priori* character of *objects*. In fact, by attributing far too much to the subject side in the subject-object relation, construing the object-conditioning subject and its constituting along primary psychological lines, Kant's position ends up not only failing to do justice to objects of experience and their character, but results in a form of idealism that cannot easily ward off the threat of an all-encompassing skepticism.

    Only a Husserlian interrogation of intentional consciousness, providing, as it does first-person, original "evidence" for the *a priori* character of objects, can truly establish the possibility of transcendental object-relations, and so successfully realizes Kant's ambition to provide a "critique of knowledge." Presumably, it is this investigation into the bounds and limitations of the knowable objects that accounts for Husserl's claim that the "true Copernican revolution" is inaugurated by way of the phenomenological reduction or *epoché*. Indeed, consider the following essential moments in the re-orientation to our conscious life Husserl thinks is occasioned by way of effecting the reduction:

1.   *Epoché* leads us beyond or beneath the natural attitude characteristic of the natural sciences and which has naively been retained from everyday life: namely, that the objects we are acquainted with are simply "out there" in the mind-independent world and possess certain features or properties that we are capable of knowing. By "suspending" or "bracketing" any and all commitments of this sort, we put out of play the everyday and theoretical presuppositions, especially those regarding the status of the reality of so-called "external objects."

2.   This also occasions a psychological reduction, which leads us beyond the domain of everyday our psychology by setting aside our commitments regarding the nature of the subject or "I" that is typically understood as undergoing "psychological states."

3.   The phenomenological reduction proper, whereby the subsequent phenomena under investigation are no longer construed in terms of a relation between a cognizing subject and the cognized object, but rather the acts of consciousness and their *a priori* constitution of objects. Indeed, here the intending and intended are simply two poles of the same, immanent act of consciousness. It is this "level" of object-orientation that we are enabled to perform the "essential" analyses appropriate to phenomenological description.

4.   Finally, this transcendental reduction entails the further claim that the immanent phenomena offered to consciousness are to be analyzed *exclusively as immanent*, that is, that they are to be regarded in total isolation from any objectivities "transcendent" to consciousness.

The phenomenological reduction supplies the true Copernican revolution insofar as it is responsible for a radical new reorienting of the way we typically approach objects of consciousness, as well as the newfound rigor and certainly in our investigations provided by its descriptions of the phenomena ("immanently" or "intuitively") given on this basis. Phenomenological description not only allows us to definitively account for the "constitution" of every sort valid objectivity or meaning (Husserl 1956, p. 233), but does so in a manner that ensures that what is captured is the objective structure of *objects* and *their a priori* constitution. In other words, by moving away from the kind of theoretical constructions central to Kantian transcendental idealism *via* the methodological maneuver that is the *epoché*, the issues plaguing the kind of transcendental theory put forward by Kant's can avoided, and the critical project truly realized. As Husserl tells us, "*[T]he phenomenological reduction*, correctly conceived, implies *the marching route to transcendental idealism*, just as *phenomenology …* is nothing other than *the first rigorous scientific form of this idealism*." (Husserl, 1956, p. 181)

II.

(i) The thing-in-itself

In many ways, the misgivings outlined by Pradelle about Kant's revolution are not new. The issues raised by Husserl scholars regarding how the turn rethinks the objects of cognition very much mirror the worries given voice to immediately following the reception of the first *Critique* by thinkers such as Jacobi. Almost two hundred years later, in the wake of P. F. Strawson's *Bounds of Sense*, it was widely presumed in the anglophone world that the only way to save the "critical insight" and "truth" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and its "transcendental turn" was to preserve the kind of *a priori* insights into the character of objects the text supplies, while dispensing with its broader metaphysical programme (Strawson, 1996). These two demands could be met by proving an account of the universal and necessary (and hence non-empirical) structures that inform the objects of our experience insofar as they are imminently demanded by our epistemic practices; a so-called "Copernican" procedure that would secure *a priori* knowledge of objects, while, at the same time, dispensing with the *Critique*'s "residual metaphysical commitments," specifically the thing-in-itself. Indeed, given that transcendental philosophy and its critique of traditional metaphysics shows us that only that which can make reference to possible experience and its structure can provide us with genuine *a priori* knowledge of objects, any notion of "things" transcending possible experience ought to be ruled-out from the very beginning.

The underlying suspicion here seems to be that by invoking the thing-in-itself and making it central to his transcendental idealism, Kant not only ends up undercutting the guiding intention of the turn, but that the the thing-in-itself invokes hidden structure and powers that downgrade (or "demote") the objectivity of objects and the objective knowledge of objects that transcendental philosophy was supposed to secure. This seems the case if the thing-in-itself is interpreted to be second thing-in-itself object that is responsible, through its "affectations," for the "mere" appearances that we are acquainted with in experience. If the thing-in-itself lies behind appearances as their cause, then we can rightfully wonder: what kind of objectivity are objects of experience supposed to ultimately possess, given we the mind is never in direct and immediate contact with such objects but only their effects?

Now, however plausible or implausible this worry may strike us as, it is these concerns regarding the positing of a second thing-in-itself object and Kant's undermining of the approach innovated by transcendental idealism that Pradelle takes to lie at the basis of Husserl's main dissatisfactions with Kant. Consider Pradelle's characterization of Kant's basic position:

> [P]ure intuitions and pure concepts can only determine objects *a priori* if these objects are not things in themselves considered in their ontological independence and in abstraction from the knowing subject. Instead, objects [of possible experience] are … appearing objects considered in their relation to our sensibility and to our faculty of

conceptual determination. These phenomena are simple subjective representations, that, beyond themselves, refer to things in themselves that are not knowable by us. (A 248-253). These phenomena hence fall under the legislation of the Copernican revolution: if they are temporal, spatial, and determinable according to mathematical magnitude and the principle of causality, this is because the pure intuitions of time and space, as well as the categories of quantity, quality, and relation, belong universally to the finite knowing subject (Pradelle, 2022, p. 75)

> Kant's transcendental idealism allows, beyond phenomena, for a non-sensible object that is the true ontological substrate but remains non-appearing in principle: the transcendental object understood as "the merely intelligible cause of appearances." (Pradelle, 2022, p. 77)

Taken together, these two claims make it clear that, for Pradelle, the thing-in-itself is not only an object in its own right and has ontological independence from objects of possible experience, but also that it is the cause of appearances, which are themselves understood to be merely "simple subjective representations" (as opposed to the "true" thing-in itself object). In contrast, claims Pradelle, "Husserl's transcendental idealism does not allow for things in themselves, which would be independent form a constituting subject in their being" (Pradelle, 2022, p. 77).

As Kant scholars have been quick to point out, however, this interpretation of Kant cannot be the way Kant intends for the thing-in-itself to be understood and construing it along these lines is difficult to square with much of what how Kant actually has to say about it.

I would first draw attention to the fact that it does not necessarily follow that if the thing-in-itself is perceived to be an unacceptable consequence of adopting Kant's transcendental idealism more generally that this gives us reason to reject the Copernican turn. Strictly speaking, the turn only commits us to the idea that there are universal and necessary conditions that structure objects of possible experience and that these structures are, as Ameriks (2015) puts it, "immanently determinable" by us as investigators engaged in the pursuit of transcendental philosophy (p. 36). In and of itself, this claim does not require us to answer the question of whether or not we need to posit a thing-in-itself independent of the conditions by which we are acquainted with objects of experience. The reversal only requires us to commit to the thesis that there are *a priori* structural conditions governing *our experience*. It does not require that we advance any claims about what lies beyond such experience (or, e.g., if it is the only one or if experience has come about through natural causes, and so on).

Admittedly, the turn and the thing-in-itself comes to be closely intwined in Kant's transcendental idealism in that the thing-in-itself as one of the elements of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction that allows Kant to do such things as establish the scope and

limits of genuine metaphysical knowledge. Once again, however, the real question that needs focusing on if we are to come to a decision about the viability of Kant's turn concerns how the turn and its reversal of the subject-object relation construes object constitution, including what is involved and entailed by objects of possible experience being constituted as Kantian appearances.

In terms of the bigger metaphysical picture, I would argue that Kant's transcendental idealism and the argumentative resources allows us to not only consistently hold onto the theory of object constitution inaugurated by Kant's turn, but also commit to the greater critique of the bounds and limits of cognition. This necessarily involves Kant's claim that there must being something independent of our way of cognizing objects of possible experience. If we can come to appreciate the way in which Kant re-thinks metaphysics *as* transcendental philosophy, we can come to see how Kant can successfully make the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction without falling into inconsistences.

This leads to the second reason why Pradelle's account of the thing-in-itself ought not motivate us to reject the turn. I submit that the main reason that marking these bounds and limits has been so commonly viewed as in tension with Kant's theory regarding the possible objects of experience is precisely that Kant overall position on the subject-object relation has been mistakenly grasped along the interpretive lines advocated by Pradelle. However, when we look at how Kant characterizes the distinction between appearances and the thing-in-itself in the *Critique*, we find it is far less vulnerable to the concern that his transcendental idealism ends up transgressing the very bounds it sets for genuine cognition and knowledge.

For instance, at A248/B304-A253/B09 Kant usefully provides the distinction between phenomena and noumena. While phenomena are "beings of sense" such as the objects given in intuition and in accordance with sensibility and its *a priori* conditioning, noumena are "beings of understanding" in that they are objects insofar as they are represented by understanding alone. As Kant makes clear, by the latter he is not referring to the understanding's contribution to the representating of given objects insofar as they are *cognized* by means of its categories (which representations would be objects of possible experience or appearances); nor does Kant have in mind the mere *thinking* of objects *via categories alone* where here categories are deployed as mere logical predicates to entertain the thought of what at other places Kant calls "the transcendental object" or "something (= X)" (A250/B305). Indeed, the thought of "the transcendental object" or "something (= X)," although a representation capable of being achieved through or by means of understanding alone, and abstracted from what is concretely given in sensibility, marks only the thought of what belongs (via understanding) *to objects of sensibility*—namely, the thought of <objects of possible experience> (A251/B305).

If neither the representing *via* categories that the understanding contributes to the cognizing objects of possible experience or the mere thought of possible objects of expe-

rience in general *via* categories (something (= X)) are instances of noumena, then what does Kant have in mind here? And how does the idea of noumena assist us to make sense of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction? The key lies in seeing that the thinking we are capable of, although always intending an object, not only allows us to represent to ourselves objects as appearances, which Kant defines as given objects insofar as they are cognized according to categories (A248/B305), but also in light of negation, including the "not" of these objects as appearances. That is, we are capable of thinking, as Kant puts it, a "*something*, i.e., an object *independent of* sensibility" (A251-2/B305, my emphasis) where this "something" does not utilize the categories required for representing the "something (= X)." This mere representation in thought is what Kant means by the thing-in-itself that is to be distinguished from appearances. Namely, an entirely negative, indeterminate thought of that which is not appearances. This representation avoids drawing on the understanding's categories, which, of course, are bound to their role in cognizing if they are not to be mere logical predicates.

If we took the categories of understanding, as mere logical predicates, to provide determination of *objects as such and in general* independent of their cognizing role in sensibility (or indeed, any transcendental conditions) through some sort of special intellection relation established through them, then we would be attempting to deploy the categories "transcendentally" (A238/B297; A242/B299; A246-8/B303-5) in the illicit attempt not only to merely *think*, but precisely *know* such objects. This, thinks Kant, would be to be taken in by what he calls *transcendental illusion* or the idea that categories apply to objects *as such and in general* regardless of whether or not these objects possibly appear according to certain *a priori* conditions; the same illusion that pre-Copernican philosophers succumbed to when they held that their thought of logically possible objects and their properties could provide them with genuine metaphysical knowledge of supersensible, transcendent being. Here, "the deception [lies in] substituting the logical possibility of the **concept** (since it does not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of **things** (where an object corresponds to the concept)." (A244/B302)

Kant's appearance/thing-in-itself distinction can avoid this misstep, however, by thinking the thing-in-itself in a way that is avoids positively utilizing any categories or indeed saying anything positive about what this thought represents. In other words, the distinction draws on the difference between negative noumena, as opposed to positive noumena. The negative thought of the thing-in-itself is indeed an instance of a "being of understanding" insofar as it is representation of "something" (where this is a "not" something) that itself both abstracts from the conditions of sensibility and can only be occasioned through mere thought. However, this does not entail that it is a "being of understanding" if by that is meant a determinate representation that both captures the way *objects as such and in general* (such as supersensible objects) true are and does so through understanding alone. To attempt to positively represent *the noumenon* would be precisely to transcend the restrictions Kant

puts on knowledge and directly grasp objects as having "constitution in itself" (A248/B306) apart from any condition simply using the power of our mind.

Despite Pradelle's characterization of the appearance/thing-in itself, Kant does not help himself to the thought of a supposedly unknowable thing-in-itself object that lies behind appearances. This *would* involve that the understanding transcendentally deploys the categories <substance-accident> or <cause-effect> in order, and in direct conflict with the bounds and limits he sets on possible objects of cognition and knowledge, in the attempt to know the "true ontological substrate" that supposedly is the ultimate "cause" of the objects of intuition. However, Kant goes to great length to distinguish what he calls the "boundary concept" (A254/B310) that is mere thought of "a thing insofar as it is **not an object of sensible intuition**" from the representation *via* categories that aims, but fails, to furnish us with knowledge of the "in itself" apart from their sensible conditions.

(ii & iii) Psychology/Subjective Idealism & Skepticism
Of utmost importance for determining whether or not Kant's account of the subject-object relation is reason for Husserl to reject the Copernican turn is the extent to which Kant thinks of the subject of the turn, and the new way of conceiving of this subject's fundamental role in allowing objects to appear, is to be understood along psychological lines. By all accounts, Husserl himself holds this view and, much to the detriment of what Husserl perceives to be Kant's otherwise laudable attempt to re-think the subject-object relation, this misstep leads to Kant misconstruing the possibility of genuine objective knowledge by inappropriately subjectivizing all of reality. Passages abound, but in in a particularly representative statement, Husserl states:

> It becomes evident that Kant's spiritual gaze lay on [the] field [of transcendental subjectivity], although he was not capable of claiming it and understanding it as a working field of a genuine, rigorous eidetic science. Thus, e.g., the transcendental deduction of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* actually already stands on phenomenological grounds; but Kant misinterprets this ground as psychological and thereby loses it again. (Husserl 1983, p. 386)

Based on this and many other passages, it is not surprising that thinkers in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl like Pradelle have themselves interpreted Kant's transcendental idealism psychologically and, drawing out the devastating consequences this would entail, take this as reason to reject the Copernican turn that supposedly lies at the root of the problem. However, the main issue is whether or not this is what Kant himself thought and, if not, the extent to which the position Husserl adopts actually ends up being much closer to Kant's than he presumed.

In many ways, it is entirely understandable why Husserl would interpret Kant's theory in a psychological way. In addition to original and innovative and arguments being vulnerable to misinterpretation, Kant does not help his cause with his misleading terminology. For example, to name just a few instances, he refers to extended bodies and their motions as "representations in us" (A387), confusingly draws on spatial language such as "inner"/ "outer," as well as writes of "boundaries" in order to distinguish what can be possibly experienced in accordance with the conditions of space and time from that which cannot (e.g., A254/B310; A367), and refers to objects of possible experience throughout the *Critique* as "mere" appearances (A49/B66; A357; A371; A392).

It will be unnecessary to simply reiterate the various defenses Kant scholars offer in order to avoid the charge of Kant's subjectivizing, where this means psychologizing, of the greater world of extended objects. These lines of argumentation are familiar enough: there are differences outlined in the Amphiboly between the character of given representations of spatially extended objects from the representations by which the mere thinking of objects traffics (A264/B320); Kant clarifies in the fourth paralogism (starting at A367) that he is making "intellectual" or "transcendental" use of spatial concepts like "inner" and "outer," rather than drawing an empirical distinction between what is "inside us" and our mere "subjectivity" and what lies "outside" of it; that the "mere" in mere appearance does not to demote these representations to the merely subjective sphere, but is used only to flag that, unlike "original" or "intellectual" intuition which grasp immediately objects "in themselves," sensible intuition makes the objects available to us as potential objects of knowledge under certain *a priori* conditions (A248/B307).

Taken together, these arguments show that something's being "inside" us for Kant simply conveys for him that it does not belong altogether "outside of us" possible experience. These same appearances and can still very well be "outside of us" in the empirical sense of being spatially distinct from us and so capable of having objective features and properties such as, e.g., motion. Further, that our experience with objects is necessarily conditioned, and so unlike a divine being that stands in an intuitive relation to things that is not defined by any conditions, we must be careful to establish what is a possible object of cognition and knowledge and what is not, which apparently does not prevent us from utilizing spatial language in order to make these points.

What I would like to draw attention to, however, is the role the unity of apperception plays in the constitution of objects insofar as it provides the ultimate ground for the representing *via* categories. This aspect of Kant's theory, I submit, demonstrates most convincingly not only that we can distinguish between mere "psychological," "subjective" states and the objective world, but that the Copernican turn is very much in line with, and presupposed by, the approach Husserlian phenomenology takes to investigating the *a priori* structures of objects immanently offered to consciousness.

It is worth pointing out at this point, that when look at the passage in which Kant introduces the Copernican revolution, we see is that the turn does not involve an entirely subject-independent thing-in-itself object "conforming to our cognition" and "merely"

appearing under its psychological conditions. If this were the case, if the thing-in-itself were the "true ontological substrate," as Pradelle puts it, then the turn would certainly mark a radical departure from the traditional way philosophers construe the relation between subject and object. As the objects of our knowledge claims require that they be capable of corresponding with our judgments, if transcendental conditions barred us from contact with the objects as they are "themselves," if they could only be made available to us as they mere appear in our psychological states, then there seems to be no way around concluding that the Copernican turn results our never being able to know what "truly" lies behind our representational states. That is, if the turn is seen as one in which an object must conform to the mind before the mind's representations of objects ("appearances") can possibly correspond to its knowledge claims, then the turn certainly results in subjective idealism and skepticism. Kant's turn would provide us with a reversal of the traditional subject-object relation whereby the objects that are figure in our knowledge correspondence would already be "in" the mind. If the standard for our knowledge were simply subjective appearances in the mind of something that does not appear, however, it is difficult to see how we could ever really claim to know anything at all.

In the Copernican passage itself, it is objects that *already appear* to us in sensibility and are thought in understanding (that is, the objects that philosophers, pre-Copernican revolution, naively took the mind to simply mirror) that themselves need to conceived of as in conformity with certain *a priori* conditions in order to so appear (Bxvi-xvii). That there is a reversal here in the direction of fit between cognition and world, knowledge and object, has least two important consequences.

First, when it comes to the story about how its objects of intuition come to be constituted so that they can be cognized as objects experience and knowledge, there are number of resources that would not be at his disposal if it were thought that the thing-in-itself object conforms with cognition. For example, possessing the bare spatial-temporal structure allowed for by sensibility, the account of how spatial-temporal objects come to be "synthesized" and "united" so as to be capable of being represented by categories can draw upon these structural features of intuitions (especially their temporal dimension) (A27/B43).

Second, the specific way we think of the understanding's categories making a structural contribution to the given objects of sensibility will have repercussions for how it is we construe the character of the objects that stand in conformity with the understanding. At points in the *Critique*, Kant seems to suggest that although we should not see the turn as one whereby the thing-in-itself comes into conformity with our cognitive conditions, objects of intuition are subjected to the "higher" faculties of mind in such a way as to be imposed upon or molded. Indeed, Kant sets up the issue of the relation between categories and intuitions as a problem of how it is categories can "apply" or "subsume" or "determine under rules" (A137/B176) objects of intuition, where this can be mistakenly assumed to mean that given intuitions, altogether different from categories that lie waiting in the mind and anticipate intuitions, are actively shaped with form or that given objects are such that, miraculously, they are somehow amenable to and coincide with the structuring of the categories. Either way, the conformity of objects of possible experience with sensibility and understanding that allow these objects to be cognized and potentially known will be misidentified and correct interpretation of Kant's revolution missed.

The unity of apperception is the key to making sense of these issues, for it is only with unity of apperception that we get the full story regarding how objects are constituted by the mind, as well as the possibility of our standing not only in a mere "subjective," but, more importantly, "objective," relations with objects.

To see this, consider an issue that Kant raises as part of his answer to the *quid juris* question posed by in the Deduction, but which he does not fully begin to tackle until the Schematism: how is it possible that objects of intuition are represented by categories? Objects of intuition and categories are "heterogenous" representations (A138/B177) in that a category, as that which accounts for the possibility of cognizing intuitions as objects of experience, is never encountered in sensibility as *an* object or particular *empirical feature* of objects of intuition (A137/B176). What is the unknown "root," as Kant put it at A15/B29, the "third thing" (A138/B177), that "mediates" between sensibility and understanding such that given spatial-temporal objects are the kind of representations capable of being thought generally under categories?

Kant's answer is that the imagination and its power of synthesizing that provides this common root. The imagination is responsible for synthesizing or combining of objects of intuitions such that they exhibit the kind of general unity required to be represented according to categories. The synthesis of the imagination, in other words, "collects the elements [of intuition] for cognition and unifies them into a certain content" (A77-8/B103) which involves that the "manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it." (A76/B102).

Indeed, categories are not imposed on and give shape to intuitions that themselves possess a pre-formed character; nor is it simply a happy coincidence that the objects sensibility are capable of being represented by the *a priori* conditions of thought. The synthesis of objects supplies them with a necessary unity such that they are capable of being grasped by our higher cognitive faculties. As Kant makes clear, the categories are simply, "concepts of [synthesis or] combination" (B130-1), which is to say, "pure synthesis, generally represented [i.e., by way of concepts], yield pure concepts of the understanding" (A78/B104; see also A79-80/B104-5).

As Kant only reveals at A142-7/B182-7, however, the unity of synthesis that categories represent is characterized in *temporal terms*. Categories can represent the unity of synthesis insofar as synthesis allows given intuitions to instantiate a number of temporal schemas, which are principles of temporal unity that, when instantiated, allow us to think intuition in accordance with a corresponding category (A137/B176).

Now, I want to stress that the imaginative unity of synthesis, despite being in part guided by concepts, is not itself attributed by Kant to the understanding; nor is it, strictly speaking, ultimately a task that the imagination is able to carry out in and of itself. Although Kant certainly lets the Table of Logical functions, a table outlining the various ways the understanding can bring its concepts together in a judgment, provide him with the "clue" to the Table of categories, when it comes to actually accounting for the possibility of the temporal unity that synthesized objects of intuition exhibit such as to be represented by categories, it finds its ultimate ground in different kind of unity. As Kant states:

> Combination is the representation of the **synthetic** unity of the manifold [of an object
> of intuition]. The representation of this unity cannot … arise from the combination;
> rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept
> of combination possible. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination [or
> categories] *a priori*, is not … the category of unity … The category … ready presup-
> poses combination. We must seek this unity … someplace higher, namely in that which
> itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence of
> the possibility of understanding. (B130-1)

As is made apparent by the following section of the Deduction (§15), the "higher" unity that ground the synthesized temporal unity represented by categories is the unity of apperception. The "unity of apperception" is Kant's term for the unity that obtains among our conscious representations insofar as they are the representations of a single conscious subject (B132-33). To claim that the unity of apperception is what grounds and makes possible synthesis or combination is thus Kant's way of saying that the ultimate condition of possibility of our having objects of cognition is that our consciousness possesses a unity that enables the (imaginative accomplished) temporal unity of objects passively received from sensibility. This is why in the passage above it is claimed that the unity of apperception is even the "ground" of the unity of concepts in a judgment, and so accounts for the very possibility of the understanding: given objects of intuition can ultimately only be synthesized or combined and represented by way of our concepts (including categories) if it stands under the condition of being for a single, unified subject of consciousness. Indeed, if our conscious states did not stand together in such a "synthetic" unity, then there would be no correlating "synthetic" unity of the manifold and thus no cognizing or discursive representing of given objects.

Indeed, the original unity of consciousness throughout its representing of objects *via* schematized categories is also the ground that allows us to differentiate between mere subjective occurrences and objective states of affairs. The synthetic unity of apperception allows for the corresponding represented objects to appear in accordance with a *necessary* synthetic unity of given manifolds, and this necessary temporal unfolding provides the basis for the objective unity and connections that characterize the "outer" objects that pop-

ulate the greater spatial-temporal world. In other words, consciousness' categories (both the "dynamical" and "mathematical"), representing the temporal unity of such objects, together allow for, as Kant puts it, "the one experience" – the publicly accessible correlate of the mind as it appears in conformity with *a priori* the conditions of cognition insofar as this cognition is that of (any particular) unified subject of consciousness. As Kant states:

> There is only **one** experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in a thorough-
> going and lawlike connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms
> of appearance … take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many
> perceptions insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thor-
> oughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of
> experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of appearances. (A110-12)

Sure enough, the way in which we happen to undergo this one experience and the way in which we *merely* think and represent (perhaps discursively or in images) to ourselves the objective world of space and time may differ from individual to individual. What is more, on the basis of this one experience we will certainly be furnished with the sensations and ideas that come to inform our psychological make-up and personal identity. But the "I" as subject of the unity of apperception is to be confused with representing to ourselves of these (representationally downstream) subjective states and psychological "experiences." To think that determinate and necessary spatial-temporal objects and their connections are sustained by indeterminate and contingent psychological happenings, ideas, inferences or connections would be to embrace the kind of approach found in earlier thinkers like Descartes and Hume and which Kant's transcendental idealism sets out to replace. Hence Kant's "anti-Cartesian" lines of argumentation in the Second Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism (A182-211/B244-256; B274-294), as well as his demonstrating in the futility of Hume's attempt to ground cause and affect relations on the mind's associate connections throughout the Doctrine of Elements (particularly at A111-14). Our grasp of objective sequences such as a boat moving downstream or a causal interaction between two spatial-temporal objects bringing about changes in each other's states is not formed and ultimately justified by the subjective sequence in which they happen to be encountered or the psychological states that accompany these experiences, but rather *vice versa*. The necessary unity that is the correlate of a unified consciousness is precisely what supplies the basis for our particular, psychological representations and states, even if these representations are themselves governed by, e.g., laws of association as Hume would have it.

Conclusion

Our mere psychological states play no role the revolutionary rethinking of the subject-object relation that defines the Copernican turn. The arguments of the *Critique* take off not

from the perspective of an individual and its particular psychological makeup, but from the perspective of the common, intersubjective stance on objects that defines the "one" experience. This "one" experience is not only capable of providing us with knowledge of objective, publicly accessible phenomena, but it can furnish us with transcendental knowledge of their conditions of possibility This latter knowledge is itself expressible in principles (e.g., Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, etc.) that are not simply valid for the individual consciousness undertaking such an examination, but objectively valid insofar as it definitely establishes how it is *objects* necessarily appear for any unified consciousnesses. For instance, that appearances, as phenomena, are extensive magnitudes with continuously gradable sensible qualities standing in lawful connections with other such magnitudes is not something that is merely psychologically imposed on a thing-in-itself object; it captures the "things" or "matters" themselves, as long as this is taken to mean *insofar as these objects are for consciousness* (B207-18/A166-76).

This all makes plain that Kant's position on consciousness and its objects is much closer to Husserl than maybe even Husserl himself may have realized. And it certainly shows that the reasons Pradelle takes Husserl to reject the Copernican turn are unconvincing ones. The Copernican turn proceeds by showing that in order for our knowledge to possibly correspond to objects, these objects must stand in accordance (or "conform") with the transcendental conditions that characterize consciousness. This turn and the knowledge it affords us, far from being reason for Husserl to reject Kant's transcendental idealism, is thus very much like the perspective of consciousness effected by the transcendental reduction. Indeed, as part of phenomenology's expounding of the meaning-bestowing conditions of sense involves, as Husserl himself puts it, both a "transcendental aesthetic" which determines how "the object is constituted in *intuition* [or] how [it] is constituted in chains of perception," as well as a "transcendental logic" that clarifies how the "laws of thought are precisely laws of *thought,* while being conditions of possibility of objectively valid being in general" (Husserl 1956, p. 379). To the extent that phenomenology aims to accomplish these two tasks, it seems to operate very much in the space opened up the Copernican turn explored by Kant.

Where the two thinkers really begin to diverge, is not only with regard to their (obviously) different methodological approaches to conscious experience, but on the much bigger issue of whether or not we are compelled hold positions about what is independent of consciousness as an essential component of the transcendental project.

> From what we have seen, Kant can certainly agree with Husserl when he says things such as: But experience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; is it not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness. (Husserl 1978, p. 232)

> Consciousness ... has to hold as a connection of being that is, for itself, closed off, i.e., as a context of absolute being into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can slip away. (Husserl 2014, p. 90)

Kant also holds there is no "the side-view" on our consciousness that could account for how a so-called thing-in-itself object comes to conform to our cognition and provide sensibility with intuitions. In this sense, for Kant, there is no pre-existing world "prior" to experience and, to this extent, the unity of apperception and its appearing correlates mark the limits of the experienceable. Indeed, consciousness for Kant is "closed off" from considerations of other (perhaps supersensible) realms of being and must remain so if we are not to lapse back into pre-critical metaphysics.

At the same time, Kant argues that the notion of the thing-in-itself is something we must necessarily think in order to ultimately make sense of *appearances.* (A251/B306). His line of thought is that if we grant that objects appear to us in conformity with certain *a priori* conditions – a philosophical commitment that presumably a transcendental thinker like Husserl would ascribe to – then we are also committed to the idea that there must be *something* (the thing-in-itself) independent of these conditions. To deny that there is something independent of the conditions by which we are acquainted with objects, argues Kant, would be to hold the "absurd" position that "there is [the transcendental conditioning of the mind that characterizes] appearance without anything *that* appears" (Bxxvi, my emphasis).

The *that it is* of appearances or that they *are* and are capable of being interrogated transcendentally by consciousness is not something consciousness can wholly take responsibility for. While we take note of a pre-existence something *in* and *through* consciousness (via representing the negative noumena) and, indeed, must do so, is a point, however, which Husserl would disagree. Phenomenology limits intentional relations in such a way that makes it hard to see how Husserl could grant that we need to necessarily intend, if only in thought, the notion of something "apart from the conditions of consciousness." As he states:

> Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being … if transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely—nonsense. (Husserl 1960, p. 84)

The universe of sense established by the reduction thus rejects "a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves" (Husserl 1960, p. 86). This is the case even if this is to risk neglecting the task of philosophically accounting for the fact *that* phenomena *are*. But this, of course, is to raise important issues regarding how Husserl understands the relation between his phenomenology and metaphysics; an issue that will need to be pursued elsewhere.

KANT'S COPERNICAN TURN IN KUDRYAVTSEV-PLATONOV'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL MONISM[1]

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Kudryavtsev-Platonov is an outstanding representative of Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy, who stands out from his colleagues in that he often refers to Kantian philosophy in his works. There is no doubt that the formation of his epistemological conception was influenced by the Kantian Copernican turn, but what exactly this influence consisted in has not yet been investigated. To answer this question I first determine under what circumstances Kudryavtsev's acquaintance with Kant's epistemology occurred. In particular, I analyzed Kudryavtsev's previously unpublished manuscript materials for lectures on metaphysics and the history of New Philosophy from the early period of his teaching career at the Moscow Theological Academy. One may conclude from this that the Russian philosopher was more likely to have been exposed to the ideas of Kantian philosophy through interpreters, who popularized Kant's philosophy, as well as through historical-philosophical literature and critical writings of later Kantians. I then conduct a comparative analysis between Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism and Kant's doctrine of space, time and categories of understanding. As a result, I show that Kant's Copernican turn is one of the key principles in Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism, but not the only one. In particular, Kudryavtsev utilized Kant's concepts of apriorism and subjectivity of cognitive forms, whereby he concentrated on the philosophical ideas of F.A. Trendelenburg and W.T. Krug's transcendental syntheticism in mind.

Keywords: *Philosophy, Kudryavtsev, Kant, Transcendental Monism, Trendelenburg, Krug*

Kudryavtsev-Platonov es un destacado representante de la filosofía eclesiástico-académica rusa, que se distingue de sus colegas por referirse con frecuencia a la filosofía kantiana en sus obras. No cabe duda de que la formación de su concepción epistemológica estuvo influida por el giro copernicano kantiano, pero aún no se ha investigado en detalle en qué consistió exactamente esta influencia. Para responder a esta cuestión, primero determino en qué circunstancias tuvo lugar el encuentro de Kudryavtsev con la epistemología de Kant. En particular, analizo materiales manuscritos inéditos de Kudryavtsev empeados en sus conferencias sobre metafísica y la historia de la nueva filosofía, pertenecientes al periodo inicial de su carrera docente en la Academia Teológica de Moscú. De ello se puede concluir que el filósofo ruso probablemente tuvo acceso a las ideas de la filosofía kantiana a través de intérpretes que popularizaron la obra de Kant, así como mediante literatura histórico-filosófica y escritos críticos de los kantianos posteriores. Posteriormente, realizo un análisis comparativo entre el monismo trascendental de Kudryavtsev y la doctrina kantiana del espacio, el tiempo y las categorías del entendimiento. Como resultado, demuestro que el giro copernicano kantiano constituye uno de los principios clave en el monismo trascendental de Kudryavtsev, aunque no el único. En particular, Kudryavtsev integró los conceptos kantianos de apriorismo y subjetividad de las formas cognitivas, considerando además las ideas filosóficas del sintetismo trascendental de F.A. Trendelenburg y W.T. Krug.

Palabras clave: *Filosofía; Kudryavtsev, Kant, monismo trascendental, Trendelenburg, Krug*

1. Introduction

Kant's influence on Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy is still little researched. During the Soviet period there was virtually no such research, and in the post-Soviet period in Russia the first studies devoted to this issue were published in a collection of articles entitled *Kant's Philosophy in Russia* (1994). Fifteen years later, the first fundamental work on the subject appeared – Aleksey Krouglov's monograph, *Kant's Philosophy in Russia at the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries* (2009; reprinted with corrections and additions: Kaliningrad, 2024). Outside Russia, the monographs, *Kant e l'ortodossia russa* (2017) von Vera Pozzi, and Thomas Nemeth's *Philosophy in Imperial Russia's Theological Academies* (2023) have recently been published. These studies allow us to assess the extent of the influence of Kantian philosophy on the Russian intellectual tradition and set the direction for further research. But at the same time, these works are by nature an overview and do not delve into the specific issues of Kant's influence on this or that Russian thinker.

Viktor Kudryavtsev-Platonov (hereafter Kudryavtsev) is one of the most prominent representatives of Russian ecclesiastical-academic philosophy. The study of his concept began in the 1890s, but until now there are few works devoted to the specific influence on him of Kantian philosophy in general and his theoretical philosophy in particular. The study of this subject is not unimportant for several reasons. Firstly, Kudryavtsev taught at the Moscow Theological Academy (hereafter MTA) for almost 40 years (1854–1891). It is difficult to overestimate the influence he had on the students of the MTA. These subsequently held not only teaching positions in various ecclesiastical but also in secular educational institutions, as well as senior leadership positions in the Russian Orthodox Church and in the civil service. Secondly, his philosophy represents one example of the synthesis of Christian philosophy with German philosophy, in particular with the theoretical philosophy of Kant, which allows today for a dialogue between contemporary Orthodox theologians and Kant. Third, from a historical and philosophical perspective, Kudryavtsev acts as a forerunner of more famous Russian philosophers such as Vladimir Solovyov, Sergey Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Pavel Florensky, Sergey Trubetskoy, Evgeny Trubetskoy, and others.

The core of Kudryavtsev's philosophy is the concept of transcendental monism. The name itself already evokes associations with Kant's transcendental idealism. The Russian Kant scholar, A.N. Krouglov, has put forward an important suggestion according to which the source for Kudryavtsev's interpretation of the "transcendental" is the transcendental syntheticism of Wilhelm Traugott Krug (Krouglov, 2009, p. 482-483). This, in turn, points to the connection of Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism with the Kantian theoretical and cognitive tradition. But what is the nature of this connection? It remains to be clarified how exactly Kant's Copernican turn influenced Kudryavtsev's philosophical views. For this purpose, it is necessary first to establish the circumstances of Kudryavtsev's acquaintance with Kant's philosophy by analyzing the unpublished manuscripts of the Russian philosopher.

Then to make a comparative analysis of Kudryavtsev's epistemology, in which the concept of transcendental monism is formulated, and Kant's theoretical philosophy.

2. Circumstances of Kudryavtsev's Acquaintance with Kantian Philosophy

Kudryavtsev was a student of the MTA where, among other things, he studied philosophy under his teacher and predecessor in the Department of Logic and Metaphysics, Fyodor A. Golubinsky. Golubinsky himself was to some extent influenced by Kantian ideas (Rozhin, 2021), which partly explains Kudryavtsev's interest in Kant. A direct acquaintance with Kantian philosophy probably took place long before Kudryavtsev began teaching at the Department of Logic and Metaphysics of the MTA, but the first factual evidence can only be found in manuscript materials for his lectures. In 1854 he began lecturing on metaphysics and the history of ancient philosophy, and somewhat later on a course on the history of New Philosophy from Kant to Hegel (Anonym, 1905, p. 16). For these lecture courses the Russian philosopher prepared outlines, two of which will be considered further on: the outline on metaphysics, consisting of two manuscripts, (Kudryavtsev, 1854; 1854/1856/1874) and a part of the outline on the history of New Philosophy (Kudryavtsev, 1858).

The outline on metaphysics was intended for the autumn term of 1854 and was designed for 20 lectures. The first four lectures contain an introductory part devoted to a general characterization of the current state of philosophy in Russia and in Germany (Kudryavtsev, 1854, fol. 1-8). Kudryavtsev defines philosophy as "the science of the ideally real, permanent, necessary, general, true being of objects, which constitutes the beginning, essence, and goal of their being" (*ibid.*, fol. 17), and metaphysics as "the science of the Absolute and its manifestations in the real world" (*ibid.*, fol. 18).

Of the greatest interest in the first four lectures on metaphysics is the analysis of philosophical dogmatism, common sense, scepticism, criticism, and the relationship between the real and the ideal, not so much on the side of content, but rather on the side of sources for the above analysis. In the margins Kudryavtsev occasionally refers to Krug's *Fundamentalphilosophie* (*ibid.*, fol. 20, 24, 25, 28, 29) and to his second volume, *System der theoretischen Philosophie* (*ibid.*, fol. 34).

Krug, who at one time succeeded Kant in the chair of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg, is also a little-studied figure today. It is known that Krug was a student of one of Kant's followers, Karl Leongard Rheingold, and is also related to the Kantian school of logic (Krouglov, 2016, pp. 441-442; Lapointe, 2018, pp. 20-22). One of the researchers of Krug's philosophy, Adolf Kemper, notes that understanding Krug's philosophy depends on understanding his *Fundamentalphilosophie* (Kemper, 1988, pp. 59-60). Thus it is necessary to elaborate on the central concept of this work, namely the concept of transcendental syntheticism, which answers the question: how do the real and the ideal relate to one another? According to Krug, they should be regarded as originally given and related to each other and the derivation of one from the other be considered as

impossible. This connection is labelled by the philosopher as 'syntheticism', which he calls transcendental because it is an original fact of consciousness and as such is inexplicable and incomprehensible (Krug, 1803, p. 129). Krug argues that there is neither transcendental realism nor transcendental idealism because both, taken by themselves, are transcendent, but there is only transcendental syntheticism. In formal terms, that is, with regard to the method of philosophizing, syntheticism is criticism (*ibid*., pp. 130-132).

> Transcendental syntheticism finds proper the natural and necessary threefold convic-
> tion inherent in every man in his right mind of the existence of himself, of the existence
> of other things outside himself, and of the existence of a commonality between himself
> and these things – and maintains that these convictions cannot be substantiated by the
> proofs of philosophical reason, but that they are nevertheless realized as unquestion-
> able because they are primordial (*ibid.*, p. 138; my translation – D.R.).[2]

Regarding the relationship between Krug's philosophical attitudes and Kant's, Krug himself believed that he was fairly accurate in his confession of the Kantian doctrine, although he thought it wrong to call Kant's system transcendental idealism (Krug, 1802, p. 108; Kemper, 1988, p. 111).

In his metaphysics outline, Kudryavtsev outlines precisely Krug's views from *Fundamentalphilosophie* concerning transcendental syntheticism. The Russian philosopher writes that philosophical syntheticism has as its initial foundation the fact of self-con-sciousness as the beginning of all cognition. This beginning reveals three fundamental, unchanging beliefs in the existence of our I, not-I and the relations between I and not-I (Kudryavtsev, 1854, fol. 32). Kudryavtsev would later develop this thought of Krug's in his concept of transcendental monism (Kudryavtsev, 1914b, pp. 98-99).

The next part of Kudryavtsev's lectures on metaphysics focuses on a step-by-step anal-ysis of the three cognitive faculties: sensible, rational, and reasoning. It should be noted that the division of cognitive faculty into these three abilities here comes most likely from Kant, and the idea of a step-by-step analysis of these abilities was not without influence from the composition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see Rozhin, 2023, pp. 49-59). At the same time, the formulation of epistemological tasks precisely as analyses of each individual cognitive ability refers to Krug's *System der theoretischen Philosophie* (Krug, 1830, pp. 33-34).

Another source of Kudryavtsev's interest in the Kantian epistemology was Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg's *Logical Investigations*, where one of the central concepts is the category of motion, which is defined as the original for subjective and objective forms of sensibility: space

and time (Trendelenburg, 1862b, pp. 490-491). In the second part of his lectures on metaphys-ics, the Russian philosopher, concerning the doctrine of the categories of pure understanding, refers three times to the above work by Trendelenburg (Kudryavtsev, 1854/1856/1874, fol. 22, 26, 35). In his later printed works Kudryavtsev also refers to the *Logical Investigations*, making remarks on Hegel's dialectic (Kudryavtsev, 1905, p. 201; 1914a, p. 47, 63; 1914d, pp. 142-150), on the possibility of applying the categories of understanding to God (Kudryavtsev, 1914d, p. 170), and criticizing the Kantian system of categories (*ibid.*, p. 110).

It is known that Trendelenburg himself was in opposition to Kantian philosophy but, at the same time, he became one of the forerunners of neo-Kantianism (see Dmitrieva, 2007, pp. 47-53; Kallio, 2018, pp. 73-74). An analysis of the content of the *Logical Investigations* shows that Trendelenburg clearly drew on the ideas of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but at the same time deviated rather strongly from Kant's transcendental idealism on a number of issues (Rozhin, 2023, p. 49). In particular, this concerns Trendelenburg's doctrine of space, time and categories of understanding. Kant, as is known, called them *a priori* forms of cognition, which have only subjective character (B 66; Kant, 1998, p. 171), but Trendelenburg could not fully agree with this because this position casts doubt on the reliability of empirical sciences (Trendelenburg, 1862a, p. 158). Trendelenburg saw a way out of this difficulty in recognizing space, time and categories of understanding as not only subjective but also objective, which is possible through the category of motion (Trendelenburg, 1862a, pp. 166-167, 368).

Finally, Kudryavtsev's awareness of Kantian philosophy is revealed through an anal-ysis of his lectures on the history of New Philosophy, devoted to the main ideas of Kant, I.G. Herder, F.G. Jacobi and J.G. Fries. Here Kudryavtsev recounts the main ideas from the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kudryavtsev, 1858, fol. 12-28), *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (*ibid.*, fol. 28-37), *Critique of Practical Reason* (*ibid.*, fol. 37-43), *Critique of Judgement* (*ibid.*, fol. 43-51), and *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (*ibid.*, fol. 51-64), drawing on the following popular manuals, expositions and reviews: *Handbuch der allgemeinen Geschichte der Philosophie für alle wissenschaftlich Gebildete* by E.C.G. Reinhold, *Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie* by J.E. Erdmann, *Versuch einer fasslichen Darstellung der wichtigsten Wahrheiten der neuern Philosophie für Uneingeweihte* by J.G.C.C. Kiesewetter, and probably[3] also, *Genetische Geschichte der Philosophie seit Kant* by Carl Fortlage (*ibid.*, fol. 2), *Geschichte der Naturphilosophie von Bacon bis auf unsere Zeit* by J. Schaller (*ibid.*, fol. 28), *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und einer kritischen Literatur derselben* by J.G. Buhle (*ibid.*, fol. 36).

As for direct references to Kant's own works, there are few in the lecture materials: Kudryavtsev refers to the 2nd edition of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kudryavtsev, 1854/1856/1874, fol. 15) and to the German edition of Kant's *Prolegomena* (*ibid.*, fol. 35-36).

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2 Cf. „Der transzendentale Synthetism erkennt die jedem Menschen von gesundem Verstande natürliche und notwendige dreifache Überzeugung von seinem eignen Sein, von dem Sein andrer Dinge außer ihm, und von der zwischen ihm und diesen Dingen statt-findenden Gemeinschaft als gültig an und behauptet, dass diese Überzeugungen gar nicht durch Beweise von der philosophierenden Vernunft erst zu begründen, aber nichts desto weniger unumstößlich gewiss sind, weil sie ursprünglich sind."

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3 In the text of the manuscript, only the surname is given without the title of the work.

3. Traces of the Kantian Copernican Turn in Kudryavtsev's Transcendental Monism

3.1. Kudryavtsev's Conception of Transcendental Monism

The materials of the lectures and the reflections on cognition set out in them formed the basis for the works *Metaphysical Analysis of Empirical Cognition* (1886), *Space and time* (1886-1887), *Metaphysical Analysis of Rational Cognition* (1887–1888) and *Metaphysical Analysis of Ideal Cognition* (1888–1889), which Kudryavtsev completed and published only 30 years later. The Russian philosopher formulates the concept of transcendental monism in *Metaphysical Analysis of Empirical Cognition* in an attempt to solve the problem of the interaction between thinking and being, or – in his terminology – between the ideal and the real.

Kudryavtsev reveals his concept in the following statements. The representation of the external world is formed of two elements: subjective, belonging to the cognizing subject, and objective, originating from objects external to the cognizing subject. On the basis of this distinction Kudryavtsev draws several conclusions: a) we do not possess objective sensible cognition, since it contains a subjective element; b) in the process of cognition of the external world we deal not with things in themselves, but with their phenomena (Kudryavtsev, 1914b, p. 83–84); c) our representation of a particular object is not a representation of the actual object, but a subjective representation, located in us and having a permanent existence for us (*ibid.*, p. 96).

The distinction of two heterogeneous elements in the image of the external world requires the investigation of their ontological foundations. For the subjective element it is the inner, spiritual, immaterial being, while for the objective element it is the external, sensible, material being (*ibid.*, p. 102). Actually, the immaterial subject directly given to everyone is the I to whom something is (*ibid.*, p. 116). With regard to the I, Kudryavtsev remarks that psychical phenomena are produced not by the organism itself, but by a beginning independent of it that causes them, our independent I (*ibid.*, p. 123). If the immaterial subject, i.e. the representing self, is given directly to everyone, there is much less reason to speak of the belonging of the objective element to material being, the direct givenness of which must still be proved. The question therefore arises: what is the cause of the phenomena of our self? Here there can be two answers: either the cause of phenomena is our self, or something independent of our self (*ibid.*, p. 116). The Russian philosopher shows that the cause of phenomena is something independent of our self, namely material being (*ibid.*, p. 137).

The recognition of two separate elements, independent immaterial being and material being, gives rise to ontological, or substantive, dualism, which also implies the heterogeneity of the properties manifested by the self-conscious self and the physical properties of the objects of the external world affecting the self-conscious self. The heterogeneity, mentioned here, of consciousness and the material world independent of it calls into question the possibility of cognition as such, since substances, being opposite, cannot act on each other. However, as it becomes clear from Kudryavtsev's reasoning, this opposite or heterogeneity does not have an absolute character. On the contrary, there is something in common between the spiritual and physical worlds, namely that they both represent limited, contingent being. The limitation of both the first and the second kind of being is expressed in the forms of space and time, which, according to Kudryavtsev, are inherent in both material and immaterial being. It is space and time, being the link between the spiritual and physical worlds, that can explain the interaction between our self and the external world. At the same time, the Russian philosopher suggests the existence of a more "intimate inner connection" between the spiritual and the material. He proposes to get beyond the philosophical model of opposing the material and the spiritual as two completely incompatible kinds of being and assumes that the same being underlies both (*ibid.*, p. 141-144).

Kudryavtsev introduces the notion of a "creative cause", under which he understands the highest Being, i.e. God, whose recognition will make it possible, on the one hand, to overcome the dualism of consciousness and matter and, on the other hand, to explain their difference as God's internal self-limitation (*ibid.*, p. 185). In this way Kudryavtsev seems to overcome substance dualism and outlines ways of resolving the problem of the interaction of the mental and the physical, and, accordingly, approaches the explanation of the possibility of cognition.

Kudryavtsev's concept of transcendental monism is specific in that it establishes a unity of being in which the spiritual and physical sides are distinguished through the explanation of the possibility of knowledge itself. In other words, it is the specificity of human cognition that requires the recognition of two real kinds of being, which agree with human experience and whose correspondence to each other can be explained only through the concept of an intelligent and omnipotent Being – God. Here we have the influence of Spinoza, of whose views Kudryavtsev was aware. Moreover, this influence may have been exercised through Trendelenburg (see Beiser, 2013). Nevertheless, the question of the perception of Spinoza's philosophical ideas in Kudryavtsev's works requires a separate study.

Similarities between Kant's transcendental idealism and Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism are found in the distinction of subjective and objective elements in cognition. Both philosophers conclude that we do not know things in themselves, but only their appearances. As the basis for the subjective element of cognition, both philosophers assume an immaterial subject, i.e. the self, and for the objective element, material existence, the latter taken by itself being independent of our self. The connection between the immaterial subject and material being arises through the effect of material things on the immaterial subject through sensibility. One of the arguments in favour of the independence of external material objects from our self-consciousness is considered by both philosophers to be the impossibility of explaining the concrete representations that arise in the self-consciousness. That the Russian philosopher was familiar with this idea of Kant's is confirmed by his words:

Kant does not reject such a [direct] way of assuring the truth of being, when, distinguishing between two elements of knowledge, objective and subjective, he says that the

matter of thinking is derived from the object; therefore the certainty of the existence of objects outside us is based on impressions of them received through the medium of the senses. The reality of the existence of empirical objects is thus also asserted by him on the consciousness of the action of these objects on us (Kudryavtsev, 1914e, p. 250).

At the same time, transcendental monism is quite close to Krug's transcendental syntheticism, discussed above, and Trendelenburg's reflections on the unconditional, which "philosophical abstraction calls absolute, and more living faith calls directly God" (Trendelenburg, 1862b, p. 425). According to Trendelenburg, the idea of God lies at the foundation of being and thinking, and through this idea the unity of the real and the ideal is always sought (Trendelenburg, 1862b, pp. 468-469).

Apart from the very distinction of objective and subjective elements in cognition, Kudryavtsev and Kant are brought together by the concept of apriorism, which explains the peculiarities of subjective forms of cognition. In empirical cognition, the Russian philosopher considers space and time to be such forms.

3.2. Kudryavtsev's Theory of Space and Time

The Russian philosopher builds his own theory of space and time in an extramural discussion with Kant and with the so-called supporters of the subjective theory of space and time.

Kudryavtsev began this discussion as early as his outlines for his lectures on metaphysics, dating from 1854, 1856 and 1874. Here Kudryavtsev directly criticizes Kant's epistemology, calling it 'subjective idealism'. In particular, he notes that Kantian subjective idealism contradicts consciousness and leads to scepticism. Kudryavtsev sees one of Kant's mistakes in the incorrectness of his conclusion about the inconsistency of the subjective element in our cognition with reality; in fact, according to the Russian philosopher, the recognition of the reality of a thing in itself and its actions on our mind leads to the conclusion about the possibility of its cognition. Kudryavtsev also argues that Kant's distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon contradicts his epistemology (Kudryavtsev, 1854/1856/1874, fol. 2).

Then the Russian philosopher analyses different views on space and time, where he singles out the subjective view to which Kant's doctrine belongs. Here Kudryavtsev mentions that Kant's ideas of space and time do not come from external objects, but belong to our cognitive ability, they are not abstract concepts, but forms of sensible perception *a priori*, having the properties of infinity, invariability and necessity. In doing so, Kudryavtsev immediately notes the incorrectness of Kant's conclusion about the exclusively subjective meaning of space and time, arguing that they are forms of sensible being and limited cognition. Space and time, belonging to the sphere of the real and, at the same time, to the sphere of the subjective, have a common beginning – movement or changeability. At the same time, space and time as subjective forms do not originate from external experience,

i.e. they are *a priori* (*ibid.*, fol. 4). Kudryavtsev also mentions Kant in relation to reasoning categories (*ibid.*, fol. 5, 15).

As we see, on the one hand, Kudryavtsev agrees with Kant that space and time appear as forms of sensible representation and have the following characteristics: 1) they belong to the cognitive faculty; 2) they do not come from experience, i.e. they are *a priori*; 3) they have the character of universality and necessity; 4) they are not discursive concepts, but are contemplations; 5) finally, they constitute the condition of the possibility of experience (Kudryavtsev, 1914c, p. 223-224). On the other hand, Kudryavtsev, unlike Kant, does not conclude from the non-empirical character of space and time that they have no real significance in the objects of experience (*ibid.*, p. 236-238). In support of the objective significance of space and time, the Russian philosopher makes two arguments. Firstly, the philosopher points out that "spatio-temporal definitions [...] if they were only subjective forms of cognition, [they] would have to be imposed by our mind on all representations without exception" (*ibid.*, p. 241-243), which is not true. Second, Kudryavtsev draws attention to the agreement of reality independently of us with the *a priori* cognition of its spatial and temporal properties (*ibid.*, p. 243-244).

Asserting that space and time belong to the subject and object simultaneously, Kudryavtsev points out the difference between space and time as forms of cognition and space and time as real properties of being. Thus, space and time as forms of cognition are given in the mind in an ideal form, whereas in external manifestations they only approach this form (*ibid.*, p. 244). The Russian philosopher defines real space and time as forms of limited existence (*ibid.*, p. 257-258), which in reality cannot be infinite. At the same time, the sign of infinity can be attributed to space and time as cognitive forms (*ibid.*, p. 268-269).

In comparison with the Kantian theory of space and time, Kudryavtsev agrees with its metaphysical component, namely the Kantian definition of space and time as *a priori* forms, and at the same time rejects its transcendental dimension – the conclusions about the only subjective character of space and time: "... it is not in the weakness of the basic propositions or premises that we should look for the weakness of Kant's theory of space and time, but in the conclusion drawn from these premises..." (*ibid.*, p. 236). At the same time, Kudryavtsev himself sees no contradiction in accepting one part of Kant's theory and simultaneously denying another, in particular he writes:

> Kant, as we have seen, presented quite thorough proofs that the views of space and time can neither come directly from experience, nor be concepts abstracted from empirical representations [...]. Then, in the characteristic features of these views, – their universality, necessity and infinity, he rightly saw an indication that the concepts of them are not of empirical origin, since in experience we do not see anything universal, necessary or infinite [...]. If Kant's further conclusion that, being of non-empirical origin, space and time have no empirical reality in themselves and are only subjective forms of our

cognition, turned out to be untenable and does not follow strictly logically from his own theory, this does not weaken in any way the validity of the premises from which such an incorrect conclusion was drawn – the doctrine of the *a priori* notions of space and time (*ibid.*, p. 274-275).[4]

3.3. Kudryavtsev's Doctrine of Categories

With regard to the categories of understanding Kudryavtsev also believes that they are *a priori*, respectively, independent of experience, but manifested in experience and on the occasion of experience. Categories of understanding, according to Kudryavtsev, by themselves cannot give knowledge about anything, because "human cognition is the result of the interaction of two factors: the cogniser and the cognised, the independent activity, according to known laws, of the reason[5] and the objects perceived by the soul, to which this activity extends. The absence of one of these factors would make cognition itself impossible" (Kudryavtsev, 1914d, p. 157).

The source of all categories, Kudryavtsev writes, is self-consciousness (*ibid.*, p. 158). Analyzing self-consciousness, according to the philosopher, one can derive the categories of quantity, quality and relation (*ibid.*, p. 161). Categories, according to Kudryavtsev, being subjective *a priori* concepts of understanding, also have an objective meaning, which is confirmed by the coincidence of the concepts of being, formed by our understanding independently of experience, with actual being and the justification of these concepts in experience. Actually, taking only the subjective meaning of categories, it is impossible, according to the Russian philosopher, to explain the coincidence of the laws of rational cognition with empirical laws. Hence Kudryavtsev concludes: "categories determine not only thinking, but also being," thanks to which true cognition as the agreement of thought with reality becomes possible (*ibid.*, p. 121-123). Thus, recognizing the objective character of pure categories, Kudryavtsev argues that they are not only forms of cognition, but also forms of being itself. At the same time, the scope of application of categories of understanding is not limited to the sphere of experience, but also includes the sphere of super-experiential being. The right of such an application of categories to being arises from the very nature of categories as "unconditionally universal and necessary" (*ibid.*, p. 171).

Kudryavtsev's disagreement with Kant mainly concerns the question of the significance of categories. According to Kant, categories are *a priori* concepts of understanding and at the same time conditions of the possibility of experience, from which the German philosopher concludes that they are only subjective in nature; accordingly, Kant limits the scope of application of categories to appearances alone (B146-148; Kant, 1998, p. 254-255).

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4   It seems that Kudryavtsev, following Trendelenburg, draws attention to the problem of Kant's neglected alternative of recognizing objective signification for a priori forms of cognition. For more details on the neglected alternative see e.g. Bird, 2006; Kanterian, 2013; Specht, 2014.

5   Meaning the understanding.

Kudryavtsev distinguishes two elements in Kant's doctrine of the significance of categories: the basic proposition and the consequence of this proposition. By the main proposition the Russian philosopher understands Kant's assertion that categories do not come from experience, i.e. they are *a priori* concepts. By the consequence he understands the conclusion about their exclusively subjective significance. Regarding the main point, Kudryavtsev is in complete agreement with Kant; moreover, he sees the merit of the German philosopher in pointing out such properties of categories as universality and necessity, as well as the fact that they do not come from experience (Kudryavtsev, 1914d, pp. 112-113).

As for the consequence of the above position, Kant believes that categories have only subjective significance, which means that nothing actually corresponds to them. Hence, according to Kudryavtsev, the German philosopher reveals a tendency to define nature as a totality of phenomena systematized by us, rather than a reflection of its actual being in our consciousness. But this conclusion, notes the Russian philosopher, Kant does not make, remaining on the position that we do not know whether anything real outside of us corresponds to the categories. This, Kudryavtsev writes, does not exclude the fact that the laws of our cognition, imposed on phenomena, may converge with the actual laws of being things in themselves. But Kant, the Russian philosopher continues, maintains that our cognition does not correspond to reality, and that the categories and *a priori* laws of reason have no significance except as a formal one. Kudryavtsev here points out Kant's inconsistency, which is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the German philosopher affirms the incognisability of things in themselves, on the other hand, he states the inconsistency of the laws of our cognition with the laws of the actual being of things. In favour of the recognition that the laws of our cognition correspond to the laws of the actual being of things, according to Kudryavtsev, is "external necessity", forcing thinking to recognisze that things are in fact as they are cognized by us through categories. Consequently, we find in things the same categorical properties that we have in our understanding. Kudryavtsev believes that because of the said coercivity, Kant allows contradictions in his own philosophy. In particular Kant, admitting things unknown to us in ourselves as the source of the matter of cognition, i.e. sensations, contradicts his doctrine of the subjective meaning of categories, since he transfers categories to that being which, according to Kant, is not subject to the laws of understanding (*ibid.*, pp. 117-120).

In particular, Kudryavtsev writes that understanding connects the subject-independent matter of sensation, which Kant calls "multifarious", by means of the forms of cognition belonging to it. Asserting this, Kant, the Russian philosopher continues, must consider the categories as real definitions of being: "allowing the multifarious as a real being, as the basis of the subjective states of our mind, we must allow that it is defined by almost all of Kant's categories" (*ibid.*, p. 120). Moreover, Kudryavtsev points to that problem of Kant's theoretical philosophy, which is labelled as the problem of 'noumenal affection' (see Hogan, 2009; Stang, 2013; Howell, 2017; Chaly, 2017; Katrechko 2021). The Russian philosopher states the

essence of this problem as follows: Kant argues that the multifariousness of impressions has as its cause things in themselves, i.e. noumenal being. But to things in themselves, according to Kant's views, the categories of pure understanding cannot be applied, and, accordingly, the category of cause cannot be applied to things in themselves. The category of cause can only be applied to our representations of things in themselves.

Kudryavtsev proposes to solve this difficulty of Kantian philosophy by recognizing categories not only as subjective forms of cognitive activity, but also as real definitions of being. Categories here act as "general and unifying links" between our cognitive abilities and existence independent of us. The proof of this connection, writes Kudryavtsev, is the coincidence of categories as *a priori* subjective forms of cognition with real being. But, the Russian philosopher notes, due to the fact that categories as *a priori* forms are universal and necessary, experience cannot give "direct positive proof" of the truth of those concepts and statements that are based on categories. Experience gives this proof in a negative way, i.e. it does not give a single case of inconsistency between categories as subjective forms of cognition and actual being (Kudryavtsev, 1914d, pp. 121-122).

Presented in general terms, Kudryavtsev's views on space, time and categories of understanding clearly show that in a number of provisions of his epistemology he relies on Kantian transcendental idealism, or rather, on a modified Kantian concept of apriorism. But was this modification original?

It has already been discussed above that the perception of Kantian ideas in Kudryavtsev's philosophy in his early years of teaching was influenced by Krug and Trendelenburg. But Krug's adherence to the Kantian understanding of the transcendental character of subjective forms of cognition is revealed in the *System der theoretischen Philosophie*. In §21 of the *System*, Krug, pointing to space and time as the original forms of contemplation, notes that they are (1) pure representations, or representations *a priori*; (2) sensible representations, or contemplations; and (3) universal and necessary representations (Krug, 1830, pp. 48-49). In the third note to the above paragraph Krug notes that representations of space and time possess transcendental ideality and empirical reality, i.e.

> that although they are something only subjective, as soon as one abstracts from the fact
> that objects are given to the soul as appearances of the external and internal sense, yet
> in relation to such objects they must be given an objective significance – further, that
> those representations are only sensible, i.e. accessible to the external and internal pow-
> ers of perception, but are not applicable to supersensible, i.e. only mind-representable
> entities, and that they cannot therefore be regarded as definitions of things-in-them-
> selves, but only as definitions of things that appear [...] (*ibid.*, p. 52).[6]

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6   Eben so richtig ist aber auch die Behauptung, dass den Vorstellungen des Raums und der Zeit transzendentale Idealität und empirische Realität zukomme d. h. dass sie zwar etwas lediglich Subjektives seien, sobald man davon abstrahire,

When comparing the theoretical and cognitive attitudes of Trendelenburg and Kudryavtsev, it turns out that both philosophers, accepting the metaphysical explanation of *a priori* forms of cognition, insist on their objective meaning, i.e. their belonging to the objective world (see Rozhin, 2023). This coincidence, taking into account Kudryavtsev's references to Trendelenburg, may be an argument in favour of the Russian philosopher's reading Kant through the prism of Trendelenburg's ideas, taking into account the latter's criticism of the Kantian position, at the same time supplementing his concept of transcendental monism with intuitions from Krug's transcendental syntheticism.

Conclusions

The circumstances of Kudryavtsev's acquaintance in the early years of his professional life at the MTA suggest that he may have been introduced to Kantian ideas through popularizer-interpreters, historical-philosophical literature, and the critical writings of late Kantians such as Krug and neo-Kantian forerunners such as Trendelenburg. At the least, they were the ones who had a significant influence on him. But along with this influence, important elements of the Kantian Copernican turn, namely the concepts of Kantian apriorism and the subjectivity of cognitive forms, entered his philosophical views in a modified form. The essence of the modification itself consists in the fact that, following Trendelenburg, Kudryavtsev makes one very significant amendment: such forms of cognition as space, time and categories of understanding have not only subjective but also objective character. At the same time, Kudryavtsev seeks to solve the problem of substance dualism on the basis of Krug's transcendental syntheticism, modified with the idea of the absolute ground of synthesis.

As a result, it can be argued that Kant's Copernican turn has become an integral part of Kudryavtsev's transcendental monism. The latter, then, is indeed an example of the synthesis of Russian religious philosophy and Kantian theoretical philosophy, and can be the basis for further interaction between contemporary theological thought and the legacy of Kant's Copernican Turn.

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dass dem Gemüthe Gegenstände als Erscheinungen des äussern und innern Sinnes gegeben seien, in Beziehung auf dergleichen Gegenstände aber ihnen objektive Gültigkeit beigelegt werden müsse – ferner dass jene Vorstellungen nur auf sinnliche d. h. dem äufsern und innern Wahrnehmungsvermögen zugängliche, aber nicht auf übersinnliche d. h. durch blosse Vernunft vorstellbare Wesen anwendbar, und dass sie daher auch nicht als Bestimmungen der Dinge an sich, sondern bloss als Bestimmungen der erscheinenden Dinge anzusehen seien [§. 13. nebst den Anmm.].

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RADICALIZING THE COPERNICAN TURN. CHANCES AND CHALLENGES OF RICHARD HÖNIGSWALD'S NEO-KANTIAN TRANSCENDENTALISM

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By establishing a transcendental theory of concrete subjectivity, the new-Kantian philosopher Richard Hönigswald radicalized Kant's Copernican turn and described the human body as principle and factum in a manifold cultural philosophy. For this purpose, he had to overcome his close relationship to the realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism of Riehl and Liebmann, who fell behind Kant's Copernican turn and his rejection of epistemological relevant things in themselves. Thus, Hönigswald went through his own Copernican turn, before he refined the Kantian concept.

Localizing the Kantian 'I think' in the concrete human-being offers the possibility to combine several parts and aspects of the Kantian philosophy and its components like ethics, aesthetics, and anthropology. Here Hönigswald concentrates on the capacities of human-beings who explore and form their living world, while Kant's Copernican turn shows their ambivalences of freedom and determination, understanding and alienness. To regard these ambivalences, we can look ahead in philosophical body theory and refer to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and today's postphenomenological approaches that stress alienation and contingency by highlighting human-beings' entanglement with the world.

In this process postphenomenology partly tries to go beyond the Copernican turn by establishing a praxeology that rejects the constitutive relevance of intentionality. If we go back to Hönigswald's radicalization of the Kantian turn we can highlight, that each way of problematizing practices and theories needs a problematizing subject and thus intentionality in its bodily representation.

Keywords: *Philosophy, Kant, Hönigswald, Copernican turn, concrete subjectivity, body*

Al desarrollar una teoría trascendental de la subjetividad concreta, el filósofo neokantiano Richard Hönigswald radicalizó el giro copernicano de Kant, posicionando al cuerpo humano como principio y factum dentro de una filosofía cultural multifacética. Para lograr esto, Hönigswald tuvo que superar su estrecha relación con el neokantismo realista-metafísico de Riehl y Liebmann, quienes retrocedieron frente al giro copernicano de Kant al mantener la relevancia epistemológica de las cosas en sí mismas. Así, Hönigswald experimentó su propio giro copernicano antes de refinar y ampliar el concepto kantiano.

Situar el „yo pienso" kantiano en el ser humano concreto permite integrar múltiples dimensiones de la filosofía kantiana y sus componentes, como la ética, la estética y la antropología. En este contexto, Hönigswald se centra en las capacidades del ser humano para explorar y dar forma a su mundo vivido, mientras que el giro copernicano de Kant resalta las ambivalencias entre libertad y determinación, comprensión y alienación. Para abordar estas ambivalencias, es posible recurrir a la teoría filosófica del cuerpo, como la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty, y a los enfoques postfenomenológicos contemporáneos, que enfatizan la alienación y la contingencia al destacar la implicación del ser humano con el mundo.

En este proceso, el postfenomenologismo intenta, en parte, superar el giro copernicano mediante el establecimiento de una praxeología que rechaza la relevancia constitutiva de la intencionalidad. Sin embargo, al regresar a la radicalización del giro kantiano realizada por Hönigswald, se resalta un punto crucial: toda forma de problematizar prácticas y teorías requiere un sujeto problematizador, y, por ende, la intencionalidad en su representación corporal sigue siendo indispensable.

Palabras clave: *Filosofía, Kant, Hönigswald, giro copernicano, subjetividad concreta, cuerpo*

1. Introduction

This article tries to shed light on the relevance of Kant's Copernican turn for the neo-Kantian approach of Richard Hönigswald (1875-1947) and the chances of Hönigswald's current reception. No longer interested in a metaphysical foundation of epistemology, Kant concentrated on the way we put ourselves into relation to our objects. By rejecting the epistemic relevance of things in themselves in his Copernican turn (Kant 1787/1998, A 359, B XVI-XVII), he highlighted the observing transcendental subject. If we are not entitled to claim knowledge about what things are, we can problematize especially and exclusively how they can be observed by us.

Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as the fundamental starting point for neo-Kantian reflections on activities of experiencing, thinking, judging, shaping, and expressing relations between human-beings and their world. These relations were thematized in manifold ways. While the founder of the genuine logical orientated Marburg neo-Kantianism Hermann Cohen focused on a logic of pure reason (Cohen 1922), Ernst Cassirer overcame Coehn's approach by developing his philosophy of symbolic forms (Cassirer 1923, 1926, 1929) and regarding the worldly human-being's manifold cultural settings in fields like language, arts, and myth. Even the axiological southwest-German neo-Kantian direction highlighted the transcendental subject in several regions of knowing and judging, as we can see in Heinrich Rickert's theory of values (Rickert 1921).

A third essential direction in neo-Kantianism can be characterized as realistic and metaphysical, because it still sticks to things in themselves as references of our knowledge. Although we are not able to experience things in themselves, they are seen as sources of knowledge that affect our ways of observing. This attitude beyond Kant's Copernican turn can be criticized as a heavily epistemic throwback. With Richard Hönigswald we can find a seldom regarded protagonist of the younger neo-Kantianism (Marck 1987, 20; Ollig 1979, 73; Zeidler 1995) who established and elaborated a groundbreaking theory of concrete subjectivity, although he initially was heavily influenced by the metaphysical and realistic neo-Kantianism (Zeidler 2002, 182; Noras 2020, 413).

Th following argumentation starts with the characterization of Kant's Copernican turn as a fundamental source of transcendental orientation in epistemology. Highlighting its concentration on the concretely observing subject, we can ask with Hönigswald how this subject can be described to overcome a Kantian gap between the empirical and transcendental subject (2.). A second argumentative step sheds light on Hönigswald's development from his early realistic-metaphysical to the later transcendental orientation. To build up and establish his cultural theory of the body, Hönigswald had to go through his own Copernican turn with the effect of radicalizing Kant's Copernican revolution (3.).

Like Cassirer, Hönigswald goes beyond a merely logical orientations in philosophy. Thus, Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as an inspiring concept to shape a neo-Kantian theory of subjectivity that does not only regard ethical and aesthetical, but manifold

further cultural forms of a bodily manifested being in the world (Hönigswald 1931/1997, 1937/1970). In this context we can see not only chances of the concrete subject, stressed by Hönigswald. Rather, human-beings can be problematized in ambivalent scenarios of freedom and determination, capacity, and limitation (4.). Finally, reading Kant's Copernican turn with Hönigswald can lead to a critical reflection of (post)phenomenological approaches that problematize intentionality in (digital) scenarios of describing and shaping cultural scenarios. In this contexts Hönigswald's neo-Kantianism can be acknowledged in its bridging position between (neo-)Kantian and praxeological approaches that do not neglect critical activity of concrete subjects in the relevant practices (5.).

2. Kant's Copernican Turn and Hönigswald's Epistemology of Concrete Subjectivity

Following Kant's path from metaphysics to transcendental idealism, epistemology does not determine, how things are; it tries to observe how they can be described with human capacities. Thus, Kant's critical point of view restricts the transcendental subject's competence of claiming true knowledge:

> „I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they
> are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves,
> and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuitions, but not
> determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves."
> (Kant 1787/1998, A 369)

If appearances are seen as "mere representations" and if space and time are described as "only sensible forms of intuitions" (Kant 1787/1998, A 369), the transcendental subject can be addressed as a merely restricted epistemological factor. On the other hand, the transcendental subject is esteemed as an active constructor of experience. Overcoming an epistemology of things in themselves, Kant highlights the constructive capacities of observing subjects –

> "just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress
> in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host
> revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he
> made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. […] If intuition has to conform to
> the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them
> a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of
> our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself." (Kant
> 1787/1998, B XVIXVII)

With this Copernican turn Kant avoids extreme epistemological positions like objectivism on the one hand and subjectivism on the other hand. Neither things in themselves nor reality constructing human-beings can find a place in his concept. Rejecting the subject's capacity to know anything about things in themselves these subjects are not only restricted, but, far away from passive figures, they can be seen as constructive explorers.

> „Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy reconceives what we know by claiming
> that it depends on the activity of the observer." (Altman 2018, 6)

This observer is not just registering and absorbing what she or he is confronted with. If objects were regarded as things in themselves, observing subjects could just be internalizing recipients. Their constructive engagement would be quite limited and restricted. Thus, overcoming the metaphysics of things in themselves, Kant stresses not only limitations, but also constructive chances of observing subjects in manifold ways:

> „The 'Copernican revolution', such as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason,
> consists in the idea that the – eminently epistemological – project of grounding a priori
> knowledge demands, on the ontological level, that this 'knowledge' be born not by the
> 'things' such as they are in themselves, but on 'objects' understood as phenomena, i. e.,
> insofar as they appear as a result of the pure forms of sensibility and insofar as they are
> synthesized (unified) by the categories of the understanding. These 'objects' are dependent on the 'transcendental subject' which Kant analyzes with respect to its faculties,
> among which sensibility, understanding, and imagination play a leading role in accounting for the conditions of the possibility of any and all knowledge." (Schnell 2020, 392)

Kant's Copernican turn does not inevitably lead to an ontological concept, because he wants to problematize preconditions of understanding and not those of being, but we can highlight with Schnell manifold involved human faculties that enable sensations, comprehension, judgment, and creativity. If we want to deal coherently and consequently with our objects in these manifold ways, we must synthetize our experiences and reflections in our own consciousness. Here we can take up Kant's 'I think', that he describes as a consciousness in general ('Bewusstsein überhaupt') by explaining it as a transcendental precondition for experience and reflection (Kant 1787/1998, B 133f.). Kant assumes that "the *I think* must *be able* to accompany all my representations"(Kant1787/1998, B131). Experiences and thoughts are those of a certain subject who constitutes and combines them. With the 'I think' 'Kant paves the way to concrete subjectivity in transcendental philosophy without intending an empirization of the consciousness in general (Krijnen 2008, 267).

"All my representations in any given intuition must stand under the condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and thus can grasp them together, as synthetically combined in an apperception, through the general expression I think." (Kant 1787/1998, B138)

Hönigswald overcomes Kant's merely formal consciousness, characterized by the just "general expression I think" (Kant 1787/1998, B138); he takes up the 'I think' as a factuality. If all experiences must be somebody's (e.g. my) experiences, all my referring to something must be a referring to myself as well. Otherwise, these experiences would not be my experiences. That each referring to something also needs a constitutive referring to the subject that refers to that something is expressed by Hönigswald in a row of self-reference ('Ich-Reihe': "die Reihe 'ich weiß', 'ich weiß, daß ich weiß usf.' als Bewußtheitseinheit" (Hönigswald 1965, 106)). Monika Witsch calls this "the sequence of presence of the 'I' that knows about its re-presence in the form of 'Me'" (Witsch 2016, 161). If I must refer to myself to be able to refer to something does not mean self-knowledge, but self-coherence. as a pe-condition for coherent and methodical experiencing and thinking, judging, and planning.

Provided that an object of observing must be observed by somebody ('I'), we can describe Kant's Copernican turn as a starting point for Hönigswald's correlation between is-determination (Ist-Bestimmtheit) and I-determination (Ich-Bestimmtheit), object- and subject-determination (Hönigswald 1927, 37), in which both are determined by each other. While Kant describes the 'I think' as a strictly formal precondition for observing something, Hönigswald locates it in the concretely observing human-being.

"The human is *principle* and *factum*, because experiencing has the structure of 'I-to me', 'I-me'." (Witsch 2016, 162)

If we consider with Hönigswald, that we always live and act in the present moment, we must combine our thoughts and experiences by back reference and anticipation. Otherwise, there would not be a coherent thinking and experiencing. Thus, according to Hönigswald there must be a continuity of self-reference to overcome the punctuality of the present moment.

„Verständnis ist immer auch Vorwegnahme des durch die Empfindungsendrücke vermittelten Sinns, freilich immer auch erneut Korrektur des sinnhaft vorweggenommenen durch das sinnbezogene Gegebene" (Hönigswald 1937/1970, 394).

Observers need a spatial location of their consciousness that can cope with the fleetingness of the present moment. This can be seen as a precondition to combine intuitions over time in acts of back reference and anticipation With Hönigswald we can ask, in how far Kant's

'I think' needs an extended bodily representation (Hönigswald 1931a/1997, 1931b/1982) in an organic system, comparable to the natural teleology Kant described in his "Critique of the Power of Judgment" (Kant 2002). In this context Hönigswald establishes the human organism as a transcendental principle to locate the constitutive activity of the observer. The observing human-being needs not just any body, but the own organism as a precondition for experiencing something coherently in the ongoing correlation of self-reference and the relation to that something. Thus, my organism offers me the possibility to avoid a subjection to the present moment, isolated from past and future. It can be seen as the precondition for being a constructive Copernican subject.

„Dem Vollzug im Sinne des ‚jetzt' entspricht eben ein ‚hier' mit jeweils verschiedenen, nach dem gewählten Bezugssystem wechselnden Größen. Das ‚Jetzt' erfordert m.a.W. einen Zeitort im Raume, – ein Naturobjekt von spezifischem Gefüge; ein Naturobjekt, dessen Kontext mit allen anderen unangetastet bleibt, das sich aber *vor* allen anderen durch die Funktion auszeichnet, den ‚Zeitort' jenes ‚jetzt' darzustellen." (Hönigswald 1970, 6)

Hönigswald's concept can be valued as an often-neglected approach to a meanwhile established combination of Kant's 'I think' (Kant 1787/1998, B 132-34) with the concrete subject (Nussbaum 2010, Nida-Rümelin 2013). Founding his transcendentalism in a bodily relationality, Hönigswald overcomes the merely formal Kantian 'I think' and focuses on the actual human-being. This concrete subject can be described as a philosophical principle, not despite of, but because of its factuality.

3. Hönigswald's Copernican Turn as a Radicalization of Kant's Transcendental Idealism

Reading Kant's Copernican turn with Hönigswald's transcendentalism can be seen as a radicalization of this turn. By stressing the activity of the observer, Kant gives the starting point for concentrating not primarily on the is-determination (Ist-Bestimtheit), but also on the I-determination (Ich-Bestimmtheit) of the epistemological correlation between object and subject. But before Hönigswald started this radicalization, he had to go through his own Copernican turn. Following his academic teacher Alois Riehl and the metaphysical approach of Liebmann, the young Hönigswald sticked to a realistic-metaphysical new-Kantianism that still claimed the epistemic relevance of things in themselves (Hönigswald 1903, 1904, 1906, 1910; Riehl 1876; Liebmann 1880), before he grounded his theory of organism in a transcendental-philosophical approach (Hönigswald 1931a/1997, 1931b/1982; Zeidler 1995; Redecker 2001). Consequently, his theory of the organism has two sources – a realistic and a transcendental one. Before he characterized the human organism as principle and factum of transcendental philosophy, Hönigswald had to overcome metaphysical and realistic influences of new-Kantian approaches, mainly represented by Riehl and Liebmann.

In his third volume of "Critical Philosophy, Introduction to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics" (1887) Riehl argues, that "sensation reveals something which does not originate exclusively with ourselves" and that they "point to a reality outside ourselves, so that trough them and their relations we get a mediate knowledge of things themselves" (Riehl 1894, 42). This meets the position of Liebmann, who came back to claiming the epistemic relevance of things in themselves (Liebmann 1880, 1904, Überweg 1923) after spreading his early slogan 'Back to Kant!'. While this slogan can be seen as a request to come back to the Copernican turn of transcendental philosophy ((Liebmann 1865, Heidenreich 2022), Liebmann fell back to things in themselves. This can be seen as a seldom regarded example of an inconsistent, partly retrograde reception of the Copernican turn during the 19th century. Positioning Riehl and Liebmann in the context of neo-Kantianism, their sticking to things in themselves can be characterized as a dramatical throw-back. It is contradictory to Kant's transcendental-idealistic argumentation, that

> "everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible
> for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are
> represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no
> existence grounded in itself" (Kant 1787/1998, A 491/B 519).

Regarding the dynamic activity of subjects shown in Kant's Copernican turn, we also must acknowledge the dynamics human-beings can show, if they go through several stages of observation. Revitalizing the Copernican metaphor, we can describe observers who move around their objects as movers of perspectivity and ongoing proving. They do not stop questioning what they have proved. This also concerns Hönigswald. That he is localized in different, partly contradicting philosophical traditions and directions can be a sign for the necessity to regard his thinking in its multi-perspectivity and dynamics. If we stick to Hönigswald's early stage, we can see him in the direction of realistic Neo-Kantianism, like Andrzej J. Noras (2020) does, while at the same time he calls Hönigswald a post-neo-Kantian philosopher. In contrast, Helmut Holzhey (2004, 117-122) stresses Hönigswald's affinity to the southwest German direction of neo-Kantianism, while Iwona Alechnowicz does not want to call him a neo-Kantian thinker at all and stresses his genuine Kantian position (Alechnowicz 2007, 56f., Noras 2020, 413).

By criticizing the threatening dogmatism of scientific schools (Hönigswald 1913, 245), Hönigswald developed his original approach. In his critical-eclectic manner he proved, chose, and refined several elements of philosophical concepts. Criticizing his early realistic-metaphysical orientation, we can go beyond a location of his relation to Kant in an ontological direction (Breil 1992) and acknowledge his later transcendental-philosophical theory of organism. This later approach results from Hönigswald's own Copernican turn in overcoming the early reference to Riehl and Liebmann.

If we take into consideration that the Copernican dynamic shows observers in motion, every new answer that is found can offer new questions to doubt previous answers. To make this ongoing proving and investigating possible, human-beings need an almost partly coherent consciousness and its localization in their own organism, as Hönigswald pointed out. This can be seen as a radicalization of the Kantian turn by Hönigswald's own Copernican revolution. Hönigswald's concept of concrete subjectivity now offers the possibility to combine the subject of philosophy with the subject of psychology. The human Copernican observer comes into interest.

4. Ambivalences and Contingency in Cultural Scenarios – Recognizing the Creativity and Dignity of 'crooked woods'

Hönigswald's further development of Kant's Copernican turn beyond objectivism and subjectivism lead him to a bodily grounded correlation of is- determination and I-determination. According to this correlation, things in themselves are neither realistic fundaments of our knowledge nor epistemically relevant imaginations of an abstract logic. In the correlation of is-determination and I-determination Hönigswald did not only reject an objectivism that can be built on things in themselves. He also denied an overstressing of the subject's capacity of pure thinking, as we can find it in the Marburg approach of neo-Kantianism (Cohen 1922). Like Cassirer, Hönigswald overcame a merely logical direction of neo-Kantianism and problematized concrete human-beings in various ways of being in their lifeworld and putting themselves into relation to it (Redecker 2005). In his "Essay on Man" Cassirer points out his overcoming of the merely logical orientated 'animal rationale' by a culturally omnipresent 'animal symbolicum'. Shifting from a preferred logical theory to a neo-Kantian philosophy of concrete subjectivity, manifold acting human-beings come into interest. The Copernican turn becomes a matter of cultural philosophy.

> „Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's
> cultural life in all their richness and variety. But all these forms are symbolic forms.
> Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an
> animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can
> understand the new way open to man – the way to civilization. " (Cassirer 1944, 44)

Overcoming a preferred glance on the 'animal rationale,' we can ask with Hönigswald how the 'animal symbolicum' can be described. This leads us to Hönigswald's theory of organism as the manifestation of the not only observing, but also judging, expressing, constituting, creating, and shaping subject in several cultural fields of research like language (Hönigswald 1937/1970) , arts (Hönigswald 1961), pedagogy (Hönigswald 1927), morality, rights, and religion (Hönigswald 1931/1997). Our body enables us to combine, express and evaluate impressions, experiences, emotions, and thoughts. This offers Hönigswald the possibility to

combine several elements of the Kantian approach, referring to aesthetical, ethical, anthropological, and biological relevant reflections. According to the subject of Kant's Copernican turn, Hönigswald shows a dynamic activity in dealing with Kantian objects of interest. This is initiated and prepared by Kant whose Copernican turn leads him to a transcendental subject beyond a preferred focus on theoretical philosophy. With the Copernican turn, the subject of morality and ethics comes into special interest.

> „Kant's ultimate 'Copernican' hypothesis is that our pure practical reason makes up
> for the otherwise seemingly pointless spinning of the excess rationality in general that
> reason, as one complex but unified faculty, brings with it, and that makes our species
> fundamentally unlike all others on earth." (Ameriks 2013, 71)

In the Copernican turn we can find a fundamental link between several ways of regarding human beings in their manifold capacities, e.g. as subjects of theoretical and practical reason. This can also be stressed with Pradelle (2020, 379), who points out that „the Copernican revolution carried out in the theoretical realm is also valid in the practical realm; just, indeed, as the a priori structures of the object were supposed to follow the formal structures of the finite subject, so here the form of the categorical imperativeness proper to the moral law follows the finite character of the will. This principle of the Copernican reversal is just as valid for the analysis of respect: to the extent to which it has an effect on sensibility, the respect for the moral law presupposes, as a moral feeling, that the being endowed with reason is also endowed with sensibility".

In the ethic relevance of the Copernican turn we can find sensitive, vulnerable and responsible subjects who have the possibility and duty to make use of their practical reason and "treat humanity" in their "*own person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*" (Kant 1786, 66), Referring to the Categorical Imperative, Kant's Copernican turn shows ambivalences of moral subjects who have to be moral not only because of their dignity, but also because of their desires. Without their limitations they would not be addressees of a categorial imperative. While Hönigswald stresses subjects of capacities, we can also focus their restrictions and ambivalences in referring to Kant.

Taking into consideration that "nothing entirely straight can be fashioned from the crooked wood of which humankind is made" (Kant 1784, 8:23), human-beings have the possibility to act against a senseful and responsible orientation and thus must think about moral questions. These 'crooked woods' are autonomous and determined (Esser 2001, Konhardt 2004; Redecker 2018), while they are dealing with capacities and restrictions (Bielefeld 2001, Himmelmann 2009), duty and desire (Höffe 1983), reflection and emotion (Kant 1764/2007, Recki 2001, Ameriks 2004). Subjects of the Copernican turn are subjects who face freedom and contingency (Sturma 2004), distance and involvement (Böhme 2012, Klemme 2006, Schönecker 2014, Loidoldt 2014, Esser 2014), progress and

perspectivity (Höffe 1989, Waldenfels 2011), responsibility and restriction (Gerhardt 2002, Sturma 2001). These ambivalences seem to be constitutive for their condition as 'crooked woods' with dignity.

Focusing human-beings as a connective factor of several topics in Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, concrete subject can be seen in their ambivalences, not only regarding capacities, but also limitations, vulnerability, contingency and finiteness. As human-beings in motion (Altman 2018, 6), who try to put themselves into relation to their objects (Ameriks 2013), these 'crooked woods' are principle and factum, subject and object of recognition at once. They must be acknowledged because of their vulnerability (Redecker 2018) and treated as "an end in itself", because they have an "inner worth, that is, dignity" and are "elevated above all price" (Kant 1786, 77).

If we interpret Hönigswald's definition of the concrete subject as principle and factum of philosophy, we can highlight human ambivalences with the aim of rejecting a postmodern view on modernity that neglects the modern sources of postmodernity and characterizes postmodernity as totally different from modernity. Beyond a manifold disputation on the question, whether Kant had a real Copernican or Ptolemaic concept of the turn (Gerhardt 1987; Miles 2006; Brandt 2007; Schönecker et al. 2011; Lemanski 2012), we can refer to the mentioned ambivalences of the Copernican turn to avoid a Ptolemaic interpretation that glorifies human-beings as self-sufficient subjects of domination who put themselves into the middle of an anthropocentric universe.

If we regard the factuality of concrete subjects and if we stress, that they can be seen as philosophical principles, because they are facts, we can come to a differentiated problematization of their ambivalences and ambiguities, their alienness and concealments with the aim of dealing with Kant's Copernican revolution as an "ongoing project" (Vater 2018, 759).This project can consider Hönigswald's reflection of the Copernican turn, especially if we take into consideration that Hönigswald's systematical concept of philosophy is open-ended (Meder 1995, 287) and can be reflected and problematized even in new fields of interest and concern.

5. Looking ahead – Kant, Hönigswald and (post)phenomenological Approaches

With Kant's Copernican turn intentionality comes into s special interest. While the relevance of intentionality combines Hönigswald's approach with Husserl's phenomenology (Orth 1993), Hönigswald's theory of organism overcame the Cartesian Ego cogito that is still constitutive in Husserl's early philosophy (Husserl 1987). Constituting and combining my experiences, I need my bodily extension. This can be stressed with Hönigswald not only against a neo-Kantian philosophy of pure thinking (Cohen 1922), but also against a phenomenology that neglects the bodily manifestation of (inter-)subjectivity. With his theory of organism Hönigswald avoids difficulties of the early Husserlian phenomenology, that does not acknowledge the bodily foundation of (inter-)subjectivity.

Highlighting bodily experience, we can find more and closer relations between Richard Hönigswald and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1984, 1986) than between Hönigswald and Husserl, but in contrast to Hönigswald, Merleau-Ponty stresses the contingency of a bodily being in the word by explaining a phenomenological interconnectedness of subject and object that goes beyond Hönigswald's correlation of is-determination and I-determination. Merleau-Ponty and postphenomenological approaches that refer to him focus ambivalences of human capacities and restrictions in a very elaborated and differentiated manner. Experiencing subjects are described as part of and entangled with the world they are dealing with (Merleau-Ponty 1984, 1986; Verbeek 2005b; Rosenberger 2020; Ritter 2021), facing perspectivity and limitation. Thus, Merleau-Ponty considers, that our bodily experience is pervaded by alienness, unconsciousness and contingency (Waldenfels 2005, 2009; Welsch 2012).

This approach is shared in today's postphenomenological positions (Verbeek 2005b; Rosenberger 2020; Ritter 2021) that are explicitly situated in the tradition of phenomenology (Verbeek 2005a; Ritter 2021), especially Merleau-Ponty (Ihde in Ihde/Kaminski 2020, 274). Postphenomenologists thematize human-technology relations (in digital scenarios) and stress the technical mediated interwovenness of man and world (Ihde/Kaminski 2020; Richardson 2020). Here the Copernican turn is transformed into an approach that describes the observing subject as determined by technical mediation. This subject is no longer a subject of knowledge, but of plausibility. Thus, postphenomenologists try to understand the world without demanding to reach the truth.

Besides the question, whether the observing subject is described as a knowing or just explaining subject, this observing subject needs intentionality to do so (Redecker 2024) and thus can rather be seen in the tradition of Kant's Copernican turn than in an ontological direction, while some thinkers of post-phenomenology leave the phenomenological tradition (Verbeek 2005b) and try to overcome intentionality as a basic element of phenomenology. Ritter stresses that

> "postphenomenology has gradually diverged from phenomenology. With its inter-relational ontology, postphenomenology now pays attention to relations rather than intentionality." (Ritter 2021, 1512; cf. Ihde 2022)

Leaving the Copernican direction by neglecting the observing subject can lead to a praxeology that does not acknowledge human-beings' possibility to put themselves into relation to the practices they are involved in (Redecker 2019). They are rather seen as objects of subjectivation than as subjects of reasoning, critique, and resistance, while even postphenomenologists characterize the experience of a mediated world is a typical human one (Rosenberger/Verbeek 2015; Richardson 2020). If "it is impossible to speak about the world in the absence of human involvement with it" (Verbeek 2005b, 110), this human involve-

ment can be problematized to revitalize Hönigswald's concentration on critical thinking. With Hönigswald we can remember the bodily founded subject of sensitivity, reason, and creative imagination as a precondition for problematizing practices and praxeology, while even praxeologists need their intentionality, if they want to investigate practices.

If we consider that our way of referring to objects is permeated by alienness, we can regard ourselves rather as questioning subjects than as knowing subjects. To admit to that we can go back to Kant's rejection of things in themselves in the Copernican turn, its radicalization in Hönigswald's theory of the organism and its transformation in phenomenological theories of alienation. If we interpret Hönigswald's and (post)phenomenological approaches in reference to Kant's Copernican turn, we can highlight the relevance of intentionality and argue against the rejection of a "transcendental and 'Anthropocene' pushback" (Ihde 2022, 853) in postphenomenology, because even this rejection is one of a concrete subject, a limited subject in motion (Redecker 2022).

6. Conclusions

Based on Kant's Copernican turn the argumentation showed Hönigswald's theory of concrete subjectivity as a radicalization of the turn. By locating the Kantian 'I think' in the concrete human-being, Hönigswald's approach offers the possibility to combine several elements and aspects of the Kantian philosophy in a cultural theory that stresses diverse capacities of the acting human-being in fields like arts, language, pedagogy, morality, and rights. If we also consider limitations and restrictions of human-beings, we can address them as 'crooked woods', who are free and determined at once, while they put themselves into relation to others, the other and themselves in various cultural fields. Thus, Cassirer's turn from the 'animal rationale' to the 'animal symbolicum' can be grounded on Hönigswald's theory of organism, that offers a bodily foundation of cultural theory.

Hönigswald describes the organism as spatial location of a concrete consciousness that is bound to the present moment of experience and thus needs its extended body that offers the possibility to combine experiences by referring to past experiences and trying to anticipate new ones. To establish his transcendental theory of bodily subjectivity, Hönigswald had to go through his own Copernican turn by overcoming his early stage of realistic-metaphysical neo-Kantianism. His originality can widely be seen in his later separation from Riehl's and Liebmann's epistemology of things-in themselves. While Riehl an Liebman fall back behind Kant's Copernican turn, Hönigswald radicalizes it by describing the bodily subject of experience as principle and factum of critical philosophy.

This radicalization of the Copernican turn overcomes a Cartesian Ego cogito and thus a Husserlian phenomenology that is not able to regard the fundamental relevance of concrete (inter-)subjectivity. Remembering that Kant's Copernican turn puts emphasis on ambivalences of observing subjects who are restricted and constructive at once, Hönigswald's focus on the knowing subject of autonomy can be enriched by regarding aspects of limitation,

contingency and vulnerability. The subject of Kant's Copernican turn can be seen as a constructive observer and actor, far from knowing things in themselves. Kant's subjects of dignity are 'crooked woods', who are esteemed in their imperfectness and vulnerability.

While Hönigswald preferably stresses the capacity of human-beings, we can refer to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body to acknowledge even restrictions of bodily experience and human capacities. That both approaches refer to intentionality as an essential factor in the attempt to understand and explain objects of interest shows Hönigswald's and Merlau-Ponty's connection to Kant's Copernican turn. In contrast, several postphenomenological approaches try to explain relations between man and world without intentionality. Here we can argue with Hönigswald's theory of the concrete bodily subject of intentionality. This subject, although restricted and limited, is indispensable to problematize practices and theories. Hönigswald's approach can remind us of the importance of Kant's Copernican turn and its ongoing critical reflection.

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EL ROL NORMATIVO DE LA PARACONSISTENCIA

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En este artículo analizo el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. En pocas palabras, este argumento plantea que un agente podría creer una contradicción sin estar necesariamente comprometido con toda oración, y que por eso deberíamos rechazar el principio lógico de Explosión. Aquí, describo las críticas hechas por Steinberger (2014), quien considera que el argumento es erróneo. Steinberger afirma que este argumento deja de funcionar cuando admitimos que la normatividad de la lógica es de "alcance amplio", es decir, que siempre tenemos la opción de abandonar las premisas o aceptar la conclusión. En este artículo doy una respuesta a Steinberger, tomando en cuenta algunos conceptos normativos que fueron ignorados en esta discusión: el concepto de compromiso, y el concepto de permiso inferencial. Muestro que una vez que tomamos estas nociones en cuenta, el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia vuelve a funcionar. Esto a se debe a que tanto el compromiso como los permisos inferenciales funcionan con "alcance estrecho". Es decir, uno se compromete con ciertas creencias a partir de otras, y uno infiere ciertas oraciones a partir de otras. Si expresamos la normatividad de la lógica con estos conceptos, podemos volver a cuestionar el principio lógico de Explosión, ya que no es razonable que creer una contradicción nos comprometa con toda oración, o sirva de base para inferir cualquier oración.

Palabras clave: *Filosofía; Paraconsistencia; Normatividad de la lógica; Compromiso Epistémico; Requisitos racionales; permiso epistémico*

In this paper, I analyze the epistemic argument in favor of paraconsistency. In a nutshell, this argument claims that an agent might believe a contradiction without being necessarily committed to every sentence, and therefore one should reject the Explosion principle. Here, I describe the criticism made by Steinberger (2014), who considers that the argument is wrong. Steinberger claims that this argument becomes ineffective once we admit that the normativity of logic is "wide-scoped", i.e., we can always choose between abandoning the premises or accepting the conclusion. In this paper I respond to Steinberger, by taking into account some normative concepts that have been mostly ignored so far in the discussion: the concept of commitment and the concept of basing permission. I show that if we take these notions into account, the epistemic argument in favor of paraconsistency works again. This follows from the fact that both commitment and basing permissions work in a "narrow-scoped" way, i.e., one is committed to some beliefs on the basis of other beliefs, and one infers some sentences on the basis of other sentences. If we express the normativity of logic with these concepts, we can challenge the logical principle of Explosion. For it is not reasonable to be committed to every sentence, or to infer every sentence, on the basis of believing a contradiction.

Keywords: *Paraconsistency; Normativity of logic; Epistemic Commitment; Rational requirements; Epistemic permission*

1. Introducción

Llamamos *paraconsistente* a una lógica que no admite como válido al principio de Explosión (A, ¬A ⊨ B), también conocido como *Ex falso sequitur quodlibet*. Este principio nos dice que un conjunto contradictorio de premisas implica cualquier otra oración.

En el debate sobre paraconsistencia hay generalmente dos tipos de enfoques para rechazar ese principio. El primero es el dialeteísmo: según este enfoque, algunas contradicciones son verdaderas. Estas contradicciones verdaderas surgen de paradojas semánticas o de fenómenos metafísicos tales como el cambio o el movimiento (Priest, 2006). Por ejemplo, "esta oración es falsa" es un clásico ejemplo de oración verdadera y contradictoria para los dialeteístas. Si λ es la oración del Mentiroso, podemos afirmar tanto λ como ¬λ. Para el dialeteísmo, el principio de Explosión es inválido porque no preserva verdad.

Se podría también distinguir entre un dialeteísmo semántico (enfocado en paradojas semánticas) y un dialeteísmo metafísico (que postula contradicciones verdaderas también a partir de fenómenos como el cambio o el movimiento). El primer tipo de dialeteísmo es representado por Beall (2009), y el segundo por Priest (op.cit.). Las teorías semanticistas evitan comprometerse con la parte más difícil del dialeteísmo, que es la inconsistencia del mundo real; solo afirman que algunos conceptos semánticos (especialmente el concepto de Verdad) son contradictorios, y que la mejor opción para entenderlos no es reformarlos, sino aceptar que algunas contradicciones son verdaderas por razones puramente conceptuales. El dialeteísmo metafísico tiene una visión del mundo particular, según la cual una explicación adecuada del mundo real necesita la aceptación de contradicciones; el fenómeno dialeteísta, para ellos, va mucho más allá de la simple contradictoriedad de algunos conceptos.

El segundo enfoque paraconsistente no requiere postular contradicciones verdaderas para rechazar el principio de Explosión, y por eso es independiente del dialeteísmo (aunque los dialeteístas suelen adoptar ambos tipos de argumento simultáneamente). Este enfoque se basa en un argumento epistémico: la idea general es que los principios lógicos deberían ser usados para manejar nuestras creencias, y Explosión no es un principio correcto para hacerlo. Creer una contradicción no debería comprometerte con creer toda oración. Por eso, debemos rechazar la validez de Explosión y adoptar la paraconsistencia. Este es el argumento que nos interesará en este artículo.[1]

En términos generales, este segundo tipo de argumento está relacionado con el *relevantismo*. El relevantismo puede verse como una familia de lógicas paraconsistentes (Mares, 2020). Es imposible hacer un recuento de la historia del relevantismo o sus distintas versiones aquí. En lo que nos atañe, nos importa fundamentalmente un aspecto de este enfoque: para la escuela relevantista, argumentos como Explosión son inválidos porque el contenido de las premisas no se refleja en el contenido de la conclusión.

Aquí nos enfocaremos en el principio de Explosión, y analizaremos la objeción específica del lógico relevantista R. Meyer. Pero el mismo enfoque relevantista explica que *todo* argumento (no sólo Explosión) requiere una conexión de contenido entre premisas y conclusión. Usualmente la "conexión de contenido" está dada por compartir letras proposicionales: en sistemas lógicos relevantistas como FDE, nunca va a suceder que en un argumento válido las premisas y la conclusión no compartan letras proposicionales (por eso no hay tautologías, y argumentos como Explosión son inválidos).[2]

¿Cuál es entonces el argumento epistémico o normativo en contra del principio de Explosión? En términos generales, el argumento parte de la siguiente observación: a veces nuestras creencias son inconsistentes, pero eso no nos compromete necesariamente con toda oración. Veremos ahora algunas versiones de este argumento.

Priest considera que la noción clásica de validez es una noción "extrañamente perversa", según la cual "toda regla cuyas premisas contienen contradicciones es válida".[3] Según Priest, lo absurdo de esta idea se vuelve más claro cuando nos damos cuenta que "la lógica es un asunto normativo: se supone que nos ofrece una teoría sobre el razonamiento correcto" (2006, p. 297). Este enfoque está basado en la idea general de Priest según la cual la lógica tiene una aplicación pretendida canónica, que es el razonamiento. Priest asume que, tal como la física o la sociología, la lógica no es solamente un sistema matemático o formal, sino que intenta comprender y explicar el razonamiento ordinario. Dado que Explosión es un principio incorrecto en el razonamiento, también debe ser rechazado como principio lógico.

Por otro lado, Meyer (1971, pág. 814) plantea el argumento en estos términos:

> Es un hecho empírico evidente que (1) alguna gente a veces se compromete con creencias contradictorias. Y de nuevo, ¿para qué sirve la lógica si no podemos decir que (2) una persona comprometida con ciertas creencias está también comprometida con sus consecuencias lógicas? Amigos, es totalmente extraño, tonto y ridículo que de acuerdo con la lógica clásica no se pueda aceptar (1) y (2) a la vez, salvo que sostengamos que algunas personas están comprometidas a absolutamente todo.

> [It is an evident empirical fact that (1) some people sometimes are committed to some contradictory beliefs. And again, what else is logic for if it is not the case that (2) a

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1 Recientemente, Carnielli y Rodrigues (2019) propusieron un "enfoque epistémico de la paraconsistencia" ligeramente distinto al que vamos a discutir aquí. Lo que ellos observan es que podemos tener evidencia a favor de A y evidencia a favor de ¬A, pero eso no significa que tengamos evidencia a favor de cualquier oración. Por eso, proponen que debemos abandonar el principio de Explosión.

2 FDE es un sistema lógico con cuatro valores de verdad: Verdad, Falsedad, Inconsistencia y Vacío de verdad. La existencia de vacíos invalida principios como la Ley del tercero excluido, mientras que la existencia de inconsistencias invalida Explosión.

3 Vale mencionar que el argumento principal de Priest (2006) contra Explosión es metafísico; i.e. afirma que hay contradicciones verdaderas (como la oración del Mentiroso). En su trabajo, el argumento epistémico es más bien secundario.

man committed to certain beliefs is committed as well to their logical consequences? Friends, it is downright odd, silly and ridiculous that on classical logic terrain (1) and (2) cannot be held together, except on pain of maintaining that some people sometimes are committed to absolutely everything.]

En resumen, Meyer nos dice que muchas personas se comprometen con contradicciones, pero esto no debería implicar que se comprometen con toda oración. Sin embargo, es perfectamente natural suponer que uno se compromete con las consecuencias lógicas de sus propias creencias. Por eso propone rechazar el principio lógico de Explosión.

En un artículo más reciente, Steinberger (2014) discute el argumento epistémico o normativo a favor de la lógica paraconsistente. El texto de Steinberger que analizaremos en este artículo se opone a este argumento epistémico de Priest y Meyer. Como veremos en la próxima sección, Steinberger sostiene que una vez que la relación entre normatividad y lógica se especifica mejor, este argumento se vuelve ineficaz.

2. La normatividad de la lógica

Para explicar mejor el argumento de Steinberger hace falta introducir el problema de la normatividad de la lógica. Usualmente se consideró que la lógica y la racionalidad tenían un vínculo obvio, en ocasiones tan obvio que ni hacía falta precisarlo. El mismo Kant en la *Crítica de la Razón Pura* (1781/2013) advirtió que la lógica "pura" marcaba un *canon* del pensamiento, que incluye "las reglas absolutamente necesarias del pensar, aquellas sin las cuales no es posible uso alguno del entendimiento" (p. 63). Autores como el Wittgenstein del *Tractatus* (1921/2012) consideraban, por ejemplo, que "nosotros no podemos pensar nada ilógico" (§3.03). En psicología autores como Piaget (1949) plantearon que nuestro pensamiento racional adulto es lógico, y estudiaron cómo las habilidades lógicas se van adquiriendo a lo largo del tiempo.

El panorama dentro de la filosofía cambió cuando Harman (1986) argumentó que la lógica no es especialmente importante para el razonamiento.[4] Según Harman, la lógica no puede ser verdaderamente normativa por diferentes razones. Entre ellas, podemos mencionar dos. La primera es que la lógica es "acumulativa", pero el razonamiento también contiene instancias de revisión. Si siguiéramos estrictamente a la lógica, solo aplicaríamos reglas y obtendríamos más creencias, sin jamás revisar. Podríamos llamar a esto *argumento de la Revisión*. La segunda razón contra la normatividad de la lógica es que la lógica es extremadamente demandante, mientras que intuitivamente no le pediríamos a los sujetos racionales que sean tan buenos razonadores. Por ejemplo, no tiene nada de malo que un

agente conozca los axiomas de Peano pero ignore miles de teoremas que se siguen de ellos. Podríamos llamar a esto *argumento de las Demandas Excesivas*. Estos no son los únicos argumentos de Harman, pero sí son centrales en su libro.[5]

En respuesta a Harman, MacFarlane (2004) sostiene que la normatividad de la lógica puede expresarse de muchas formas, y algunas no son afectadas por estas objeciones. La normatividad de la lógica se expresa por medio de "principios puente", que conectan hechos sobre la validez lógica con demandas epistémicas. Por ejemplo, "Si A implica B, entonces si uno cree A, uno *debe* creer B". Los principios puente pueden variar en distintos aspectos: por ejemplo, el operador podría ser más débil (tener *razones* en vez de *obligaciones*), o usar otra "polaridad" ("uno *no puede rechazar* la conclusión" en vez de "uno *debe creer* la conclusión"). Más adelante explicaremos esto con más detalle.

Un aspecto fundamental en esta discusión es el concepto de *alcance*. Los enunciados normativos condicionales suelen ser ambiguos en el lenguaje cotidiano. Por ejemplo, decimos "si quieres dejar de fumar, debes tomar chicles de nicotina". Pero esto puede leerse de forma literal (quieres dejar de fumar → debes tomar chicles de nicotina), o de una forma más holista (debes(dejar de fumar → tomar chicles de nicotina)). Similares distinciones pueden hacerse en distintos ámbitos normativos, sean epistémicos, prácticos o legales.

En términos puramente técnicos, las dos posibles lecturas se distinguen por el alcance del operador deóntico. Si O es un operador deóntico de deber, y P uno de permisión, los principios de alcance *amplio* nos dicen O(A → B), o equivalentemente ¬P (A & ¬B); mientras que los principios de alcance *estrecho* nos dicen A → OB. Veremos que en la discusión sobre la normatividad de la lógica la distinción entre estos tipos de principios es fundamental.

En la taxonomía de MacFarlane, los principios puente pueden tener distintas formas, de las cuales mencionaremos algunas posibilidades que utilizaremos a lo largo del texto:

– Alcance: puede ser amplio (W), donde el operador deóntico aplica al condicional entero, o estrecho (C), donde solo se aplica el operador deóntico al consecuente.
– Operador: puede ser *obligación* (o) o *tener razones* (r).
– Polaridad: puede ser positiva o negativa, es decir, puede pedir la creencia en la conclusión (+) o el no-rechazo (-).

De este modo podemos clasificar a los principios puente usando la terminología: Wo+, Wo-, Wr+, Cr+, Cr-, etc.

Como respuesta a los argumentos de Harman, MacFarlane propone los siguientes principios de alcance amplio:

(**Wo-**)   Si A implica B, entonces no está permitido creer A y rechazar B. [6]

Más generalmente, si $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ implican B, entonces no está permitido (creer $A_1, \ldots,$ y creer A_n, pero rechazar B).

(**Wr+**)   Si A implica B, entonces uno tiene razones para evitar esta combinación de actitudes: creer A y no creer B.

Más generalmente, si $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ implican B, entonces uno tiene razones para evitar está combinación de actitudes: creer $A_1, \ldots,$ y creer A_n, pero no creer B.

El primer principio responde al argumento de las Demandas Excesivas, pues indica que lo realmente prohibido no es ignorar algunas consecuencias de nuestras creencias, sino rechazarlas. En ese sentido, no tiene nada de malo ignorar algunas consecuencias de los axiomas de Peano; lo malo sería rechazarlas.

El segundo principio nos indica que, aunque mantener la coherencia lógica no es una *obligación*, siempre tenemos *razones* para hacerlo. Las razones aquí deben ser entendidas como *pro tanto* o derrotables, en el sentido de Broome (2013). La idea es que en muchos casos una razón es por sí sola insuficiente para generar obligaciones. Por ejemplo, un día despierto con una ligera fiebre. Tengo razones para quedarme en casa: debería reposar. También tengo razones para ir a la oficina: hay que resolver muchos asuntos en el trabajo. Para determinar en esos casos qué debo hacer, debo sopesar las razones entre sí. En casos como Demandas Excesivas, obviamente tengo razones para creer el Teorema de Fermat (después de todo, es un teorema de la aritmética), pero no estoy obligado a hacerlo, porque quizás no conozco suficiente matemática.

Por último, la forma de "alcance amplio" de los principios nos permite responder al argumento de la Revisión. Si creo A y A → B, no necesariamente debo creer B. Porque B bien podría ser falsa o auto-contradictoria (en ese caso correspondería revisar las premisas). Lo importante, según los principios de alcance amplio, es mantener la coherencia: no puedo creer las premisas y rechazar la conclusión al mismo tiempo.

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6 Me tomo algunas licencias en la traducción para ayudar a la legibilidad en español. Literalmente MacFarlane propone "Si A implica B, entonces uno debe procurar (no creer A o no descreer B)". Introduzco "no está permitido" usando una traducción lógica aceptada en lógica deóntica, y modifico "decreer" por "rechazar". Se mantiene la forma lógica del principio original, pero resulta mucho más legible en español.

3. Steinberger contra el argumento epistémico

En esta sección vamos a analizar con más detalle las objeciones de Steinberger contra el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. Según Steinberger, tanto Priest como Meyer presuponen en sus argumentos un requisito normativo de alcance estrecho, como el siguiente:

(**Co+**)   Si $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ implican lógicamente B, y uno cree $A_1, \ldots,$ y A_n, entonces uno debe creer B.

La consecuencia problemática de (**Co+**) junto con Explosión es que, una vez que tu conjunto de creencias es inconsistente (por ejemplo, contiene dos oraciones contradictorias A y ØA), debes creer toda oración. Es decir, si creo que el conjunto de Russell pertenece y no pertenece a sí mismo, debo creer que la luna está hecha de queso. Esto es justamente lo que critican Priest y Meyer, y lo usan como motivo para rechazar Explosión.

El requisito (**Co+**) ciertamente es intuitivo a primera vista, y para muchos es lo primero que viene a la mente cuando pensamos en la relación entre lógica y racionalidad. Pero como observaron Broome (1999; 2013) y MacFarlane (op. Cit.) este requisito es problemático. Un argumento que suele usarse en contra de este requisito (además del de Explosión) es que le da una suerte de auto-justificación a toda creencia. Dado que A implica A, si uno cree A, debería creer A. Esto oscurece una distinción usual entre *creencias* que uno tiene y creencias que uno debería tener. Este argumento suele conocerse como el *argumento de Auto-justificación*.[7]

Steinberger sostiene que el argumento de Auto-justificación refuta principios de alcance estrecho como (**Co+**). También observa que, si buscamos seguir manteniendo principios de alcance estrecho, (**Co+**) podría ser modificado al cambiar el operador de "deber" por un operador más débil de "razón":

(**Cr+**)   Si A implica B, y uno cree A, entonces uno tiene una razón para creer B.

De este modo, evitamos la objeción de la Auto-justificación, porque creer A no significa que *debemos* creer A, sino que tenemos *razones* para creer A. Esto va en sintonía con el "Principio de conservadurismo" de Harman (op. cit. p. 46), según el cual "uno está justificado en seguir aceptando algo en ausencia de razones para no hacerlo".

Sin embargo, con (**Cr+**) también perdemos el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. Según Steinberger (pp. 17-19), (**Cr+**) es demasiado débil para que funcione el argumento epistémico paraconsistente: si sumamos (**Cr+**) con Explosión, creer una contra-

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7 En inglés, este argumento suele denominarse "bootstrapping argument", pero el concepto de "boostrapping" (como una forma de obtener algo sin pagar un costo de entrada) no tiene una traducción literal al español.

dicción ahora nos da una *razón* para creer toda oración. Pero esto no es tan problemático como tener un *deber* de creer toda oración. Como antes señalé, las razones son débiles: podría haber razones para creer A, y también haber razones más fuertes para no creer A.

En otras palabras, las razones son provisorias. Por lo tanto, el principio (**Cr+**) no está necesariamente en tensión con el principio de Explosión. Si la fuerza de las razones lógicas es débil, entonces tener razones para creer toda oración no es necesariamente problemático, y ya no se justifica abandonar el principio de Explosión. En ese sentido, al debilitar el principio puente, se debilita mucho el argumento epistémico contra el principio de Explosión. En resumidas cuentas, Steinberger observa que el argumento epistémico se basa en un principio puente incorrecto (como **Co+**). Al reemplazarlo por un principio puente más razonable como (**Cr+**), la fuerza del argumento se pierde.

Steinberger también argumenta, siguiendo a MacFarlane (2004), que la mejor caracterización de la normatividad de la lógica involucra principios de alcance amplio, como el siguiente[8]:

(**Wo+**)   Si A implica B, no está permitido creer A y no creer B.

Si ese principio define la relación entre racionalidad y lógica, entonces el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia falla. Incluso si adoptamos lógica clásica, un conjunto de creencias contradictorio no te compromete a creer toda oración. Para cualquier contradicción A ∧ ¬A y cualquier oración B, uno tendría un deber disyuntivo: no creer la contradicción o creer B. Entonces uno siempre tiene la opción de revisar las creencias inconsistentes, en vez de entregarse a la trivialidad. Por lo tanto, uno puede mantener la creencia de que la lógica es normativa, o es una guía para razonar, y también mantener el principio de Explosión.

En resumen, Steinberger concluye que un principio de alcance estrecho basado en razones no logra explicar por qué rechazar Explosión. Lo mismo sucede con un principio de alcance amplio basado en deberes. Y esos son los únicos dos tipos de principio puente que podríamos aceptar. Por lo tanto, no hay razones epistémicas para rechazar Explosión.

En las próximas secciones, voy a desafiar esta afirmación de Steinberger. Los principios puente antes mencionados no son el único aspecto relevante de la normatividad de la lógica. Hay otros conceptos normativos, como el *compromiso epistémico* o el *permiso inferencial*, que pueden caracterizar de forma más completa la normatividad de la lógica. Una vez adoptados estos nuevos principios normativos, el argumento epistémico contra Explosión se vuelve más efectivo.

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8 Steinberger considera distintas formas de expresar requisitos racionales para la lógica. Aquí no hace falta mencionarlos todos. En general, el alcance estrecho produce Auto-justificación, y si modificamos el operador (por ejemplo, si decimos "tiene razones" en lugar de "debe"), el requisito racional evita este problema, pero se vuelve considerablemente débil. Los principios de alcance amplio se terminan imponiendo porque la lógica nos da deberes, no solo razones.

4. Compromiso epistémico

Si los argumentos anteriores de Harman o MacFarlane son correctos, entonces la normatividad de la lógica solo puede expresarse con principios de alcance amplio. Es decir, los principios tendrán la forma "no puedo aceptar las premisas y rechazar al mismo tiempo la conclusión". Pero no pueden tener la forma de alcance estrecho "si acepto las premisas, debo aceptar la conclusión". Esto llevaría al problema de la Auto-justificación. Sin embargo, en esta sección y la próxima voy a argumentar que la relación entre lógica y racionalidad podría tener distintos aspectos, y algunos de ellos pueden expresarse con principios de alcance estrecho.

Un concepto normativo ignorado hasta ahora en el debate sobre la normatividad de la lógica es el de *compromiso epistémico*. Nuestras creencias nos *comprometen* con otras creencias. En el mismo sentido en que, por ejemplo, hacer una promesa nos compromete a cumplir con lo prometido.

Shpall (2014) argumentó que los principios normativos sobre compromisos son de *alcance estrecho* (p. 25). Esto se debe particularmente a que los compromisos son dependientes del agente y del contexto en cuestión. Shpall se refiere a compromisos epistémicos y prácticos en distintas esferas. Por ejemplo, al hacer una promesa me *comprometo* con realizar cierta acción. Sin embargo, su enfoque puede extenderse a nuestro contexto. Lo que nos va a interesar es a qué nos compromete una determinada *creencia*.

Mi intención aquí es utilizar estas observaciones para el caso específico de la normatividad lógica. Los principios de alcance amplio antes descritos pueden verse como universales: ninguna persona debería creer "llueve", "si llueve, voy a mojarme" y rechazar "voy a mojarme". Pero aquí hay una dimensión de "alcance estrecho" que no deberíamos ignorar: al menos intuitivamente, la persona que cree "llueve" y "si llueve, voy a mojarme" está *comprometida* a creer "voy a mojarme". Esto no significa, naturalmente, que los agentes que creen "llueve" deberían tener infinitas creencias explícitas que se siguen lógicamente, de la forma "llueve o la luna es de queso"; solamente decimos que creer "llueve" los *compromete* con esas consecuencias lógicas. Este compromiso podría verse de forma disposicional: si al agente que cree A y A → B le preguntáramos qué piensa de B, o le hiciéramos cuestionarse sobre B, debería (en principio) aceptar B.

En general, si uno cree A y cree A → B, uno está comprometido con creer B. Pareciera razonable entonces aplicar un principio de alcance estrecho para esta noción:

(**Cc**)   Si A₁, …, Aₙ implican B, y uno cree A, …, y Aₙ, entonces uno está comprometido con B.[9]

Ahora no resulta tan problemático el problema de la Auto-justificación: naturalmente, creer A te compromete con A. Incluso el principio funciona adecuadamente en otros casos: creer

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9 En este caso, "N" es por el alcance estrecho, y "c" por la noción de compromiso.

A y A → B te compromete con creer B, creer A y creer B te compromete con A ∧ B, etc. Sin embargo, hay un punto que interesa para nuestros propósitos: este fenómeno no se extiende tan obviamente a *todos* los casos de validez de la lógica clásica. Un caso especialmente problemático es Explosión. Uno no diría, intuitivamente, que un agente con una creencia inconsistente está realmente comprometido con todas las oraciones del lenguaje.

Podemos ver entonces cómo la noción de *compromiso* da lugar a una reformulación del argumento epistémico paraconsistente. El nuevo argumento nos dice algo razonable, y muy parecido a lo que planteaba Meyer: intuitivamente, un agente podría tener creencias inconsistentes sin estar comprometido con todas las oraciones del lenguaje. Ese podría ser un motivo para rechazar Explosión.[10]

Tenemos, sin embargo, un desafío. Algunos compromisos lógicos sí existen (antes señalé, por ejemplo, que creer A y creer A→B nos compromete con B). Y si esto es así, ¿cómo podríamos trazar la línea entre los compromisos razonables y los que no lo son, como el de Explosión?

El enfoque sugerido en este artículo es que, incluso si aceptáramos la lógica clásica como la lógica adecuada para lidiar con la mayoría de los fenómenos, una lógica no-clásica (o más precisamente, paraconsistente) puede explicar algunos conceptos epistémicos particulares, como el de *compromiso epistémico*.

Entonces, para el fenómeno particular del *compromiso* epistémico, una posibilidad es capturarlo por medio de una lógica no-clásica L:

(**Cc***)   Si $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ implican B en la lógica (paraconsistente) L, y uno cree $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, entonces uno está comprometido con B.

Si queremos rechazar la plausibilidad epistémica del principio de Explosión, la lógica L debería ser, al menos, paraconsistente. Una opción podría ser adoptar la lógica relevantista FDE, donde la validez requiere un contenido común entre premisas y conclusión; hay extensiones de FDE (como N4 de Nelson o R de Routley y Meyer) que son paraconsistentes, pero también validan Modus Ponens.[11] Por lo tanto, el argumento paraconsistente basado en la normatividad de la lógica puede mantenerse. La paraconsistencia podría funcionar como una posible lógica para los compromisos epistémicos.

Vale aclarar que el principio (**Cc***) todavía debe responder al problema de las Demandas Excesivas. Porque incluso en una lógica paraconsistente, no se supone que uno deba comprometerse con *todas* las consecuencias de sus propias creencias. Una manera posible de resolver este problema es restringiendo las inferencias incluidas en el principio puente:

(**Cc****)   Si $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ implican *fácilmente* B en la lógica L, y uno cree $A_1, \ldots, A_n$, entonces uno está comprometido con B.

Con esta restricción, evitamos el problema de las Demandas Excesivas. Y al mismo tiempo, sigue siendo razonable rechazar Explosión, porque el motivo para rechazar esta regla no es que fuera una inferencia *difícil*, sino que es una inferencia muy poco razonable.

Cómo determinar si una inferencia es "fácil" es algo, lamentablemente, bastante difícil.[12] Lo natural sería apelar a la complejidad y el largo de la derivación, a partir de determinado aparato de prueba: una inferencia que requiere un mayor uso de reglas, o reglas más complejas, es una inferencia más "difícil".

El desafío entonces es elegir un sistema deductivo adecuado. Por ejemplo, si usamos el criterio de las pruebas en Deducción Natural con reglas básicas, algunas reglas intuitivamente muy "sencillas" como el Silogismo Disyuntivo, terminan siendo muy complejas, porque requieren un uso del principio de Explosión y varios usos de suposiciones. De hecho, podríamos observar que la longitud o complejidad de las pruebas en Deducción Natural con reglas básicas no es un buen indicador de lo fácil o difícil que podría ser una inferencia.

Una mejor guía podría ser un sistema de Deducción Natural con reglas básicas y derivadas (por ejemplo, el Silogismo Disyuntivo), como el sistema *intelim* desarrollado por D'Agostino (2014); esto es más parecido a cómo realizamos las pruebas en la vida real. Otra opción, aún más empírica, es usar un sistema de "Lógica Mental" (Rips, 1994), que también funciona de forma similar a la deducción natural, pero solo con reglas intuitivas: por ejemplo, incluye el Modus Ponens pero no la Introducción de la Disyunción. En cualquier caso, si la idea es usar una lógica L paraconsistente (por ejemplo, alguna extensión de FDE), deberíamos adoptar estos sistemas de reglas a la lógica paraconsistente L.[13] En la sección 6 consideraremos otra objeción relacionada con esta: que el principio de Explosión de hecho podría derivarse de otras reglas más simples e intuitivas.

Como respuesta a este argumento contra Explosión, Steinberger podría argumentar que el *compromiso* es una noción débil (como el concepto de *tener razones*), entonces comprometernos con toda oración a partir de creer inconsistencias no sería necesariamente un problema. Pero, como observa Shpall (2014), el compromiso es más fuerte que tener una razón. Hay de hecho algo malo si te comprometiste a ir a una fiesta de cumpleaños y no fuiste. En general, otros pueden quejarse si no cumpliste tus compromisos. En palabras de Shpall (p. 13):

Los compromisos son *pro tanto*, pero no deben entenderse bajo el modelo de las razones. Hay muchas razones que uno puede tomar o dejar. Tengo razones para llevarle

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10 Curiosamente, el argumento original de Meyer citado arriba estaba formulado en términos de "compromiso", aunque nunca se le prestó mucha atención a esto.

11 Para un análisis de las extensiones de FDE, véase (Omori & Wansing, 2017).

12 Agradezco a un réferi anónimo por plantear este asunto.

13 D'Agostino y Solares-Rojas (2024) desarrollaron una versión de *intelim* para el caso de FDE.

flores a la secretaría del departamento de geología, incluso si nunca la conocí -por ejemplo, el hecho de que mejorará su día. (…) Sin embargo, no hay problema si no realizo esas acciones, o muchas otras. Pero sí hay problema si no cumplo con mis compromisos.

[Commitments are pro tanto, but they are not to be understood on the model of reasons. There are lots of reasons that you can take or leave. I have a reason to bring flowers to the secretary of the geology department, even though I've never met her—namely, the fact that it would brighten her day. (…) Yet it is perfectly okay for me to fail to act on these reasons, and countless others. But it is notperfectly okay for me to fail to satisfy my commitments]

Según Shpall, el solo hecho de tener una razón para hacer una acción *no* habilita a los demás a quejarse de que uno no realizó esa acción (p. 14). Pero eso sí sucede con los compromisos. En otras palabras, los compromisos (a diferencia de las razones) son *estrictos*. Por lo tanto, no podemos aceptar tan fácilmente el compromiso con toda oración solo por el hecho de creer inconsistencias. Por lo tanto, el argumento epistémico contra Explosión podría ser expresado adecuadamente en términos de *compromisos*.

Esto no significa que los principios puente sobre creencias, mencionados en las primeras secciones de este artículo, deben ser abandonados. Los principios de compromiso no son incompatibles con los principios puente anteriores, y pueden ser considerados como distintas dimensiones de un mismo fenómeno: la relación entre lógica y normatividad. Con la diferencia de que los principios puente sobre creencias como (**Wo+**) intentan preservar la coherencia general y los principios sobre compromisos como (**Nc****) nos explican a qué nos comprometemos cuando creemos algo.

En resumen, en esta sección hemos mostrado que, si bien el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia no funciona en el modo exacto en que suele ser presentado (con principios puente basados en creencias y obligaciones), puede reformularse haciendo más explícito que estamos hablando de compromisos. En la próxima sección, vamos a analizar otra dimensión en la cual el "rol normativo de la lógica" requiere un enfoque paraconsistente.

5. Racionalidad y razonamiento

En su libro *Rationality through reasoning* (2013), John Broome hace una distinción muy útil entre requisitos racionales (*rational requirements*) y permisos inferenciales (*basing permissions*). Según Broome, los requisitos racionales aplican a *estados*, y ser racional en este sentido es simplemente tener un conjunto coherente de actitudes (por ejemplo, no tener creencias inconsistentes). Sin embargo, las reglas de *razonamiento* o *permisos inferenciales* expresan cómo adoptar nuevas actitudes sobre la base de tener otras actitudes. De acuerdo con Broome (2013):

…la racionalidad tiene dos aspectos -uno estático y otro dinámico. La racionalidad regula los estados mentales de las personas: algunos estados particulares, como el de tener creencias contradictorias, son irracionales, y otros no lo son. La racionalidad también regula los procesos mentales de las personas. En particular regula el razonamiento: hay formas racionales e irracionales de razonar. ¿Cómo están los aspectos estático y dinámico conectados entre sí? Es natural asumir que los procesos racionales nos pueden ayudar a evitar estados irracionales. Pero los dos aspectos de la racionalidad tienen diferentes estructuras. La racionalidad estática es regulada por requisitos sincrónicos, mientras que la racionalidad dinámica es regulada por permisos diacrónicos. Es difícil encontrar una conexión sistemática entre estas dos estructuras que unifique satisfactoriamente los dos aspectos de la racionalidad.

[…rationality has two aspects – a static one and a dynamic one. Rationality regulates people's mental states: some particular states, such as the state of having contradictory beliefs, are irrational and others are not. Rationality also regulates people's mental processes. In particular it regulates reasoning: there are rational and irrational ways to reason. How are these static and dynamic aspects of rationality connected together? It is natural to assume that rational processes can help us avoid irrational states. But the two aspects of rationality have different structures. Static rationality is regulated by synchronic requirements, whereas dynamic rationality is regulated by diachronic permissions. It is hard to find a systematic connection between these two structures that satisfactorily unifies the two aspects of rationality.]

Podemos pensar en el fenómeno de la *akrasía* o debilidad de la voluntad, en el que una persona considera que X es la acción correcta, pero sin embargo no logra realizarla. Por ejemplo, imaginemos una persona que considera que debería dejar de fumar, pero no puede dejar de hacerlo. Esta persona puede salir de la *akrasía* de dos maneras: dejando de fumar, o abandonando la idea de que debería dejar de fumar. Sin embargo, no es racional abandonar la idea de que debería dejar de fumar sobre la base de que actualmente está fumando. Esto sería un caso de *racionalización*, es decir, la tendencia a justificar nuestras acciones solo por el hecho de que las realizamos[14]. Mientras que sí es racional dejar de fumar sobre la base de creer que no debería fumar; de hecho, esa es la base del razonamiento práctico.

En el caso del razonamiento y la lógica, estos permisos inferenciales nos habilitan a tener ciertas creencias sobre la base de otras creencias que están lógicamente conectadas. En esta sección voy a mostrar que los argumentos epistémicos a favor de la paraconsistencia podrían ser reformulados al nivel de los permisos inferenciales. Esto coincide con la observación de Priest de que la regla de Explosión es incorrecta como regla de "razonamiento".

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14   Véase https://dictionary.apa.org/rationalization.

Broome no es específico sobre las reglas correctas (o permisos inferenciales) para el razonamiento lógico. Solo dice, como ejemplo (2013, pág. 191), que el *Modus Ponens* muestra un permiso inferencial: podrías creer racionalmente B sobre la base de creer A y creer A → B. Pero esto no se extiende trivialmente para todo caso de validez clásica. La regla de Explosión es seguramente uno de esos casos problemáticos: una regla que, si bien preserva verdad, no puede ser usada como un permiso inferencial. Es decir, no debería estar permitido creer toda oración B sobre la base de creer A y creer ¬A. Esta también es una forma distinta de interpretar lo que Meyer y Priest sugieren en los pasajes antes citados.

Una vez que marcamos la diferencia entre requisitos racionales y permisos inferenciales, es posible postular una lógica para los requisitos racionales y otra para los permisos inferenciales. La lógica clásica (o cualquier otra lógica que captura la preservación de verdad) podría funcionar para los requisitos racionales; suponiendo que MacFarlane tiene razón, no deberíamos aceptar las premisas y rechazar la conclusión de un argumento que preserva verdad. Sin embargo, algunos principios clásicos no funcionan adecuadamente como permisos inferenciales, como sucede en el caso de Explosión. Por eso, los permisos inferenciales deberían representarse con una lógica divergente, más débil que la clásica. Y aquí es cuando resurge el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. Pues este sistema lógico debe ser paraconsistente, si asumimos que Explosión no puede funcionar como permiso inferencial.

Steinberger podría responder, contra este argumento nuevo a favor de la paraconsistencia, que todo caso de validez clásica (incluyendo Explosión) puede ser usado como un permiso inferencial. Pero esto no es nada obvio. Como antes mostramos, no es trivial afirmar que toda inferencia clásica tiene un correspondiente permiso inferencial. Incluso Broome afirma, en el pasaje antes citado, que "es difícil encontrar una conexión sistemática" entre requisitos racionales y principios de razonamiento.

Explicitar los permisos inferenciales para la lógica no es para nada sencillo. Un caso problemático es Reflexividad (A implica A): si el argumento de Auto-justificación es tomado en serio, uno no debería poder creer A sobre la base de creer A. Pero en la medida en que no aceptemos Reflexividad, las lógicas no-clásicas más populares (K3, LP, FDE, intuicionismo, etc.) no servirán como teorías para permisos inferenciales, dado que son reflexivas. Una lógica no-reflexiva que podría servir para este propósito es la lógica de la fundamentación o *grounding* (Correia & Schnieder, 2012). La noción de fundamentación es explicativa: si B fundamenta A, entonces podemos decir que A *porque* B. Por ejemplo, el hecho de que llueve fundamenta el hecho de que llueve o hace frío; entonces podemos decir que llueve o hace frío *porque* llueve. Varios autores (Fine, 2012; Correia, 2014) desarrollaron teorías lógicas para esta noción. Estas lógicas son sublógicas de la clásica. Usualmente estas lógicas son irreflexivas: no podríamos decir que "llueve porque llueve". Y más importante para nosotros, estás lógicas también son *paraconsistentes*. No podríamos decir que "llueve porque la oración del Mentiroso es verdadera y falsa". En otros artículos (referencia omitida por anonimato), se sugiere el siguiente principio:

(Fundamentación y permiso)   Si A fundamenta B, entonces es racionalmente permisible creer B sobre la base de creer A.

Dada la irreflexividad y la paraconsistencia de la lógica de la fundamentación, esta familia de permisos inferenciales puede responder al argumento de Auto-justificación y también al argumento contra el principio de Explosión.

Más allá de esta propuesta particular basada en la lógica de la fundamentación, la idea general podríamos formularla así: los permisos inferenciales no pueden derivarse de forma automática de la teoría lógica "correcta" (es decir, la que preserva verdad). Se necesita una teoría particular de los permisos inferenciales, y por ende también una lógica. Esta lógica será paraconsistente, en tanto y en cuanto nos resulta muy poco intuitivo creer "Dios existe" sobre la base de creer que "la oración del Mentiroso es verdadera y falsa".

En resumen, en esta sección mostramos que la lógica paraconsistente (o más precisamente, *alguna* lógica paraconsistente) puede cumplir un rol normativo, como teoría de los principios correctos de razonamiento o (en terminología de Broome) *permisos inferenciales*. Es importante aclarar que no se trata de un argumento revisionista respecto a Explosión. Es decir, no mostramos que la lógica paraconsistente debe reemplazar a la clásica en todo contexto. Lo que proponemos, desde una perspectiva más pluralista, es que para algunos fenómenos epistémicos, como la realización de pasos inferenciales, un enfoque paraconsistente puede resolver mejor algunos de los problemas que se presentan.

6. El argumento de Lewis

El punto de vista defendido aquí se enfrenta a criticas similares a las planteadas contra otras teorías paraconsistentes.[15] En particular, autores como C.I. Lewis mostraron que, si bien el principio de Explosión no resulta intuitivo, el principio se deriva de otros que sí resultan intuitivos:

1.	P & ¬P	Premisa
2.	P	&-Elim
3.	P ∨ Q	∨-Intro
4.	¬P	&-Elim
5.	Q	Silogismo Disyuntivo

Este razonamiento muestra que, de hecho, podríamos obtener cualquier oración Q a partir de cualquier contradicción P&¬P. Entonces, si uno quiere rechazar Explosión, uno debe rechazar el Silogismo Disyuntivo, la Introducción de la Disyunción o la Eliminación de la

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15 Agradezco especialmente a un réferi anónimo por haber planteado esta cuestión.

la Conjunción. ¿Cuál de esas tres inferencias resulta implausible para el *compromiso* y la *fundamentación*?

En los enfoques dialeteístas, basados en la aceptación de algunas contradicciones, la respuesta al argumento de Lewis es clara: no vale el Silogismo Disyuntivo. Esto se debe, principalmente, a la aceptación de contradicciones verdaderas. Naturalmente, si P podría ser verdadera y falsa a la vez, no podríamos pasar de PVQ y ¬P a Q, porque ese argumento no preserva verdad de forma general (puede suceder que PVQ sea verdadera, ¬P sea verdadera, pero Q sea falsa).

El problema surge de forma más marcada para enfoques paraconsistentes *epistémicos*, donde no se asume la verdad de ciertas contradicciones. Aquí se pueden pensar distintas soluciones. En la Lógica de la Fundamentación (Correia, 2014, pág. 33), se asume que la conclusión será más compleja que las premisas (es decir, una conclusión siempre tendrá más conectivos que las premisas que la fundamentan), y por eso se rechaza el Silogismo Disyuntivo. En la sección 5 sugerimos usar una teoría lógica de este tipo para la noción de permiso inferencial.

Podemos analizar qué opción nos sirve más para el concepto de *compromiso epistémico*. En la sección 4 sugerimos usar FDE o alguna de sus extensiones, donde no vale el Silogismo Disyuntivo. Esta solución es la más usual dentro de los enfoques relevantistas. Otra opción es apelar a cuestiones de *contenido*. Por ejemplo, podríamos cuestionar la Introducción de la Disyunción. Podríamos postular que creer "llueve" no nos compromete con creer "llueve o 2+2=8" (o de forma más general, que creer p nos compromete con creer p o q para toda oración q). Esta inferencia no vale en algunas lógicas no-clásicas relativamente conocidas, como Kleene Débil o WK. La lógica trivaluada de Kleene débil es similar a la clásica, pero requiere (cuando las premisas no son inconsistentes) que todas las letras proposicionales usadas en la conclusión estén en las premisas (Ciuni & Carrara, 2017). El problema es que en esta lógica sí vale el principio de Explosión, por lo que no puede servirnos como herramienta para la paraconsistencia. En la lógica de Kleene Débil Paraconsistente (PWK), por el contrario, se pide (cuando la conclusión no es tautológica) que todas las letras usadas en las premisas sean usadas en la conclusión; por eso falla el Silogismo Disyuntivo, y también Explosión, pero vale la Introducción de la Disyunción (Ciuni & Carrara, op. Cit). Una opción superadora es usar una lógica aún más débil, como S_{FDE}, donde no vale Explosión y tampoco la Introducción de la Disyunción (Re, Pailos, & Szmuc, 2020). Un análisis exhaustivo de estas lógicas está por fuera del alcance de este artículo.

Otra alternativa, quizás más provocadora, es apelar a *lógicas no-transitivas* (Cobreros, Ripley, Egre, & van Rooij, 2012). Estas lógicas suelen aplicarse a problemas semánticos como la paradoja del Mentiroso o la paradoja de Vaguedad. Podríamos ilustrarlo con la paradoja *sorites*: si le sacamos un granito de arena a un montón de arena, nos queda un montón de arena. Pero si usamos repetidamente esta premisa y Modus Ponens, llegaremos a una situación donde hay un "montón de arena" pero ya no quedan granitos de arena. Por eso, Cobreros *et al.* (op.cit) rechazan el uso repetido de la regla sobre la base de usos previos. De modo similar, podríamos aceptar en la derivación anterior que p nos compromete con $p \lor q$, y que $\{p \lor q, \neg p\}$ nos compromete con q. Pero aun así podríamos rechazar que $\{p, \neg p\}$ nos compromete con q.[16] Esta solución es más revisionista que las anteriores, porque requiere el abandono de reglas estructurales.

En cualquier caso, encontrar lógicas paraconsistentes adecuadas para conceptos como el *compromiso epistémico* y la *fundamentación* es un desafío complejo e interesante. Discutir todas las lógicas que podrían servir para tal propósito, y encontrar las que funcionen mejor, es una tarea que está fuera de los alcances de este artículo, cuyo objetivo es fundamentalmente motivacional. Proponemos que el análisis de conceptos normativos como el compromiso epistémico y la fundamentación son modos muy razonables de justificar o motivar distintas lógicas paraconsistentes sin comprometerse con el dialeteísmo.

6. Conclusión

Como mostró Steinberger (2014), no hay hasta ahora en la literatura argumentos concluyentes contra el principio de Explosión basados en la normatividad de la lógica. Podríamos adoptar un operador de alcance amplio en nuestros principios epistémicos y evitar así la obligación de creer todas las oraciones por el simple hecho de tener creencias inconsistentes.

En respuesta a esta observación de Steinberger, en este artículo exploramos dos aspectos de la normatividad de la lógica donde operan principios de alcance estrecho con los que puede reformularse el argumento epistémico a favor de la paraconsistencia. El primero es la teoría de los *compromisos lógicos*. Si uno cree A, uno está comprometido con A y con otras consecuencias de A. Sin embargo, no es obvio que una creencia inconsistente comprometa al agente con toda oración. Una teoría paraconsistente podría ser introducida como teoría de los compromisos. Esto podría utilizarse como argumento a favor de la paraconsistencia, en esta dimensión de la normatividad.

Un segundo aspecto normativo donde se justifica la paraconsistencia es la noción de Broome (2013) de *permisos inferenciales*, que intuitivamente podemos entender como principios adecuados para razonar, porque indican cuándo podemos adoptar ciertas creencias sobre la base de otras. La regla de Explosión no es intuitivamente un buen caso de permiso inferencial: no se supone que puedas creer "Dios existe" sobre la base de creer "La paradoja del Mentiroso es verdadera y falsa". Entonces, una lógica paraconsistente podría capturar esta clase de permisos. Ambos argumentos, según nuestra lectura, pueden tomarse como interpretaciones de los argumentos originales de Meyer y Priest.

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16 Estas lógicas suelen aceptar de un modo "inferencial" el principio de Explosión; es decir, admiten que A&¬A implican B. Sin embargo, son paraconsistentes a nivel meta-inferencial: en determinados casos puede suceder que aceptemos A y aceptemos ¬A, pero no aceptemos B. Para una discusión más extensa al respecto, véase (Barrio, Rosenblatt, & Tajer, 2015).

Para concluir: propusimos dos argumentos a favor de un enfoque paraconsistente, basados en la normatividad de la lógica. Estos argumentos son más modestos que los de Priest y Meyer, porque no intentamos probar que la regla de Explosión debe ser rechazada en todo contexto. Lo que mostramos es que la paraconsistencia puede formar parte importante de una teoría sobre la normatividad de la lógica, si tomamos en cuenta las distintas dimensiones de esta normatividad.

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LA COMPLEJIDAD EN TEXTOS ARGUMENTATIVOS: ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN (2017-2022)

COMPLEXITY IN ARGUMENTATIVE TEXTS: STATE OF THE ART (2017-2022)

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Linguistic complexity has developed as an increasingly relevant topic in different theoretical and applied areas of language studies, even in interface with education. As the conceptions of complexity are diverse, this bibliographical review article seeks to present a state of the art, with articles written between 2017 and 2022, on the field studies specifically dedicated to the analysis of argumentative texts, in the last five years. For this, a qualitative descriptive-interpretive methodology of documentary type was adopted, mainly focused on content analysis. It was found that most of the investigations work on what is known in the literature as relative complexity and that the most frequently used criteria are syntactic, although investigations dedicated to argumentative complexity are presented at other linguistic levels (textual and pragmatic, for instance). Most of the works are devoted to writing at an academic level, with an emphasis on argumentative competence in foreign languages or L2. There is little research on children, young people and non-school populations and on the teaching of argumentation in the mother tongue, which opens up research paths on the construction of argumentative discourse and its complexities in different contexts.

Keywords: *argumentation, argumentative complexity, argumentative texts, linguistic complexity, state of the art.*

La complejidad lingüística se ha desarrollado como un tema cada vez más relevante en diferentes áreas teóricas y aplicadas de los estudios del lenguaje, incluso, en interface con la educación. Como son diversas las concepciones de complejidad, este artículo de revisión bibliográfica busca presentar un estado de la cuestión, construido con artículos producidos entre 2017 y 2022, sobre los estudios del campo específicamente dedicados al análisis de textos argumentativos, en los últimos cinco años. Para ello, se adoptó una metodología cualitativa descriptiva-interpretativa de tipo documental, principalmente centrada en el análisis de contenido. Se encontró que la mayoría de las investigaciones trabajan sobre lo que se conoce en la literatura como complejidad relativa y que los criterios empleados con mayor frecuencia son los sintácticos, aunque se presentan investigaciones dedicadas a la complejidad argumentativa en otros niveles lingüísticos (textuales y pragmáticos, por ejemplo). La mayoría de los trabajos se dedican a la escritura en nivel académico, con un énfasis en la competencia argumentativa en lenguas extranjeras o L2. Se encuentra poca investigación en niños, jóvenes y poblaciones no escolares y sobre la enseñanza de la argumentación en lengua materna, lo que nos abre caminos de investigación sobre la construcción del discurso argumentativo y de sus complejidades en diferentes contextos.

Palabras clave: *argumentación, complejidad lingüística, complejidad argumentativa, estado de la cuestión, textos argumentativos*

1. Introducción

La complejidad lingüística es un tema, dentro del campo de los estudios del lenguaje y de las lenguas, relativamente nuevo, pero que viene ocupando espacios cada vez más relevantes dentro de diferentes áreas teóricas y aplicadas de investigación de este campo, incluso en interface con la educación. En este sentido, cabe decir que no se trata de un tema uniformemente concebido, ya que son diversas las concepciones de complejidad presentadas por diferentes investigadores.

Este artículo, entonces, busca presentar un estado de la cuestión sobre los estudios de complejidad lingüística, específicamente dedicados al análisis de textos argumentativos. Además, se vincula a un trabajo de investigación más amplio que tiene como pregunta general: "¿Qué hace que un texto argumentativo sea más complejo que otro teniendo en cuenta la complejidad de procesamiento?". Para ello se consideró necesario primero hacer una revisión bibliográfica que diera cuenta de la pregunta "¿Cómo la complejidad en textos argumentativos ha sido analizada en las investigaciones de los últimos cinco años?

Para responder esta última pregunta, en el siguiente apartado, se presenta brevemente el tema de la complejidad, luego, la metodología utilizada para la construcción de esta investigación bibliográfica y posteriormente los resultados encontrados, primeramente, en una parte cuantitativa y, en seguida, en una parte cualitativa. Al final, se presentan algunas discusiones y conclusiones derivadas de los análisis anteriores.

2. Marco teórico

Leal (2021) afirma que la complejidad lingüística ha sido un concepto sobreentendido en los estudios del lenguaje durante décadas, esto es, el concepto se daba por sentado y no había estudios sistematizados que pudieran definirla desde una perspectiva directamente vinculada a los fenómenos linguisticos en sí. Según el autor, en tres momentos de la historia de la lingüística se estudió o se discutió la complejidad lingüística: en la mitad del siglo XIX; en la primera mitad del siglo XX; y entre fines del siglo XX y este inicio de siglo XXI. Sin embargo, hasta este último periodo, el tema "no habría pasado de mera especulación" (p.188), ya que no había herramientas teóricas para el desarrollo refinado de los análisis necesarios. Esto produjo que las conclusiones a las que llegaban los lingüistas estaban limitadas por observaciones más especulativas que científicas, lo que las hacía, además de diversas, muchas veces contradictorias.

En una revisión bibliográfica sobre el tema, Ochoa y Cueva (2020) indican que la complejidad lingüística se ha visto desde dos perspectivas: por una parte, una complejidad absoluta, entendida como una propiedad objetiva del sistema lingüístico, y, por otra, una complejidad relativa, entendida a partir de la relación que se establece entre el sistema lingüístico y el hablante (Miestamo, 2017). Además de esta oposición, señalan que se puede encontrar, en algunos trabajos, una oposición entre una complejidad del sistema, o sea, de la lengua en sí misma, y una complejidad estructural, medida a partir de

cómo se utilizan y se organizan las informaciones lingüísticas en los textos (Palloti, 2014). Para esta última investigadora, además, es posible hablar de una complejidad cognitiva, que tiene que ver con la relación entre estructuras lingüísticas y costes de procesamiento (esfuerzo cognitivo del hablante para comprender determinada información), concepto cercano al de complejidad relativa.

Como variables para medir la complejidad se han usado las variables "cantidad y variedad" de determinados elementos (Rescher, 1998), algunas veces de manera interrelacionada y otras veces como variables independientes.

En resumen, se puede decir que la complejidad ha sido estudiada desde dos puntos de vista: desde una perspectiva que toma el sistema lingüístico como una entidad independiente, es decir, bajo criterios que consideran medidas lingüísticas independientes de los usos que se hacen de ellas, o desde una perspectiva que considera a las personas, es decir, los hablantes de una o de más de una lengua, como un factor relevante para medir la complejidad.

Desde la primera perspectiva, las investigaciones se centran en los distintos niveles de la lengua. De manera general, se encuentran investigaciones dedicadas al estudio de la complejidad fonética o fonológica (Gayraud, Barkat-Defradas, Lahrouchi y Ben Hamed, 2018; Konnerth, 2018), complejidad léxica (Aravena & Quiroga, 2018; Allaw & McDonough, 2019; Bui, 2021), complejidad sintáctica (Kyle & Crossley, 2018; Jiang, Bi y Liu, 2019; Wu, Mauranen y Lei 2020), complejidad semántica (McKenna, Choudhary, Saxon, Strimel y Mouchtaris, 2020; Contreras-González, Tovar-Vidal y De Ita Luna, 2021), complejidad textual (Benoit, Munger y Spirling, 2019; Tolochko, Song y Boomgaarden, 2019), etc. Además, en el desarrollo de las distintas metodologías adoptadas en cada investigación, la complejidad se mide en unidades distintas: se encuentran trabajos que analizan la complejidad a nivel de frases u oraciones (Véliz de Vos, Riffo, Salas-Herrera y Roa-Ureta, 2018; van der Hoek-Snieders, Stegeman, Smit y Rhebergen, 2020; di San Pietro, Barbieri, Marelli, de Girolamo y Luzzatti, 2022) y otros, que toman los textos como objetos de estudio (Berendes, Vajjala, Meurers, Bryant, Wagner, Chinkina y Trautwein, 2018; Chen & Meurers, 2019; Chon, Shin y Kim, 2021).

3. Metodología

La metodología de esta investigación es cualitativa descriptiva-interpretativa de tipo documental. Para el desarrollo de este estado del arte, se hizo una búsqueda bibliográfica, en las siguientes bases de datos: Science Direct, Scopus, Scielo, Redalyc, Educational Source, Academic Search Complete, de artículos escritos entre 2017 y 2022. Para la búsqueda, se utilizaron los términos "complejidad lingüística", "complejidad textual", "complejidad semántica" y "complejidad argumentativa" en tres lenguas: español, inglés y portugués.

En esta búsqueda inicial, fueron encontrados más de 300 artículos. En un segundo momento, decidimos considerar solamente los textos que trataban sobre la complejidad en textos argumentativos. En total sólo se encontraron dieciséis (16) textos. Estos textos fueron analizados cuantitativa y cualitativamente. En el análisis cuantitativo, se buscaba entender

el escenario que se nos presenta cuando hablamos de complejidad argumentativa y tener un panorama general. Así, los textos fueron organizados teniendo en cuenta el año de publicación, revista de la publicación, lengua de publicación, lengua estudiada y destinatarios. En el análisis cualitativo, se identificó a través de la metodología de "análisis de contenido" (Krippendorff, 2004; Bardin, 2016), los siguientes aspectos: los temas enfocados y los tipos de complejidad considerados (sintáctica, semántica, morfológica, etc.), los criterios usados para medir la complejidad, las metodologías utilizadas y los resultados.

4. Resultados - Presentación de los datos cuantitativos

Considerando el año de publicación, se encontraron los siguientes resultados, que demuestran un cierto equilibrio entre la producción de los últimos años:

Tabla 1. Producción por año

AÑO	CANTIDAD DE TEXTOS
2018	3
2019	3
2020	1
2021	4
2022	5

Tomando las revistas de publicación como medida numérica, se hallan los siguientes datos, que explicitan una cierta diversidad de revistas en que se publicaron los trabajos seleccionados:

Tabla 2. Producción por Revistas

REVISTAS (POR ORDEN ALFABÉTICO)	CANTIDAD DE TEXTOS
Asian ESP Journal	1
Assessing Writing	2
Cogency	1
Investigações em Ensino de Ciências	1
Journal of English for Academic Purposes	3
Language Learning in Higher Education	1
Liberabit. Revista de Psicología	1
Lingüística y Literatura	1
Moderna Sprak	1
Revista Iberoamericana de Diagnóstico y Evaluación	1
Second Language Research	1
System	2

Ya respecto a la lengua de publicación, entre las tres lenguas seleccionadas para la construcción de la investigación, se observa un gran predominio de las publicaciones en inglés — lo que se trata de un fenómeno general en el campo científico —, aunque las lenguas estudiadas sean más diversas, cómo se puede ver en las TABLAS 3 y 4:

Tabla 3. Producción por lengua de publicación

LENGUA DE PUBLICACIÓN	CANTIDAD DE TEXTOS
Inglés	11
Español	4
Portugués	1

Tabla 4. Producción por lengua estudiada

LENGUA ESTUDIADA	CANTIDAD DE TEXTOS
Inglés-LE	8
Español	4
Inglés	2
Portugués	1
Portugués-LE	1
Italiano	1

La mayoría de las investigaciones encontradas tuvieron como objetivo determinar el grado de complejidad de textos producidos por distintas poblaciones, por lo es interesante cuantificar estos distintos destinatarios de cada trabajo:

Tabla 5. Producción por destinatarios

DESTINATARIOS	CANTIDAD DE TEXTOS
Estudiantes universitarios	11
Especialistas académicos	2
Adultos mayores	1
Preadolescentes	1
Adultos en general	1

Se ve que la gran mayoría de los trabajos se dedican a la comprensión del desarrollo de la escritura en nivel académico, aunque se presentan algunos pocos trabajos con otras poblaciones, siendo apenas uno de ellos con jóvenes.

5. Resultados - Presentación del análisis cualitativo

Temas y enfoques

Los textos encontrados tratan de temas y contextos variados, aunque como ya se pudo notar anteriormente, la mayoría de los trabajos se desarrollan en el contexto académico. Entre estos, predominan los que se dedican a analizar la escritura académica en lengua extranjera (Brezina & Palotti, 2019; Lan, Lucas y Sun, 2019; Li, Nikitina y Riget, 2022; Shao, Zhang, Zhang, Zhong y Xu, 2022; Wind & Zólyomi, 2022), pero también se encuentran trabajos sobre la escritura académica en lengua materna (Tuzinkievicz, Peralta, Castellaro y Santibáñez, 2018; Atak & Saricaoglu, 2021), el análisis de géneros académicos (Fauzan, Lubis y Kurniawan, 2020; Ziaeian & Golparvar, 2022), los usos argumentativos de la oralidad (Pérez & Allende, 2021; Santos, 2021; Su, Liu, Lai y Jin, 2021), el uso de la argumentación en interacciones on-line (Souza & Queiroz, 2018; Su *et al.*, 2021), empleos específicos de determinados grupos etarios — adultos mayores (Santibáñez, 2019) y preadolescentes (Pérez & Allende, 2021), y la complejidad como uno de los instrumentos de medida del razonamiento deductivo (Merino, Hernández y Alemany, 2018).

Cabe decir que los enfoques sobre los diferentes tipos de complejidad dentro de estos trabajos también se construyen de manera diversa. Mientras predominan los estudios que toman la complejidad sintáctica como el principal factor de análisis de los textos argumentativos (Lan *et al.*, 2019; Fauzan *et al.*, 2020; Atak & Saricaoglu, 2021; Santos, 2021; Shao *et al.*, 2022; Li *et al.*, 2022; Wind & Zólyomi, 2022; Zhang & Lu, 2022; Ziaeian & Golparvar, 2022), se presentan también trabajos que tienen en cuenta la complejidad léxica (Fauzan *et al.*, 2020; Santos, 2021; Wind & Zólyomi, 2022), la complejidad morfológica (Brezina & Palotti, 2019) o que se enfocan lo que se podría denominar complejidad argumentativa (Souza & Queiroz, 2018; Tuzinkievicz *et al.*, 2018; Santibáñez, 2019; Pérez & Allende, 2021; Su *et al.*, 2021) y complejidad lógica (Merino *et al.*, 2018).

En la siguiente sección, se presentan los criterios utilizados para determinar la complejidad por cada una de las investigaciones.

Medidas de complejidad adoptadas

Para presentar cómo la complejidad en textos argumentativos ha sido observada en los diversos trabajos encontrados sobre el tema, a continuación, se presenta en forma esquemática cada uno de los trabajos encontrados. Estos se clasificaron teniendo en cuenta el nivel de lengua usado en los estudios y los criterios o medidas usadas para evaluar la complejidad lingüística en los textos seleccionados para sus análisis. Se empieza por los trabajos de orden morfológico y se termina con los estudios de nivel textual.

Tabla 6. Criterios de medida de complejidad

AUTORES	NIVEL LINGÜÍSTICO ENFOCADO	UNIDAD BÁSICA DE ANÁLISIS	EJEMPLOS DE CRITERIOS
Brezina y Palotti (2019)	morfológico	palabra	diversidad de formas verbales
Lan *et al.* (2019)	sintáctico	sintagma nominal	modificadores de nombre (uso de premodificadores y uso de postmodificadores)
Fauzan *et al.* (2020)	sintáctico	frase	estructura gramatical de sujetos y verbos, complejidad de sintagmas nominales, voz y modo verbal, densidad léxica
Atak y Saricaoglu (2021)	sintáctico	frase nominal y oración	tipos de cláusulas, tipos de oraciones, tipos de sintagmas, incrustación de sintagmas, uso de modificadores.
Santos (2021)	sintáctico	oración	tamaño de las oraciones, índices de subordinación y de coordinación y número de oraciones
	semántico	Palabra	diversidad lexical
Shao *et al.* (2022)	sintáctico	Frase y oración	formas gramaticales (cláusulas no finitas y sintagmas), funciones sintácticas (modificadores de nombre, sujetos/ complementos)
Li *et al.* (2022)	sintáctico	cláusula (oración coordinada o subordinada) y número de cláusulas por unidad T (cláusula principal más las cláusulas dependientes).	longitud media de la cláusula y de la unidad-T, cantidad de diferentes tipos de cláusulas en la subordinación, cantidad de cláusulas coordinadas, complejos nominales por cláusula y por unidad-T, sintagmas verbales por unidad-T
Wind y Zólyomi (2022)	sintáctico	frase	calculada por un programa llamado L2 Syntactic Complexity Analyzer (L2SCA)
	semántico	proposición	índice total de conectivos y desarrollo del vocabulario académico
Zhang y Lu (2022)	sintáctico	sentencia (proposición) y cláusula	criterios tradicionales: tamaño de las unidades (unidad-T, cláusula), cantidad de cláusulas (subordinación) y de sintagmas (coordinación) por sentencia y por unidad-T, tipos de sintagmas.

AUTORES	NIVEL LINGÜÍSTICO ENFOCADO	UNIDAD BÁSICA DE ANÁLISIS	EJEMPLOS DE CRITERIOS
Ziaeian y Golparvar (2022)	sintáctico	Oración y cláusula	Tipos de cláusulas (modificadores adverbiales, cláusulas adverbiales, complementos clausales, etc), tipos de sintagmas (complementos nominales, determinantes, modificadores adjetivales, etc), cantidad de cláusulas adverbiales, de complementos clausales etc. por cláusula
Souza y Queiroz (2018)	textual	elementos de la argumentación	uso de las partes de un argumento: proposición, fundamento, garantía, soporte, cualificador y refutación
Merino *et al.* (2018)	textual	palabra	niveles de complejidad lógica (número de ocurrencias de operadores lógicos) y lingüística (número de palabras)
Tuzinkievicz *et al.* (2018)	textual	argumento	número de argumentos, estructura argumentativa (argumentación simple o argumentación compleja, coordinada, subordinada y combinada), validez del argumento: opinión principal (y como se presenta) posible sesgo de información.
Santibáñez (2019)	pragmático	elementos de la argumentación	argumentatividad (disposición para participar de la argumentación), agresividad verbal (uso de estrategias de ataque), marcos argumentativos (meta-objetivos), estrategia individual/colectiva (valores culturales), fuerza argumentativa (funciones de los argumentos y de la argumentación en situaciones jerárquicas), auto construcciones (reconocimiento de limitaciones y/o motivaciones sociales y cognitivas), cortesía (tendencia de cuidado a terceros)
Pérez y Allende (2021)	pragmático-textual	elementos de la argumentación	Número, tipos de argumentos y niveles de incrustación argumental determinan distintos niveles argumentativos.

AUTORES	NIVEL LINGÜÍSTICO ENFOCADO	UNIDAD BÁSICA DE ANÁLISIS	EJEMPLOS DE CRITERIOS
Su *et al.* (2021)	pragmático-textual	elementos de la argumentación	procesos de construcción de la argumentación (aspecto estructural de la argumentación, aspecto social de la argumentación, focos de los argumentos)

Como se observa, prima el análisis hecho desde el nivel sintáctico tanto a nivel del sintagma nominal como a nivel oracional, usando criterios que son aplicables a cualquier tipo de texto. No obstante, en los últimos años se ha introducido el nivel semántico y pragmático-textual, con un énfasis en el tipo de texto objeto de análisis: los textos argumentativos.

En el siguiente apartado, se presenta más detalladamente algunas de esas investigaciones.

Problemas, metodologías y resultados encontrados
Metodológicamente, se puede notar una diferencia entre los caminos elegidos por los investigadores que enfocan sus análisis en la complejidad sintáctica o morfológica y los que se centran en la complejidad argumentativa. Mientras los del primer grupo optan por la construcción de investigaciones prioritariamente cuantitativas, incluso, en muchos casos, utilizando programas estadísticos para la construcción de sus análisis, los del segundo grupo optan por la construcción de investigaciones prioritariamente cualitativas, aunque se encuentren también trabajos en este grupo que adopten caminos más cuantitativos. Veamos inicialmente unas investigaciones de corte cuantitativo y posteriormente unas de corte cualitativo.

Para entender la relación que se establece entre la complejidad de sintagmas nominales y la proficiencia en la escritura en L2, Lan *et al.* (2019) se basaron en un índice de complejidad de modificadores de nombres, que les sirvió de instrumento para el análisis de 100 papers argumentativos escritos en inglés por estudiantes chinos del primer año con diferentes niveles de proficiencia. Como resultado de su investigación, identificaron que existe una asociación entre estos factores. Sin embargo, identificaron también que la fuerza de esta asociación es débil, ya que los estudiantes con mejor desempeño en el idioma, o sea, con más altos niveles de proficiencia, no necesariamente producen textos más complejos.

Un resultado similar fue reportado por Santos (2021), quien buscó entender el impacto del incremento de las demandas cognitivas en tareas argumentativas orales, además de la relación entre proficiencia y complejidad lingüística en las producciones de estudiantes chinos de portugués como lengua extranjera. Si bien Santos (2021) indica que, en la oralidad, la complejidad cognitiva afecta la complejidad lingüística en relación con la diversidad lexical, no encontró correlación entre la proficiencia (medida por la corrección lingüística) y la complejidad.

Centrados en la complejidad frasal, Shao *et al.* (2022) analizaron los diferentes tipos de elaboración de sintagmas presentados en textos escritos en inglés por estudiantes universitarios chinos en las carreras de Ciencia, Tecnología e Ingeniería, Matemáticas e Inglés, en comparación con textos escritos por expertos presentados en libros didácticos de Inglés como Lengua Extranjera. En ese estudio, tampoco se encontraron diferencias significativas entre los datos presentados en las producciones de los dos grupos, lo que refuerza la idea de que la complejidad sintáctica en textos argumentativos no refleja la proficiencia en una lengua.

También en el contexto de la enseñanza de inglés como lengua extranjera para estudiantes universitarios chinos, Li *et al.* (2022) construyeron una investigación en la que se solicitó la producción de tres textos argumentativos, en tres momentos de un semestre (semanas uno, ocho y dieciséis), a un grupo de estudiantes de química y biología de nivel intermedio en el primer año de formación. Observaron que se presentó una trayectoria no lineal de desarrollo de la complejidad sintáctica en la escritura de los estudiantes, aunque hubo un predominio de estructuras nominales en todas las etapas de la investigación. Contrario a los trabajos presentados anteriormente, sí encontraron una relación entre el desarrollo de la complejidad en los textos y el nivel de proficiencia de sus autores, ya que los textos escritos por los estudiantes que estaban en el nivel de dominio intermedio-alto tenían un mayor nivel de complejidad sintáctica que los textos escritos por los principiantes. Sin embargo, en términos de medidas holísticas, los participantes con nivel más bajo habían hecho mejor progreso, que los que estaban en niveles más avanzados.

Enfocándose en el tema de la autoevaluación en la escritura en segunda lengua, Wind y Zólyomi (2022) les propusieron a estudiantes de inglés húngaros que compusieran y autoevaluaran textos argumentativos al inicio y al final de un semestre de una asignatura de escritura avanzada. Los investigadores no encontraron resultados significativos en el incremento de la complejidad lingüística en la producción de los estudiantes. Cabe destacar que incluso el índice de complejidad sintáctica, comparativamente, disminuyó entre la producción inicial y la producción hecha al final del semestre. Se pudo observar que los estudiantes tendían a acortar las cláusulas en sus ensayos, lo que nos puede revelar, de algún modo, que ellos, para lograr una mejor producción escrita, disminuyeron la complejidad sintáctica de sus textos.

Desde una perspectiva cualitativa, Souza y Queiroz (2018) aplicaron una actividad con estudiantes universitarios de química en un foro online: ellos, en parejas o tríos, debían presentar visiones opuestas acerca de un caso. Las investigadoras observaron que los estudiantes utilizaron más categorías de proposición y fundamento, que serían componentes de una premisa básica de un argumento. Luego de esas categorías, las más usadas fueron las de garantía y refutación, partes importantes para la validación de las premisas y para la presentación de condiciones de excepción. Las categorías que podrían representar más complejidad fueron menos utilizadas por los estudiantes, como, por ejemplo, la contraposición y el soporte. Además de diferencias en estas categorías generales, los autores encontraron diferencias entre las subcategorías que compondrían los diferentes movimientos de la construcción de la argumentación. Por ejemplo, en la categoría "proposición" se nota que los estudiantes utilizaron muchas más proposiciones sin cualificador y proposiciones que aceptan o aprueban un argumento, que proposiciones que remiten a un cambio de argumentación y proposiciones con cualificadores.

Desde una perspectiva más pragmática de la argumentación, Santibáñez (2019) presenta una investigación desarrollada a lo largo de tres años en Chile con adultos mayores, sobre 65 años, de tres regiones distintas del país, a través de un estudio descriptivo-explicativo de metodología mixta cuantitativo-cualitativo. A partir de una muestra de carácter no probabilística, con personas no pertenecientes a la población de extrema vulnerabilidad y sin indicios de demencia senil o deterioro cognitivo, el investigador aplicó un cuestionario con preguntas cerradas y un dilema social que los participantes debían responder por escrito. El investigador observa que, entre los adultos mayores, los que optan por empatizar con el protagonista de un dilema social propuesto (siendo éstos en su mayoría mujeres, mayores de 70 años, con un nivel educativo más alto, y de la capital) son los que muestran mayor densidad argumentativa, medida en función de la cantidad y de la pertinencia de las razones presentadas para soportar sus puntos de vista.

Desde el mismo paradigma metodológico, Pérez y Allende (2021) enfocaron su estudio en la oralidad de preadolescentes. Se pudo notar que los participantes produjeron discursos con distintos niveles de complejidad argumentativa. Estos niveles de complejidad se midieron por la presencia de la subordinación entre argumentos, o sea, por la incrustación argumental. Los investigadores concluyen que la población estudiada puede construir y organizar un discurso argumentativo complejo, medido por la explicitud y por la riqueza de los niveles de argumentación presentados dentro de una determinada estructura argumental. Tal posibilidad demuestra dominio de la argumentación y capacidad de construir niveles estructurales de argumentos interrelacionados, aunque predomina la yuxtaposición de argumentos e incluso la presentación de argumentos únicos, o sea, no interrelacionados, para apoyar su punto de vista.

Varias investigaciones relacionaron la complejidad con otros factores tanto intratextuales como extratextuales: tema, género discursivo, la disciplina, la lengua empleada, el ambiente de aprendizaje, el tiempo de estudio y la tarea. A continuación, se describen estos trabajos.

Tuzinkievicz *et al.* (2018) desarrollaron un estudio que buscó comparar el desarrollo de la complejidad en tareas sociocientíficas realizadas por estudiantes de Psicología en diferentes momentos del cursado (ingresantes o avanzados) y en función de la presencia de un gráfico sobre el cual se argumentó. Los textos se analizaron teniendo en cuenta si se trataba de un texto argumentativo o no; en los textos que sí eran argumentativos, se analizó cuántos argumentos se presentaban, si se diferenciaba la opinión principal y de otras opiniones, cuál era la estructura argumentativa, y cuál era el sesgo confirmatorio, además del uso de la información dada.

Los resultados de su investigación indicaron una relación entre el tiempo de formación académica y la complejidad presentada en los textos producidos: los estudiantes ingresantes produjeron más textos que pueden ser clasificados como no argumentativos y los estudiantes avanzados más textos argumentativos. Además, los investigadores también observaron que mientras entre los estudiantes avanzados se presenta una relación entre cantidad de argumentos y cantidad de información, entre los ingresantes no ocurre lo mismo, ya que se presenta baja cantidad de argumentos en sus producciones, independientemente de la información disponible. Igualmente se evidencia que no necesariamente un texto más largo, con mayor número de elementos, será un texto más complejo argumentativamente.

Con un enfoque específico en el análisis de la complejidad morfológica en textos argumentativos escritos en lengua extranjera, Brezina y Palotti (2019) presentan dos estudios de caso: uno que compara estudiantes universitarios holandeses que aprenden italiano con estudiantes universitarios italianos, y otro que compara textos producidos por universitarios italianos estudiantes de inglés con textos producidos por británicos y estadounidenses. Es interesante observar que los resultados de cada investigación son distintos entre sí. Respecto al italiano, se nota que la complejidad morfológica varía efectivamente entre nativos y no nativos, y que es significativamente menor en estudiantes con niveles de proficiencia más bajos. Además, observaron que la complejidad morfológica está correlacionada con otras medidas, como la diversidad léxica y el tamaño de la oración. Respecto al inglés, encontraron que la complejidad morfológica se mantiene constante entre hablantes nativos y no nativos, y que no establece correlación con otras medidas de complejidad del texto. Estos resultados revelan que la lengua en sí misma afecta las medidas de complejidad: diferentes lenguas exigen manejos distintos de las diferentes complejidades que componen la producción de un texto.

Atak y Saricaoglu (2021) enfocados en la complejidad sintáctica, diseñaron una investigación en contexto educativo, recogiendo datos de tres producciones escritas de estudiantes turcos de inglés en nivel intermedio. Encuentran diferencias significativas en la complejidad de los textos producidos en función del tópico discutido en cada propuesta solicitada en su investigación. Para los autores, los textos impersonales demandan un mayor esfuerzo cognitivo que se refleja en la complejidad sintáctica de los textos producidos.

Fauzan *et al*. (2020) utilizaron una metodología basada en corpus, para entender los movimientos retóricos (que incluirían la complejidad lingüística) presentados en resúmenes de artículos del campo de la lingüística aplicada. Los autores analizaron cómo se organizan los resúmenes retóricamente y cómo se manifiesta la complejidad lingüística en esos resúmenes. Hallaron una fuerte influencia del género en la construcción gramatical de los textos, ya que el género "resumen de artículo" tiene convenciones típicas a las que el escrito y el escritor deben adherir. Aunque hayan encontrado una considerable variedad en la complejidad gramatical, los autores apuntan que las funciones comunicativas de los movimientos y de las etapas (*moves and steps*) estudiados también influyeron en dicha complejidad.

De igual manera, el género resultó ser una variable explicativa en el trabajo de Zhang y Lu (2022), cuando analizaron sintácticamente la producción de cartas de aplicación y textos argumentativos de estudiantes chinos de nivel universitario aprendientes del inglés como lengua.

Ziaeian y Golparvar (2022), al analizar la complejidad sintáctica en artículos académicos publicados en periódicos del campo de la lingüística aplicada, de química y de economía, comparando la producción de autores que tienen la lengua inglesa como su primera lengua con los que la tienen como segunda lengua, encontraron diferencias significativas en los tipos de complejidad entre disciplinas: los textos de las áreas de la lingüística aplicada y de la economía, en las medidas de cláusulas, por ejemplo, son más complejos que los textos del área de química; mientras que, respecto a las medidas de los sintagmas, ocurre que Química presenta textos más complejos. Al comparar producciones hechas por hablantes de inglés como lengua primera y como segunda lengua, no encontraron diferencias claras en la complejidad de los textos.

Enfocadas en el desarrollo de la argumentación colaborativa en el contexto del aprendizaje de inglés como L2, Su *et al*. (2021) examinaron cómo un grupo de estudiantes universitarios de inglés participó en un proceso de argumentación colaborativa durante un semestre a partir de la discusión *face to face* (cara a cara), de la escritura colaborativa en línea y de entrevistas. Midiendo la complejidad argumentativa desde un aspecto estructural de la argumentación, un aspecto social de la argumentación, y de los focos de los argumentos, concluyen que influyen en la complejidad de los discursos presentados no sólo la estructura argumentativa, sino también factores externos, tales como el ambiente de aprendizaje, la tarea, el tiempo, y la propia lengua. Además, observaron que los estudiantes podían proponer un argumento más complejo cuando participaban activamente en el discurso argumentativo, desafiando, elaborando o revisando lo que decían, que cuando simplemente proponían nuevas ideas sin evaluarlas cuidadosamente.

A su vez, Merino *et al*. (2018), enfocados no en la producción, sino en la comprensión de textos argumentativos, consideraron diferentes niveles de complejidad lógica, basada en el número de ocurrencias de operadores lógicos, y de complejidad lingüística, basada en el número de palabras. Concluyen que se desarrollan mejor las tareas menos complejas lingüísticamente, mientras la complejidad lógica no afecta significativamente, de manera aislada, los resultados. Aunque utilicen una única medida sencilla para definir la complejidad lingüística, los autores evidencian algún tipo de relación entre dicha complejidad y la comprensión de los caminos argumentativos.

6. Discusión

El tema de la complejidad argumentativa ha estado motivado por preguntas sobre la relación entre complejidad y proficiencia, complejidad y desarrollo lingüístico, mediado por el tiempo y la escolaridad. Frente a estas relaciones, en la mayoría de las investigaciones, no se

halla un efecto positivo en la primera relación, pero sí en la segunda. Posiblemente el nivel lingüístico analizado y los criterios empleados pueden explicar estos resultados.

Asimismo hay trabajos que centran la atención en medir el nivel de complejidad de las producciones argumentativas escritas u orales de diversas poblaciones. Se evidencia que es posible establecer niveles de complejidad relacionando este concepto con niveles de argumentación, determinados por aspectos cuantitativos y cualitativos de la estructura argumental.

De lo anterior se puede concluir que la mayoría de las investigaciones encontradas pertenecen a lo que se conoce en la bibliografía como complejidad relativa (Miestamo, 2017): estudios aplicados, cuyos resultados dependen de los desempeños orales o escritos de los participantes. No se encontró ninguna investigación de corte puramente lingüístico-estructural.

De otra parte, los resultados coinciden con lo reportado por Ochoa y Cueva (2020), en el sentido de que los criterios que se emplean con mayor frecuencia para medir la complejidad son los sintácticos, y en estos casos, la variable "cantidad" resulta determinante para medir la complejidad (por ejemplo, entre más modificadores nominales y verbales, más complejidad). En cambio, en estudios más pragmático-discursivos la variable que prima es la "variedad" (ejemplo: diversidad de argumentos, diversidad de modificadores).

El hallazgo encontrado en algunas investigaciones donde se relaciona la complejidad con factores intratextuales o extratextuales resulta importante para considerarlo en futuras investigaciones. Por ejemplo, los resultados reportados por Wind y Zólyomi (2022), quienes encuentran que por el interés de hacer más claro un texto, el autor puede simplificar sus estructuras, o el trabajo de Santibáñez (2019), que resalta como un factor determinante de la complejidad, la empatía.

De manera general, se puede notar que la gran mayoría de los trabajos se dedican a la comprensión del desarrollo de la escritura en nivel académico, lo que nos puede indicar que es un contexto privilegiado de enseñanza-aprendizaje de la argumentación y que el discurso argumentativo es una herramienta para el desarrollo del pensamiento crítico. Además, se evidencia que la población estudiada en casi todas las investigaciones, a excepción de una, es la población adulta, lo que también nos podría indicar que se considera la argumentación una práctica lingüística compleja. Hay también un énfasis en los estudios relacionados con el desarrollo y evaluación de la competencia argumentativa en lenguas extranjeras o L2. Estas son las dos fortalezas de las investigaciones encontradas, pero a la vez muestran dos debilidades del estado de la cuestión sobre este tema: se encuentra muy poca investigación sobre complejidad argumentativa en niños, jóvenes y poblaciones no escolares e investigaciones sobre argumentación en lengua materna, posiblemente porque se trabaja menos, lo que representa un vacío que hay que subsanar.

De esta manera, un camino se abre para la enseñanza del discurso argumentativo y de sus complejidades en diferentes contextos. La comprensión de las características generales de los textos argumentativos y de los distintos niveles de complejidad permitirá pensar en didácticas específicas y en escalonar adecuadamente el acercamiento a este género textual.

7. Conclusiones

Para terminar, como apuntamos al inicio del texto y como se pudo comprobar en las secciones siguientes, la complejidad no ha sido observada de manera uniforme en los diversos trabajos sobre el tema, lo que dificulta el establecimiento de relaciones entre ellos y la realización de estudios aplicados. Tampoco hay conclusiones contundentes sobre los criterios usados para medir la complejidad en general y en particular, en los textos argumentativos. Es preciso poner a prueba los criterios, validarlos y posiblemente, integrarlos; usar criterios no sólo sintácticos y léxicos sino semánticos y pragmáticos, tales como la progresión textual, las cadenas argumentativas, la temática de los textos, la relación entre informaciones viejas y nuevas etc., y tener en cuenta variables como el género textual y el tópico.

Por último, es importante llevar a cabo investigaciones que permitan correlacionar las percepciones que tienen los hablantes nativos o no nativos en relación con la complejidad de un determinado texto y los desempeños, por ejemplo, de la comprensión lectora. A nivel de la escritura, comparar la valoración que una población atribuye a la complejidad de una tarea con la complejidad del texto producido a propósito de dicha tarea. Esto permite ver si hay – o no – una distancia entre el "conocimiento dicho" y la actuación lingüística. Los hallazgos serán un insumo para los lingüistas (usar los datos para comprender la complejidad absoluta y relativa) y para los educadores (desarrollar progresivamente la competencia argumentativa).

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