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THE ARTS IN HEGEL'S AESTHETICS: SYSTEM, MODERNITY AND THE CASE OF CINEMA

GUSTAVO DE AZEVEDO TORRECILHA

gustavo.torrecilha@usp.br

Universidad de São Paulo

Abstract: *This article has the goal of offering a contribution with regard to an updated reading of Hegel's system of arts, considering the invention of cinema in the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. For this goal, it is necessary to understand how Hegel structures his system of arts in an articulation that is not based merely on the formal properties that are intrinsic to the arts of architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry, but that is mainly derived from the specific content of each art. This prevalence of content is justified by the broader context of Hegel's systematic philosophy, in which the logical determinations of the Idea find resonance in the spiritual productions of humankind, not as mere applications of Hegel's logic, but as developments of the Idea itself in its dialectical movements. As a result, the system of arts, as the individual part of Hegel's Aesthetics, follows the systematic development of the artforms, which are, in their turn, particularizations of the universal content of art. In this relation between the arts and the artforms, cinema can be comprehended as part of the romantic artform, which is due not only to the period of history in which it was invented, but also to the content itself that cinema conveys. And as the most recent and final art of the system, cinema not only conveys a content that suits the spiritual demands in the context of the dissolution of the romantic artform, but it also works as a kind of completion to the whole system, insofar as it has the possibility of amalgamating all other arts in itself and of becoming one of the most powerful cultural phenomena of modernity.*

Keywords: *Hegel; system of arts; cinema; modernity.*

Resúmen: *Este artículo tiene como objetivo ofrecer una contribución en lo que respecta a una lectura actualizada del sistema de las artes de Hegel, considerando la invención del cine en el cambio del siglo XIX al XX. Para ello, es necesario comprender cómo Hegel estructura su sistema de las artes en una articulación que no se basa meramente en las propiedades formales intrínsecas a las artes de la arquitectura, la escultura, la pintura, la música y la poesía, sino que se deriva principalmente del contenido específico de cada arte. Esta prevalencia del contenido se justifica*

por el cuadro más amplio de la filosofía sistemática de Hegel, en que las determinaciones lógicas de la Idea encuentran resonancia en las producciones espirituales de la humanidad, no como meras aplicaciones de la lógica de Hegel, sino como desarrollos de la Idea misma en sus movimientos dialécticos. En consecuencia, el sistema de las artes, como parte individual de la Estética de Hegel, sigue el desarrollo sistemático de las formas de arte, que son, a su vez, particularizaciones del contenido universal del arte. En esta relación entre las artes y las formas de arte, el cine puede comprenderse como parte de la forma de arte romántica, lo que se debe no sólo al periodo de la historia en que se inventó, sino también al propio contenido que transmite el cine. Y como arte más reciente y final del sistema, el cine no sólo transmite un contenido que se ajusta a las exigencias espirituales en el contexto de la disolución de la forma de arte romántica, sino que también funciona como una especie de culminación de todo el sistema, en la medida en que tiene la posibilidad de amalgamar todas las demás artes en sí mismo y de convertirse en uno de los fenómenos culturales más poderosos de la modernidad.

Palabras clave: *Hegel; sistema de las artes; cine; modernidad.*

Introduction[1]

The third part of Hegel's *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* is dedicated to investigating the individual arts and their relations to one another. They are conceived as a system, in which architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry are the realizations, on an individual level, of the universal concept of art. Those were the arts that Hegel saw as historically and conceptually significant for the expression of the human spirit [*Geist*] throughout the centuries, from ancient times to his own modern context. But with the development of technology, new arts were invented and it can be argued that no other art has resonated more with the public since the beginning of 20th century than the art of cinema[2]. The goal of this text is precisely to understand how the so called seventh art[3] relates to the other arts in the system and if it can be conceived within the structural organism Hegel dedicated to the diverse ways of expression of the universal concept of art.

This article is structured in two major parts: the first one is dedicated to understanding how Hegel comprehends the different arts and how he articulates them in a system based not only on their form, but primarily on their content. As it will be argued, this strategy is unusual if compared to other philosophers of the period of German idealism such as Kant, August Schlegel and Schelling, whose divisions of art are based mostly on form, on how the different arts present a content, which, by its turn, is conceived in a more unitary way. Hegel, on the other hand, comprehends the content of art historically; that results in its expression through different artforms (symbolic, classical and romantic) in a system in which those different particularizations of the content of art are more compatible with each individual art.

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2 Even though the art of cinema was not the only one invented after Hegel held his courses on aesthetics at the University of Berlin during the years between 1820 and 1829, it has arguably become the most significant during the 20th century. No other art has been capable of resonating both within the mass culture and the world of high arts. Another important art that saw its technical development during this period is the art of photography, but it can be argued that it does not invent a major new language as cinema does. Photography can be brought closer to the art of painting, for it presents a still image within a two-dimensional surface; also, photography, as an art, does not have the same repercussions cinema has among the public.

3 With the other six being, as overall conceded, the arts of architecture, sculpture, painting, music, literature and dance. The first five are the ones that are encompassed by Hegel's system. Even though he speaks of *Poesie*, as the terms have evolved in the more than a century and a half since he held his lectures on aesthetics, it has become synonymous with literature, since the term "poetry" has been employed in the last decades more in relation to a specific genre within the literary art. In regard to dance, Hegel acknowledges it at the same time he considers it unfit for his system, belonging to a group of imperfect or incomplete [*unvollkomene*] arts, as it is also the case with gardening [*Gartenbaukunst*] (Hegel, 1990, 262). Regarding the use of texts in other languages, all translations into English were made by me. For Hegel's texts, the English translations were the main source when they were available, with occasional changes; in those cases, the original German text was the one cited.

The second part of this article is dedicated to the art of cinema and if and how it can be understood through Hegelian lenses. For that, it will be necessary to comprehend whether it can be integrated into the system and the position it would have within said system. The art of cinema can be placed within the realm of the romantic artform, not only because cinema as a technology was invented in modernity, but also because the appropriation of this technology by the human spirit has the goal of exploring human nature to its deepest level.

The goal of this discussion is to offer a contribution with respect to an attempt at an update of Hegel's system of arts for the present day. It is by no means an unprecedented attempt; Richard Dien Winfield's book *Rethinking the Arts after Hegel: From Architecture to Motion Pictures* has a similar goal in a much more extensive way. However, as this text will discuss, Winfield disagrees with Hegel's reasoning for the division of arts and presents his own, returning to the formal types of expression of each individual art as their major differentiating quality. Nonetheless, his work will be an important source of discussion throughout this whole text, even if my goal is to remain closer to Hegel's own strategy of division. The development of this text also incorporates Alain Badiou's twist of Hegel's systematic in his attempt to characterize cinema as an art that arises after comedy, which is the last stage of poetry that Hegel discusses in his *Aesthetics*. Nonetheless, both authors agree with regard to a characterization of cinema as an art that aggregates all other arts of Hegel's system. Finally, considering the role of the technical reproduction in the essence of cinema, a discussion with Walter Benjamin's classic essay on the topic is necessary, in order to show how his reading of the status of art in modern times compares with Hegel's own reading of the dissolution of art.

Hegel's system of arts[4]

Hegel's *Aesthetics* is divided into three parts: the first one concerns an investigation of the Idea of artistic beauty, "the Ideal, in the still-undeveloped unity of its fundamental characteristics, independently of its particular content and its different modes of manifestation"; the second one corresponds to the development of this "inherently solid unity of artistic beauty […] unfolded within itself into an ensemble of forms of art", and the third one presents the system of individual arts as the "reality in the element of externality itself", as the "sphere in which the work of art is actualized in the element of the sensuous" (Hegel, 1975, 613-614). The first part corresponds to the universal comprehension of the concept of the beautiful as such, the second to the particularization of this concept in its symbolic, classical and romantic forms and the third to the individualization of the artistic beauty in its effective realization of the particular content of each artform directed to the senses, through architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry. Even though it can be argued

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4   The argumentation of this section mainly follows my previous research dedicated to Hegel's systematization of arts, which I had the opportunity of publishing more thoroughly in the form of the following texts: Torrecilha, 2021 and 2022.

that Hegel himself did not choose to use the term "system" in the title of this part[5], his division still works in a systematic way, for Hegel comprehends the arts by articulating them around a common principle in a procedure that is common to his philosophy as a whole. In the philosophies of German idealism, to which the notion of system is one of the most important ones, it corresponds to an integration of the various parts not only as a type of organization, but mainly as an organism based on rationality and that contains a universal principle, which originates particular levels in which each part relates both to one another and to the whole, to this main principle. In Hegel's aesthetics, this principle is the expression of the Idea, the "appearance of the Idea to the sense [*das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee*]" (Hegel, 1975, 111; Hegel, 1989, 151), which takes place through the modes of expression that constitute each art. The individual arts are not indifferent to the content, as if they could indifferently convey any content; they are determined by the content of this Idea and its subsequent particularizations, which means that Hegel sees each art as better suited to a specific artform.

This briefly outlined system that comprehends Hegel's concept of art is too, by its turn, part of a greater system, as delineated in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which sees its first part, the science of logic, as the pure dialectical determinations of the Idea, the second part, the science of nature, as the objective development of the Idea in the world and the third part, that of the science of spirit, as the self-conscious development of the Idea in its return to itself. In this sense, in §§15 and 16 of the *Encyclopedia* Hegel (2010, p. 43) understands the system as a "circle of circles" constructed upon a principle. This principle is the development of the Idea, which is firstly set out in its pure logical determinations and sees the remaining parts, nature and spirit, not as applications of such determinations to other areas of knowledge, but as the immanent development of the Idea itself, which breaks through the pure intellectual determinations to realize itself in nature, only for it to then return to itself by gaining self-conscience and becoming able to comprehend its own rationality within human thought. It is based on this systematic reasoning that Hegel, following the structure delineated in his *Science of Logic*, understands art as the realization of spirit, that means, as the realization of the Idea through artistic beauty, with the artforms as the particular level and the different arts as the individual level.

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5   Hegel's *Lecture on Aesthetics* are not a work that the philosopher wrote and published; it was his student Heinrich Gustav Hotho who compiled the work based on notes from the courses conducted at the University of Berlin in the the summer semester of 1823, the summer semester of 1826 and the winter semester of 1828/1829. Hotho's edition did not incorporate material from Hegel's earlier lectures in Heidelberg or from the Berlin winter semester of 1820/21. Hotho had access to Hegel's own manuscript and also to notes taken by himself and some of his colleagues (the *Mitschriften* and *Nachschriften*). As a matter of fact, the division in three parts appears only in the last series of lectures of 1828/1829 and the *Nachschrift* that we have, which was annotated by Adolf Heimann, presents the third part under the title "On the particular configurations of artworks" [*von den besonderen Gestaltungen der Kunstwerke*] (see Hegel, 2020, 1074). Since we do not have access to Hegel's own manuscript that Hotho used in his compilation, it is not possible to affirm if the word "system" would actually appear in the title of the section, had Hegel published his philosophy of art as a complete work.

And as his *Logic* also prescribes, Hegel divides the arts based not only on their form, but mainly on their content. This reasoning is outlined by §133 of the first volume of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, in which, discussing the appearance as part of the doctrine of essence, Hegel (2010, 200) states that

§133. The manner of being-outside-one-another that is characteristic of the world of appearances is a totality and completely contained in its *relation-to-itself*. The relation of the appearance to itself is thus completely determined, has the *form* in itself and because [it is] in this identity, has that form as its essential substance. Thus the form is *content* and, in keeping with its developed determinacy, it is the *law* of the appearance. The negative side of the appearance, what is alterable and not self-sufficient, falls to the *form* as *not reflected in itself* – it is the indifferent, *external form*.

For the contrast of form and content, it is essential to keep in mind that the content is not formless but instead has the *form within itself* just as much *as* it [the form] is *something external* to it. A doubling of the form presents itself; at one time, insofar as it is reflected in itself, it is the external concrete existence, indifferent to the content. What presents itself here *in itself* is the absolute relation of content and of form, namely, their turning over [*Umschlagen*] and into one another, so that the *content* is nothing but *the form turning* into content and the *form* nothing other *than the content turning* into the form. This "turning over" is one of the most important determinations. It is *posited*, however, only in the *absolute relationship*.

Considering how art presents the Idea through a material existence that is both directed to the senses and appropriate to the Idea itself, it is understandable how, within Hegel's systematic philosophy, the expression of art through a specific form constitutes its law of appearance, since it is intrinsically related to its content. Even in the wider logical picture of Hegel's philosophy, form is both external, in the sense that it is the way content presents itself exteriorly in the effective world, as it is internal to content, in the sense that the form a content assumes is not merely a contingency, but it is contained in the content itself as a necessity for its expression. As a result, both form and content must achieve unity for the proper expression of the Idea and this unity is what allows the logic (and the whole system of categories that stems from it) its systematic structure and unitary logical development, for "if the same content could be developed by alternative routes, then method and content would fall asunder"; and on top of that, "instead of being inherent in logical categories, logical ordering would be external to them", for "form would be indifferent to content and each category would be something given to the thinking that externally links it to other terms" in a logical substantiation that, "instead of being systematic, […] would be afflicted by a dual dogmatism, condemned to take for granted the content it thinks and the thinking by which it orders its content" (Winfield, 2014, 34).

In the addition to the *Encyclopedia* paragraph cited above, Hegel (2010, 201) states that "a work of art lacking the proper form is, precisely for this reason, not proper, that is to say, not truly a work of art", for "genuine works of art are precisely those whose content and form prove to be thoroughly identical"; Hegel himself makes it clear how this logical determination is tied to the effective existence of art. Indeed, in his *Aesthetics*, he states that

> art does not seize upon this form either because it just finds it there or because there is no other; on the contrary, the concrete content itself involves the factor of external, actual, and indeed even sensuous manifestation. But then in return this sensuous concrete thing, which bears the stamp of an essentially spiritual content, is also essentially for our inner [apprehension]; the external shape, whereby the content is made visible and imaginable, has the purpose of existing solely for our mind and spirit. For this reason alone are content and artistic form fashioned in conformity with one another (Hegel, 1975, 71).

Hegel (1975, 95) sees in art both a content and its expression or appearance as the realization of this content, with "both aspects [...] so penetrated by one another that the external, the particular, appears exclusively as a presentation of the inner". In this respect, there are two things to consider. The first one is that, for Hegel, art has two dimensions, the spiritual and the sensuous, with content being linked to the spiritual dimension and form to the sensuous dimension, for it is the effective expression of content. That is why form is associated with the different arts, for art can only exist in the real world through the arts, as it has been discussed above in the outline of the *Aesthetics*, in which the part concerning the individual arts is precisely the sphere of the actualization of the work of art in the element of the sensuous. And considering how this logic determination permeates the whole development of the artistic Idea, it can be conceived how the systematization and division of the different arts derive not from form, but from content as the distinctive quality that gives each one its place. The form, as the realization of the inner spiritual content in the effectiveness of the world, is linked on a higher level with the content and how it can adequately express itself.

And the content of each art stems from the particularizations of the Idea of beauty in the artforms. Hegel (1975, 82) affirms that the "general forms of art must likewise be the fundamental principle for the articulation and determination of the individual arts", for "the kinds of art have the same essential distinctions in themselves which we came to recognize in the general forms of art", which, "universal as they are despite their determinateness, break the bounds of *particular* realization through a *specific* kind of art and achieve their existence equally through the other arts [...]". That means that each individual art is more closely linked to a particular artform, even if they also present the universal Idea of art, which can be conveyed through all other arts; this universal Idea, however, has its ulterior particularizations. The artforms correspond to the "specific shape which every content of

the Idea gives to itself […] because the content must be true and concrete in itself before it can find its truly beautiful shape" (Hegel, 1975, 300). The first content of the Idea, "still in its indeterminacy and obscurity" (Hegel, 1975, 76), presents itself in the symbolic shape, while the classical content "consists in its being itself the concrete Idea" for it is "*implicitly the unity of the divine nature with the human*", as opposed to the romantic shape, which "has won a content which goes beyond and above the classical form of art and its mode of expression" (Hegel, 1975, 78-79). So, even if art is understood as the perfect unity between form and content, this unity can take place with: (i) deficiency of both (as it is the case with symbolic art, where the deficiency of content causes deficiency of form); (ii) perfect adequacy of the stage of truth that can be exposed to the human senses and its expression through a sensuous medium (as it is the case in classical art); and (iii) a particular content that already is beyond what can be exposed to the senses, leaving to the form of art to try to overcome the limitations that are imposed by the sensuous appearance (as it is the case in romantic art).

In the realm of the individual arts, if we take into consideration, first, how "the *true* element for the realization" of the romantic content "is no longer the sensuous immediate existence of the spiritual in the bodily form of man, but instead the *inwardness of self-consciousness*", and second, how this "new content, thus won, is on this account not tied to sensuous presentation, […] but is freed from this immediate existence" in a way that "it retreats from the sensuousness of imagination into spiritual inwardness and makes this, and not the body, the medium and the existence of truth's content" (Hegel, 1975, 80), it can be clear how Hegel associates this type of content with the arts of painting, music and poetry, for they gradually suppress the tridimensionality of art. They first, through painting, cancel "the *real* sensuous appearance [*Erscheinung*], the visibility of which is transformed into the pure *shining* [*Schein*] of art" through "colour, […], the differences, shades and blendings" (Hegel, 1975, 625-626). Painting, as opposed to architecture and sculpture, is already a more interior expression of the human spirit, and even if it is considered a plastic art too, it is not as real and external as the other two. While the works of architecture and sculpture are themselves installed in the real world, painting creates its own world within its frames, which delimit the work in its opposition to the real world, without mixing itself with the outer universe. Music's content is also "constituted by spiritual subjectivity" of the "inner life as such", whose "explicitly shapeless feeling […] cannot manifest itself in the outer world", just as poetry's is the "richest", which makes it "the most unrestricted of the arts" to the point that it even is perceived as "the absolute and true art of the spirit and its expression as spirit, since everything that consciousness conceives and shapes spiritually within its own inner being speech alone can adopt, express, and bring before our imagination" (Hegel, 1975, 626). Both music and poetry emphasize painting's deepening into human nature by suppressing even more the real and external parts of art and expressing the subjectivity that constitutes the spirit after the classical era.

The "principle and content" of sculpture, on the other hand, is the "spiritual individuality as the classical ideal", which expresses itself "in the human form and its objective organism, pervaded by spirit, which has to shape into an adequate appearance the independence of the Divine in its lofty peace and tranquil greatness" (Hegel, 1975, 624-625). Architecture is tied to the symbolic, for it is also seen as the "beginning of art because, in general terms, at its start has not found for the presentation of its spiritual content either the adequate material or the corresponding forms" and must therefore "be content with merely seeking a true harmony between content and mode of presentation and with an external relation between the two", which is achieved by employing a heavy material that is "inherently non-spiritual, […] shapeable only according to the laws of gravity" and whose form "is provided by production of external nature bound together regularly and symmetrically to be a purely external reflection of spirit and to the the totality of a work of art" (Hegel, 1975, 624). Both architecture's and sculpture's works are characterized by their heavy materials, with the difference of how the latter can convey organic (specially human) forms to perfection, which makes it more closely tied to the spiritual expression that is feasible of being realized through art. Architecture, on the other hand, is limited to the symmetry and regularity of its constructions, which even when they aspire to be beautifully and artistically presented, find the practical and utilitarian limitations of what can be molded in these materials, as the symbolic art itself finds limitations in its indeterminacy and obscurity for the beautiful expression of the true spiritual interests of humankind.

The content of each artform is therefore what Hegel (1975, 623) perceives to be the "mode of division which has deeper grounds" and "as the true and systematic articulation of this Third part". As a result, he must dismiss the form as the basis of division, for it is not directly associated with the spiritual side of art, but with the realization of the spiritual side for the senses. Even if Hegel acknowledges that art has an instance of its production directed to the senses, it is essentially directed to the spirit and it cannot be independent from the spiritual instance. That is why he considers the "purely sensuous apprehension" of "merely looking on, hearing, feeling, etc." to be the "poorest mode of apprehension" (Hegel, 1975, 36). The conception of art (and thus of the different individual arts) through the senses is merely abstract and related to only one side of art, the sensuous side; the true division must take the spiritual side in consideration, where the content of art acquires its spectrum of possibilities, with the sensuous side being the effective expression of these possibilities in the material existence. This is what allows the individual arts to be a circle within the circle of art, which, by its turn, is also a circle within Hegel's systematic philosophy. They all are guided by the same principle, the Idea, and how the Idea develops itself in the different levels of its realization, be it within the pure determinations of thought, be it in the spiritual productions of humankind.

This way of proceeding is quite different from other authors from the period of German idealism. Kant, in is *Critique of Judgment* (2007, 149), bases his division of the

expression of the aesthetic ideas on an "analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which individuals avail themselves in speech, with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible", in which the modes of expression consist "in *word*, *gesture*, and *tone* (articulation, gesticulation, and modulation)". August Schlegel (see 1884, 112-127), by his turn, sees a poetic character in all arts, differentiating their genres based on the apprehension of said character by the senses: there are the ones that simultaneously express the sensible intuition (grasped through vision, as in sculpture, painting and architecture) and the ones that express it successively (grasped through audition, as in music and poetry); as an intermediate genre he mentions dance, as an art composed of movements that take place in space following temporal measures of sound. Finally, Schelling (see 1966, 125-131) divides the particular forms in two groups based on the potency each art has to express the Absolute: those are the group of the plastic arts (including music, painting, architecture, bas-relief and sculpture), which concerns the real side of the artistic world, expressed through matter, as opposed to the art of language, which concerns poetry, which, as the the ideal side of art, expressed through the Idea, is the higher potency of the plastic arts. Kant, A. Schlegel and Schelling follow a formal division of the arts insofar as they comprehend their content to be ultimately the same. As a result, there are no particularizations of it that can serve as the basis for the systematic articulation of the arts.

What differentiates Hegel from those thinkers is how he perceives the content of art in a way that is not so unitary. There is of course a universal determination of this content (which is the topic of the first part of the *Aesthetics*), but even in its universality the content of art is historically apprehended, which results in its particularizations that ultimately serve as the fundament for the individual arts. It must be added, however, that Hegel does not merely chose to put content as the differentiating quality in the relations of arts to one another as if he could have arbitrarily made this decision; as discussed, it is the necessary development of his own systematic thinking and of the logical determinations of the Idea, not only in terms of form and content, but also in the relations between the universal, the particular and the individual stages or moments of the concept of art.

It must be added, however, that Hegel's way of proceeding does not come without criticism after all. Winfield, whose commentary on Hegel's logic served to elucidate the necessity of a unitary development between form and content, strongly disagrees with the consequence of this division, namely, the association of each artform to each specific individual art. But it is a stance that he developed when directly discussing the systematization of the arts and in establishing his own contribution to this topic. In *Stylistics: Rethinking the Artforms after Hegel*, he still emphasizes the "immanent character of systematic argument" in which "any conceptual advance must rely on nothing but the terms already established", resulting in an "ordering of topics" that "will reside in their own content"; as a result of this ordering of topics, he concedes that the "prior" determinations of the particular artforms mean "that the forms of art are distinguishable without introducing any features specific

to an individual art, whereas the individual arts incorporate in their own reality the different artforms" (Winfield, 1996, 8). He even questions if the "spatio-temporal orderings are sufficient to identify such media in regard to the additional physical properties that otherwise distinguish them", because "if these further features are not incidental to the aesthetic significance of each putative artistic media, then a spatio-temporal schematization will not be the proper vehicle for individuating the arts" and it "will hardly be the only principle for dividing the arts that can be derived from the concept of art" (Winfield, 1996, 102). In Hegel's system, given the logical determinations of form and content, these further features are clearly not incidental, for the form is also contained in the content itself.

But if in *Stylistics* he highlights the importance of such a philosophy of art in contrast to formal aesthetics, it is in his other work, *Rethinking the Arts after Hegel*, published almost 30 years later, that Winfield engages more critically with Hegel's division of arts, dismissing this consequence with regard to the association between artforms and individual arts. He considers that Hegel's claim that the "differentiation of individual arts that attends only to the physical, psychological, and linguistic aspects of artistic media ignores a further connection essential for understanding the proper identity of each art" represents a collapse of the "systematic demarcation of the particular and individual dimensions of fine art", because "instead of operating within a three-fold division of visual art, music, and literature, Hegel reorganizes the individual arts under a different three-fold division corresponding to the three-fold differentiation of particular artforms" (Winfield, 2023, 18-19). Such claims are "hardly benign" for they "not only [...] call into question the aesthetic capabilities of each individual art, but they end up limiting the form and content of individual arts in ways that are insupportable" (Winfield, 2023, 19). Winfield (2023, 15) opts, instead, to take a step back and to examine each art by how its "defining media gives specific embodiment to the features general to fine art and then to each of the fundamental artistic styles, every one of which incorporates what is universal to aesthetic worth". Such "differentiation of the arts by sensuous properties and corresponding media appropriate for aesthetic employment leaves us with 'pure', nonhybrid varieties" of "architecture, sculpture, painting (and all other two-dimensional graphic art), music, and literature, including the 'still' and 'moving' options that leave room for kinetic sculpture (and dance) and cinema" (Winfield, 2023, 16). It is a system that, by building upon "upon Hegel's account of the individual arts, remedy its glaring inconsistencies and major omissions" (Winfield, 2023, 6) and becomes even more comprehensive than the system that served as its fundament, with each art being analyzed in relation to the "aesthetic value that revolves around the unity of meaning and configuration" (Winfield, 2023, 447-448) and to the development of this unity in the three different artforms.

If Hegel had considered that each part of his aesthetics presupposed the previous one, Winfield also tries, albeit with a different approach, to comprehend each art both in relation to the universal concept and its pure character as an art, as in relation to the different

particularizations this universal concept and pure character can shape. So, sculpture, for example, is not only discussed from the point of view of classical art, but also from the point of view of symbolic and romantic art. Hegel, again in the example of sculpture, even when he discusses it in the symbolic period (as in Egyptian sculpture), bases his vision on the point of view of sculpture as a classical art and dismisses its symbolic productions, opposing its animal or anthropomorphic forms and its alleged rigid nature to the perfection of the classical Greek sculpture and its humans forms, which perfectly convey the classical content more appropriate to this specific individual art. For that matter, it must also be granted that Winfield does recognize that Hegel's association of each particular artwork to each individual art means, on no account, exclusivity. In fact, it is as if Winfield tries to give classical and romantic architecture, symbolic and romantic sculpture, symbolic and classical painting and music more legitimacy and dignity within the system. However, my brief note serves more as a remark than a discussion worth going into, for Winfield's comments about Hegel's association of artforms and individual arts are unfortunately scarce. In addition, discussing it more thoroughly would certainly hinder the development of the second goal of this text, which is to comprehend how cinema can be perceived through Hegel's systematic understanding of art and the arts.

Cinema and the arts

Due to the period in which it was invented, that of modernity, cinema becomes immediately associated with the romantic artform. As a consequence of his criticism of Hegel's pairing of the artforms with the individual arts, Winfield makes an effort to think all arts from the different points of view of the symbolic, classical and romantic artforms (even in the cases of photography and cinema), but even if he briefly discusses the possibility of cinema being produced from a symbolic or classical point of view, it is clear that, if one tries to incorporate this art to Hegel's system, it must be put in the realm of romantic art, for it is "well suited for a world view that […] is ready to explore the life of freedom in its totality in every corner of existence, high or low" (Winfield, 2023, 494-495)[6]. With regard to this total

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6 Winfield (2023, 496-497) believes that "a filmmaker could express the self-understanding of pre-modern communities by using mobile composition and montage to capture such spectacles with a genuinely cinematic visual dynamic", and that "in these ways, the art of film can accommodate all the artforms, even if our earthly experience provides no evidence of anything other than modern, essentially Romantic style movies". However, if we remain closer to Hegel's own comprehension of the adequacy between an artform and an individual art, we can also apply to cinema the same remarks that Hegel made in relation to works such as Goethe's *West–Eastern Divan* and *Iphigenia*, which are seen as assimilations of symbolic and classical contents by the romantic artist. The artist, in this context, "is of course allowed to borrow his materials from distant climes, past ages, and foreign peoples, and even by and large to preserve the historical form of their mythology, customs, and institutions", at the same time that "he must use these forms only as frames for his pictures, while on the other hand their inner meaning he must adapt to the essential deeper consciousness of his contemporary world" (Hegel, 1975, 276). So, even if cinema is to be conceived in a more exclusive relation to the romantic era, it is precisely this era that allows the assimilation of contents from other times.

freedom, cinema can be either compared to the novel – with regard to "depicting problematic individuals who aspire to wield a freedom that cannot be fully embodied in any given sensuous reality" or with regard to "addressing the plight of individuals in a world of settled institutions of freedom who try to find some individual endeavor that retains fundamental significance for the fabric of their community" – or to modernist art and its "flight […] away from objective representation", which is achieved by avant-garde or experimental cinema, even though their "motion pictures exhibit their own difficulty at creating any imagery that can adequately express self-determination" (Winfield, 2023, 495). As a result, cinema is a "quintessentially modern art, tied to the world view that invests fundamental value in the reality of inner and outer freedom and finds its artistic fit in what Hegel characterizes as the Romantic style of art" (Winfield, 2023, 492). It is precisely this freedom in the modern artistic world view that allows cinema to even become an art, since the use of its technology is not necessarily and directly linked to an artistic production.

In this sense, if one analyzes the peculiarity of cinema itself, it becomes clear that is not only due to this historical contingency that cinema can be understood as a romantic art; the art of cinema also has the goal of exploring the human nature to its deepest level by employing a variety of forms in order to achieve this. As it was the case with other arts (particularly architecture), that can also be employed non artistically, so can moving pictures (as it is the case with a variety of audiovisual productions, from advertising to documentaries). However, the freedom allowed by this media is completely tied to the freedom that makes up the content of art in the modern romantic era. As an art, cinema carries on with the deepening into the human subjectivity that was conducted during the romantic period, and that, linked with its relevance and its potential to reach the widest of the audiences, is what makes cinema the most resonant art within the public from the 20th century onwards.

It must be noted, however, that the romantic period is, in Hegel's aesthetics, a quite long one. It begins with the emergence of Christian religion and it lasts at least until Hegel's own time. Hegel acknowledges a change that takes place in his time and that directly affects the artistic production of the modern world, for if the romantic art was the one that demanded modes of expression that highlighted human subjectivity, during the era of its dissolution, the interior and human side of artistic productions become even stronger. Cinema, therefore, can be thought not only as an art invented during the romantic era, but as an art that constituted itself in accordance with the world view that became predominant during the dissolution of the romantic artform. About this dissolution, Hegel (1989, 235) states that

> in our day, in the case of almost all peoples, criticism, the culture of reflection [*Bildung der Reflexion*][7], and, in our German case, freedom of thought, have mastered the artists

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7   The translation here was slightly altered (for the English text, see Hegel, 1975, 605).

too, and have made them, so to say, a *tabula rasa* in respect of the material and the form of their productions, after the necessary particular stages of the romantic artform have been traversed. Bondage to a particular subject-matter and a mode of portrayal suitable for this material alone are for artists today some thing past [*etwas Vergangenes*], and art therefore has become a free instrument which the artist can wield in proportion to his subjective skill in relation to any material of whatever kind. The artist thus stands above specific consecrated forms and configurations and moves freely on his own account, independent of the subject-matter and mode of conception in which the holy and eternal was previously made visible to human apprehension.

This dissolution of the romantic artform also corresponds to a systematic unfolding of Hegel's philosophy, that sees art coming to an end. This end does not mean that art will not be made anymore, but that the relation between humans and artworks fundamentally changes. As it has already been discussed, the philosophy of art is part of the philosophy of spirit; art constitutes, together with religion and philosophy, the absolute spirit, which encompasses the free and rational productions made by humankind, which, aware of such freedom and rationality, tries to comprehend itself. This circle is delineated in the §§553 to 577 of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and concerns these three types of productions made by the free and rational human being towards their self comprehension. Art is the first stage of this self comprehension, for it takes place in the exterior sensuous, while religion takes for its form that of representation and philosophy that of concept, of pure intellectuality. For Hegel, in the historical development of the human spirit throughout the centuries, the exteriority of the sensuous is suppressed as humans increasingly turn to their own interior, and, beginning with painting, art turns to the "treatment of man's inner nature" (Hegel, 1975, 887). Considering that "precisely on account of its form, art is limited to a specific content" and that "only one sphere and stage of truth is capable of being represented in the element of art" (Hegel, 1975, 9), the systematic development sees art lose its relevance as the primary mode for self apprehension in modern times; religion and philosophy become better ways of responding to the spiritual needs of the contemporary world. As a result of this loss of relevance that constitutes the dissolution of the romantic artform, art cannot be enjoyed as the ancient peoples did; instead of worship, reflection becomes the main element in the relation between humans and artworks, with art even incorporating it in itself by trying to explore new modes of configuration. Since art increasingly shares with religion and philosophy the expression of the highest aspirations of the spirit, it becomes free to convey other subjects in its quest for the comprehension of human nature. It is in this sense that Winfield can compare cinema to both the novel and modernism, for all those types of quintessentially modern art profit from the free use of individual contents, forms and configurations.

The dissolution of the romantic artform takes place then in the last great circle of Hegel's aesthetics, that of poetry, where he sees a division between epic, lyric and dramatic poetry. Within this circle is the last one, that of dramatic poetry, which is divided between tragedy, drama and comedy. Comedy must carry out the end of art, since "on this peak comedy leads at the same time to the dissolution of art altogether", for if "all art aims at the identity, produced by the spirit, in which eternal things, God and absolute truth are revealed in real appearance and shape to our contemplation, to our hearts and minds", comedy, by its turn,

> presents this unity only as its self-destruction because the Absolute, which wants to realize itself, sees its self-actualization destroyed by interests that have now become explicitly free in the real world and are directed only on what is accidental and subjective, then the presence and agency of the Absolute no longer appears positively unified with the characters and aims of the real world but asserts itself only in the negative form of cancelling everything not correspondent with it, and subjective personality alone shows itself self-confident and self-assured at the same time in this dissolution (Hegel, 1975, 1236).

However, the dissolution of art in comedy may still have an aftermath. And this aftermath constitutes another possibility of contemplating cinema from the point of view of Hegel's system. It must, however, build upon his work and take other elements into consideration, since he could not have foreshadowed the invention of the technology of cinema and its appropriation by the human spirit in order to express and understand its own nature. This possibility sees cinema, as an art that is capable of achieving the deepest of the spiritual subjectivity, congregating other arts in order to constitute itself and to provide its means to achieve the almost infinite variety of forms that are intertwined with modern art. The most complex and profound films deploy not only the representative art of poetry for its storytelling, but also the arts of architecture to build its scenario, of sculpture to constitute its bodily movements depicted on screen, of painting to delimit the frame of each scene, and of music (and sound in general) to add profundity to the elements visually depicted.

This constitution of cinema as the amalgamation of all arts is obviously not directly laid out by the Hegelian text. However, there are authors such as Badiou who see how this total art could constitute itself. He sees in the dissolution of the romantic art form the possibility for a "further dialectical twist, which would be the abolition of this abolition in a new form whereby art would constitute the total deployment of its already existing resources", as "a figure of representation whose content would gradually accumulate the henceforth timeless destiny of a more or less absolute art" (Badiou, 2020, 111). This final art, as opposed to comedy, would not be the negative manifestation of the Absolute, but its manifestation of "itself in the total mobilization of the registers of representation", amalgamating the arts and "drawing the history of art to a close not through the negative pirouettes of comedy,

but with the attendant anxiety and seriousness of a redemptive totalization" (Badiou, 2020, 111-112). It would be the "ultimate art, beyond modern comedy, as the redemptive future of an annihilated art, in the form of *a complete dialectical sublation of comic negativity*. In a sense: as an end of the first ending" (Badiou, 2020, 112). This art would be cinema and according to Badiou (2020, 115), even Hegel would have recognized "in cinema the total overcoming of the negative impasse represented by modern comedy", proclaiming it the "absolute art"[8]. Winfield understands cinema in a similar sense with regard to unifying in itself all other arts, seeing, after the phase of pure cinema and silent film, with the addition of sound and language, the possibility to "fulfill hybrid cinema's potential to become a total art, integrating architecture, sculpture, graphic art, music, and literature in service of film's dynamic visual imagery" (Winfield, 2023, 469).

It can be argued that Hegel had the possibility of recognizing a total art in theater or opera, for they summon "the others to constitute the scenery, the stage, the movement of the actors, gestures, singing and dialog, etc., in order to carry out a single all-encompassing work of art" (Werle, 2013, 241). In fact, in the lecture series of 1826, Hegel (2018, 882) sees opera as a "complete totality [*vollständige Totalität*]" and he even considers the dramas of the ancient peoples to be "essentially opera", even though "the content of the ancient tragedies was not the one of the contemporary opera". However, as Werle (see 2013, 294) argues, poetry is the art of representation, with theater or opera only making its action more representative without presenting a new content other than that of their respective texts. Even so, cinema not only goes further than the mere presentation of moving images, but by adding music and language, becomes "the modern world's dominant 'total' art", taking the place that once belonged to opera and musical theater and becoming a "total hybrid art" (Winfield, 2023, 432).

And cinema, as opposed to theater and opera, which are the representations of a text, has its own specificity. That is what makes it so different to read a play or a libretto as opposed to a script; with the first two, the general idea of the dramatic representation is more directly perceived by the reader, while with the script it is more difficult to effectively visualize the finished work with all its different possibilities, even if they are described in the script. These possibilities concern framing and composition, hand-held or stabilized shooting, fadeouts, cuts, dissolves, split screens, special sounds and effects, flashbacks, narration and slow motion, just to name a few. When the audience sees a film, it is not a representation of another standalone work, but the work itself, as the director intended it to be after all the stages of production, with the script serving merely as the basis for this work. The staging of a play or an opera can aggregate other ideas that were not in the originally conceived text (as

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8   It must be briefly noted that, however, for Badiou (2020, 115), this totalization only takes place imaginatively and not "in an authentic artistic singularity", with cinema being "less an art than a recapitulative nostalgia for the time when real arts existed".

for example in contemporary stagings that present the action in times and places that differ from the ones imagined by the author) without them being considered other works and not the staging of this text. They can even change plot elements of the original text without that affecting the staging's relation to it; in cinema, a change of plot during recording or editing goes vastly unnoticed, for scrips are normally not made accessible to the public, nor the general public is really interested in them[9]. When they are made accessible to the main public, it is normally in the form of a different standalone text: an example is Tarantino's novelization of his film *Once Upon a Time in Hollywood*. With regard to the novel, the subordination of the script to the film is also made clear when a novel is adapted to the screen; in those cases, a script must be written and the director cannot simply use the novel as his basis. Even when plays are adapted to the screen, the original text cannot serve as the basis and a script must also be written; an example of this is Polanski's *Carnage*, whose screenplay was written by the director together with Yasmina Reza, writer of the original play *Le Dieu du carnage*. In cinema, each production is an autonomous work, and even when a remake of a film is only adapted to a different setting, both films constitute different works of art on their own, since their content gives the director an infinite range of possibilities to tell the story using the different modes of montage cinema has to offer. While there may be discussion as to whether the staging constitutes a work on its own (apart from its respective text), it is generally accepted that no script is by itself a work of art[10], only the film. The capacity of cinema to reach the widest of audiences through its technical reproduction is also to be mentioned; while each theatrical production is restricted to those who can attend the theater, the same film is available to a much larger audience worldwide.

With respect to the term "technical reproduction", borrowed from Benjamin's classic essay, it is worth briefly discussing it in comparison to Hegel's understanding of the end of art. In Benjamin's text *The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility*, the possibility of technologically reproducing a work is something that strips its aura from it, with artworks losing their cult value and gaining value that becomes associated with its exhibition. This a polarity Benjamin sees already in Hegel's claim that "we have got beyond venerating works of art as divine and worshipping them. The impression they make is of a more reflective kind, and what they arouse in us needs a higher touchstone and a different test", for "thought and reflection have spread their wings above fine art" (Hegel, 1975, 10). Benjamin (2008, 48) sees the significance of the "beautiful semblance [*schöner Schein*]" as "rooted in the age of auratic perception that is now coming to an end", for aura was the ground of aesthetic experience before the age of technological reproducibility. And film is

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9   Of course many scripts are easily found online, but they are sought mainly by people who are (or who wish to be) involved with screenwriting and film production.

10   In this regard, see Winfield, 2023, 456-457. In fact, during the era of silent film, cinema was produced mostly without scripts, which became more important as films became more complex.

the "most powerful agent" of this age, with high "social significance", which "even – and especially – in its most positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic side: the liquidation of the value of tradition in the cultural heritage" (Benjamin, 2008, 22).

Benjamin's reading tries to add a new dimension to Hegel's thesis about the end or dissolution of art; by agreeing with Hegel that "an ancient statue of Venus, for instance, existed in a traditional context for the Greeks (who made it an object of worship)", he also sees a difference "from the context in which it existed for medieval clerics (who viewed it as a sinister idol)"; however, there was something that was "equally evident to both": "its uniqueness – that is, its aura" (Benjamin, 2008, 24). Even if the relation with the artwork becomes different, with a religious ritual around it giving way to "the most profane forms of the cult of beauty" that still display a "ritualistic basis", it is only with technological reproducibility that the work of art becomes not only emancipated "from its parasitic subservience to ritual" but also "reproduction of a work designed for reproducibility", with politics becoming the foundation of artistic production (Benjamin, 2008, 24-25)[11]. But Benjamin adds some twists to Hegel's thesis of the end of art; as Werle (2004) points out, Benjamin operates from a point of view in which a technical development causes the change of the relations between humans and works of art, disregarding the role of religion within the modern world. Hegel, on the other hand, sees this change as a result of the development of religion itself, for it is due to Christianism (and Protestantism in particular in the modern world) that humans turn to their own interior. The losing of the aura of the work of art has therefore been in place since the surpassing of classical by the romantic artform, therefore, way before cinema could ever be invented, as for example in the genre painting of the Netherlands[12]. Cinema, from a Hegelian point of view, would not contribute to the end of art due to its technology; actually, the appropriation of this technology is just another means of expressing and going even deeper into the content of art that was already present in the dissolution of the romantic artform.

In conclusion, there is room for cinema to be thought within the systematic of Hegel's comprehension of the arts. Cinema presents a development of the concept of art that allows, in an appropriation of technological development, an even further deepening of the

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11   Again, as indicated for Badiou's text, it is not possible going into the specific political consequences of Benjamin's vision, given the limited scope of this text.

12   "In contrast to an abstract opposition between art and religion in the modern era, as Benjamin means, what we have in Hegel is a dialectics between religion and art, a double movement from both the absolute to the sensuous as a return from the sensuous to the absolute. Benjamin is focused on only one moment, the one regarding the prevalence of the sensuous, dismissing the proper speculative meaning of this sensuous, that this sensuous mirrors and reflects the religious interiority, instead of placing itself in opposition to it and, precisely in this way, being able to be explored in all its range. [...] The treatment of the sensuous is not dependent upon an abandonment of religion, but rather upon a deepening of the religious interiority towards the prose of life [...]. At the root of the transformation of the concept of art in the modern era is not predominantly the 'material' problem of the development of techniques for the reproduction of artworks, but the problem of the spiritual and religious content that has undergone mutations in its own realization" (Werle, 2004, p. 38-39).

human subjective spirituality that is feasible of artistic expression. The appropriation of the immense range of possibilities offered by the technology with regard to the recording and editing of films takes place only as a result of the diversified ways of expression that the human spirit demands in the modern era. Were the capacity of humankind's artistic expression as the appearance of the Idea to the senses not so wide and diverse, the technology of moving images could have stayed restricted to merely non artistic ends. It is not technology itself, but how humans can make use of it in the process of their self understanding that constitutes the core of this art.

At the same time, there's also the aspect of cinema congregating all other arts around itself and of becoming a total art, the ultimate spiritual expression through artistic means. And as the last art of this update of Hegel's system, it incorporates the immense possibilities that arise in the era of the end of art in a form that works as the completion of the system, retrospectively congregating all other parts to constitute itself. Cinema is the positive realization of the end of art and it can only effectively come into existence due to its position at the end of this historical development, which saw the emergence of each art as the most well suited for the expression of a content during a specific period. The arts of Hegel's original system may have sufficed for spiritual expression until his time, but with the subsequent phases of history a new way of self apprehension needed to arise, taking advantage of the possibilities offered by the modern world.

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THE PARTING OF THE WAYS AND THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 20TH CENTURY

MARIO ARIEL GONZÁLEZ PORTA

mariopor@pucsp.br
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo
Bolsa de Produtividade CNPq PQ2

Resumen: *La "separación de los caminos" debe constituir un tema central en la reflexión historiográfica acerca de la filosofía del siglo XX, una vez que condicionó en gran medida el tratamiento de temas y procesos característicos de la misma. Como estudio de caso, el debate en torno al psicologismo (Psychologismusstreit) es analizado en esta perspectiva, mostrándose cómo la "separación de los caminos" condicionó visiones anacrónicas de este proceso y, al mismo tiempo, llevó a dejar de lado momentos fundamentales del mismo.*

Palabras claves: *separación de los caminos; psicologismo; neokantismo; escuela de Brentano; Husserl; Frege; filosofía analítica.*

Abstract: *The parting of the ways must constitute a central theme in the historiographic reflection on the philosophy of the 20th century since it has largely conditioned the treatment of characteristic themes and processes of the same. As a case study, the debate about psychologism (Psychologismusstreit) is analyzed from this perspective, showing how the parting of the ways has conditioned anachronistic visions of this process and at the same time leading to leaving aside fundamental moments of it.*

Keywords: *parting of the ways; psychologism; neokantism; Brentano school; Husserl; Frege; analytical philosophy.*

Certainly, throughout the history of philosophy, there have always been divergent schools and tendencies. However, the existence of something akin to two philosophical traditions that developed in almost absolute independence from one another is a singular phenomenon of 20th-century philosophy. Without fully endorsing Friedman's (2000) particular interpretation of this phenomenon, we will briefly refer to it as *the parting of the ways.*

The parting of the ways should be a central theme in a historiographical reflection on 20th-century philosophy, if only because:

1. First, it is reflected in the way one views the history of philosophy (keywords: ahistoricism vs. historicism) and potentially constructs it (keywords: rational reconstruction vs. historical contextualism).
2. Second, it has specifically influenced the way in which the history of 20th-century philosophy has been written.
3. Third, it determines how one engages with *the parting of the ways* itself.

The impact of *the parting of the ways* on the history of 20th-century philosophy has taken on three characteristic forms:

1. First, recounting two separate histories, thereby overlooking a broad and rich field of thematic parallels and systematic—if not actual—points of contact.
2. Second, anachronistically projecting *the parting of the ways* onto the understanding of processes that took place prior to it.
3. Third, overlooking or rather reductionistic considering other philosophical currents.

If the preceding observations are correct, then it makes sense to highlight the importance and necessity of transversal perspectives on 20th-century philosophy—perspectives that should reveal how certain themes and problems cut across various traditions. Since, as already noted, *the parting of the ways*, despite being a very significant phenomenon, does not exhaust everything that occurred in 20th-century philosophy (one might think, for instance, of Neo-Kantianism, the Brentano School, Marxism, and *Lebensphilosophie*), it is also necessary to show that transversal perspectives are useful for understanding the relationships of these traditions both to *the parting of the ways* and to one another.

The list of possible transversal themes is certainly not small and includes, among many others, the theme of intuition. To indicate what is at stake: the distancing of the scientific worldview from intuition constitutes a shared problem for Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, neopositivism, hermeneutics, and *Lebensphilosophie*. Each of these directions offers a distinctly characteristic response to this issue, sometimes in the form of an actual critical dialogue with other currents.

However, in order to avoid remaining at the level of abstract programmatic statements or merely listing examples, I wish to illustrate this proposed program through a concrete case, at least in outline—namely, the Psychologism debate *(Psychologismusstreit)*.

As I now turn to the Psychologism debate as a case study, it is important to recall certain facts:

1. First, there can be no doubt that the Psychologism debate played a decisive role in the emergence of both analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy, and, beyond that, in the prior and simultaneous development of Neo-Kantianism and the Brentano School. This involved not only thematic parallels and systematic points of contact but also actual interactions and a shared development up to a certain point—one that was often forgotten or disregarded due to *the parting of the ways*.

2. Second, *the parting of the ways* has manifested itself in this topic in a characteristic manner, leading to the aforementioned isolating and anachronistic perspectives. Here, I will mention three paradigmatic cases.

a) Husserl and Frege

The studies on the relationship between Frege and Husserl, initiated by Føllesdal (1950), have been strongly influenced by the works of Mohanty (1962, 2003), which many other researchers sympathetic to Husserl have followed. The essence of this perspective is to analyze the relations and differences between the two authors primarily through the lens of the opposition between language and intentionality. The result, broadly speaking, is a simplistic all-or-nothing view, wherein Husserl addresses and definitively resolves a problem to which Frege, who remains within the framework of naturalism, is supposedly insensitive (González Porta, 1999).

It is true that Frege's anti-psychologism begins with a merely negative distinction between logic and psychology in *The Foundations of Arithmetic*. However, it is also true that precisely the critical resistance he faced from his anti-psychologist opponents—particularly Kerry (1887; cf. González Porta, 2016a)—compelled him to deepen his diagnosis of psychologism in *The Basic Laws of Arithmetic*, ultimately understanding psychologism not merely as the result of a simple confusion but as a consequence of a mistaken conception of subjectivity (González Porta, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2021a). According to Frege, this conception of subjectivity was "epistemological idealism" (Frege [1897] 1980, 42, 136), i.e., the erroneous assumption that my only direct and immediate objects are my ideas (Frege, 1893, pp. xviii–xxii). If this is the case, then psychologism can only be overcome by rejecting its fundamental thesis—something already accomplished in *Basic Laws*—and ultimately refuting it, as occurs in *The Thought* (González Porta, 2009). The idea that thinking is "the

grasping of thoughts" is a revolutionary thesis within the context of 19th-century German philosophy, marking the culmination of a complex development.

If Frege, in his refutation of psychologism, arrives at significant theses regarding subjectivity, these nonetheless remain without any methodological foundation. The point at which Frege arrives becomes the point from which Husserl departs—now equipped with a powerful new methodological tool for developing a theory of the subject adequate to logical realism: phenomenology (González Porta, 2022a). In short, the anti-psychologisms of Frege and Husserl are not separated by an unbridgeable gap but rather form a continuity, precisely because both confront related problems and attempt similar solutions (González Porta, 2015a). As a passing remark, it should be noted that Exner (1833) had already explicitly posed this problem to Bolzano, though Bolzano ultimately failed to provide a satisfactory solution (González Porta, 2002/2003).

b) Moore's Refutation of Idealism

The works of many analytic philosophers—paradigmatically, Klemke (2009)—on Moore's *Refutation of Idealism* follow the same anachronistic trajectory as Mohanty's studies on Frege and Husserl. Since it is often assumed that this refutation represents the first step toward linguistic analysis—an idea that Russell retrospectively introduced in his *Autobiography (1967)*—scholars have repeatedly overlooked the fact that Moore explicitly resisted being classified as a linguistic-analytical philosopher (González Porta, 2016b, 2022a).

As a result, *Refutation of Idealism* is frequently interpreted as a typical analytic argument that should and can be rationally reconstructed using the tools of mathematical logic. However, this approach simply disregards Moore's own text, which, in its argumentation, fundamentally appeals to a *phenomenological* method. To convince his reader that the relation between an act and its object is not a part-whole relation and, consequently, that intentionality is something singular and irreducible, Moore explicitly invites them to: *"See!"* (Moore, 1903, 450). Overlooking this undeniable fact also leads to neglecting Moore's connections to Stout and, through him, to Brentano. We will return to this point later.

c) Wittgenstein

Thirdly, it is worth mentioning the often-forgotten fact that the debate on psychologism undergoes a significant shift in analytic philosophy from Wittgenstein onward—a shift that, among other things, changes the very concept of psychologism itself (González Porta, 2021c, 2022a). As is well known, Wittgenstein's theory of meaning does not conceive of meaning as something related to ideal entities and a correspondingly private understanding but rather as a socially communicative event. Psychologism is now no longer primarily associated with relativism but rather with "mentalism," "solipsism," and "private language." However, with few exceptions, scholars tend to overlook this decisive shift and, now under the inspiration of later Wittgensteinian thought, once again project

anachronistic perspectives onto authors such as Frege, Moore, or Russell (cf. Haack, 1978, and González Porta, 2015b, 2022a).

Yet, in reality, Wittgenstein returns to the identification of psychologism with introspectionism, which was already at the core of the early debates on psychologism in France. This identification made it plausible for behaviorist psychology to be understood as an alternative to psychologism—something that certainly would have made no sense for either Frege or Husserl.

We could analyze these three cases more deeply and possibly add others, examining each in exhaustive detail. However, we will pursue a different strategy: we will attempt to provide an overarching perspective that not only corrects particular one-sided or anachronistic views but also offers a more comprehensive and complete outlook on the entire topic. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized from the outset that this remains merely a sketch, which does not claim to be exhaustive and may thus require supplementation in various respects.

Let us sketch, then, how a history of 20th-century philosophy regarding the debate on psychologism should appear—one that takes into account and seeks to overcome the historiographical consequences of the *parting of the ways*, so as to avoid the kinds of errors already mentioned.

First, it is crucial to understand that, in order to properly situate the trends of the 20th century, we must broaden our scope and turn our attention to the 19th century, since certain phenomena are simply prolongations of processes that began in the 19th century (González Porta: 2019b, 2020a, 2021c). In this Regard, it is important to recognize:

- that the debate on psychologism (PS) was actually a <u>debate</u>.
- that the debate on psychologism (PS) was actually not <u>one</u> debate (González Porta, 2020a).

In the 19th century, there were three fundamental variants of anti-psychologism, which we could designate as:

- Normativist: Herbart (1813), Lotze (1874, 1881), Brentano (1874, 1884–1885, 1956, 1962) (González Porta, 2019c, 2019/20, 2022b, 2022d, 2023a, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b).
- Transcendental-Idealist: Cohen (1871, 1883), Natorp (1887a, 1887b, 1888, 1897, 1912), Windelband (1884), Rickert (1892, 1909) (González Porta, 2006, 2017a, 2021b).
- Logical-Realist: Bolzano (1837a, 1837b), Frege (1884, 1893, 1897), Husserl (1900/01, 1913a, 1913b, 1923/24) (González Porta, 2002–2003, 2014a, 2015a, 2017b, 2022c).

Now, among these different strands of anti-psychologism, there are numerous points of contact as well as differences. The differences arose from their divergent programs and systematic motivations, which led each strand to identify a particular form of psychologism as its primary target of critique. Normativism had to contend first with Benecke and later with Czolbe; Neo-Kantianism with Beneke, Fries, Lange, and Helmholtz; logical realism with Mill, Erdmann, Sigwart, Wundt, and Lipps. Consequently, each of the aforementioned strands developed a distinctive form of anti-psychologism (González Porta, 2017a, 2021b, 2022a, 2023a, 2024a, 2024b).

Whereas the normativist approach ultimately rested on the fundamental idea of an originally normative consciousness, the other two approaches were primarily shaped by different conceptions of the *a priori*, which, in turn, were reflected in their characteristic conceptions of logic. For Neo-Kantianism, "logic" was synonymous with epistemology; for logical realism, it encompassed epistemology but also fundamentally formal/general logic and semantics. While for the Neo-Kantians, there are only empirical objects and all *a priori* knowledge was conceivable solely as a condition for the possibility of empirical cognition, for logical realism, there are also abstract objects. Consequently, whereas for Neo-Kantianism, *a priori* knowledge was possible only through transcendental reflection, for logical realism, direct *a priori* knowledge was possible through something akin to a special logical source of knowledge or a categorial intuition.

Despite all their differences, the three aforementioned tendencies faced a similar, yet characteristically differentiated challenge posed by their specific psychological opponents: namely, the task of developing a positive conception of subjectivity that was coherent with their anti-psychologism. In the normativist case, this involved combating any form of naturalistic reductionism that conceived of the psychic as a blindly causal process while affirming a spontaneous and free subjectivity for which normative consciousness was original (González Porta, 2006, 2015c, 2019c, 2019/20, 2024a, 2024b). This problem was not entirely foreign to the other two tendencies, though they each had their own specific difficulties. In the Neo-Kantian case, the challenge lay in clarifying the relationship between the transcendental and an ultimately concrete subjectivity—that is, in developing a psychology compatible with the transcendental method (Natorp, 1912, 1918; González Porta 2006, 2017a). In the logical-realist case, the issue concerned the clarification of how a real and ultimately temporal subject could have access to absolutely transcendent and atemporal objects (González Porta, 2002/03, 2006, 2015a, 2016a, 2017a).

Lotze, Frege, and Natorp are the three figures who, in each of the directions, provided the initial impulse for a response to the psychological challenge—a response that, due to the specificity of their anti-psychologism and the corresponding psychological critique, was characteristically distinct. However, there was another major difference. Whereas Lotze (1881) and Natorp (1912) offered the most mature response to the problem of their specific anti-psychologism—such that their responses were not fundamentally altered later—Frege

only took the first step in that he rejected the principle of immanence, thereby opening promising perspectives. It would ultimately be Husserl who, in *Logical Investigations*, fully completed the task of providing an adequate conception of subjectivity for logical realism.

If one pays attention to this process, it becomes clear that the debate on psychologism was not merely exhausted in the sharp separation between logic and psychology—which constituted only its negative aspect—but that one of its essential outcomes was a decisive renewal of the theory of subjectivity, which reached its peak in Husserl's phenomenology.

At this point, clarification is necessary. It has been repeatedly stated that Husserl's *Prolegomena* definitively refuted psychologism. This claim, if not outright false, is at least superficial. Certainly, the *Prolegomena* provide the first extensive and systematic treatment of the problem of psychologism. However, the argumentative or purely logical refutation of psychologism—which identifies it with relativism and ultimately demonstrates relativism as self-contradictory—was far from marking the end of the debate, nor was it even Husserl's own final word on the matter. Crucial and decisive for overcoming psychologism is the dissolution of its theory of subjectivity, which is carried out through the phenomenological-intentional conception of subjectivity developed in the second volume of *Logical Investigations* (González Porta, 2011, 2022c).

By paying attention to the foregoing, one is able to correct a second widespread error (González Porta, 2011). The question of the relationship between psychology and phenomenology is one that Husserl would engage with until the end of his life, continuously offering new perspectives on the matter.

For precisely this reason, Husserl's critique of psychologism continues to develop after the *Logical Investigations*, specifically in the direction of surpassing mere argumentative refutation through an actual overcoming. From this perspective, the idealistic-transcendental turn now signals a new decisive moment. Only with and after the transcendental reduction, i.e., with the definitive overcoming of naturalism, does Husserl believe himself capable of achieving the final overcoming of psychologism—namely, its transcendental form. However, for this to happen, psychology itself must take on its ultimate form, namely the phenomenological one, which will only be possible after the development of transcendental phenomenology (González Porta, 2011).

Nevertheless, the transcendental-phenomenological turn is by no means Husserl's final word in the debate on psychologism. Despite all differences with Neo-Kantianism regarding the conception of transcendental philosophy—differences that concentrate on the opposition between phenomenological intuition and transcendental method—Husserl, with the transcendental turn, returns to a problem that Natorp had already identified and attempted to solve in a different direction: namely, by dissolving the rigid opposition between subject and object through the idea of two modes of considering the same phenomenon—subjectivation and objectivation. Whereas the *Logical Investigations* provided a theory of subjectivity consistent with logical realism, addressing the psycholo-

gists' persistent demand for clarification of how a psychological subject could have access to abstract objects, the transcendental turn now raises the problem of the relationship between transcendental and concrete subjectivity. It is now clear that a solution like Natorp's is entirely excluded for an intuitive transcendental phenomenology. Husserl consciously seeks to account for this. Fundamental concepts such as spatialization, temporalization, individuation, or monad express Husserl's concern with mediating the distance between transcendental and concrete subjectivity.

However, this is still not the end. After defining phenomenology as descriptive psychology, as eidetic psychology, and as transcendental phenomenology—always emphasizing the separation between phenomenology and psychology—the supposed definitive overcoming of naturalism leads to the overcoming of Cartesianism and to the identification of transcendental phenomenology with pure phenomenological psychology (González Porta, 2011). Other paths were certainly possible, and it is well known that Heidegger (Biemel, 1955) pursued a different path to its conclusion when, in his article for the *British Encyclopedia*, he ultimately asserts that the fundamental task consists in demonstrating that the true transcendental subject is the factual subject in its facticity (González Porta, 2010).

Let us now return to other developments that are not entirely unrelated to the previous discussion. If Frege, on the one hand, takes the first step on a path that Husserl follows to its conclusion, there is another aspect of his anti-psychologism that points in a different direction. In fact, we must distinguish in Frege between an epistemological and a methodological anti-psychologism—or between the rejection of a psychologism based on a false thesis and a psychologism that results from confusion (González Porta, 2022a). That is: we must distinguish between Frege's reflective diagnosis and refutation of psychologism and the way he actually conducts logical analysis with the absolutely essential assistance of the new logic. Methodological anti-psychologism consists in consistently eliminating all psychological considerations from logical argumentation. Thus, while in the first sense Frege takes the first step, in the second he provides a clear example of a mature, elaborated procedure.

It is this second anti-psychologism that will have a decisive impact on analytic philosophy (González Porta, 2022a), something that is particularly evident in Wittgenstein's ambivalent relationship with Frege and, specifically, with Frege's *Der Gedanke*. Two crucial moments must be distinguished in this regard: Russell and Carnap. On the one hand, Russell (1903) certainly operates within the horizon of Moore's refutation of idealism, which plays a decisive role in the turn toward analysis. However, in the way he conducts this analysis, he stands closer to Frege, which is paradigmatically demonstrated in his discussion with Cassirer, marking a distinct turning point. While Cassirer, without abandoning anti-psychologism and following Natorp's teaching, emphasizes the necessary complementarity of the subjective and objective perspectives, Russell demands the complete exclusion of all subjective perspectives from the logical foundation of mathematics and insists on developing it using purely logical resources.

Russell's methodological perspective is extended by Carnap (1928) from mathematics to the logical reconstruction of the language of science as a whole. The logical reconstruction of scientific language now appears as an analytic variant of the theory of constitution, which, as such, also has specific phenomenological and Neo-Kantian variants in Husserl and Cassirer. However, Carnap's claim to carry out a purely logical reconstruction of the language of science cannot entirely dispense with its starting point in basic propositions and thus cannot absolutely avoid the problem of psychology.

If the psychologism debate extends across various traditions, it also brings with it themes that constitute specific moments of the controversy, such as the relationship between act, content, and object (González Porta, 2015c). It is little known that not only Lotze but also Brentano played a decisive role in English philosophy at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The most significant figure of English Brentanism is undoubtedly Stout, who, not coincidentally, anticipated Twardowski's critique of Brentano (1893) by a year and advocated the separation of content and object. Stout exerted an important influence on both Russell and Moore. It is Stout (1892, 1896) who stands in the background of Moore's intentionalist critique of idealism. However, this does not mean that Moore simply reproduces Stout's conception of intentionality. In fact, there is a discussion between Moore and Stout, as Moore denies any role for content and seeks to understand intentionality as a simple act-object relation. However, with this direct realism, the possibilities for developing a theory of the foundational relationship of acts become limited.

Something similar occurs within the Brentano School itself (González Porta, 2019c, 2019/20). When Twardowski introduces the distinction between content and object, he nevertheless holds onto the idea that every act has an object, thereby leading to a doctrine of different types of objects. While Husserl, starting from Brentano's notion of intentionality, aims at a complication of act theory, Meinong develops another variant that focuses on a complication of the structure of the object. In this way, Brentano's descriptive psychology develops into Meinong's theory of objects (Meinong, 1904, 1907, 1921). This development within the school would not occur without resistance, as is particularly evident in the Höfler (1906) – Marty (1908) polemic (González Porta, 2022b). This debate makes it clear that anti-psychologism, which neither party wished to abandon, could lead to two possible final outcomes: either to a reformulation of the psychological method that is not incompatible with the acceptance of transcendent entities, or to a theory of objects that ultimately abandons the psychological method altogether and should thus be regarded not only as anti-psychologistic but as genuinely a-psychologistic.

This development of anti-psychologism into objectivism takes place not only within the Brentano School but also within Neo-Kantianism, specifically through authors such as Lask (1912) and Bauch (1925). In particular, the latter explicitly accuses the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School of a refined psychologism, which provokes Natorp's reaction, leading to an explicit polemic between the two (González Porta, 1989).

However, the late objectivism of some Neo-Kantians is only one of the possible developments of their anti-psychologism. It coexists, in fact, with another development that moves in the opposite direction and is radically embodied in Hönigswald (1913, 1921) (González Porta, 2023c). Hönigswald starts from Natorp and considers that the origin of psychologism lies in a false idea of subjectivity. However, against Natorp, he also points out that this false idea of subjectivity is a consequence of a one-sided, natural-scientific concept of experience. The Neo-Kantian concept of experience is now identified with the concept of experience in the natural sciences, emphasizing that it is based on this concept that the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental was established—a distinction that has played a decisive role in the entire Neo-Kantian struggle against psychologism. However, given the development of scientific psychology, the exclusive dominance of the natural-scientific concept of experience should be called into question. For Hönigswald, this development is paradigmatically illustrated by the empirical-experimental method of the Würzburg School's psychology of thinking. It is based on such an analysis that Hönigswald asserts that the empirical and the transcendental are not mutually exclusive, as there are facts that are simultaneously principles, such as the self and language (González Porta, 2023c).

As early as Stumpf (1892), in a polemic with Cohen and Windelband and in the spirit of the psychological method and Brentano's descriptive psychology, the fundamental thesis was formulated that something cannot be both transcendentally true and psychologically false. In doing so, he anticipated major problems that any form of anti-psychologism would have to face in the coming decades—not only within Neo-Kantianism but also within phenomenology.

Husserl had formed his idea of psychology in the nineteenth century, with psycho-physiology as the model of scientific psychology, and had shown little interest in later developments in psychology that took place in the twentieth century, such as the aforementioned psychology of thinking or the even more well-known and influential Gestalt theory. His student Gurwitsch (1829; cf. Soares 2021) had already drawn the master's attention to the necessity of serious reflection on these developments but without much success. In doing so, Gurwitsch opened the possibility for a critique of Husserl, which contemporaries like Cassirer would undertake and which Merleau-Ponty would later develop intensively (Soares/González Porta, 2022e), with the latter leading phenomenology in a direction that was less transcendental and more empirically oriented (González Porta, 2020a).

Looking back at the interconnected development of phenomenology, Neo-Kantianism, and the Brentano School, it must be said that while psychologism was philosophy's main adversary, subjectivity also became its central theme—albeit in different forms and through different approaches. Those who sought to exclude subjectivity from philosophy were clearly in the minority. In this regard, something quite different happens within analytic philosophy.

For the development and future of the analytic treatment of psychologism, not only is Wittgenstein's (1980, 580) already mentioned anti-mentalism decisive, but also his critique

of psychology. As is well known, Wittgenstein argues in the *Philosophical Investigations* that the state of psychology cannot be compared to the infancy of physics because psychology involves not only experimental difficulties but also conceptual confusions. This Wittgensteinian diagnosis synthesizes the necessity of conceptual clarification as the foundation of all psychology and the substitution of any properly philosophical analysis of the subject with an analysis of the semantics of attributing propositional attitudes. In this context, the idea emerges that the philosophy of mind should be nothing other than an inquiry into our concepts of mind (Crane, 2014). The peak of analytic philosophy, or more precisely, of the linguistic-analytic method, thus has decisive implications for the question of psychologism (see Haack, 1978, and cf. González Porta, 2015b).

If certain things are set in motion within the phenomenological–Neo-Kantian tradition, this movement would intersect with developments in analytic philosophy that originally had entirely different origins. With Quine's challenge to the *Two Dogmas of Empiricism* (1969), the fundamental assumptions of classical linguistic analysis were called into question, paving the way for naturalism and, with it, a new stage in the discussion between psychologism and anti-psychologism. It is not without reason that in recent years there has been talk of a revival of psychologism. However, this psychologism is sometimes not a true revival but rather a transformation of its meaning, which places the philosophy of mind as a respectable analytic topic on the agenda, as in the case of Tim Crane (2014).

Naturalism today is a phenomenon that has given an entirely new shape to the linguistic-analytic tradition and has, frequently, gained dominance in the Anglo-Saxon sphere. What is interesting, however, is that what might initially be considered a characteristic development of analytic philosophy proves to be no less significant for phenomenology. Naturalized phenomenology—or at least a fundamental discussion of phenomenology with naturalism, possibly accompanied by less enthusiasm for transcendentalism—is a tendency that can be observed today. Certainly, such developments are not merely the result of philosophical considerations but have been decisively influenced by advances in the cognitive sciences and neuroscience.

Finally, it should be noted: a history of twentieth-century philosophy that consciously seeks to engage with the *parting of the ways* cannot simply accept the idea of a "history of analytic philosophy" without question but must critically examine it—an inquiry that should be an essential part of a deeper discussion on the historiography of twentieth-century philosophy.

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¿ONTOLOGÍA TRACTARIANA CONJUNTISTA?

SET THEORY TRACTARIAN ONTOLOGY?

Angelo Briones

anbriones@udec.cl

Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Chile

Resumen: *La presente investigación se articula en torno a dos objetivos: (i) presentar la propuesta de G. Lando, según la cual la ontología tractariana debe concebirse desde el lenguaje de la teoría de conjuntos y (ii) exponer diversas dificultades a las que se enfrenta dicha propuesta. Respecto a (ii), lo fundamental será argumentar que las distintas estrategias que Lando menciona para evitar los problemas que conlleva la adopción del extensionalismo resultan inadecuadas. A partir de esto, se concluirá que no es posible compatibilizar el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana, por lo que la propuesta de Lando es insostenible.*

Palabras clave: *Ludwig Wittgenstein; extensionalismo; ontología formal; estructura; estado de cosas.*

Abstract: *The present research is based on two objectives: (i) to present G. Lando's proposal, according to which Tractarian ontology must be conceived through the language of set theory, and (ii) to present various difficulties faced by this proposal. Regarding (ii), the main point will be to argue that the strategies Lando mentions to avoid the problems associated with the adoption of extensionalism are inadequate. From this, it will be concluded that extensionalism cannot be made compatible with Tractarian ontology; therefore, Lando's proposal is untenable.*

Keywords: *Ludwig Wittgenstein; extensionalism; formal ontology; structure; state of affairs.*

1. Introducción: La ontología tractariana[1]

La presente investigación se concentra en evaluar la propuesta de G. Lando, la cual consiste en formalizar mediante el lenguaje de la teoría de conjuntos la ontología propuesta por L. Wittgenstein en su trabajo *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Para esto, a continuación, comentaré en qué consiste la ontología tractariana, como también describiré qué interpretación adopta Lando de dicha ontología. Todo esto facilitará, en las siguientes dos secciones, revisar la propuesta de Lando y luego advertir ciertos problemas en los que incurre tal propuesta.

Para comenzar, tenemos que Wittgenstein en el *Tractatus* reconoce las siguientes entidades: objetos (*Dingen, Gegenstand*) (*T.* 2.01, 2.011, 2.0121), estados de cosas (*Sachverhalte*) (*T.* 2, 2.20141, 2.0272) y hechos (*Tatsachen*) (*T.* 1.1, 1.11, 1.2).[2,3] Ahora bien, parte de cualquier análisis ontológico es precisar cuántas categorías de entidades hay. Este tema en lo que respecta al *Tractatus* es objeto de debate, en la medida que, según Plourde (2016), podemos reconocer al menos tres respuestas:

- Aquella según la cual hay dos categorías: los objetos y los hechos (cfr. Anscombe, 1959; Black, 1964) —Plourde denomina a esta respuesta la *interpretación clásica* de la ontología tractariana.[4]
- La otra respuesta igualmente reconoce dos categorías, aunque afirma que estas son la de los objetos y los estados de cosas (cf. Carruthers, 1990; Stenius, 1960). Cabe señalar que es esta la que adopta Lando — de aquí en adelante llamaremos a esta la *interpretación estándar*.
- Finalmente, está aquella según la cual hay tres categorías, a saber, los objetos, los estados de cosas y los hechos (cf. Dietrich, 1973; Simons, 1985) —esta recibe el nombre de *interpretación disidente*.

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2   Las citas que hacen referencia directa a las proposiciones del *Tractatus Logico – Philosophicus* serán consignadas con la letra ˝*T*˝ seguido del número de la proposición.

3   Para la presente investigación no serán consideradas las situaciones (*Sachlage*).

4   Esta interpretación es la que también adopta Russell en la introducción al *Tractatus*. Es importante señalar que la interpretación clásica contempla la traducción realizada por Ramsey y Ogden de los términos ˝Sachverhalt˝ y ˝Tatsache˝, donde el primero se traduce como ˝hecho atómico˝ (*atomic fact*), mientras que el segundo se traduce como ˝hecho˝ (*fact*). Por otro lado, esta interpretación se corresponde con lo que Black denomina teoría – F —por *Fact theory* (Black, 1964, 39 – 40). La tesis básica de esta teoría es que un *Sachverhalt* es un hecho, al igual que un *Tatsache*, con la única diferencia que los primeros tienen como constituyentes inmediatos a los objetos, mientras que los segundos tendrían como constituyentes a los *Sachverhalte*. Así, un *Sachverhalt* es un hecho atómico, en la medida que no tiene otros hechos como constituyentes, mientras que los *Tatsache*, en estricto rigor, son hechos complejos, dado que tienen otros hechos como constituyentes.

Tal como he advertido, Lando adopta la interpretación estándar de la ontología tractariana. En lo que resta de esta sección me concentraré en describir tal interpretación —respecto a la interpretación disidente se dirá algo más al final de la última sección. Aunque antes de entrar en esto, resulta pertinente decir algo sobre los objetos. En primer lugar, como se puede notar, independiente de la interpretación que se haga de la ontología tractariana, siempre se reconoce la categoría de los objetos. Una característica distintiva de los objetos es que estos son simples (*T.* 2.02), a diferencia, por ejemplo, de los estados de cosas (*T.* 2.0272), dado que estos son obtenidos a partir de los objetos. Respecto a esto último, tenemos que los objetos corresponden a la extensión de los estados de cosas y, además, determinan la estructura de tales entidades (*T.* 2.032). Así es que los objetos pueden ser concebidos, respecto a los estados de cosas, como su contenido y su forma (*T.* 2.025). Otro aspecto que cabe tener en cuenta sobre los objetos es que son independientes para su existencia (*T.* 2.0122). Esto último resulta coherente con su estatus de entidad simple. Notemos que, de hecho, podemos determinar el que un objeto sea simple a partir de su independencia, tal que un objeto es simple porque no depende para su existencia de nada más que de sí mismo. Basado en esto, un estado de cosas, por ejemplo, al ser una entidad compleja —constituida por los objetos— no sería independiente. No obstante, Wittgenstein advierte cierto tipo de dependencia de los objetos respecto a los estados de cosas (*T.* 2.0122). Esta dependencia consiste en que los objetos *deben* ser constituyentes de algún estado de cosas —y esto, porque es esencial a un objeto ser un constituyente de un estado de cosas (*T.* 2.011). Una manera de interpretar esto, sin suponer una contradicción con la idea de que los objetos son independientes, es que un objeto si bien no depende *rígidamente* de nada, este depende *genéricamente* de algún estado de cosas. De acuerdo con esto último, un objeto necesariamente debe constituir algún estado de cosas, pero no es necesario que constituya el estado de cosas que efectivamente constituye. Mediante esta estrategia, no habría tensión con la idea de que los objetos son independientes, dado que la dependencia genérica puede ser interpretada como un tipo de independencia (cf. Alvarado, 2015, 32).[5]

Aclarado ya las características generales de los objetos, revisemos ahora brevemente en qué consiste la interpretación estándar de la ontología tractariana.[6] En primer lugar, esta interpretación se articula considerando la traducción que ofrecen McGiness y Pears de los términos "Sachverhalt" y "Tatsache", donde el primer término se traduce como "estado de cosas" (*State of affairs*) y el segundo como "hecho" (*Fact*) —notemos que es esta la traducción que se está considerando en esta investigación. En segundo lugar, esta interpretación toma a los estados de cosas como aquellas cosas que son representadas o descritas por proposi-

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5   Por ejemplo, si una entidad *x* depende genéricamente de *y*, *x* es independiente de *y*, dado que en un mundo posible *x* puede existir, aunque no exista *y*. Mientras que, si *x* depende rígidamente de *y*, no hay mundo posible en que exista *x* y no exista *y*.

6   Para un tratamiento sistemático de esta interpretación se sugiere el trabajo de Plourde (2016), el cual lleva por título "State of Affairs, Facts and Situations in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*".

ciones elementales independientes de su valor veritativo y, en este sentido, son entidades que posiblemente podrían ser el caso (cf. Plourde, 2016, 186; Stenius 1960, 30).[7] El punto distintivo de esta interpretación es que, si la proposición es verdadera, entonces el estado de cosas representado existe y correspondería a un hecho. Por ejemplo, dice Stenius, si una proposición es verdadera, el contenido descrito por esta, i.e., el estado de cosas, "no solo afirma lo que es el caso, sino que es realmente el caso; por lo que este contenido descriptivo es un hecho, un *Tatsache*" (Stenius, 1960, 30). A partir de lo dicho hasta aquí tenemos que toda proposición se corresponde con un *posible* estado de cosas, independiente de si este es el caso o no.[8] Ahora, si el estado de cosas es el caso, esto es, si existe, es un hecho. Por lo que, en definitiva, resulta que todo hecho es un estado de cosas que existe —cuando revisemos lo que dice la interpretación disidente al final de la tercera sección se volverá sobre esta tesis.

Con estas ideas en mente, en la próxima sección se revisará la propuesta de Lando, la cual se define por concebir los estados de cosas y los hechos como conjuntos. Finalmente, en la sección 3, se expondrán una serie de críticas a esta propuesta, concluyendo que el análisis conjuntista no es compatible con ciertos supuestos básicos de la ontología tractariana, específicamente con aquel que toma a los estados de cosas como entidades estructuradas, en virtud de su compromiso con el extensionalismo.

2. El análisis conjuntista de la ontología tractariana

G. Lando en su trabajo *Tractarian Ontology. Mereology or set theory?* (2007), argumenta por una interpretación conjuntista de la ontología tractariana. Para facilitar el análisis de lo que propone Lando, me parece pertinente tener presente la siguiente distinción. Como indica Varzi (2010), hay dos maneras de caracterizar la labor de la ontología: una material y una formal. La primera trata acerca de lo que hay, mientras que la segunda tiene que ver con especificar la estructura de lo que hay, independiente de lo que esto sea (Varzi, 2010, 3). Considerando esta distinción, podemos diferenciar entre un análisis ontológico material y uno formal. El primer tipo de análisis tendrá como objeto, por ejemplo, evaluar si lo que colma nuestra ontología son solo las entidades fundamentales postuladas por nuestras mejores teorías científicas o, en realidad, debemos aceptar además objetos ordinarios. Mientras que un análisis formal se dedica, por mencionar un caso, a evaluar que lo que hay debe ser entendido como simples y/o como entidades compuestas, independiente de lo que esto sea. Hay que tener presente que una teoría metafísica, en general, se vale indistintamente de ambos análisis —y esto es justamente lo que postula Varzi (2010, 4 – 8). Un caso de esto serían las distintas teorías mereológicas propuestas por autores como Canavotto & Giordani (2022), Koslicki (2008) o Sattig (2019). En estas propuestas, hay un compro-

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7 Una proposición atómica es aquella que tiene como constituyentes inmediatos a los nombres (T. 4.21 – 4.22)

8 Esto que estamos considerando es lo que Black captura como *teoría – P* —por *Possibility theory* (Black, 1964, 40 – 41)

miso *material* con objetos ordinarios y, además, estas se analizan *formalmente* como todos mereológicos en un marco aristotélico (Briones, 2023).

En lo que respecta al *Tractatus*, podemos encontrar ambos tipos de análisis. Por ejemplo, cuando Wittgenstein nos habla acerca de los objetos (*Gegenständen*), no nos dice cuál es el estatus metafísico de estos, sino que más bien nos ofrece un análisis formal al afirmar que estos son simples (*T.* 2.02) y ontológicamente independientes (*T.* 2024).[9] Razones por las que los objetos son la sustancia del mundo (*T.* 2.021). Por otro lado, una prueba de un análisis material explícita del *Tractatus* es el compromiso con los estados de cosas y los hechos, ya que con esto se nos dice qué cosas son las que colman la ontología. Ahora bien, respecto al aspecto formal de esto que hay el *Tractatus* es silente, más allá de afirmar que los estados de cosas y los hechos son complejos (*T.* 2.01, 2.14 - 2.141) y tienen estructura (*T.* 2.034). Es en este punto que podemos ubicar la propuesta de Lando —y su pertinencia. Para este autor, a propósito de lo que hemos revisado previamente, los estados de cosas y los hechos deben ser analizados formalmente como conjuntos. La pertinencia de esta propuesta, Lando la justifica, entre otras razones, considerando las ventajas explicativas que tiene por sobre otra propuesta según la cual los estados de cosas y los hechos deben ser analizados formalmente como todos mereológicos. En lo que resta de esta sección revisaré con mayor detalle cómo se articula la propuesta de Lando.

De entrada, resulta importante recordar la interpretación de la ontología tractariana con la cual Lando se compromete. Dice el autor: "De hecho, la clase de los hechos atómicos es una subclase de la clase de los estados de cosas: un estado de cosas es un hecho atómico si y sólo si este subsiste" (Lando, 2007, 250).[10] De acuerdo con lo comentado en la sección anterior, resulta que Lando se compromete con la interpretación estándar, según la cual todo hecho es un estado de cosas. Por lo que, si los estados de cosas son *constituidos* por los objetos, entonces los hechos son también constituidos por los objetos (Lando, 2007, 250). En el contexto de su propuesta, Lando considerará que la relación de constitución aquí señalada debe ser precisada como la relación 'ser un elemento de' (Lando, 2007, 248) —aludiendo aquí a la relación binaria de membresía de la teoría de conjuntos. Y así es que aquello constituido por los objetos debería ser un conjunto. Esta idea se introduce como alternativa a aquella según la cual la relación de constitución debe ser interpretada como

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9   Consideremos, por ejemplo, lo que dice Tejedor: "El debate sobre el estatus metafísico de los objetos tractarianos ha generado una gran variedad de opiniones divergentes. No obstante, de estas interpretaciones contrapuestas puede extraerse un denominador común: los participantes en este debate sobre la metafísica de los simples parten del supuesto de que Wittgenstein adopta una posición particular en la disputa realismo-fenomenalismo, y luego argumentan que los objetos Tractarianos son las unidades más simples del tipo metafísico que, en su opinión, favorece Wittgenstein" (Tejedor, 2001, 286). Un análisis material sobre este tópico puede ser la propuesta de Frascolla (2004), según la cual los objetos tractarianos son *qualia*.

10   Un hecho atómico es aquel constituido por objetos. Siempre que se hable de hechos a lo largo del trabajo me estaré refiriendo a hechos atómicos.

la relación mereológica 'ser parte de'. Esto último es lo que en su momento sugiere Frege, como queda claro en su carta a Wittgenstein del 28 de Junio de 1919. De hecho, Frege en esta carta advierte que si efectivamente la relación de constitución debe ser interpretada en clave mereológica se contradice la proposición 1.1 del *Tractatus*, la cual dice que el mundo es la totalidad de los hechos, no así de las cosas.[11] No revisaré aquí este problema, aunque para el caso basta con indicar que lo que advierte Frege no se sigue si entendemos la relación de constitución que va de los objetos a los estados de cosas, como también a los hechos, como una relación que no esté regida por la propiedad de la transitividad, como justamente ocurre con la relación de membresía.[12]

Aclarado lo anterior, Lando introduce la noción de 'clase' en términos intuitivos: "dada una cierta propiedad, hay una clase de objetos con tal propiedad" (2007, 253) y enseguida advierte que para que una clase sea tratada como un objeto de la ontología, i.e., algo sobre lo que podamos cuantificar, esta debe ser *objetivada*. Aquí es importante advertir lo siguiente: si una clase requiere ser objetivada es porque, a primeras, postular una clase de ciertas entidades no implica necesariamente un compromiso ontológico con tal clase. En este sentido, por ejemplo, hablar de la clase de los gatos siameses no implica un compromiso ontológico con la clase, además de sus miembros. En este nivel del análisis los estados de cosas y los hechos serán tratados como clases de objetos (Lando, 2007, 254) —el rango de las clases está determinado por el análisis material que ofrece el *Tractatus*.[13] Ahora bien, de acuerdo con Lando, una forma de objetivar una clase es mediante la relación de *representación*, que va de un objeto representante a una clase representada (Lando, 2007, 254). Entonces, cuando una clase se representa mediante un objeto, la clase se objetiva. Me detendré en este punto un momento. La relación de representación tiene dos relatas, a saber, lo representante y lo representado. Ahora, si mediante la representación objetivamos lo representado, esto último cuenta como una entidad *bona fide* de la ontología. Parecería, por tanto, que realizada la objetivación de la clase, contamos ahora con el objeto representante —el cual debería ser aceptado como una entidad de la ontología— y el objeto representado, lo que para el caso corresponde a la clase. Ante el riesgo de inflar la ontología tractariana y aceptar más entidades que las que el análisis material determina, resulta pertinente la siguiente idea de Lando: "cuando las clases se consideran objetos en sí mismos, esta relación de representación será una subclase de la identidad" (Lando, 2007: 254). Me parece que hay, al menos, dos maneras de interpretar esta idea: (1)

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11   Dice Frege en la carta mencionada: "Es esencial para una cosa que esta pueda ser un componente de un objeto – estado [*object – state*]. ¿Puede ahora una cosa ser un componente de un hecho? La parte es parte del todo. Si una cosa es un componente de un hecho y todo hecho es parte del mundo, entonces la cosa es también parte del mundo"

12   En un momento de la investigación, Lando menciona la posibilidad de optar por alguna relación binaria distinta a la de membresía, que por definición sea no-transitiva, dentro de un marco mereológico (Lando, 2007, 252).

13   Lando también dice que el mundo y el espacio lógico caen en el rango de las clases (Lando, 2007, 254). No obstante, dado los intereses de la presente investigación, no se consideran tales entidades en el grueso del análisis.

realizada la objetivación de la clase, la clase es idéntica con el objeto que la representa y (2) cuando contamos con que los relatas de la relación de representación son entidades de la ontología, entonces la relación de representación es de identidad. Independientemente de cuál sea la interpretación correcta, lo crucial aquí es que, en un momento del análisis, se establecerá que una clase representada es idéntica con el objeto que la representa. No profundizaré en las complejidades que traería consigo (1) y (2), dado que mi crítica no apunta a este flanco de la propuesta. Entonces, por cuestiones metodológicas, basta con conceder lo que el autor está proponiendo.

Volviendo al tema, Lando formaliza la relación de representación de la siguiente manera:

$$[\text{y representa X}] : O(y, \ X)$$

Donde "y" es el objeto representante y "X" es la clase representada y, por tanto, objetivada. El paso siguiente consiste en determinar una condición necesaria y suficiente para que haya representación, que es la siguiente: "una representación de X necesita incluir al menos todos los miembros de la clase X" (Lando, 2007, 258). Dado que la clase es una entidad compleja, en la medida en que es obtenida a partir de otras cosas, su representación, i.e., el objeto representante, debe ser complejo a su vez.[14] Notemos que esta condición impuesta a la relación de representación resulta similar a la característica que tiene la relación de *figuración* (*Abbildung*) de Wittgenstein: los elementos tanto de lo representado como de lo figurado se deben corresponder con los elementos de aquello que es representado y de aquello que es figurado (*T*. 2.13, 2.131).

Realizado lo anterior, Lando especifica que la representación de la clase corresponde a un conjunto y este tiene como miembros los mismos miembros de la clase. Esto se formaliza de la siguiente manera (Lando, 2007, 259):

$$[\text{y representa X} - 2 \text{ versión}] : \ O(y, \ X) \leftrightarrow \forall z(z\varepsilon X \leftrightarrow z \prec y)$$

Aquí el operador "ε" está por "ser miembro" para el caso de los conjuntos, mientras que el operador "$\prec$" está por "ser miembro" para el caso de las clases. Lo importante de este principio, como señala Lando, es que "y es un conjunto que tiene como elementos todos los miembros de *X* y nada más" (Lando, 2007, 259). Luego de esto, se establece que un estado de cosas es representado por un conjunto cuyos elementos son los objetos tractarianos que constituyen el estado de cosas, mientras que un hecho es representado por el mismo conjunto de objetos (Lando, 2007, 259). Finalmente, a partir de este principio "podemos decir

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14 Como se ha mencionado previamente, Lando entiende que los estados de cosas y hechos son clases de objetos. Según la evidencia textual del *Tractatus* ambas entidades son complejas (*T*. 2.01, 2.0272, 2.03, 2.034). Entonces, se descarta que haya clases de un solo miembro o clases vacías (cf. Lando, 2017, 254, nota al pie 5).

que, desde el punto de vista de la teoría de conjuntos, la relación O(y, X)es de identidad: clases representadas y conjuntos representantes contienen exactamente los mismos componentes, por lo que es mucho más fácil identificar clases y conjuntos" (Lando, 2007, 259). Aquí, tal como se advirtió más arriba, se apela a que el objeto representante es idéntico a la clase representada.

Antes de continuar, comentaré lo dicho considerando la diferencia entre análisis material y análisis formal. En su momento se mencionó que Wittgenstein realiza un análisis material cuando nos dice que lo que hay son estados de cosas y hechos —aunque también realiza un análisis formal de los objetos. Este análisis material se puede complementar con un análisis formal sobre los estados de cosas y los hechos, el cual da cuenta de cómo debemos entender formalmente los estados de cosas y los hechos. Y esto justamente es lo que hace Lando al concebir y formalizar la ontología del *Tractatus* mediante la teoría de conjuntos. Un aporte significativo de un análisis formal en general, para el caso de la ontología tractariana, es explicar cómo debemos entender que los objetos constituyen los estados de cosas y los hechos. A partir de la propuesta de Lando, la relación de constitución se debe entender cómo la relación de membresía, por lo que, en consecuencia, la relación de constitución en el *Tractatus* no es de orden transitiva, tal que si los objetos son miembros de los hechos y los hechos, a su vez, son miembros del conjunto que identificamos como el mundo (cf. Lando, 2007, 259), no se sigue que los objetos sean miembros/constituyan el mundo —y esto evita el escenario descrito por Frege en su carta del 28 de Junio de 1919.[15] Hay que notar aquí que, si asumimos que la teoría de conjuntos es adecuada para concebir y formalizar la ontología tractariana, entonces ciertos hechos de la ontología deben ser explicados a partir de los principios básicos que adopta la teoría en cuestión. Uno de estos principios básicos de la teoría de conjuntos es el axioma de extensionalidad, según el cual hay identidad entre conjuntos si y sólo tienen los mismos miembros. Entonces, si los estados de cosas y los hechos son conjuntos, sus condiciones de identidad deben estar regidas por el axioma mencionado. Sobre este punto tratará el resto del análisis de la presente sección, como también los cuestionamientos a la propuesta de Lando que serán expuestos en la siguiente sección.

De entrada, me parece importante señalar que no es ajeno a Lando lo problemático que puede resultar adoptar extensionalidad en el contexto de la ontología tractariana:

> Cabe prever una posible objeción general. (…) en algunos puntos de mi exposición parto del supuesto de que es posible formular condiciones de identidad adecuadas para las entidades complejas enumerando sus constituyentes. Esta presuposición puede etiquetarse de «extensionalismo» y podría discutirse desde varios puntos de vista (Lando, 2007, 262).

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15   Ver nota 10.

Ante esto, Lando ofrecerá una serie de alternativas que permitirían conciliar el extensionalismo con la ontología en cuestión. Aunque antes de revisar esto, veamos brevemente por qué podría ser problemático comprometerse con el extensionalismo en el marco de la ontología tractariana. Asumamos el siguiente escenario: a nivel de los objetos contamos solo con dos entidades, sean estos a y b, a partir de los cuales hay dos estados de cosas posibles —independiente de si estos corresponden a hechos. Los cuales serían [aRb] y [bRa].[16] La estructura formal de estos estados de cosas sería {a, b} y {b, a}, respectivamente. Por extensionalidad, estos estados de cosas son idénticos, dado que tienen los mismos miembros. Pero esto no puede ser correcto, dado que el análisis de estos muestra que el primero trata de que a está R con b, mientras que el segundo trata de que b está R con a —si consideramos que los estados de cosas corresponden al contenido semántico de las proposiciones atómicas, cada estado de cosas mencionado sería el contenido de distintas proposiciones atómicas (cf. Lando, 2007, 256), una de las cuales puede ser verdadera, mientras que la otra falsa. Otro problema, relativo a los hechos, sería el siguiente: tal como lo considera la interpretación estándar, que es la que adopta Lando, los hechos son hacedores de verdad de proposiciones atómicas (cf. Lando, 2007, 255). Pues bien, consideremos que solo tenemos el hecho de que a está R con b. La estructura formal de este hecho es {a, b}. Este hecho haría verdadera la proposición atómica "a está R con b". Dado que contamos solo con este hecho, se sigue, en consecuencia, que la proposición atómica "b está R con a" debe ser falsa ya que no hay un hecho que la haga verdadera. Pero aquí viene el problema. La estructura del hecho que *debería* hacer verdadera la proposición "b está R con a" es {b, a}. Por extensionalidad, ocurre que {b, a} es idéntico con {a, b}. Por tanto, la proposición que en principio es falsa acaba por tener un hacedor de verdad y, así, tendría que ser verdadera. Entonces ocurriría que siempre que haya una proposición atómica verdadera, toda proposición atómica distinta de esta, que tenga los mismos constituyentes, será también verdadera. Pero esto, me parece, entra en conflicto con la proposición T. 2.222, según la cual la verdad o falsedad de una proposición —en cuanto figura— consiste en el acuerdo o desacuerdo de su sentido con la realidad. En efecto, en principio, no contamos con un hecho que se corresponda con lo expresado por la proposición "b está R con a", no obstante, tendría que ser verdadera ya que hay un hecho que sería idéntico al hecho que *debería* ser el caso para que la proposición en cuestión sea verdadera. Y la razón de esto no es más que la extensionalidad.

Si bien Lando no menciona estos problemas, me parece que es consciente de que este tipo de problemas pueden surgir al suscribir extensionalidad —y recordemos que debemos suscribir extensionalidad, si nuestro análisis concibe la ontología tractariana en términos conjuntistas. Digo esto porque Lando sugiere distintas estrategias para conciliar extensionalidad con los lineamientos ontológicos del *Tractatus*, entre las cuales hay dos útiles para evitar los problemas advertidos. Notemos que, en términos generales, la extensionalidad

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16   Para el caso no consideraré que "R" está por un objeto, aunque esto será crucial en el análisis de la siguiente sección.

resulta problemática al ser ciega a la *estructura*, i.e., el ordenamiento de los objetos, de los estados de cosas y de los hechos, lo cual es un aspecto determinante de estos tipos de entidades (*T.* 2.0272, 2.032, 2.032, 2.034, 2.14, 2.15):

> Según algunos estudiosos, la mera lista de constituyentes (incluidas eventualmente las relaciones) no basta para identificar hechos o estados de cosas. Una misma clase de constituyentes puede conectarse de distintas maneras, generando hechos y estados de cosas diferentes (…)

> Estas diferentes formas de combinación serían la forma lógica de los estados de cosas (y la estructura de un hecho). Si uno suscribe esta lectura de la noción tractariana de la forma lógica de un estado de cosas, no aceptará los presupuestos extensionalistas de algunos argumentos de este artículo (Lando, 2007, 264).[17]

Ahora las dos estrategias que buscan conciliar estructura y extensionalismo son las siguientes:

- Forma lógica como relaciones: la idea aquí, en primer lugar, es que las relaciones son objetos de la ontología, esto es, contarían como constituyentes de los estados de cosas y de los hechos —y, por tanto, la estructura formal de un estado de cosas debe mostrar como miembros suyos a las relaciones. En segundo lugar, debemos considerar que las relaciones son la forma lógica de la entidad (Lando, 2007, 264).
- Objetos con formas lógicas: aquí el punto es que no hay algo así como una forma lógica como constituyente, sino que la forma lógica de un estado de cosas o de un hecho resulta de la forma lógica de los constituyentes —aquí queda abierto si las relaciones deben ser consideradas constituyentes de los estados de cosas y de los hechos. Entonces, "dada una lista de constituyentes, la forma lógica del estado de cosas que los incluye está determinada. En este caso, no es necesario mencionar la forma lógica en las condiciones de identidad del estado de cosas y se puede apoyar el extensionalismo" (Lando, 2007, 264).

Hay que dejar en claro que Lando no opta por ninguna de estas alternativas. No obstante, cualesquiera de ellas parecerían adecuadas para conciliar el extensionalismo con el análisis de la ontología tractariana y, así, evitar los problemas mencionados más arriba. Entonces, queda por evaluar qué implica cada una de estas alternativas y si realmente son eficaces para evitar los problemas advertidos. Esto es el objetivo de la siguiente sección.

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17   Por mor de la argumentación ˝forma lógica˝ y ˝estructura˝ serán utilizados como términos equivalentes.

3. Los problemas del análisis conjuntista

Mi estrategia aquí procederá de la siguiente forma. En primer lugar, aceptaré el siguiente condicional: si el análisis conjuntista de la ontología tractariana es correcto, entonces es compatible el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana. La razón por la cual debemos aceptar este condicional es que adoptar la teoría de conjunto trae consigo comprometernos con los principios que rigen esta teoría, entre los cuales está lo que dice el extensionalismo; lo que le resulta patente a Lando, tal como se ha señalado previamente. Ahora, aceptado el condicional, mi intención es mostrar que el consecuente es falso, esto es, no ocurre que el extensionalismo es compatible con la ontología tractariana. Dado esto, concluiré que el antecedente también es falso, es decir, es falso que el análisis conjuntista de la ontología tractariana sea correcto.[18]

En el tramo final de la sección anterior se mencionaron distintos problemas que surgen por el compromiso con el extensionalismo. Notamos que la raíz de estos problemas es que el extensionalismo es ciego a la estructura de los estados de cosas y de los hechos. Por este motivo, tenemos que, en primera instancia, el extensionalismo no es compatible con la ontología tractariana. Posteriormente, siguiendo a Lando, se mencionaron dos alternativas que supuestamente permitirían dar cuenta de forma adecuada de la estructura de los estados de cosas y de los hechos. En coherencia con esto, asumiré que, si al menos una de estas alternativas logra efectivamente tal cometido, entonces el extensionalismo es compatible con la ontología tractariana. En caso contrario, el extensionalismo no será compatible con dicha ontología.

Aclarado lo anterior, procedamos ahora a revisar las alternativas que ofrece Lando. De acuerdo con lo dicho más arriba, la primera alternativa —de ahora en adelante PA— dice que las relaciones de los estados de cosas son la forma lógica o estructura de los estados de cosas. Una manera de capturar esto es la siguiente. Consideremos dos estados de cosas [aRb] y [bRa]. Aquí cada estado de cosas tiene tres constituyentes, donde R, la relación, también está contando como un constituyente y, por tanto, por un objeto tractariano.[19] Los estados de cosas en cuestión exhiben distinta estructura, en la medida en que sus constituyentes exhiben un ordenamiento distinto. Ahora bien, por PA, dada esta diferencia, resultaría que la relación del primer estado de cosas es distinta de la relación del segundo estado de cosas. Capturemos esto de la siguiente manera: [aRb] y [$bR'a$], donde $R \neq R'$. A partir de esto, en el contexto del análisis conjuntista de la ontología tractariana, tendríamos que la estructura formal de los estados de cosas en cuestión sería la siguiente: $\{a, R, b\}$ y $\{b, R', a\}$, respectivamente. Por extensionalidad, aquí hay dos conjuntos, dado que tienen miembros distintos. Lo crucial de PA es que la diferencia estructural entre estados de cosas

18   Notemos que si el consecuente es verdadero no se sigue la verdad del antecedente; con la verdad del consecuente solo garantizamos que es posible un análisis de la ontología tractariana que adopte el extensionalismo.

19   Potter, por ejemplo, es un defensor de que las relaciones son objetos tractarianos (cf. Potter, 2009, 233).

supone, necesariamente, diferencia a nivel de los constituyentes de las entidades complejas y esta alternativa resulta coherente con el extensionalismo.

Revisemos ahora si es del todo adecuada la alternativa descrita. En primer lugar, revisemos las siguientes proposiciones del *Tractatus*:

2.011: Es esencial a las cosas el que puedan ser parte constituyente de un estado de cosas.

2.0141: La forma de un objeto es la posibilidad de su ocurrencia en estados de cosas.

A partir de estas proposiciones, tenemos que es parte de la esencia de los objetos poder ser un constituyente de un estado de cosas, es decir, siguiendo aquí a Fogelin (2002), que estos puedan combinarse unos con otros para obtener así un estado de cosas. Digamos que esto es la esencia general de los objetos —al igual que es parte de la esencia de cualquier conjunto no-vacío tener miembros. Ahora bien, un objeto puede ser un constituyente de un estado de cosas y no así de otro y esto justamente está determinado por su forma, a saber, el rango de combinaciones posibles de un objeto (cf. Morris, 2015, 46) —la forma de los objetos podría ser entendida como la esencia individual de cada uno de los objetos. Adicionalmente, consideremos la siguiente proposición:

2.01231: Para conocer un objeto, no tengo por cierto que conocer sus propiedades externas, pero sí todas sus propiedades internas.

Siguiendo aquí la interpretación de Morris (2015), podemos capturar la diferencia de las propiedades internas de un objeto con sus propiedades externas, diciendo que las primeras son esenciales a estos, mientras que no lo son las últimas. Y dado que la esencia de los objetos tiene que ver con sus posibilidades de combinación con otros objetos, tendríamos que una propiedad interna de un objeto es que este *pueda* estar combinado con otro objeto, mientras que una propiedad externa de este sería la manera en que efectivamente está combinado con otro objeto.[20]

Para continuar, revisemos ahora esta otra proposición:

2.032: El modo y manera en que los objetos se conectan en un estado de cosas es la estructura de tal estado de cosas.

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20 Morris caracteriza esto de la siguiente manera: "Las cualidades externas de una cosa son aquellas que la cosa tiene sólo de manera contingente, mientras que las cualidades internas son las esenciales a ellas. En nuestro sencillo ejemplo es una cualidad externa de Bill que esté a la izquierda de Ben, por cuanto para él no es necesario estar a la izquierda de Ben. Pero es una cualidad *interna* de Bill que *pueda* estar a la izquierda de Ben: eso es parte de su esencia" (Morris, 2015, 45).

Sin forzar demasiado la interpretación de esta proposición, parece que aquí Wittgenstein afirma que la estructura de un estado de cosas consiste en la manera en que los objetos son configurados. Adicionalmente, asumiré que diferentes configuraciones de los objetos en los estados de cosas implican distintos estados de cosas. Llamaré a esto la *tesis de la estructura*. Por otro lado, resulta crucial tener presente que, si un objeto es un constituyente de un estado de cosas, esa posibilidad debe residir ya en el objeto (*T.* 2.012 – 2.0121). De manera que si un objeto constituye o no un estado de cosas no es algo que podamos determinar por hechos *extrínsecos* a la naturaleza del objeto.

Considerando todo lo dicho hasta acá, consideremos el siguiente esquema de razonamiento:

1. Asumamos una ontología en la cual contamos solo con tres objetos tractarianos, *a*, *b* y *R*, donde *R* corresponde a una relación.
2. Asumamos que a partir de tales objetos podemos obtener los siguientes estados de cosas: [*aRb*] y [*bRa*] —podemos decir que las formas de los objetos permiten la obtención de estos estados de cosas (*T.* 2.0141).
3. Por la tesis de la estructura, dado que cada estado de cosas señalado en (2) exhibe una configuración diferente, tenemos dos estados de cosas.
4. Lo dicho en (3) debe ser explicado por los principios de la teoría formal que explica la ontología tractariana. En el caso de la propuesta de Lando, lo dicho en (3) debe ser explicado considerando el compromiso con el extensionalismo, dada la explicación conjuntista que él ofrece.
5. Una manera en que el extensionalismo puede explicar el hecho de que [*aRb*] no es idéntico con [*bRa*] es considerando que *R* del primer estado de cosas es distinto de *R* del segundo estado de cosas —esto es básicamente lo que nos dice la alternativa de Lando que estamos revisando, a saber, PA.
6. Entonces, por (5), tenemos que *a* y *b* del primer estado de cosas son idénticos a *a* y *b* del segundo estado de cosas, pero *R* del primer estado de cosas no es idéntico a *R* del segundo estado de cosas.
7. En (6) se muestra un total de cuatro entidades, *a*, *b*, *R* del primer estado de cosas y *R* del segundo estado de cosas. Dado que por definición las relaciones son objetos tractarianos, entonces, por (6), el análisis de los estados de cosas señalados en (2) arroja un total de cuatro objetos tractarianos.
8. La conclusión de (7) es contradictoria con lo supuesto en (1).

Con (8) hemos llegado a un resultado problemático: se inicia el análisis asumiendo que hay solo tres objetos tractarianos, pero por lo dicho en (5) se acaba el análisis con cuatro entidades, las cuales deben ser todas objetos tractarianos —tal como se indica en (8). Esto último contradice nuestro supuesto inicial. Es importante tener claro que este problema

se origina al identificar la forma lógica o estructura de un estado de cosas con uno de sus constituyentes, comprometiéndose, además, con el extensionalismo —lo que se dice en (5). Ahora bien, notemos que este problema no se resuelve si aceptamos que el dominio de los objetos tractarianos es infinito —lo cual parece ser una cuestión abierta (cf. McGray, 2006, 148 – 152; Soames, 1983, 574), dado que es perfectamente posible comenzar el análisis especificando solo las tres entidades iniciales, en un dominio infinito, y así obtener dos estados de cosas solo con estas tres entidades; luego, aplica lo dicho en (4) – (8). En realidad, una manera de evitar el problema que he advertido sería apelar a un criterio referente a la constitución de un estado de cosas, del tipo 'las *x*s constituyen *y*, si y sólo si *C*'. Donde el valor de las *x*s son los objetos tractarianos, el valor de *y* los estados de cosas y *C* corresponde a una condición tal que evite que el mismo objeto tractariano, *R*, aparezca en los dos estados de cosas considerados. Pero esto resulta demasiado exigente para la teoría de conjuntos: si definimos los conjuntos por *comprensión*, como parece sugerir Lando cuando define lo que es una clase (cf. Lando, 2007, 253), a lo sumo podemos decir que, si los estados de cosas son conjuntos, sus miembros tienen la propiedad de ser objetos tractarianos. Pero esto no resulta suficiente para evitar el problema señalado. Otra forma de evitar (8) sería establecer que si tenemos el estado de cosas [*aRb*] no puede ser el caso de que exista un estado de cosas [*bRa*], a menos que este último sea idéntico con el primero. Pues bien, me parece que establecer algo como esto supone que podemos determinar la no existencia de un estado de cosas a partir de la existencia de otro estado de cosas. Pero esto atenta contra la proposición 2.062, donde se especifica que no podemos determinar la existencia o no existencia de un estado de cosas a partir de la existencia o no existencia de otro estado de cosas —esto último volverá a aparecer cuando revisemos la segunda alternativa.

Ahora bien, otra estrategia podría ser la siguiente: dado que los estados de cosas considerados exhiben distinta estructura, no podría ser el caso que compartan los mismos constituyentes, específicamente *R*. Es decir, si *R* está con *a* a la izquierda y con *b* a la derecha —lo que corresponde al estado de cosas [*aRb*]—, *necesariamente* no podría ocurrir que *R* pueda estar con *b* a la izquierda y con *a* a la derecha —que es el estado de cosas [*bRa*]. Notemos que debe ser necesario que si obtenemos [*aRb*] no podamos obtener [*bRa*], ya que si esto es meramente contingente, lo planteado en el esquema de razonamiento podría seguir siendo válido. Esta estrategia negaría (2) y, así, no se sigue lo planteado en (8) —en última instancia, el mundo descrito podría tener solo un estado de cosas, por ejemplo, [*aRb*]. Pero esta estrategia se enfrenta, al menos, a dos dificultades: la primera tiene que ver con la diferencia entre propiedades internas y externas de los objetos. Parece cierto en el escenario descrito que es parte de las propiedades internas de *R* que este se pueda combinar con *a* y *b*, pero sería una propiedad externa que *R* se combine como lo hace efectivamente en el estado de cosas [*aRb*] o [*bRa*], lo cual en ningún caso es esencial a *R*. Entonces, es cierto que podría ocurrir que *R* se combine efectivamente con *a* y *b* en el estado de cosas [*aRb*] y que no se combine con *a* y *b* formando el estado de cosas [*bRa*], aunque esto en

ningún caso es un hecho necesario, sino que más bien contingente, a riesgo de identificar las propiedades internas del objeto con sus propiedades externas. Pero esto entra en conflicto con la estrategia que estamos revisando, ya que esta requiere que el hecho descrito sea necesario y no así contingente. La otra dificultad apunta a la naturaleza del objeto, en particular de R. De acuerdo con la estrategia planteada, por el hecho de que R sea constituyente, por ejemplo, del estado de cosas $[aRb]$ se seguiría que R no puede ser constituyente del estado de cosas $[bRa]$. Pero esto en ningún caso parece estar determinado por la naturaleza de R. Si aceptamos que R es un constituyente de $[aRb]$, estamos aceptando que es parte de la naturaleza de R que este se pueda combinar con a y b, pero de aquí no se puede concluir que, por ejemplo, R pueda ser constituyente de $[aRb]$ y no así de $[bRa]$. Establecer algo como esto último sería apelar a hechos *extrínsecos* de la naturaleza de R y esto, como se advirtió más arriba, va contra lo que Wittgenstein afirma en el *Tractatus*.

En conclusión, por todo lo dicho hasta aquí, me parece que PA no puede compatibilizar de forma adecuada el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana.

Veamos ahora lo que ocurre con la segunda alternativa que plantea Lando —de ahora en adelante SA. Según esta, la forma lógica de un estado de cosas, y así de un hecho, debe ser reducida a la forma lógica de los constituyentes. Esta alternativa, independiente del compromiso con el extensionalismo, parece ser la que más se ajusta a lo planteado en el *Tractatus*. Veamos, por ejemplo, lo que dice Gaskin: "Objetos en el mundo son configurados, y nombres en proposiciones elementales son configuradas: pero aquellas configuraciones no son ellas mismas otros objetos, u otros nombres" (Gaskin, 2008, 328). La idea aquí es que la forma lógica o estructura de los estados de cosas es algo que se *muestra* mediante la configuración de los objetos y no es en sí un constituyente adicional a los objetos configurados (cf. Gaskin, 2008, 329). Una de las proposiciones del *Tractatus* en la que podemos encontrar evidencia para sostener esto sería la siguientes:

> 2.03: En un estado de cosas los objetos están entrelazados unos con otros como los eslabones de una cadena.

A partir de esta proposición, podemos considerar que la estructura de un estado de cosas consiste en la manera en que los objetos que lo constituyen están *concatenados* (*T.* 4.22). Y en este sentido, dar cuenta de cómo los objetos de un estado de cosa están concatenados supondría dar cuenta de la estructura de este, de manera que en las condiciones de identidad de los estados de cosas no sería nombrada su forma lógica o estructura.

Ahora bien, a pesar de los méritos que tiene SA, no parece que con esta estrategia podamos compatibilizar el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana y la razón es que el extensionalismo es ciego a cualquier aspecto adicional a la mera lista de los constituyentes de un estado de cosas. Ilustraré esto último apelando a un caso de la química: pensemos en el *butano* y el *isobutano* que son dos macromoléculas, las cuales tienen como constituyentes

diez moléculas de hidrógeno y cuatro moléculas de carbono, enlazadas mediante enlaces covalentes. A pesar de compartir los mismos constituyentes hablamos de dos macromoléculas y su diferencia la podemos capturar mediante su estructura química.21 En términos generales, podemos decir que la estructura química de cada una de estas macromoléculas consiste en la manera en que se concatenan, mediante los enlaces, cada una de las moléculas de hidrógeno y de carbono. No obstante, si aceptamos el extensionalismo, resulta que las entidades en cuestión habrían de ser idénticas, a pesar de diferir a nivel estructural, dado que tienen los mismos constituyentes (cf. Lewis, 1986, 36 – 39). Pues bien, algo similar ocurriría con los estados de cosas en el contexto de sa. Podemos decir que la estructura de un estado de cosas está determinada por cómo están concatenados los objetos, tal que la diferencia entre los estados de cosas, con los mismos constituyentes, consiste justamente en cómo estén concatenados sus constituyentes. Pero esta diferencia no puede ser capturada desde el extensionalismo, ya que, según esta doctrina, si listamos los mismos constituyentes, entonces hay identidad. En otros términos, para el extensionalismo lo único que funda la diferencia entre entidades es la discernibilidad a nivel de extensión, que para el caso sería el nivel de los constituyentes; cualquier hecho adicional a esto no sería importante, al menos para la identidad de las entidades.

No obstante, podemos pensar una forma de salvaguardar la idea de que la concatenación de los constituyentes en un estado de cosas, a saber, su estructura, es relevante para su identidad asumiendo un compromiso con el extensionalismo. Esta forma sería adoptar un principio de *exclusividad* que gobierne la relación de concatenación (cf. Cotnoir & Varzi, 2021, 206), tal que dado cualquier estado de cosas que consista en la concatenación de los objetos *a* y *b* —para el caso no es relevante considerar aquí las relaciones como objetos—, entonces no hay un estado de cosas distinto que sea la concatenación de los objetos *b* y *a*.22 Pero una estrategia como esta no me parece del todo adecuada en el contexto del *Tractatus*, sin mencionar que sería un principio *adicional* al cuerpo de principios que rigen la teoría de conjuntos. Digo esto porque el principio de exclusividad contradice flagrantemente la evidencia textual del *Tractatus*, específicamente las proposiciones *T*. 2.061, 2.062 y 5.135, según las cuales, al ser un estado de cosas independiente, no se puede inferir la existencia o no existencia de un estado de cosas a partir de la existencia o no existencia de otro estado de cosas. En otras palabras, de acuerdo con el principio de exclusividad, si aceptamos la existencia de un estado de cosas, *x*, en que *a* y *b* están concatenados, se sigue que no puede haber un estado de cosas, *y*, que tenga a *a* y *b* como constituyentes, pero que estos estén concatenados de manera distinta. Es decir, si a partir

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21 Sus fórmulas químicas, respectivamente, son ᴄʜ3ᴄʜ2ᴄʜ2ᴄʜ3 y (ʜ3ᴄ)-ᴄʜᴄʜ3-ᴄʜ3.

22 Podemos formalizar este principio, donde *C* es el predicado ̈...es la concatenación de...̈, ̈*x*̈ y ̈*w*̈ están por estado de cosas y ̈*y*̈ y ̈*z*̈ están por objetos, de la siguiente manera:

[*Exclusividad*]: $\forall x \forall y \forall z (Cxyz \rightarrow \neg \exists w Cwzy)$

de *x* se puede inferir, asumiendo la verdad del principio de exclusividad, que no existe *y*, entonces, contradecimos la evidencia textual del *Tractatus* —por lo que aceptar lo del principio de exclusividad parecería un sacrificio demasiado alto a pagar solo para poder aceptar el extensionalismo. En consecuencia, si desechamos el principio de exclusividad por esta razón, sigue patente la problemática señalada más arriba.

Por tanto, considerando lo mencionado, concluyo que SA tampoco permitiría conciliar adecuadamente la ontología tractariana con el extensionalismo.

Para continuar, resumamos lo que se ha realizado hasta aquí. Básicamente, se han considerado las dos alternativas que, según Lando, permitirían compatibilizar el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana. La primera, PA, apelaba a que la estructura o forma lógica de los estados de cosas se debe identificar con las relaciones, asumiendo que estas son objetos tractarianos. La segunda alternativa, SA, consistía en asumir que la estructura de los estados de cosas está determinada por la manera en que los objetos están concatenados en los estados de cosas. Para cada una de estas alternativas se mostraron distintos problemas. Respecto a PA, lo crucial fue mostrar lo inadecuado que resulta identificar la forma lógica con un objeto tractariano. En lo que concierne a SA, no se trató tanto de criticar lo que esta alternativa dice, sino que más bien de mostrar que no hay manera en que el extensionalismo pueda capturar justamente que la estructura de un estado de cosas se debe entender como la manera en que sus constituyentes están concatenados. Ahora bien, de acuerdo con lo advertido al inicio de esta sección, del hecho de que ninguna de las alternativas de Lando resulta adecuada, debemos concluir que no es posible compatibilizar el extensionalismo con la ontología tractariana. Y, a partir de esto, concluyo que el análisis conjuntista de la ontología tractariana no es correcto.

Como último punto, quisiera mencionar cierta interpretación de la ontología tractariana, según la cual ningún hecho es un estado de cosas. Notemos que en el contexto de esta interpretación el extensionalismo sería irreconciliable con la ontología en cuestión. En efecto, si tanto estados de cosas como hechos tienen los mismos constituyentes, pero no ocurre que los hechos sean estados de cosas, entonces no habría forma de adoptar el extensionalismo de manera coherente. Entonces para concluir, veamos brevemente las ideas centrales de esta interpretación, la cual Plourde (2016) denomina *la interpretación disidente* —ver sección 1.

En la primera sección, como también a lo largo del trabajo, se advirtió que Lando adopta la *interpretación estándar* de la ontología tractariana, según la cual todo hecho es un estado de cosas. Notemos que esta interpretación resulta coherente en el marco del proyecto de Lando: si aceptamos que los estados de cosas y los hechos son conjuntos, los cuales tienen como sus únicos miembros a los objetos, se sigue, de acuerdo con el extensionalismo, que un hecho será idéntico a un estado de cosas siempre que tengan los mismos miembros. Entonces, parece que, si rechazamos la interpretación estándar, de entrada, el proyecto de Lando enfrentaría problemas. Por ejemplo, si un hecho *x* y un estado de cosas *y* tienen

como constituyente a los objetos *a* y *b*, pero resulta que un hecho no es nunca un estado de cosas, no podría ser que *x* = *y*, lo cual entra en contradicción con el extensionalismo. Ante este problema, los problemas advertidos para el extensionalismo, como también las estrategias revisadas más arriba, resultarían ser una cuestión de segundo orden, ya que lo urgente sería intentar conciliar el extensionalismo considerando la diferencia entre hechos y estados de cosas. Como se dijo recientemente, hay una interpretación de la ontología tractariana, la interpretación disidente, que justamente defiende que nunca un hecho es un estado de cosas. Esta interpretación se construye a partir de ciertas ideas de R. Dietrich (1973) y P. Simons (1985). En lo que resta de este trabajo revisaré estas ideas.

Comencemos considerando lo que dice Dietrich —sigo aquí el análisis realizado por Plourde (2016, 189). Basándonos en la evidencia textual del *Tractatus*, podemos afirmar que en la ontología tractariana se reconocen hechos (*Tatsachen*) negativos y positivos (*T.* 2.06), aunque según Dietrich no hay algo así como estados de cosas (*Sachverhalte*) positivos y negativos (Dietrich, 1973, 24). En efecto, en el *Tractatus* más bien se habla de estados de cosas existentes (*bestehenden Sachverhalte*) y estados de cosas que no existen (*Sachverhalte nicht bestehen*) (*T.* 2.04 y 2.05).

Por otro lado, es importante tener presente la manera en que se relacionan los estados de cosas y los hechos de acuerdo con la siguiente proposición:

> 2.06: La existencia (*Das bestehen*) y no-existencia (*Nichtbestehen*) de los estados de cosas es la realidad (a la existencia de los estados de cosas la llamamos también un hecho positivo, a la no-existencia, un hecho negativo).

Siguiendo lo que se advierte aquí, tenemos que la existencia de un estado de cosas (*Das Bestehen Sachverhalt*) es un hecho positivo, mientras que la no-existencia de un estado de cosas (*Nichtbestehen Sachverhalte*) es un hecho negativo (cf. Dietrich, 1973, 22). En este punto es fundamental advertir que según Wittgenstein un hecho positivo *es la existencia de un estado de cosas*, no así un *estado de cosas existente* —en el caso de un hecho negativo, este sería la no-existencia de un estado de cosas y no así un estado de cosas no existente. Es decir, debemos tener presente que hay una distinción entre la existencia de un estado de cosas y un estado de cosas existente. Podemos capturar esto de la siguiente manera: decir "La existencia de…" es distinto de decir "Un… que existe", de igual manera que sería distinto decir "La rojez de…" de decir "Un… que es rojo". Entonces, afirmar que "La existencia de un estado de cosas es un hecho" sería distinto de afirmar que "Un estado de cosas existente es un hecho". Cabe señalar que esta distinción es pasada por alto por la interpretación estándar, la cual toma "La existencia de…" como una frase equivalente con "Un… que existe" (cf. Plourde, 2016, 187 – 189).

El punto está que al no tener presente esta distinción y sostener, así, la equivalencia, lo afirmado en 2.06, respecto a los hechos negativos, resultaría en que si un estado de cosas

que no-existe es un hecho negativo, entonces tendría que haber algo así como estados negativos, lo cual no es algo que podamos encontrar en el *Tractatus* (cf. Plourde, 2016, 189). A la vista de esto, Dietrich estipula que "La existencia de…" y "Un… que existe" no están por las mismas entidades —refieren a entidades distintas— y, en este sentido, los hechos son distintos de los estados de cosas (cf. Dietrich, 1973, 23 – 25) —lo cual aplicaría también si el análisis contempla la diferencia entre "La no-existencia de…" y "Un… que no existe".

Veamos ahora qué dice Simons, siguiendo la argumentación de Dietrich. De acuerdo con Simons "[s]i los hechos fueran simplemente sumas de *bestehenden Sachverhalten*, entonces un solo *bestehender Sachverhalt* tendría que ser un existente o la obtención de sí mismo" (Simons, 1985, 333). Sugiero la siguiente interpretación de esta idea: como hemos visto, en el *Tractatus* se habla de estados de cosas existentes y de estados de cosas no-existentes. Me parece que podemos trazar la distinción entre estos, apelando a que la colección de los primeros es *obtenida* a partir de lo que es el caso, luego, de esta colección podemos determinar la colección de los estados de cosas no-existentes (*T.* 2.05). El punto ahora es que si, un estado de cosas existente es un hecho, este tendría que obtenerse por sí mismo, pero ¿qué significa aquí 'obtenerse por sí mismo' y por qué habría de ser un problema que un estado de cosas se obtenga por sí mismo? Ofrezco la siguiente respuesta: si un estado de cosas existente es un hecho, entonces no hay nada que determine la obtención de un estado de cosas, más que el estado de cosas como tal. Consecuentemente, un estado de cosas existente o no-existente, está determinado solo por ser un estado de cosas. Pero entonces o todo estado de cosas es existente o todo estado de cosas es no-existente o es una cuestión indeterminada si un estado de cosas es existente o no-existente. Sin embargo, hemos aceptado que hay estado de cosas existente y estados de cosas no-existentes. Por tanto, un estado de cosas no puede obtenerse por sí mismo.

Conforme a esta respuesta, ocurre que, si ningún estado de cosas puede ser obtenido por sí mismo, entonces ningún estado de cosas puede ser un hecho —ya que, si un estado de cosas es un hecho, según Simons, este tendría que obtenerse por sí mismo. Consecuentemente, la interpretación estándar de la ontología tractariana, según la cual todo hecho es un estado es cosas, debería ser falsa. Esto último es problemático para la propuesta de Lando, dado que para que su propuesta sea viable, específicamente por el compromiso con el extensionalismo, se requiere que sea verdadero que todo hecho es un estado de cosas. Ahora, podríamos preguntar si es que hay alguna forma de compatibilizar la interpretación disidente con el proyecto de Lando. Una alternativa inmediata sería rechazar que los estados de cosas y los hechos sean constituidos por las mismas entidades. Por ejemplo, podríamos aceptar que los estados de cosas son constituidos por los objetos, mientras que los hechos son constituidos por los objetos, en adición a otras entidades distintas de los objetos, o sencillamente por entidades distintas de los objetos. Aunque cualesquiera de estas estrategias implican postular entidades ajenas a las que se consideran en el *Tractatus* y esto ciertamente sería un costo teórico demasiado alto que no resulta pertinente discutir aquí.

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MAX MORE Y LA COHERENCIA FILOSÓFICA DEL INMORTALISMO EXTROPIANO

MAX MORE AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL COHERENCE OF EXTROPIAN IMMORTALISM

Nicolás Rojas-Cortés
nicolas.rojas.c@uchile.cl
Universidad de Chile

Resumen: *El presente artículo analiza críticamente la obra de Max More con el propósito de determinar si el extropianismo puede considerarse una filosofía coherente o, más bien, una ideología inmortalista. A partir de la revisión de sus textos fundacionales y de las sucesivas versiones de los Extropian Principles, se examina la evolución del pensamiento extropiano desde el inmortalismo inicial hacia la noción de progreso perpetuo y la trascendencia tecnológica. Se sostiene que, aunque More contribuye a la consolidación del transhumanismo contemporáneo, su propuesta adolece de una falta de coherencia interna y de diálogo filosófico crítico. En consecuencia, el extropianismo se revela como un discurso dogmático situándose más cerca de una ideología inmortalista que de una reflexión filosófica coherente.*

Palabras clave: *extropianismo; transhumanismo; Max More; filosofía del transhumanismo; inmortalismo.*

Abstract: *This article critically analyzes Max More's work with the aim of determining whether extropianism can be regarded as a coherent philosophy or, rather, as a immortalist ideology. Drawing on a review of his foundational texts and the successive versions of the Extropian Principles, it examines the evolution of extropian thought from its initial immortalism toward the notions of perpetual progress and technological transcendence. The article argues that, although More contributed to the consolidation of contemporary transhumanism, his proposal suffers from a lack of internal coherence and philosophical dialogue. Consequently, extropianism reveals itself as a dogmatic discourse, closer to an immortalist ideology than to a coherent philosophical reflection.*

Keywords: *extropianism; transhumanism; Max More; philosophy of transhumanism; immortalism.*

1. Introducción

Una de las voces más representativas de lo que podríamos llamar transhumanismo clásico es la de Max More (nacido como Max T. O'Connor[1]) Al igual que Nick Bostrom, es uno de los portavoces más citados del movimiento y ha intentado elaborar una filosofía específica dentro de este movimiento, a saber, el extropianismo (*extropianism*).

Es indiscutible que la obra de Max More es un piso mínimo para cualquier investigación que intente dar cuenta de, al menos, un tipo de transhumanismo. Sus trabajos han sido citados innumerables veces por académicos de diferentes partes del mundo, y aun así no podemos afirmar que existan muchos trabajos académicos que examinen la coherencia interna de las propuestas extropianas (Andrade, 2022; Rubio Hípola, 2022; Bour, 2022). Si bien puede haber un sinfín de razones para que esto sea el caso, nuestra hipótesis es que es difícil sistematizar y medir la coherencia de una serie de ideas que, aunque usen lenguaje filosófico, caen más en el ámbito de la discursividad ideológica que en el de discusión disciplinar filosófica. Sin embargo, es necesario destacar que More ha jugado un papel importante como precursor de ideas que luego serán desarrolladas por posteriores transhumanistas (Sorgner, 2009; Fuller, 2011; 2019; Fuller y Lipinska, 2014) o incluso rechazadas por vertientes menos liberales del movimiento (Hughes, 2012;2014).

Ahora bien, cuando analizamos un fenómeno interdisciplinario como el transhumanismo es importante reconocer que la coherencia de sus propuestas solamente se puede medir en el diálogo con expertos de las áreas que están en juego en lo que se propone[2]. De esta manera, la hipótesis filosófica de este artículo es que las propuestas del extropiano muchas veces caen más cerca de la ideología que de la filosofía, aunque esto no representa, bajo ningún sentido, la imposibilidad de que una ideología pueda seguir fundamentando propuestas más allá de sí misma.

En primer lugar, explicaremos qué es la extropia y cómo se relaciona, al menos en las primeras formulaciones del autor, con el inmortalismo. En segundo lugar, mostraremos cómo es que han evolucionado los diferentes valores promovidos por el extropianismo tanto en las declaraciones como en los principios propuestos por More. En tercer lugar, se abordará la cuestión del sentido frente a la existencia por medio de la noción de progreso perpetuo que reemplaza al inmortalismo. Finalmente, se considera la coherencia interna del proyecto extropiano, ya que, a nuestro entender, sus presupuestos no son completamente consecuentes con las propuestas para superar a la condición humana que expone Max More.

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1 Si el artículo no ha sido republicado bajo el nombre de Max More, citaremos al autor como Max T. O'Connor en función de ilustrar la evolución del pensamiento del autor.

2 El mismo More aceptará este principio en su *Proactionary principle* (2005).

2. El primer valor extropiano: la inmortalidad

Max More junto a Tom Morrow[3] fundaron la revista *Extropy* (1988), cuyo nombre refleja su intento de fundar una cosmovisión. Hay, al menos, dos sentidos en los que *Extropy* puede definirse: (1) en tanto que su sentido tiene relación con el concepto científico de *entropía*, pero también, (2) en tanto que su sentido representa una propuesta para especificar y diferenciar este movimiento del transhumanismo en general.

El término original fue acuñado por Tom Morrow en 1988 (Bour, 2022) y no debe ser considerado como el contrario técnico de la entropía, porque esto ya existe y es la neguentropía, literalmente "entropía negativa" (*negative entropy*). En un correo público a sus lectores, More aclara que "Its a metaphor the the kinds of things we value, and for the overcoming of human limits in a perpetual process of improvement". Un poco antes de esta afirmación, el transhumanista advierte que "While I'm all in favor of tuning up this definition, I caution against trying for a pseudo-precision" (More, 1996).[4] Esta última advertencia no es menor si se considera que el concepto ha evolucionado desde 1988 hasta aproximadamente el 2003 y de ninguna de sus versiones es posible predicar el adjetivo de la precisión. Desarrollaremos esta crítica en la última sección.

En el número 4 de *Extropy* se presenta de manera indiscutible una de las características definitorias de lo que entendemos como transhumanismo extropiano. En el texto *What's wrong with Death?* (1989) se afirma:

> A central extropian value is the love of life and the opposition to death. Death is seen as an enemy which destroys personality, value, information (in the brain), and all possibility of further growth in personal knowledge, wisdom, power, and experience. This is very clear to me and to fellow immortalists, and yet most people go to great lengths to find arguments which show death to be good or at least unobjectionable. (O'Connor, 1989, 20)

Este primer valor extropiano —que podría entenderse como uno de los primeros principios extropianos antes de la publicación del primer manifiesto (Bell y O'Connor, 1990) y las posteriores formulaciones de los principios (More, 1990; 1992; 1993; 2003)— se resume en la siguiente afirmación: "Death is about the worst possible thing that could happen to you" (O'Connor, 1989, 20). La razón detrás de una afirmación como esta es que, para el extropiano, en ciertos contextos la debilidad humana (*human weakness*), como las enfermedades terminales, es capaz de afectar a la comprensión que tenemos de nosotros mismos y de lo que deseamos. Por ejemplo, en el caso de un sufrimiento que podría parecer acabar solamente con la muerte, la muerte podría valorarse como un bien. El punto es que, para More, no debería ser posible que un evento inmediato como el sufrimiento deba imponer

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3 Nombre transhumanista de Tom Bell.

4 https://extropians.weidai.com/extropians.96/4101.html

preferencias o deseos a mi yo del futuro. Eso revelaría otro de los elementos humanos que el extropianismo quiere superar: la ignorancia respecto a las posibilidades abiertas por las tecnologías emergentes. Para el extropiano, si en la inmediatez del presente alguien prefiriera morir antes que seguir sufriendo a causa de una enfermedad terminal, esto implica el asumir que la consideración de la enfermedad como "terminal" será necesariamente siempre el caso y no existiría ninguna posibilidad en el futuro cercano o lejano para que aquella enfermedad deje de ser considerada como "terminal" (O'Connor, 1989, 21).

Tal actitud sería irracional para More en tanto que se confunden las preferencias y los "deseos reales" (*preferences and "real wants"*) con la identidad del agente que las ha generado. El extropiano define los deseos (*wants*) como acciones-tendencias (*actions-tendencies*), es decir, "objetos hacia los que siento que se dirigen mis acciones" (1989, 21). Una afirmación como esta es clave para desarrollar una posterior reflexión sobre la noción de identidad para el extropianismo de More, porque lo que se está diciendo es que nuestra identidad no puede reducirse a nuestros deseos más o menos profundos en tanto que la inmediatez de lo contingente —liberarse del sufrimiento causado por una enfermedad considerada ahora como terminal— podría hacernos creer que una urgencia momentánea es más importante que los deseos que nos representan propiamente. Si admitimos como válido el razonamiento usado por More, entonces lo que él está describiendo es que puede haber fenómenos que nos hagan obrar de formas que de manera inmediata nos puedan aliviar pero que no sean efectivamente una solución para el problema que nos ha llevado a tal situación.

Se debe reconocer la intuición filosófica de More en este caso, porque está describiendo un caso típico de acrasia (ἀκρασία) en el cual una voluntad puede considerar que entre dos opciones la alternativa inmediata sería preferible a la solución efectiva, pero a largo plazo. No obstante, el modo de abordar el problema por parte del portavoz del extropianismo, aunque cercano al clásico problema filosófico recién mencionado, prefiere inclinarse por una perspectiva, a nuestro parecer, ingenuamente naturalista. Esto se ilustra muy bien cuando, sin argumentación ulterior ni referencias a fuentes científicas, se ofrece un punto de vista evolucionario en el que el cerebro, compuesto de muchas subunidades programadas para realizar tareas específicas, por razones evolutivas ha desarrollado un subsistema para detener el sufrimiento, cueste lo que cueste (1989, 21). Desde esta perspectiva, detener el sufrimiento por medio de la muerte podría ser una opción justificable desde un punto de vista evolucionario, sin embargo, difícilmente podría admitirse que hay razones morales, racionales o incluso metafísicas para que la muerte deba preferirse por sobre un gran sufrimiento (1989, 21-22). En este caso, si admitimos el razonamiento de More, como mucho, esta elección se debería más a un proceso evolutivo que a un verdadero deseo. Asumir, siguiendo a More, que un deseo evolutivo es mejor o más valioso que un "deseo real" implicaría aceptar que no podemos liberarnos de la naturaleza. Una afirmación tal sería totalmente contraria al proyecto transhumanista.

Un elemento clave en la discusión transhumanista es determinar si de este movimiento puede predicarse el deseo de inmortalidad (Sorgner, 2021). More da una respuesta que a nuestro parecer es capaz de zanjar la discusión:

> For those who don't believe that physical immortality (or vastly extended life) is a possibility, the rational trade off between pain and longer life will be different. If you don´t expect to live more than a few years after recovery, enduring the pain may have insufficient rewards to be worth it. The longer you expect or hope to be around to enjoy life, the more pain it is rational to be willing to endure. So I´m not arguing that it is *always* wrong to choose death; just that death, especially for the immortalist, is virtually always the worst thing, and that death may be the thing you have most reason to avoid even if you *currently* want it more than the painful alternative. (1989, 22)

La argumentación detrás de una afirmación como la del extropiano depende de la comprensión que se tiene del punto de vista respecto a la muerte. Según él, si consideramos que la muerte de otros es mala, esto es porque la muerte de una alteridad representa la destrucción de sus valoraciones. No obstante, mi muerte no es comparable con la de otros, porque en términos de perspectiva, la muerte para mi representa la aniquilación de todo punto de vista posible: es decir, la aniquilación de la condición de posibilidad de la realidad (1989, 22-23). En la vereda contraria nos encontraríamos con el "*deathist*, que podríamos traducir como "mortalista", es decir, aquel para el que la muerte no representa un problema ni tampoco busca superarla activamente por medio de la ciencia. Esta última perspectiva equivaldría para More posicionarse desde un punto de vista que pretende ser objetivo, una perspectiva que intenta identificarse con un todo al que las valoraciones particulares no le interesan. El problema es que para More es imposible concebir la idea de una experiencia más allá de la subjetiva. De hecho, él incluso identifica lo que yo soy con mi perspectiva del mundo (I *am* this looking-out at the world), de manera que no es posible, para una perspectiva subjetiva, el comparar la muerte personal con la de cualquier otro porque no refieren al mismo fenómeno (1989, 23). Dicho de otro modo, aunque pueda intentar optar por una perspectiva de otra persona, o incluso de una totalidad, como el mundo[5], no podría homologar esa forma de representarse al mundo con mi perspectiva personal.

Lamentablemente, en un giro muy poco filosófico, según More, lo que estaría actuando detrás de la actitud mortalista sería un profundo autoengaño respecto a la naturaleza de la muerte. Decimos que es un giro muy poco filosófico porque cuando se acusa a un contrincante argumental de autoengaño se debe, al menos, ofrecer razones con las que mostrar por qué él está realizando una consideración falsa respecto al objeto de análisis. Lo que More hace en este caso es afirmar que una perspectiva ciega ante la muerte

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5   Una crítica al transhumanismo desde una perspectiva neorealista ha sido desarrollada en Rojas (2024).

(*death-blindness*) es ignorante respecto a las posibilidades que hoy existen para aniquilar al aniquilador. Estas posibilidades son las opciones clásicas del transhumanismo: transferencia mental o criogenia. No obstante, la pregunta inmediata es: ¿Por qué el que existan tecnologías emergentes que permitan la evasión de la muerte implicaría que tenemos un mejor conocimiento respecto del objeto de análisis?

La propuesta de More se presenta más como una propaganda que como una argumentación. No por evadir algo comprendemos mejor a la muerte. El extropiano propone tres argumentos en contra de los mortalistas.

El primero es la falacia del naturalismo moral, muy utilizada por los bioconservadores (Ferry, 2017; Rojas, 2022; 2024) para intentar persuadirnos del que lo que se ha entendido como natural es equivalente a lo bueno. No es el caso que lo natural deba ser necesariamente el único fundamento de la moralidad. De hecho, ni siquiera es evidente por sí mismo lo que quiera decir natural o naturaleza en el contexto de discusiones sobre este tema. Ahora bien, es importante destacar que para More la apelación a la falacia naturalista implica una perspectiva no subjetiva, pues la naturaleza sería ciega a los intereses humanos (O'Connor, 1989, 24). Volveremos a retomar este argumento más adelante.

El segundo es atacar la idea de que morir es necesario para darle sentido a la vida. Según él, esta perspectiva es defendida por Bernard Williams en su escrito *The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality* (1973) y "sospecha" que el filósofo asume las dos siguientes ideas:

The two mistakes here are firstly in moving from the fact of death to come to the conclusion that life has no meaning and, secondly, in holding that life is meaningless without a specified limit. (O'Connor, 1989, 24)

El problema de una afirmación como esta es la carga de la prueba, es decir, ¿dónde es que Williams afirma algo así o, como mucho, permite una inferencia así? Lamentablemente, More no se hace cargo de presentar argumentos fundamentados en pruebas efectivas en contra de la propuesta de Williams, como tampoco se encarga de exponer la propuesta del filósofo (More, 1991). Es decir, estamos ante la clásica falacia del hombre de paja. No hay referencias al verdadero asunto que intenta discutir el filósofo británico, tampoco referencias a la comprensión que tiene del epicureísmo ni de su discusión con Thomas Nagel (Williams, 1973).

El último argumento del extropiano es un ataque al epicureísmo, a la formulación de que cuando la muerte no es nada para nosotros porque cuando ocurre, ya no existimos (Epicuro, 2012). Para More el argumento epicúreo tiene un salto lógico, ya que confunde la perspectiva subjetiva con la objetiva. Objetivamente tiene sentido que la muerte no sea nada para nosotros, porque cuando ocurre ya no existe la condición de posibilidad para la experiencia subjetiva, pero para el extropiano esto no debe ser considerado como un argumento para aceptar nuestra condición de finitud. El hecho de que podamos tener metas y necesitemos vivir para cumplirlas implica, según More, que tenemos razones para vivir

más. A simple vista puede comprenderse que More no entiende que hay diferentes tipos de argumentación respecto a objetos comunes. Difícilmente el argumento de los epicúreos debe ser juzgado por no ser lo suficientemente creativo como para poder admitir que la muerte puede y debe ser superada. Una *consolatio* no debe ser confundida con una descripción de un fenómeno, y la propaganda extropiana que busca superar a un hecho como la finitud humana tampoco es una descripción de ella.

De esta seguidilla "argumental", el extropiano ofrece una descripción clave para determinar de una vez por todas si es el caso que hay, al menos, un tipo de transhumanistas que buscan la inmortalidad:

> It seems to me that those who cannot see why death is a bad thing are sick. For a thing to be sick is for it function inefficiently, to fail in its function. A mind is sick when does not function efficiently. A healthy mind is a thing which explores, which loves information and ideas, which finds new ideas and perspectives and the understanding they make possible deeply appealing. Death is what put a final end to all possibilities of learning, of exploring, of improving. […]. An immortalist is someone who understands that physical death is the end of existence as far as he or she is concerned. The immortalist loves the process of living and learning and so regards death as the ultimate enemy who has to be avoided or hunted down and exterminated by protecting against all possible causes of destruction of the self. (O'Connor, 1989, 27-28)

Agregando un poco más adelante que

> Deathism threatens not only those who believe it but also those of us who are already immortalist. Deathism must be challenged and extirpated if we are to ensure our own survival. (1989, 28)

El peso de la prueba recae sobre el que afirma una propuesta y quiere convencernos de ello. No obstante, la propuesta del precursor del extropianismo es profundamente extraña y difícil de aceptar. ¿Se está ofreciendo una comprensión normativa de lo que es normal, bueno y funciona bien? Si bien es cierto que no podemos discutir con el hecho de que no tenemos pruebas respecto a la posibilidad de una existencia una vez ha acaecido la muerte, tampoco existen razones suficientes como para no poder considerar una afirmación tal como propaganda capitalista Rojas, 2023). El admitir la muerte como un hecho no implica necesariamente querer que todos mueran, como tampoco implica aceptar que la muerte sea la condición de posibilidad del sentido para la entidad que somos. Como mucho, se puede afirmar, desde una perspectiva realista, que la muerte es un hecho y que a lo largo de la historia humana se han creado mecanismos para disminuir el porcentaje de mortalidad para nuestra especie.

Afirmaciones como las de More apelan más a los sentimientos que a argumentos efectivamente científicos y, aún así, no son capaces de convencer totalmente. ¿Qué pasaría si encontramos el caso de una persona cuyo deseo más propio es el suicidio no como mecanismo de defensa frente a algún problema sino como una alternativa al aburrimiento respecto a una existencia que ya no ofrece emociones? Si bien para More se deben respetar los deseos individuales, como veremos en la próxima sección, parece ser que sus propuestas para los extropianos funcionan como normas y no solamente como guias. En el mismo sentido, ¿qué tan buena guía puede ser adherir a la búsqueda de la inmortalidad si desde una perspectiva racional y naturalista se hace imposible una existencia más allá de los límites de la existencia?[6] En las próximas secciones veremos cómo es que este primer valor se modula e incluso se camufla en otras formulaciones.

3. De Declaraciones a Principios

La evolución del pensamiento extropiano puede rastrearse en la transición que se da entre *The Extropian Declaration* (Bell y O'Connor, 1990) y las sucesivas versiones de *The Extropian Principles* (More, 1990; 1992; 1993; 2003). Este primer texto ofrece dos afirmaciones importantes para comprender la caracterización específica del extropianismo. La primera es otra afirmación que podríamos identificar con la discursividad ideológica del proyecto de More y Bell:

> We who want to live, we who want freedom, we who want to learn: We challenge the forces of entropy!
> We deny *all* limitations on our bondless wills: Ignorance, State, Religion and Death.
> (Bell y O'Connor, 1990, 51)

Las palabras clave mencionadas por los autores son importantes para seguir articulando la exposición de su pensamiento. No es inmediatamente evidente el por qué vivir, ser libre y aprender tienen relación con la entropía (*entropy*), ya que, uno podría identificar aquí un error categorial aplicado a una comparación de fenómenos que no son equiparables. Si entendemos entropía desde la física como el desorden de un sistema, la pregunta inmediata implicaría cuestionar cómo es que los extropianos podrían concebirse de manera equiparable a la de una magnitud física o, si se quiere, descripción científica de la realidad. No obstante, la segunda premisa nos da una intuición respecto a la autocomprensión que los extropianos tienen de sí mismos, al igual que las proclamas libertarias del siglo xix o los manifiestos futuristas, su objetivo no sería argumentar sino movilizar.

En el caso de que dudemos de poder enfrentar a la entropía por medio de la tecnología, los extropianos podrían levantar un contraargumento apelando a que la perspectiva

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6   Se prefiere evitar decir naturaleza, porque, como veremos en las próximas secciones, More parece repetir una versión extropiana de la falacia naturalista.

contraria a la de ellos es una falacia naturalista al asumir que la entropía, en tanto que descripción científica de la realidad, es natural, y, por lo tanto, es algo aceptable. Esto explicaría la razón de que en la segunda parte de la declaración se sostenga que:

> Extropians hold a consistently anti-entropy point of view. What does ´extropy´ mean? Look to its etymology: 'Entropy' comes from the Greek 'en', or 'in', plus 'trepein', or 'change'. 'Extropy', on the other hand, comes from 'ex', or 'out', and 'trepein'. This while entropy deceases order, usable energy, and information, extropy increases all three of these goods, goods that our well-being demands. In a universe threatening to drown us in a rising tide of disorder, extropy offers us safe passage to higher ground. (Bell y O'Connor, 1990, 51)

Se sigue, entonces, que los extropianos comprenden su propio proyecto en una categoría asimilable a la de la entropía. Si bien, en un principio, como se menciona en el primer número de *Extropy* esto se entiende como una metáfora, uno podría preguntar qué tan metafórico es este discurso en tanto que hay prácticas y tecnologías de sí que se fomentan para poder ejecutar un ordenamiento extropiano de la realidad.

Entre 1990 y 2003, More publica distintas versiones de *The Extropian Principles*. Aunque varía la terminología, el contenido esencial se mantiene: una defensa de la expansión ilimitada de la vida, la inteligencia y la libertad mediante la tecnología. En su última formulación (More, 2003), se presentan siete principios[7]; sin embargo, tres de ellos condensan el núcleo del pensamiento extropiano: (1) Boundless Expansion o Perpetual Progress; (2) Self-Transformation; (3) Practical Optimism y (4) Rational Thinking. Si bien los otros principios aportan a la comprensión del movimiento, estos reflejan en detalle su comprensión ideológica del progreso, mientras que los demás son más bien una propuesta política.[8]

3.1. Expansión ilimitada o progreso perpetuo

La expansión sin límites, o el progreso perpetuo (como es reformulado en la versión 3.0), es un intento de usar el lenguaje de los inmortalitas en función de presentarse como un paladín de la tecnología de punta. Lo que se buscaría es cambiar de paradigma antropológico desde una comprensión esencialista de nosotros mismos hasta una comprensión transitoria implica alejarse del humanismo clásico y tomar una posición activa respecto a la modificación de nuestra comprensión en un plano práctico. Así, More afirma que:

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7 Respecto al cambio de estos principios, Bour (2022) detecta que la influencia de Rand en el pensamiento de More implicaba el el peligro de devenir un pensador dogmático en tanto que la "Foundationalist nature" de la epistemología de Rand no permite que sus propios presupuestos sean reexaminados. Es gracias a la recomendación de Mark Miller en 1993 que More conoce la obra de William Bartley y es influenciado por su interpretación de la epistemología de Popper (2022, 143). En el caso de More, las directrices de su extropianismo están sujetas a una constante modificación, al menos, hasta la última formulación del año 2003.

8 Ambas perspectivas no están separadas, por supuesto, pero no se pueden abordar en solo una investigación.

> We go beyond many humanists in proposed fundamental alterations in human nature in pursuit of these improvements. We question traditional, biological, genetic, and intellectual constraints on our progress and possibility. (More, 2003)

Inmediatamente uno puede comprender que, al menos en el caso de More, no es que no exista algo así como la "naturaleza" que también encontramos en el Humanismo o en las expresiones bioconservadoras, sino que más bien es sobre ella donde se deben aplicar los mejoramientos (*improvements*) en función de superar (*overcome*) los límites humanos. Para More es claro que no habría una carga moral negativa en la modificación de lo que se entiende como naturaleza. En este sentido, el admitir la evolución como una descripción válida para la entidad que somos implica que los "límites naturales" que puedan existir también pueden ser superados en función de detener la entropía, es decir, imponer orden sobre el mundo y nosotros mismos con la finalidad de extender nuestra existencia por medio de un progreso sin límites.

En este contexto, el complemento directo de la mejora no puede ser solamente nuestro cuerpo, sino que también el medio ambiente y el mundo habitable en general. La evolución de las especies está relacionada con el medio ambiente, y, en este sentido, el extropianismo no se agota solamente en una campaña por modificar al cuerpo, el medioambiente, es una de las condiciones que posibilita la prosperidad de la vida (More, 2003). Esto quiere decir que, incluso, la migración espacial es una opción válida para la perspectiva extropiana. Ahora bien, la ejecución práctica de este principio depende necesariamente de aceptar los otros principios, de manera que esta expansión perpetua depende de una comprensión de la libertad bastante peculiar.

3.2. Auto-transformación

El principio de la autotransformación aparece en todas las formulaciones de More con pequeños anexos y variaciones. Es destacable que en todas las formulaciones de este principio se destaca una formulación similar al de una tecnología del yo foucaultiana (Ferrando, 2023, 91), porque se insiste en que "Perpetual self-improvement requires us to continually re-examine our lives" (More, 1990, 17; 1992, 6; 1993, 10; 2003). Este reexaminar continuo apunta, en la mayoría de los casos, a un individuo que, si bien vive rodeado de otros individuos y sabe que la cooperación es necesaria para conseguir relaciones óptimas, debe centrarse en transformarse a sí mismo. Las primeras versiones de este principio destacaban la influencia de Friedrich von Hayek en el pensamiento de More en tanto que se afirmaba que este principio era incompatible con un control centralizado (1990, 17), porque en su autoritarismo reprime la elección libre y el orden espontáneo de las personas autónomas (1992, 6). Además, la versión 2.5., agregaba que, en el pensamiento extropiano, no se busca gobernar a otros ni ser gobernados, porque la autotransformación depende de la libertad de experimentar consigo mismo (*self-experimentation*). En función de afirmar esto último, el extropiano, en un lenguaje bioético, ataca la idea

que podamos ser coaccionados por "el bien de la mayoría" ya que esto equivaldría a acatar una actitud paternalista (1993, 10). La formulación más precisa de este influjo lo podemos encontrar en una afirmación como la siguiente: "Extropians are rational individualist, living by their own judgment, making critical, informed, and free choices, and accepting responsibility for those choices" (1992, 6).

Este pensamiento libertario tendrá una influencia clave en al menos dos conceptos nucleares para las versiones posteriores del transhumanismo: el principio de proactividad (The proactionary principle) y su posterior reformulación como el imperativo de la proacción (*The Proactionary Imperative*) por Steve Fuller y Veronika Lipińska (2014), y la libertad morfológica (Morphological Freedom), desarrollado, entre otros, por Anders Sandberg (2013).

Para llevar a cabo una experimentación de sí y de la realidad de este talante, los extropianos necesitan de una actitud existencial respecto a la tecnología. Dicho de otro modo, la confianza en la tecnología deviene fundamento de una forma de otorgar sentido a la existe. En las siguientes secciones desarrollaremos la idea de progreso perpetuo.

3.3. Optimismo dinámico u optimismo práctico[9]

Se advertir que este es uno de los principios más ideológicos de todos, considerando, por ejemplo, la siguiente formulación

> Where others see difficulties, we see challenges. Where others give up, we move forward. Where others say enough is enough, we say: Forward! Upward! Outward! We espouse personal, social, and technological evolution into ever higher forms. Extropians see too far and change too rapidly to feel future shock. Let us advance the wave of evolutionary progress. (1992, 7)

Esta actitud optimista da más información sobre qué tipo de relación tiene este humanismo tecnófilo con la inmortalidad, ya que, si antes los extropianos se consideraban inmortalistas, con este optimismo cualifican aún más este proyecto: "Rather than enduring an unfulfilling life sustained by a desperate longing for an illusory heaven, we direct our energies enthusiastically into moving toward our ever-evolving vision" (1993, 11). En el fondo, el presupuesto base de esta actitud sigue siendo un racionalismo que niega cualquier fe pasiva y más bien redirige la responsabilidad de alcanzar cualquier meta o proyecto en el sujeto racional capaz de utilizar la técnica de la manera más óptima para alcanzar tales fines. No obstante, como ya hemos señalado, More está influenciado por las ideas de Hayek, de manera que no solamente la fe ciega en causas externas como Dios son objeto de su escepticismo, sino también el Estado o cualquier entidad que prometa solucionar los problemas del individuo (2003). Cabe destacar que Hayek no es la única influencia en esta formulación, sino que los

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9 En la declaración 2.0. el optimismo dinámico se encuentra en el quinto lugar de los principios (1992, 7).

presupuestos principales que tiene en mente dependen de las lecturas que realizó sobre Ayn Rand, por eso es que More entiende al optimismo y el pesimismo como

> psycho-epistemological traits. That is, they are more than detached assessment of objective probability; they are commitments to a particular mode of cognition and action.

> Optimism and pessimism are personal characteristics having both psychological and knowledge-related aspects integrated into action-guiding attitudes. They profoundly affect a person´s thinking, behavior, happiness and achievement. (More, 1991/92, 18)

Además de ser influenciado por Rand, More acepta como válidas las premisas del psiquiatra estadounidense Aaron T. Beck, de manera que resalta aspectos del optimismo extropiano[10] como si se tratara de una terapia cognitiva, es decir, modificando los rasgos psicoepistemológicos en función de superar las actitudes pesimistas que impiden abrazar las propuestas extropianas. En este sentido, el optimismo de More da cuenta una campaña férrea por defender su cosmovisión,

> Only an iron-clad demonstration of impossibility (such as Godel´s incompleteness theorem) will stop them; even then optimists will be careful not to draw unnecessarily frustrating conclusions. This means accepting limits as limits within-a-context and then widening the context to step around the obstacle. For example, an optimist may accept the Second Law of Thermodynamics but will resist unproved consequences such as the impossibility of achieving an infinite amount of life and thought. (More, 1991/2, 19)

Desde una afirmación se puede intuir que la campaña extropiana en contra de las limitaciones impuestas por la "naturaleza" —si aceptamos la segunda ley de la termodinámica como una descripción válida de la naturaleza entendida como descripción física del mundo en el que habitamos— supera en su optimismo a lo que podríamos admitir válido para una racionalidad coherente. Es decir, si bien se ataca la fe ciega relativa a la religión o a un dios que pueda resolver las cosas por nosotros, no ocurre lo mismo frente a un optimismo tóxico respecto a lo que puede un (trans-)humano. La justificación de este aspecto del optimismo extropiano se fundamentaría en el primer principio que ya hemos descrito, el progreso perpetuo.

3.4. Pensamiento racional

Según la sistematización de S. Bour (2022) uno podría admitir, al menos, las influencias de Ayn Rand, Friedrich Hayek y Karl Popper en la epistemología extropiana. No obstante, gracias a una entrevista realizada al científico informático Mark Miller y publicada

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10   Formulación personal para hablar tanto de *Optimismo dinámico u optimismo práctico*.

en los números 11 y 12 de *Extropy* (Krieger, 1993a; Krieger,1993b), Max More recibió una alternativa a la epistemología fundamentada en Rand y Popper, ya que ambas propuestas epistemológicas no alcanzaban a ser efectivamente un caso de pensamiento racional.

Respecto a la primera, en tanto que en su sistema de pensamiento podían predicarse el valor de axiomas a conceptos como la existencia, la identidad y la conciencia, entonces estos no podrían ser racionalmente cuestionados (Bour, 2022, 143). Respecto al segundo, al extropiano le pareció que el racionalismo crítico de Popper termina promoviendo una fe irracional en la razón en tanto que el principio de racionalidad es más una decisión moral que una actitud racionalmente fundamentada (Bour, 2022, 144). En este contexto, y por consejo de Miller (Krieger, 1993b, 30), More reconoció que el racionalismo del extropianismo debía ser capaz de incluso dudar de sus propios fundamentos, abrazando el racionalismo pancrítico (*pancritical rationalism*) expuesto por William Bartley en su obra *The Retreat to Commitment* (1962). En palabras de Bour,

> Pancritical rationalism takes up the traditional sceptical approach while being part of the modern scientific approach which affirms that any postulate must be able to remain open to criticism. Bartley established also a distinction between criticism and justification. For him, propositions must be criticised rather than justified. He claims that everything must be criticised, without any attachment to any presupposition or belief, which prevents from a dogmatic attitude. (2022, 145)

Así, cobra sentido que en la formulación de 1998 el pensamiento racional sea el principio que busque tanto alejarse de los dogmas como también no aceptar autoridades intelectuales últimas. Si el conocimiento humano puede avanzar hasta un conocimiento posthumano, entonces no es necesario darle espacio a una creencia en la racionalidad, sino que conocer hasta efectivamente superar progresivamente los sesgos cognitivos y los límites del conocimiento humano. De esta manera, Bour afirma que el racionalismo pancritico es una actitud que posibilita a los extropianos en su proceso de constante reformación hacia el progreso (2022, 145).

3.5. *¿Qué son estos principios?*

A decir de More, en la formulación 2.5. de los principios, no debe confundirse a los principios solamente con creencias que deben tener los extropianos, sino como acciones necesarias de integrar en las vidas de cada entidad que quiera devenir trans y post humana. Uno podría leer en estos principios una cierta normatividad respecto a cómo comprendernos a nosotros mismos por medio de la acción hasta que la tecnología posibilite la transformación efectiva en posthumanos.

Antes habíamos destacado que el concepto de extropia, en tanto que superación de la entropía, asumía una falacia naturalista al identificar la entropía con una descripción natural, y por lo tanto "correcta", de la realidad. En palabras de More,

> As posthumans we will both embody extropy and generate more — more intelligence, information, energy, vitality, experience, diversity, opportunity, and growth. As we progress from human to transhuman to posthuman, our understanding and application of these Principles will evolve with us. The Extropian Principles are a new operating system for ourselves; always seeking to improve upon them, we will avoid dogmatizing them. The Principles derive their value by guiding us to our true goal: the maximization in our lives of extropy. (1993, 12)

Desde este contexto se puede preguntar qué clase de categoría es la que se tiene en mente cuando se intentan predicar principios o valores extropianos, porque si en un momento la extropia parece ser equiparable con la entropía en tanto que descripción termonuclear de la realidad, ¿cómo es que ahora también se puede predicar la participación de los posthumanos en la generación de la extropia? O bien, ¿el autor está diciendo que es posible, incluso al asumir una perspectiva naturalista de la realidad, que entidades individuales son capaces de combatir una descripción de la realidad que ha sido derivada desde la termodinámica hasta una supuesta ontología "natural" por combatir? La falta de precisión del autor no permite dar cuenta de una respuesta estas preguntas. Quizás, en tanto que descripción del desorden de todo aquello que participa de una sistematización, los extropianos pueden comprenderse a sí mismos como agentes que, por medio de la tecnología, intentan ofrecer un orden provisorio en el plano de lo óntico y actuar siguiendo ciertos principios en el plano de lo ético; pero eso no implica, bajo ningún sentido, que una esperanza ciega en la tecnología sea capaz de realizar modificaciones efectivas a una descripción ontológica de la realidad. Incluso uno podría preguntar con qué seriedad la hipótesis de la muerte térmica del universo debe ser tomada en cuenta para luego levantar proyectos de pensamiento desde ella.

4. Trascendencia extropiana

Los escritos de Max More han funcionado como un piso mínimo para estabilizar una comprensión contemporánea del concepto de transhumanismo (Sorgner, 2021, 9). No obstante, afirmamos que no es el caso que todos los tipos de transhumanismos puedan ser identificados con el extropianismo.

El año 2023 More se ha empeñado en realizar una serie de post titulados *True Transhumanism* en su *substack* con la finalidad de "to clarify this philosophy by explaining what it is not" (2023a). Sin embargo, el problema de esta serie de posteos es que, al menos los publicados a la fecha en que se escribe este texto, los escritos son una serie de re-versiones de varios de los manuscritos que ya hemos comentado aquí. En su mayor parte, el extropianismo se mantiene sin muchas modificaciones, excepto en su comprensión de la inmortalidad.

Respecto a la inmortalidad, que es el primer valor extropiano expuesto en este texto, Max More se retracta de seguir utilizando el concepto de inmortalidad que él había definido

como "the belief in the desirability of, and a striving for, an unending life" (2024). De hecho, en el mismo lugar afirma que: "Although I have used the term "immortality", I have not done so for around 25-30 years" (More, 2024). El problema es que inmediatamente luego de realizar una afirmación como esta, el extropiano comienza a aclarar los sentidos con los que él entiende la inmortalidad. Hay, al menos, tres sentidos para More: (1) biológica, (2) súper y (3) híper. La primera es la más importante en tanto que se ha logrado comprobar que existen entidades que no envejecen porque sus células eucariotas no están sujetas al límite de Hayflick, es decir, al número máximo de duplicaciones que puede sufrir una célula antes de entrar en la senescencia. De esta manera, hay entidades que pueden llegar a vivir indefinidamente sin que la muerte por causas naturales (envejecimiento) pueda ocurrir. Este es el caso, por ejemplo, de las medusas *Turritopsis dohrnii*, las hidras, o otros organismos pluricelulares cuya tasa de envejecimiento es muy bajo. Con esto en mente, More afirma que la inmortalidad biológica es "is something that we know exists in the animal kingdom. We can probably achieve it, given enough time and research" (More, 2024).

En segundo lugar, la super inmortalidad implica que "We never have to die" (More, 2024). En este caso, lo que está en juego es la asunción de que la identidad personal es algo digitalmente transferible y replicable en diferentes instancias (en una existencia cyborg, por ejemplo) manteniendo una continuidad psicológica. Evidentemente, el autor no ofrece pruebas contundentes para mostrar que este caso sería posible. Más bien, a modo de condicional, él afirma que "si se considera que la supervivencia personal requiere de la continuidad psicológica antes que la física, entonces la super inmortalidad podría ser alcanzable o abordable mediante el uso de *backups*" (More, 2024). Evidentemente, esto no podría implicar la imposibilidad de ser destruido porque todavía existe una dependencia física.

En tercer lugar, por híper inmortalidad se entiende "la existencia eterna sin salida" (More, 2024), es decir, la imposibilidad de morir, aunque se desee. El extropiano ilustra este caso con el mito de Titono, a quien le fue concedida la inmortalidad, pero no la juventud eterna, volviéndose cada vez más viejo, como los nativos de la isla de los Struldbrugs en *Los viajes de Gulliver* de Jonathan Swift (1726).

Con estos tres sentidos en mente, para More hay, al menos dos problemas de seguir usando la palabra inmortalidad, y es que, en primer lugar, no es buena propaganda si se piensa inmediatamente en el tercer sentido mencionado. De hecho, en tanto que con el extropianismo se busca ofrecer muchas opciones para mejorarse y obtener una mejor vida, este último sentido no sería compatible con el transhumanismo de More. En segundo lugar, hablar de inmortalidad suele tener connotaciones religiosas y, como ya hemos señalado, el racionalismo pancrítico impide respetar este tipo de dogmas, de manera que para los expropianos sería mejor hablar de inmortalidad biológica. La conclusión de More equivale a la relación que debería tener el transhumanismo con la inmortalidad,

> In the end, whether you like the immortality word or not, let us agree to do all we can to defeat aging and biological death. Fight the eternal enemy. Push it back and back until death becomes an unfamiliar face, invading only on the rarest of occasions. (More, 2024)

Solamente se evita hablar de inmortalidad, pero en el fondo, no se niega, sino que se intenta exponer de forma "racional" con el objetivo de alejar su propuesta de tendencias dogmatizantes como la de la religión.

El principio que fundamenta un movimiento como este se puede identificar en lo que hemos llamado el optimismo extropiano. En una de sus primeras formulaciones, se afirma que "Dynamic optimists practice an empirical and rational approach to life — testing new approaches and critically examining purported answers", y respecto a la religión,

> Faith need not be associated with religion but religion is its natural home, providing systematization and reinforcement. Systematized faith in particular doctrines is dogma. Religions by their nature require dogma: An unquestioning belief, a surrender of probing reason, an abdication of cognitive responsibility. […]. Religious faith relieves you of personal responsibility for making real choices whether intellectually or morally, instead handing you the answers. (More, 1991/92, 22)

Para More, la estrecha relación entre fe y religión componen una fuerza entrópica porque se relaciona estrechamente con una forma explicativa irracional que rechaza el pensamiento crítico con el fin de resguardarse en la resignación de ser incapaces de ofrecer una respuesta por medios científicos (1990/1996). En este sentido, la religión, si bien es capaz de ofrecer un sentido a la existencia, no es capaz de hacerlo ofreciendo un fundamento para nuestra acción. De ahí se sigue que, en respuesta a este fenómeno entrópico, el extropianismo debe fomentar una actitud práctica.

Sin embargo, More cree que la ciencia por sí misma tampoco es capaz de ofrecer un paradigma de sentido capaz de reemplazar a la religión. El nihilismo, que debe ser superado por exhortación de Nietzsche, según More puede encontrar en una *eupraxofia* (More, 2013, 4)[11] una alternativa tanto al cientifismo como a la religión en tanto que ambos pueden devenir dogmáticos (More, 1990/1996). De este modo, para el extropiano, ofrecer sentido implica

> Meaning involves transcending limits, but transcending limits to connect with something trivial will not serve to provide meaning. For the transcendence of limits to bestow meaning, what we connect with must be valuable. (More, 1990/1996)

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11   "Paul Kurtz, an American humanist and sceptical philosopher, coined the term "eupraxsophy" in 1988. This neologism is a combination of three Greek terms—*eu* (good, well), praxis and *sophia* (wisdom, knowledge)— and literally means "good practice" or "active wisdom" (Bour, 2022, 133).

Entonces, el sentido se entiende como una relación que se deriva de la conjunción de los dos elementos mencionados —trascendencia y valor— lo que para los extropianos equivaldría a afirmar que:

> Life and intelligence must never stagnate; it must re-order, transform, and transcend its limits in an unlimited progressive process. Our goal is the exuberant and dynamic continuation of this unlimited process, not the attainment of some final supposedly unlimited condition. The goal of religion is communion with, or merely serving, God, a being superior to us. The Extropian goal is our own expansion and progress without end. Humanity must not stagnate to go backwards to a primitive life, or to halt our burgeoning move forward, upward, outward, would be a betrayal of the dynamic inherent in life and consciousness. We must progress on to transhumanity and beyond into a posthuman stage that we can barely glimpse. (More, 1990/1996)

No obstante, ¿cómo entender este proceso ilimitado de autotransformación desde una perspectiva naturalista? Es posible considerar como valioso el deseo de no resignarse y autocomplacerse con una vida primitiva, pero no hay relación evidente entre lo que uno desea y lo efectivamente posible. Si el portavoz del extropianismo se ha esforzado por depurar su lenguaje de palabras que podrían tener connotaciones religiosas, ¿por qué abordar el problema del ofrecer sentido a la vida con una respuesta que tampoco se puede someter a una crítica racional? Dicho de otro modo, el fundamento de la posibilidad de otorgar sentido para More recae en una propuesta que sigue mostrando una fe dogmática: la trascendencia será tecnológica o no será.

Tal es el caso de sesgo respecto a sus propias ideas que en su *A Letter to Mother Nature* (1999), y en sus reversiones posteriores (2013), More vuelve a traicionarse a sí mismo y vuelve a caer en una forma extropiana de falacia naturalista: aceptamos que hay algo natural, pero defectuoso, y esa es razón suficiente para trascender esos límites hasta alcanzar la posibilidad de que "cada uno de nosotros pueda decidir cuánto quiere vivir" (2014, 450). Insistir de esta forma no en una perfección final, sino en la persecución de este proceso ilimitado de autotransformación permiten comprender a la extropia como una ideología dogmática que intenta presentarse como inmune a la crítica racional. En palabras de S. Bour: "the idea that the full actualisation of human potential is never achieved. It also implies a constant review of its own model and the progress made" (2022, 140). Pero el problema es evidente: desde 1990 a la fecha en que se escribe este artículo no se ha ofrecido una revisión racionalmente crítica respecto a los fundamentos del extropianismo, solamente *addenda* a un proyecto de transhumanismo bastante poco coherente respecto de sí mismo.

5. La cuestión de la coherencia interna

El problema de Max More, como adelantamos, es que más que exponer una filosofía como él pretende, lo que ha hecho es realizar propaganda del tipo de ideología muy específica que representa. Un elemento clave en el quehacer filosófico es el diálogo con otros que están interesados en hacer lo mismo que tú, pero también con otros que están en contra. No por nada existe el estado del arte incluso en la actividad filosófica. Como hemos mencionado, si bien More tiene en mente ideas de Ayn Rand, Friedrich von Hayek, Karl, Popper, Derek Parfit y William Bartley, esto no es suficiente para discutir a la altura de alguien que pretende exponer los fundamentos de un movimiento que busca caracterizarse dentro de un marco más general —siendo el extropianismo una versión específica del transhumanismo—. El no ser capaces de hacerse cargo de las críticas que otros pensadores han hecho en contra del pensamiento postulado y simplemente ofrecer respuestas atacando maliciosamente a numerosos hombres de paja habla más de una falta de apertura al diálogo que una verdadera actitud racional.

Hay dos fenómenos que reflejan esto en la producción intelectual de Max More: la carencia de precisión al caracterizar una idea y la falta de coherencia respecto a las consecuencias de admitir ciertos presupuestos como válidos. Es difícil tomar en serio una definición como la siguiente

> This transhumanism is a life philosophy, an intellectual and cultural movement, and an area of study. In referring to it as a life philosophy, the 1990 definition places transhumanism in the company of complex worldviews such as secular humanism and Confucianism that practical implications for our lives without basing themselves on any supernatural or physically transcendent belief. (More, 2013b, 4)

No es evidente por sí mismo qué quiere decir filosofía de vida, y, de hecho, una formulación tal parece más cercana al sectarismo que al trabajo académico. Eso sí, es importante reconocer que fue uno de los primeros pensadores en intentar explicar qué relación tiene el transhumanismo con el humanismo secular, ya que tampoco es evidente por sí mismo qué se debe entender por lo trans- en su relación con el humanismo ni por lo trans- respecto del humano. En el primer caso, en tanto que *trans-humanismo* el punto es enfatizar en las raíces ilustradas de este proyecto. Se identifica en la ilustración la condición de posibilidad del aparecer de ideas como el énfasis en el progreso y la decisión autónoma de mejorarse a uno mismo y al mundo en el que se habita (2013b, 4). De ahí que, en el segundo caso, la formulación de lo *trans-humano* busque destacar la superación del humano tanto como medio y como fin, esto quiere decir que los límites de cómo nos hemos entendido —biológica y genéticamente— deben ser superados por medio de la tecnología con la finalidad de devenir posthumanos. Sin embargo, no se explica cómo esto podría suceder, sino que en una actitud dogmática se afirma que es necesaria una aproximación interdisciplinaria para poder lograr la superación del humano (2013b, 4-5).

Es problemático, además, que More considere a sus principios como una norma respecto a la que los transhumanistas deberían estar de acuerdo (2013b, 5). Evidentemente, el autor intenta matizar la afirmación, ya que lo formula como

> Although the Principles of Extropy define a specific form of transhumanism, that document is both the first comprehensive and explicit statement of transhumanism and embodies several crucial elements shared by all extant forms of transhumanism,

Y un poco más adelante

> All transhumanist to date would likely also have no disagreement with the principles. (2013b, 5)

Si bien se refiere a los siete principios extropianos, a primera vista, afirmaciones como estas parecen contradecir el principio de pensamiento racional. En efecto, este rechaza la creencia de que se pueda apelar a una autoridad para justificar una afirmación, entonces: ¿cómo entender el nivel de normatividad que ofrecen los principios extropianos? ¿No podrían aparecer otras formas de transhumanismo que no fueran extropianas? Si esto último es el caso, el único transhumanista efectivamente extropiano posterior a More sería Steve Fuller y tendríamos que eliminar de la lista a otros como David Pierce, James Hughes o Stefan L. Sorgner. Entonces, vale la pena preguntar: ¿le es posible al transhumanismo encontrar una forma no extropiana de presentarse? More reconoce que hay muchos tipos de transhumanismo, pero no realiza ninguna advertencia respecto a cómo deberíamos considerar a los movimientos o pensadores que se consideren a sí mismos también transhumanistas, pero no extropianos.

Por otra parte, el autor insiste en defender la posibilidad de la transferencia mental apelando a que sus presupuestos no son dualistas, sino que funcionalistas (2013b, 7). La dificultad de una respuesta como esta radica en asumir que todos deben compartir los mismos presupuestos que el autor. Se podría argumentar que existe una comprensión de la identidad personal[12] y los estados mentales que puede ser reducible a fenómenos físicos y que, además, los científicos trabajando en las diversas formas de transferencia mental tienen una comprensión lo suficientemente acabada de ella como para poder ejecutar investigaciones de punta respecto a este problema. No obstante, no hay datos efectivos de que este sea el caso. El peso de la prueba, al igual de los que creen en la existencia del alma o de la naturaleza humana como una cosa, recae en los que proponen la idea y no en los próximos comentadores.

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12 De hecho, Max More está asumiendo una comprensión de la identidad personal que depende de su lectura doctoral de la obra de Derek Parfit (More, 1995). Pero en ninguno de sus artículos explica cómo es que su tesis se relaciona con su esperanza en la transferencia mental.

Otro de los malentendidos que busca aclarar More tiene relación con el tema de la utopía. Como hemos afirmado, es cierto que en los últimos textos de su producción "filosófica" ya no utiliza la palabra inmortalidad porque eso podría implicar un sentido cuestionable desde una perspectiva naturalista. Esta es la razón por la que More afirma que los transhumanistas no buscan una utopía, sino una extropia, es decir, un progreso perpetuo, sin fin, que pueda superar los límites de la condición humana (2013b, 14). Sería un oxímoron preguntar cuáles son los límites de un progreso perpetuo, pero en la práctica no es el caso de que exista una materialidad perpetua de la que podamos obtener el rédito suficiente como para que el progreso se pueda perpetuar *ad infinitum*. La consideración de la materialidad finita de recursos en juego no parece ser un fenómeno importante para la reflexión dado que en *A Letter to Mother Nature* (2013a) vuelve a afirmar, nuevamente respecto a una noción de "naturaleza" por superar, que el extropianismo persigue continuamente nuevas formas de excelencia posibilitadas por la tecnología (2013a, 450).

6. Conclusión

Planteado así el pensamiento de Max More, y considerando su carácter de polímata, podemos preguntar: ¿por qué se le considera como un autor tan importante para el transhumanismo si sus ideas pueden ser sometidas a críticas considerables? Muchas de sus ideas no responden a una comprensión actualizada y precisa de cómo funciona la ciencia, sino que sus afirmaciones podrían incluso identificarse con las divagaciones de un místico religioso, que con una retórica sentimentalista —la superación de la muerte— busca persuadirnos de que desear al extropianismo. Pero ¿cómo hay que entender el deseo de superar a una ley de la termodinámica? ¿Bajo qué comprensión de nosotros mismos podemos llegar a optimizar a la entidad que somos hasta devenir capaces de modificar una descripción de la naturaleza como es la entropía? Asimismo, si bien existe una naturaleza que se pretende superar por medio de la tecnología, ¿qué tipo de relación debemos tener con la tecnología si ella misma es entendida por este autor como una extensión natural del intelecto y la voluntad de la entidad que somos? ¿Superar la naturaleza implica también superar la tecnología? En este mismo sentido, ¿una existencia post humana también equivaldría a una existencia post- tecnológica? No es posible desarrollar una respuesta desde la "sistematización" que hemos intentado realizar hasta aquí porque Max More no ha seguido desarrollando el extropianismo en diálogo con las diferentes variantes de transhumanistas que han surgido posteriormente a sus planteamientos.

Es innegable que las obras de Max More han sido citadas una cantidad increíble de veces y sus ideas se han transformado en combustible para innumerables críticas al transhumanismo. No obstante, hasta este punto, no parece correcto afirmar que la popularidad sea equivalente a un trabajo científico coherente ni tampoco serio. Es particularmente llamativo que la obra que le da forma al corpus extropiano dialogue con tan pocas fuentes filosóficas de su época y que tampoco responda a las críticas, a esta fecha clásicas, que se han

levantado frente a sus propuestas. La filosofía en tanto que actividad disciplinar no puede realizarse desde un solipsismo como el de More, y eso explica muy bien por qué hay tan pocos artículos científicos dedicados a sistematizar o comentar su pensamiento: no hay una coherencia interna en sus propuestas.

El esfuerzo de Salomé Bour (2022) por sistematizar el pensamiento de More es encomiable, porque intenta explicar los presupuestos y alcances de la filosofía extropiana. Sin embargo, un acercamiento crítico al proyecto extropiano también nos permite someter a duda el grado de seriedad con el que hay que tratar a tales propuestas. Si admitimos, junto a otros estudiosos del transhumanismo (Ross, 2020; Sorgner, 2021; Sandberg, 2015) que el aporte de More a la filosofía transhumanista es haber estabilizado un uso contemporáneo para el concepto de transhumanismo, entonces hay que admitir que no nos deberían importar ni sus principios ni sus valores en la medida en que no pueden ser compartidos más allá de los adeptos al extropianismo.

La propuesta extropiana representa uno de los desafíos principales de la reflexión filosófica, a saber, que el peso de la prueba lo carga el que quiere mostrar o persuadirnos de algo. Lamentablemente, en este caso, Max More no es capaz de dialogar filosóficamente con otros ni tampoco de ofrecer argumentos a la altura del conocimiento que presume saber.

El extropianismo, entonces, parece más cerca de la actividad intelectual de un polímata que sabe mucho de muchas cosas diferentes, pero ninguna con precisión. El caso es aún peor cuando encontramos adendas a un proyecto que no comprende lo contradictorio de sus ideas fundamentales —pasar de una propaganda por el inmortalismo a la exigencia normativa de buscar un progreso perpetuo— y respecto a los conocimientos que ya existían en su época. Si el extropianismo es una de las formas originales claves para comprender el transhumanismo, entonces podemos afirmar que es una de las raíces más dogmáticas de los movimientos que buscan el mejoramiento.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING VERSUS THE LOGIC OF THE CONCEPT

RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

Abstract: *The concept is both a logical category and a psychological reality. If the concept was not a type of mental content, it could never be thought by living individuals. Nevertheless, if the concept were just a mental content, logic proper would be precluded, robbing philosophical psychology of any possible truth. The essay explores how the concept can play this double role, enabling logic and the psychology of thought to be related yet distinct. In so doing, the essay shows how the dual thinking of thinking in logic and philosophical psychology allows conceptualization to retain the autonomy on which philosophy depends.*

Keywords: *philosophy; Hegel; logic of the concept; thinking.*

The concept is both a logical determinacy and a psychological reality.[1] If the concept were not a particular type of mental content, real minds could never think its logical determinacy. Nonetheless, if the concept were reduced to a mental content, logic proper would be precluded and philosophical psychology would be robbed of any possible truth. To see this, we must properly understand the double duty that the concept plays and how logic and the psychology of thought are related yet distinct.

The psychology of thought, like logic, is a thinking of thinking. Both investigations seem to unite their method and content, their subject and object, in contrast to all non-psychological, non-logical disciplines where thinking examines something other than itself. Those latter disciplines must presuppose the method they employ since what they examine does not include the thinking of it. Such non-logical, non-psychological investigations must further take for granted the boundaries of their subject matter, since unless these borders are assumed, they have nothing to investigate in distinction from their own thinking.

In the case of logic, the thinking of thinking makes an absolute beginning since at the start of logical investigation, what valid thinking is has still to be determined. At the outset of logic, neither its method nor its topic is yet at hand. Logic can begin with no presuppositions about knowing or the object of knowing, for in either case it would beg the question. Consequently, logic goes astray if it engages in any psychological explanations, bringing in the real activities of mind. They, no more than any other factors, cannot be introduced, for at the start of logic, no content or procedure has any validated authority. Only at the conclusion of logical investigation has valid thinking been established and this can only be secured through the accomplished constitution of valid thinking that thinks itself.[2] Although logic is normative, it cannot fail to practice what it preaches, since only then can it be the valid thinking of valid thinking.[3]

Unlike logic, philosophical psychology's thinking of thinking does not make an absolute beginning. The psychology of thinking presupposes not only logic, but the philosophy of nature and those parts of the philosophy of mind that account for the psyche,

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1   This essay was delivered on July 28th, 2025, at the Winter School on Hegel's Metaphysics of the Concept, held at the Institute of Philosophy, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile. It draws upon a more extensive discussion in my book, *The Intelligent Mind: On the Origin and Constitution of Discursive Thought* (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 181-203.

2   Hegel provides the classic statement of these insights in the Introduction to this *Science of Logic*. See Hegel, G. W. F., *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1976), pp. 43ff.

3   As Collingwood notes, "If logic were merely descriptive, it would be a psychology of thinking; like all psychology, it would abstract from the distinction of thoughts into true and false, valid and invalid, and would consider them merely as events happening in the mind." See R. G. Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Bristol, UK: Thoemmes Press, 1995), p. 128. If logic, Collingwood continues, "had only to consider other kinds of thought, it could afford to deal with its subject-matter in a way either merely normative or merely descriptive, but towards itself it can only stand in an attitude that is both at once." For this reason, as Collingwood observes, logic's "subject-matter, namely thought, affords an instance of something which cannot be conceived except as actual, something whose essence involves existence." See Collingwood, *An Essay on Philosophical Method*, pp. 130-1.

consciousness, and the development of intelligence from intuition through the constitution of propositional discourse. Mind's thinking can neither be conceived nor actualized without all these factors already determined, for no individuals can think unless they inhabit a universe in which their own animal bodies have evolved with the psychological dimensions that enable them to participate in a linguistic community in which they can formulate and communicate their thoughts. For just this reason, the psychology of thinking cannot possibly play the Archimedean role of being an epistemological principle, determining what can be thought and which thoughts are valid. Any attempt to give the psychological process of thought this foundational privilege is plagued by "psychologism", the incoherence of being determined by objective factors of nature and mind while being ascribed the juridical role of determining what can be truly thought to be objective.

Nonetheless, the psychology of thinking provides a service that neither logic nor any other discipline can accomplish: by accounting for the mental reality of thought, the psychology of thought can make intelligible how living individuals can truly theorize about themselves. Whereas logic determines the categories of thought, the psychology of thinking determines how real living individuals are able to conceive them as well as non-logical topics without being juridically conditioned by the enabling psychological conditions of reason. The Socratic imperative "to know thyself" here achieves fulfillment in that the philosophy of mind accounts for how mind can think autonomously. If this could not be done, the philosophy of mind, not to mention every other arena of philosophy, would be a vain enterprise, devoid of possible reality.

Thought as a Psychological Reality

The psychology of thinking begins both in theory and in reality after language has attained sufficient syntax and vocabulary to actualize propositional discourse. Insofar as the linguistic vehicle of thinking has an infinitely generative grammar and indefinitely flexible lexicon, it leaves undetermined what concepts, judgments, inferences, and systematic arguments can be formulated and transmitted. The development of thinking that language makes possible therefore does not entail any further development of syntax or vocabulary. Thought may generate new concepts requiring additions to the lexicon, but it may equally use the vocabulary at hand and supplement the given meanings of words through the web of propositions its thinking produces. So long as the linguistic community has reached the plateau of propositional linguistic practice and its members have acquired mature mastery of their particular grammar, they are ready to engage in the autonomous activity of thinking.

What enables thought to be free are two factors, both of which are available once linguistic intelligence has provided the psychological resources for thinking. First, the creative generative character with which grammar and lexicon empower language provides thought with the means to formulate imageless content without any restriction regarding what meaning this content can have nor what propositions can be produced to determine that content.

Language provides the enabling, but not determining condition for conceptual discourse and, as such, it leaves thought free and unconditioned. Whatever limits apply to thought are limits thinking imposes upon itself in untrammeled rational inquiry. Second, the self-determined character of universality enables conceptual content to have an autonomous immanent development, permitting thought to be both synthetic and a priori. The logic of the concept establishes this identity between universality and self-determined determinacy. Thought can be ampliative without depending upon experience because the universal, contra Kant, cannot be empty. Universality necessarily entails both particularity and individuality. Without particularization, there can be no universal unity and without particulars being individuals, differentiated from one another, they cannot maintain the plurality on which their distinction from the universal depends. The universal is therefore freely self-differentiating and conceptual content need not be drawn from intuitions lying beyond thought.[4]

Nevertheless, the autonomous thinking that language makes possible is subject to different stages of psychological realization. This is due to how intelligence can think not only about conceptual content, but also about the imagery supplied by intuition and imagination. In all its operations, thinking is a having of thoughts, such that thinking is always occupied with itself, as both the subject and object of its activity.[5] Whatever those thoughts may be, they cannot be formed and apprehended without being verbalized in either inner or overt speech. The meaning of thought may be completely imageless, but that meaning cannot be verbalized unless imagination keeps in mind the configuration of the words that express thinking. Consequently, thinking always involves imagination to supply at least the signs of the words with which thoughts are formulated. Moreover, the thoughts that thinking conceives may not be pure, deriving their entire content from logical determination. Thought can equally conceive concepts, judgments, and inferences that are empirical, deriving their content from general representations supplied by imagination and intuition. In the latter case, thinking will conceive thoughts whose content is dependent upon and in relation to external sources. The thoughts so conceived do not lose their form as thoughts, but their content is alien to that form. The psychology of thinking therefore involves distinct types of thought characterized by different relations between the form and content of thinking. Each of these types of thought involves the logical determinations of concept, judgment, and syllogism, but each realizes these logical determinations in particular psychological activities, distinguished by the psychological factors they employ. In all cases, language is necessarily

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4   For a more detailed investigation of how universality is self-determined, see Winfield, Richard Dien, *From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel's Subjective Logic* (London: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 51-65.

5   Hegel writes, in thinking, intelligence "finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being ...it is a plain identity of subjective and objective ... the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object". See Hegel, G. W. F., *Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830)*, trans. William Wallace, *together with the Zusatze in Boumann's Text (1845)*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §465, p. 224.

at work, without having to undergo any grammatical or lexical modification. Consequently, the different stages in the psychology of thinking are not stages in linguistic development. Although thought always involves language, the development of thinking proper is distinct from the phylogenetic genesis of language, the historical modifications of language, and the ontogenetic maturation of discursive individuals.

The different relations between the form and content of thinking represent different stages in the autonomy of thought. Whenever thinking has a content different from thought, it occupies itself with something extraneous, something given independently of its own activity. In that case, thinking has a formal character, reflecting how its activity does not generate the content of what it thinks. A thinking whose form and content fall apart thus involves heteronomy in that thinking takes on a content it finds given, instead of thinking something immanent to thought itself. The more thinking determines the content of what is thought, the more heteronomy is overcome and the more conceptual autonomy is achieved.

Many have doubted whether thought can ever liberate itself from heteronomous content. Ever since Kant declared thought to be empty without intuition,[6] it has been widely presumed that thinking is inherently finite and externally reflective in that thinking can think only about contents that it must find outside of conceptual determination. Such empty finite thinking is governed by the principle of formal self-identity, the principle of non-contradiction, according to which each concept is what it is and not what it is not. On this basis, thoughts have a given content that is fixed and rigid, barring concepts from having any self-determined, immanent development. Under this reign of heteronomy, a thinking that relies on thought alone can never arrive at new content or relate fundamentally different concepts to one another. Such formal, empty thought can only be analytic, analyzing what is contained within given contents and confirming whether they are internally consistent in accord with the principle of non-contradiction. How thought can then unconditionally affirm the non-analytic truth that thinking is finite, analytic, and governed by a formal logic is a mystery left unexplained and ignored by these eviscerators of reason.

Admittedly the psychology of thinking does involve forms of heteronomous thinking, where thought orders figurative contents given independently of logical determination, allowing metaphor to play some role. These heteronomous forms, however, are not exhaustive of thought. The psychology of thinking will demonstrate this by leading through the stages of conceptualization where intelligence passes from understanding to reason, at which point the form and content of thinking cease to be opposed and thought becomes fully autonomous.

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6   Kant notoriously writes, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) A51/B75, pp. 193-4), adding, "without intuition all of our cognition would lack objects, and therefore remain completely empty" (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A62/B87, p. 199). Kant fails to recognize that he has thereby deprived his own transcendental investigation of any claim to genuine knowledge.

These stages are different from the logical succession whereby the concept gives rise to judgment, the forms of judgment develop into one another, and syllogism emerges from normative judgment and unfolds its own forms.[7] The psychological stages of thinking do incorporate these forms of thought, but bring them into play in conjunction with mental content and mental activities supplied by intuition and imagination. In the *Republic* Plato pictured this psychological development of thinking in the Divided Line,[8] where the heteronomous thought of calculative, demonstrative reasoning, which proceeds from external presuppositions and relies upon intuitive contents and constructions, leads to the pure thinking of "dialectics", which moves beyond all assumption from one concept to another.

From the Opposition of Consciousness to Intelligence and Thinking

The development from intuition to representation provides the psychological conditions of linguistic intelligence and in doing so secures the place of thinking within the mental domain of intelligence. This location has been ignored by most modern accounts of thinking, which tend to place thought within consciousness. This reduction of thinking to a conscious awareness reflects two familiar dogmas. The first dogma is that consciousness is the one and only domain of mind. The second dogma is that consciousness is discursive, according to which consciousness cannot confront any objectivity unless consciousness conceives categories that confer upon its mental content a necessary, non-subjective unity. Kant pioneers the construal of consciousness as essentially discursive in his "Deduction of the Categories" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, precluding any consciousness without thought. Although Kant does not explicitly take into account the linguistic reality of thinking, the dogma that consciousness is discursive has since been upheld by those who substitute language for consciousness as their epistemological foundation. The prime exponent of this move is Wilfrid Sellars, who maintains that the intersubjectivity of language allows mental content to be objective for consciousness. Sellars argues that insofar as consciousness makes knowledge claims, knowledge claims entail judgment, thinking judgment is bound up with language, and language involves interaction among individuals who recognize their common assents to commonly perceived objects, the opposition of consciousness is tied to linguistic practice and the thinking this involves.[9]

The genesis and actuality of discursive intelligence exposes the fundamental incoherence of these dogmas. If consciousness could not confront objects without using conceptual discourse, language and thinking would be unable to arise. If consciousness was essentially

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7   For a systematic investigation of these logical developments, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 67-130, and Winfield, Richard Dien, *Hegel's Science of Logic: A Critical Rethinking in Thirty Lectures* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), pp. 223-74.

8   Plato, *Republic*, 509d-513e, in Plato, *Complete Works*, ed .John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) pp. 1130-2.

9   See Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 105-7.

tied to language and thought, no individual could be conscious before having linguistic intelligence. Not only would dumb animals be bereft of consciousness, but neither children nor the first originators of language could be conscious or self-conscious before they began to converse. If this were so, no pre-linguistic individuals could ever be conscious of one another, of their respective expressions, or of any objects that could be perceived in common, all of which must factor in the recognition process by which language can begin to be acquired.

Further, unless pre-discursive individuals are not only conscious, but have the subject-object awareness of intelligence, they could never apprehend both their mental contents and the objects to which they refer, as intuition and representation make possible before thinking occurs. Because consciousness is only aware of the object it confronts and never simultaneously of the mental act by which it has that awareness, it cannot concurrently apprehend the correlation of sign and signified necessary for language and thought. Only intelligence can do both because intelligence is the form of mind that apprehends its mental content to be both subjective and objective.

The reduction of mind to consciousness has another fatal consequence that undermines any prospect for philosophical psychology, not to mention logic itself. If consciousness exhausts mental activity and thinking is trapped in the oppositional polarity of conscious awareness, reason can never escape the impasse that results when consciousness counts as the ultimate framework of knowing. Insofar as conscious awareness treats its mental content as an object confronting it, consciousness can never certify that what it takes its object to be corresponds to that object as it is given independently of consciousness. To validate correspondence, consciousness must compare its own mental content with what it represents the object to be in itself. In doing so, however, consciousness cannot avoid discovering that what figures in that comparison as the standard for the truth of its own representation, the object in itself, is nothing but that object as it appears for consciousness. Accordingly, if the confrontational opposition of consciousness applied to all cognition, including that of reason, thinking would never be able to validate the truth of its thought.

This problem is compounded for both logic and psychology insofar as the opposition of consciousness precludes the reflexivity that allows logic to think thinking and the philosophy of mind to conceive the real mental process it employs in conceiving the psychology of thinking. So long as mind is reduced to consciousness, every attempt to know an act of knowing will depend upon a further reflection that remains beyond the consciousness under consideration.

When instead the two dogmas are cast aside and consciousness is relegated to its proper place among the psyche and intelligence, the psychology of thinking can free reason from confinement to the opposition of consciousness.

In thinking, as well as in intuition and representation, intelligence combines the contrasting self-relations of the psyche and consciousness, thereby presupposing and incorporating both. Just as the psyche feels its own feelings, so intelligence relates to its intuitions, representations, and thoughts as its own products. At the same time, however,

intelligence departs from the self-communing of the psyche by treating its intuitions, representations, and thoughts as determinations of something objective. Conversely, although intelligence distinguishes its mental contents from itself, giving them an intentionality or reference like that of consciousness, intelligence relates to its objective intuitions, representations, and thoughts as equally its own subjective determination. In this concurrent way, intelligence relates to its thoughts, as well as its intuitions and representations, as both subjective and objective, unlike the psyche, which communes with its own mental content without distinguishing subject from object, and unlike consciousness, which repels its mental content as something confronting it.

Like consciousness, thinking is about something. Thought has meaning and the thinking of thoughts is intentional. Nonetheless, thinking operates fundamentally differently from pre-discursive conscious sense-certainty, perception, and understanding, where conscious mind needs no verbal formulations to be certain of the immediate being of the sensible manifold, of things and their properties, and of the dynamical interaction of objects. Although thinking may address what is sensed, perceived, and understood pre-discursively, thought does so by thinking about conceptual determinations. These are concepts and thought by intelligence as such, but they no less comprise universal determinations of objects. By contrast, consciousness senses, perceives, and understands its objects without apprehending how their determinations are its own. Unlike consciousness, intelligence theorizes in thinking, for to theorize, mind must apprehend the concepts with which it grasps the universal nature of objectivity, while recognizing that these concepts are mind's own thoughts.[10]

The objectivity of thought has its logical basis in how universality and what is determined in and of itself both have a self-determined character.[11] Unlike what is truly objective, phenomena are relative to something else that is their underlying ground. The same is true of heteronomous understanding, whose apprehension is dependent upon given content. Although conditioned apprehension may address the "correctness" of its representations by seeking to confirm their conformity to appearances, this match

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10   Hegel notes that consciousness may know *that* an object is, engaging in *Wissen*, but intelligence aims to know what the object is, to know its substantial nature, that is, to engage in cognition proper, *Erkennen*. In thinking "intelligence strips the object of the form of contingency, grasps its rational nature and posits it as subjective; and conversely, it at the same time develops the subjectivity into the form of objective rationality. Thus our Knowing, which was at first abstract and formal, becomes a Knowing that is filled with a true content and is therefore objective. When intelligence attains this goal … it is in truth what, to begin with, it only ought to be, namely cognition (*Erkennen*). The latter must be clearly distinguished from simple Knowing or awareness (*Wissen*). For consciousness is already a Knowing. But free mind does not content itself with a simple Knowing; it wants to cognize, in other words, it wants to know not merely that a n object is, and what it is in general and with respect to its contingent, external determinations, but it wants to know in what the object's specific, substantial nature consists." See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §445, p. 191.

11   For further discussion of this key truth, see Richard Dien Winfield, *Hegel and the Future of Systematic Philosophy* (Houndmills, ᴜᴋ: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 45-56.

remains within the phenomenal domain of what is relative and cannot provide true knowledge. Only autonomous thinking can grasp what is non-relative and determined in and of itself. Whereas oppositional appearance may confront consciousness, objectivity proper is an object of thinking intelligence.[12]

Intelligence as Thinker

Whatever content thinking may have, thought gains its own objectivity in verbal expression, either inner or overt. In thinking, intelligence knows that this expression is its own thought and thereby knows itself to be the thinking self that pervades all its verbalizations. The words through which intelligence thinks are the particularizations of its thinking being. To the extent that these particular verbal thoughts no longer draw their meaning from intuition, they are products of discourse, contained within the universality of thinking intelligence as the differentiation by which one affirms one's own identity as a thinker.

Intelligence as thinker cannot be the disembodied solitary meditator of Cartesian solipsism. To think is to verbalize and to verbalize requires being an animal with an evolved "language faculty" who has interacted with other similarly endowed animals with whom one has developed or acquired language. The thinker necessarily has an embodied psyche, consciousness, self-consciousness, intuition, imagination, and the habits allowing one to focus on having thoughts while all one's other physiological and mental processes proceed sufficiently in the background. Only with all these natural and psychological factors in play, can intelligence engage in conceptualization, where the subjective activity of thinking produces thoughts as its object, knowing these to be both in mind and with a meaning of their own, accessible to others. By thinking, intelligence can engage in theoretical cognition, the cognition that knows objects through concepts. The objects of theory are inherently conceivable, uniting the subjectivity of concepts with the objectivity of their independent being. This allows thinking to be objective and intelligence to know itself as uniting subjectivity and objectivity in its exercise of true thought.

In intuition subjectivity and objectivity are immediately united insofar as the given mental content provided by sensation is directly apprehended to be just as much a mental as an objective determination. Intuition does this without any mediating transformation of its content.

Representation departs from this immediate intuitive unity by opposing the mental to the objective. Imagination does this by recollecting intuitions, thereby producing images that it knows to be fashioned by its own activity in distinction to the objects whose intuitions it represents. Imagining intelligence is always aware of its representations being both mental products of its image-making and about something intuitable. Otherwise, representation reverts to intuition. Imagination thereby knows that its representation has distinctly sub-

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12   The distinction between oppositional appearance and objectivity proper is highlighted by Hegel in his rigorous employment of ˮ*Gegenstand*ˮ versus ˮ*Objekt*ˮ.

jective features which render its recollected intuition something different from the object to which it originally refers. The representation is still about something objective and thereby unites subject and object. Representation does so, however, in a form, imagery, that intelligence knows to be merely subjective.[13] In imagining, intelligence connects its intuitions and representations in a mental time and space of its own. Thereupon, in mechanical memorization, semiotic imagination suspends the reference of words to their independently given meanings, leaving them wholly contained within the mental field of verbal memory. Although imagination thereby frees intelligence of dependence upon given intuition, it has yet to generate a new objective meaning of its own.

In thinking, intelligence provides what imagination cannot: image-less content that is no less objective. To the extent that thoughts are theoretical, they unite subjectivity and objectivity in a psychological activity that is just as much objective as subjective. Thinking can unite subjectivity and objectivity because the subjectivity it comprises and the objectivity it is about are both conceptual. In thinking, the embodied individual employs language to perform an activity of conceptual determination, discursively formulating the object of its thought. This subjective reality of thinking has as its objective counterpart a conceptually determined objectivity, objects as manifest in thought. In thinking objects of thought, intelligence unites its concepts with the conceivable objectivity they comprehend. By conceiving what is objective, one has thoughts that comprise one's subjective reality as thinker as well as the conceptual being of one's object. One's thinking, which unites subjectivity and objectivity in its theorizing, is itself both subjective and objective. Intelligence cannot fail to be aware of this, for thinking has a psychological reality consisting in the verbalization of one's thought where one is equally aware of formulating these verbal expressions, of thinking one's thoughts.

The Psychology of Conceptualization

Although the logical autonomy of conceptual determination underlies the psychological autonomy of thinking, the latter does not parallel the former. Logic, as a thinking of thinking, can assert no determinate claims about knowing or its object without begging the question. Logic's self-thinking thought can only arise as an autonomous development from indeterminacy, depending on no external operations or introductions of material.

By contrast, the psychological reality of thinking begins on the very concrete threshold of propositional discourse, where the individual member of a linguistic community has a particular grammar and lexicon with which to begin formulating concepts from the general representations at hand. Initially, thought will consist in thinking through that given

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13   Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §465, p. 224.

content, producing concepts out of imagery and names.[14] This will involve transformations of verbal meanings, where words that originally signified general representations begin to take on a logical, conceptual significance. The general development is the same whether this occurs in the independent efforts of the founders of a linguistic community or through the interaction of a new language user with the conceptually proficient adults of that user's community. Verbal meanings that applied to pictured groups of individuals come to designate abstract attributes or classes or geni and species that contain those individuals within their logically defined universality.

Deriving Concepts from Given Representations

Thinking begins its psychological career by reflecting upon the general representations to which words initially refer and verbally formulating what universals it finds in that given content. To the extent that general representations retain the individuality of imagery, the concepts that reflective understanding uncovers in them have a formality that leaves out of account what individuates these representations. In this respect, the thinking of understanding consists in abstracting.[15]

Three types of universality come into play: abstract universality, class, and genus. Understanding first thinks abstract universals that pick out common features of individuals, while leaving otherwise undetermined the other aspects that distinguish those individuals from one another. This involves an engagement in propositional discourse, whether inner or overt, stating the relation of abstraction by which the universal in question is defined. Once such generalities are verbalized, understanding confronts a second type of universal that it can now articulate: class. Class arises from the thinking of abstract universals since whatever individuals share a common generality can be thought to belong to the class that has that shared identity. All understanding must do is think that grouping, verbalizing what it means to belong to that collection of individuals. Once more, the universal leaves undetermined what distinguishes the particulars to which it refers, for class membership does not itself differentiate its members. Nonetheless, thinking class membership puts the understanding in a position to conceptualize the genus and species being of individuals. When all members of a class are conceived to have something in common, they can be

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14   As Vygotsky points out, it would be mistaken to study concept formation by focusing solely on the verbal definition of concepts, since concentrating just on words "fails to take into account the perception and the mental elaboration of the sensory material that give birth to the concept. The sensory material and the word are both indispensable parts of concept formation" (Vygotsky, L. S., *Thought and Language*, trans Alex Kozulin (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986), pp. 96-97). Conversely, "concept formation cannot be reduced to association, attention, imagery … all these moments are indispensable, but they are insufficient without the use of a sign, or word … Real concepts are impossible without words, and thinking in concepts does not exist beyond verbal thinking. That is why the central moment in concept formation, and its generative cause, is a specific use of words as functional "tools"" (Vygotsky, *Thought and Language*, p. 106-107).

15   Hegel remarks of understanding that "its activity consists, in general, in making abstractions" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §467, p. 226).

thought to have a shared nature with that feature as a necessary differentiation. That thought of genus and species being is once more psychologically constituted in the propositional formulation of its identity. By having necessary differentia, genus and species involve a more concrete universality than abstractions and classes, which leave undetermined everything distinguishing the individuals they involve. Nonetheless, the individuation of species members still remains outside the concept of genus and species, for when the lowest species is reached, what individuates its members is not specified by their species being. So long as thinking remains a conceptual understanding that conceives what is universal in representations given to it, thought remains burdened by this formality of being unable to lay hold of what is individual.

Due to this abiding formality, a subjective arbitrariness taints whatever certainty understanding may have that its conceptions are objectively valid. The universal content that is abstracted from given representations can always be redefined to cover a greater or lesser extension, just as the boundaries of a class can always be altered as the identity of shared membership gets revised. The same corrigibility applies to the taxonomy of genus and species, for what differentia are truly necessary cannot be firmly established by reflecting upon the concrete contents of given representations. What differentia may apply to the current members of a genus or species may turn out to be absent from other individuals who appear to warrant inclusion. And the validity of laws and the forces they govern are always subject to revision when understanding confronts representations that cannot be accommodated by them.

From Associating Representations to Discursive Judgment

The categorizations that understanding makes in thinking over what intelligence represents provide the material for making judgments that further determine objects of thought. Thinking judges not by connecting representations, but by formulating propositions to determine verbal meanings through one another. Although judgment logically determines the individual or particular by the universal in an immediate fashion, discursive judging qualifies individuals or particulars that are already sufficiently conceptualized to be designated by words. Since these subjects of discursive judgment are categorized through the reflective thinking of understanding, they have a plurality of specifications that are not all determined by the categories found in them by the understanding. Consequently, when understanding judges its objects of thought, the predications it imposes have an external, subjective character. Although the judgments affirm thought determinations that hold true of the subject in question, the manifold content of the object of judgment allows for other judgments involving different qualifications. This predicament applies to judgments that attribute abstract universals, class membership, and species being to verbally identified subjects, as well as to judgments that apply further predications to subjects which are already characterized as sharing abstract universals, class membership, and species being. In every

case, substitutions can always be made, both with regard to the subjects of the judgment as well as to the predicate that is ascribed. Accordingly, when understanding seeks to validate the judgment it makes, it is impelled to provide reasons for the predication. Although imagery might illustrate what judgment claims, only verbal formulation can properly identify the logical terms of the judgment and articulate a supporting reason for their connection.

From Discursive Judgment to Discursive Syllogism

Understanding develops syllogisms in order to provide a mediating rationale for the connections that judgment immediately makes. Just as judgment depends upon prior conceptualization of the factors it combines, so syllogism depends upon prior formulations of judgments that can serve as the constitutive steps of inference. Thinking intelligence can continue to formulate new concepts and make new judgments, but every engagement of understanding will exhibit the structural dependence of judgment on preliminary concept formation and of syllogism upon antecedent judgment. That structural dependence will be present in the engagements of verbal recall that must accompany the thinking of judgments and inferences, without which the train of inferential thought cannot be sustained.

The syllogizing of understanding contains the same formality that afflicts the concept formation and judging that understanding undertakes. This can be no surprise, since understanding infers by thinking through a series of its judgments. Although syllogism logically connects the individual to the universal through its particularity, the universals, particulars, and individuals that figure in the thinking of understanding are not exhaustively determined by their relation to one another. Because the understanding initially forms its concepts through abstraction, the particulars of its universals are individuated by extraneously given content that lies outside those universal's conceptual differentiation. Just as the judgments of the understanding exhibit arbitrariness insofar as their subject can be connected to other predicates and its predicates can be connected to other subjects, so the inferences built of such judgments follow routes that could be supplanted by others. Since a universal applies to individuals who may share multiple particular features and fall under multiple commonalities, what unites universal and individual is a matter of choice, just as is what universal is connected to individuals through some particularity.[16]

Nonetheless, the very form of syllogism presents understanding with the challenge of overcoming the extraneous content of the objects of thought. In syllogism, the universal, particular, and individual are all mediated by one another. Inference ties the universal and individual together through the particular, as can be articulated in the three successive judgments: "the universal is the particular", "the particular is the individual", and "the universal is the individual". In so doing, inference renders the particular connected to the individual through the universal, since in the two judgments, "the universal is the particular" and "the

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16 For further discussion of these options, see Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 107-22.

universal is the individual", the universal ties the particular to the individual. This further renders the universal connected to the particular through the individual, which follows from the judgments, "the universal is the individual" and "the particular is the individual".[17] Although the mediation of all three terms through one another overcomes in form the immediacy with which syllogism proceeds,[18] so long as understanding makes inferences from independently given premises, its thinking remains bound to heteronomous content. Nonetheless, the mediating activity of inference carries with it the imperative of overcoming the immediacy of its premises, which remains unfulfilled so long as the factors of syllogism retain an externality calling for the mediation inference supplies.

Although Kant imprisons reason within the form of syllogism, inference can never think the unconditioned that Kant properly recognizes to be reason's distinguishing content. To move beyond the heteronomy of understanding to the autonomy of reason, intelligence must overcome the limits of inferential thinking. What Plato pictured in the Divided Line as an ascent from demonstrative thought to dialectic will consummate the psychological development of theoretical intelligence.

Reason as a Psychological Process

To think autonomously, intelligence must no longer foist universal forms of thought upon an independently given content. The heteronomous thinking of understanding formulates concepts, judges, and infers such that what is thought over is distinct from the conceptual ordering it undergoes. In order for thinking to determine the object of thought without appeal to externally given content, the entire determination of what is thought must emerge in the process of its conceptualization. The discourse in which the subject matter is conceived must formulate it as it is constituted in its own right. For this to be the case, the content must be self-ordering and the form by which it is thought must be intrinsic to how it is determined. Thinking will then have a form pregnant with content, a form that is no longer relative to givens external to it, a form that is instead unconditioned and self-determining. For its part, the object of reason will no longer be the product of a form-giving manufacture, but something determined in and of itself. Thought will not abstract from some concrete factor it confronts but instead proceed from the most minimal determination of the subject matter and think through the path of its internal constitution, where nothing is thought before its prerequisite constituents and preconditions have been conceived. In this manner the subject matter will be conceived as it constitutes itself in its self-subsistent objectivity,

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17 See Winfield, *From Concept to Objectivity*, pp. 114-6, for a detailed explanation of how these connections follow from one another.

18 Hegel maintains that "in inference" the understanding "characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference" by which the parts of syllogism are distinguished. "With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, §467, p. 225). Still, more than syllogism is necessary to comprehend the positive outcome of the elimination of the formality of understanding.

taking on further determinations whose order is rooted in how their content is related to the prior and posterior determinations that together comprise the formation of the object in its own right. Instead of proceeding from given representations to which understanding relates concepts through judgment and inference, intelligence reasons by thinking through the intrinsic process of its subject matter, securing the objectivity of its thought by having it be the self-constitution of its object.

The general path of this concrete thinking is familiar enough. In the domain of logic, reason must begin with indeterminacy and think through how determinacy arises without taking determinacy for granted. On this basis, reason can proceed to address determinacy that is determined by a prior determinacy, thinking through the two-tiered relations of essence, where categories such as essence and appearance, grounded and grounded, whole and part, and cause and effect can be constituted. This can then pave the way for thinking through self-determined determinacy, which incorporates determinacy and the determiner of determined determinacy such that what is determined is indistinguishable from what does the determining. Similarly, in addressing nature, reason will begin with what is least determinate and ingredient in all further natural being – namely, space. Time can next follow, followed by matter, whose constitution requires perdurance in both space and time. The mechanics of matter in motion can then be constituted and thought, as prerequisite for the physical workings of electromagnetic processes, from which chemical relations can be thought and constituted. On this basis, reason can then think the emergence of life from the coordination of chemical reactions into a self-renewing system, from which the centralized sensitivity and motility of animal life can be thought and be constituted. With these contents at hand in thought and reality, reason can proceed to develop the reality of mind from its most minimal constituents, thinking through the psyche, then consciousness, and finally intelligence, before addressing the conduct and cultural world that discursive rationality makes possible. What makes this conceptualizing a concrete autonomous thinking that has objective truth is how its thinking comprises a self-developing content that involves nothing more than the self-subsistent nature of its subject matter. The thinking of understanding remains heteronomous because it applies its thought to a given material, producing something determined by an external reflection upon a predetermined, presupposed topic. Reason, by contrast, thinks autonomously because the universals it conceives particularize themselves, comprising a conceptual self-development that follows out the intrinsic self-constitution of an object as it is determined in and of itself.[19] By unifying its

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19   Hegel contrasts the object of understanding and the object of reason in this vein, writing, "the following distinction must be firmly established between Understanding and Reason: that for the latter, the object is determined in and for itself, is the identity of content and form, of universal and particular, whereas for the former it falls apart into form and content, into universal and particular, and into an empty 'in-itself' to which the determinateness is added from outside; that therefore, in the thinking of the Understanding, the content is indifferent to its form, while in the comprehensive thinking of Reason the content produces its form from itself." See Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind, Zusatz* to §467, p. 226.

own particularization into an individual self-determined concrete universal, the conception of reason can be at one and the same time the true comprehension of its subject matter and the determination of that object's own independent individuality.[20] Unlike understanding, reason is fully free in its relation to its object, for intelligence can only know the object as it is determined in and of itself by thinking concepts that develop themselves.[21]

Although the path of reason is nothing other than the development of philosophical theory, the thinking of reason has a psychological reality that can be distinguished from the conceptual content of philosophical argument. To think autonomously, intelligence must employ discourse, with all its given syntax and vocabulary. Moreover, intelligence must use propositions in which judgments and inference come into play. Even though judgment immediately connects universals with particulars or individuals, without supplying the rationale for the connection it makes, concrete thinking must make predications to articulate the differentiations that its subject matter takes on in its self-constitution. Inference also must come into play even though the universal, particular, and individual are external to one another in the mediating process of syllogism. Intelligence needs inference to articulate how conceptual determinations are mediated by one another, for the concrete thinking of reason follows out how the universal particularizes itself and thereby attains the individuality of being something determined in and through itself. To overcome the givenness of content that enters into every inference, intelligence must rely upon the order in which it presents propositions articulating successive differentiations of the subject matter that is underway being thought and constituted. This is not a matter of inferring the premises of each syllogism from an antecedent inference, but rather verbally formulating the sequence of concept determinations that provide the prerequisite constituents of those that follow. This involves articulating contrasting judgments and inferences that ascribe different determinations to the same subject. Only through such opposing propositions can the subject matter develop itself, taking on determinations that it does not yet have, becoming what it is not without ceasing to be at one with itself. If instead, intelligence restricted itself to analysis in obedience to the principle of non-contradiction, no new content could emerge.

In these ways, propositional discourse provides sufficient resources for intelligence to think concretely, producing out of its own thought process the independent content of

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20   As Hegel notes, in the pure thinking of reason, "the universal is known as self-particularizing, and from the particularization gathering itself together into individuality; or, what is the same thing, the particular loses its self-subsistence to become a moment of the Notion. Accordingly, the universal is here no longer a form external to the content, but the true form which produces the content from itself – the self-developing Notion of the thing [*Sache*]" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §467, p. 227).

21   As Hegel remarks, here "thinking has no other content than itself, than its own determinations which constitute the immanent content of the form; in the object, it seeks and finds only itself. Here, therefore, the object is distinguished from thought only by having the form of being, of subsisting on its own account. Thus thinking stands here in a completely free relation to the object" (Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §467, p. 227).

its object. In so doing, intelligence can recognize itself to be a reason that thinks objectively, attaining truth. In reasoning, one knows oneself to be, in one's own autonomous thinking activity, the realization of the correspondence of subject and object, of concept and objectivity.[22] Once more, the psychological resources for doing so do not determine what one thinks, let alone what counts as true. Rather they enable our intelligence to think autonomously and delineate the intrinsic nature of the subject matter.

In distinguishing reason from understanding, the philosophy of mind arrives at the point of securing its own psychological reality. If this could not be done, if the theory of mind could not establish how intelligence can think autonomously and conceive itself in truth, philosophical psychology would be a vain endeavor.

In conceiving the concept, we must never forget that the psychological resources that enable us to think through logical development play no juridical role in determining either its form or content. The identification of the concept, that is, the universal, with self-determined determinacy is of key importance in allowing the psychological conditions of thought to leave the autonomy of conceptual determination unencumbered. Precisely because logic must make an absolute beginning that presupposes neither method nor subject matter, the concept cannot be at hand from the outset. Self-determined determinacy presupposes determinacy. Determinacy cannot be accounted for by appealing to any given determinacy without begging the question. Determinacy can only be constituted from indeterminacy. Similarly, determined determinacy, which is posited by a determiner, cannot be accounted for without the development of determinacy from indeterminacy. Determinacy can only become a determined determinacy when the development of determinacy comes to incorporate all given determinacy in a process that mediates determinacy in its totality. This development occurs when measure relations give way to an infinite progress in which all qualitative and quantitative determinations are absorbed. The logic of essence thereby arises and it provides the two factors on which self-determined determinacy depends: what is determined by a determiner and what is a determiner of determined determinacy. What generates the logic of the concept is the process whereby the distinction between determiner and determined undermines itself, which fully occurs in reciprocal causality, where what determines and what is determined become one and the same. That indistinguishability constitutes self-determination, which involves the self-differentiation of the universal into particularity and individuality, in which the concept consists.

Although the concept thereby arrives late on the scene of logical development, every step along the way is in truth a concept. The logical determination of being is the concept of being, just as that of nothing is the concept of nothing, and so forth. All stages in the

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22   Accordingly, Hegel can duly characterize reason as "self-knowing truth, the self-cognizing Reason" where "*knowing* now constitutes the *subjectivity* of Reason, and the *objective* Reason is posited as *Knowing*" ([Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, *Zusatz* to §467, p. 227]).

logic are conceptual determinations precisely because they have been generated in a completely autonomous development. That self-determined character is what allows them to be exhaustively conceptualizable and free of any dependence upon given assumptions.

As thinkers, we are living animals dependent upon immersion in a linguistic community, but as engaged in conceptual discourse, we are able to share in the autonomy of the concept and access the truth without qualification.

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