Intuition, Experimental Philosophy and Modal Rationalism

  • Rafael Miranda Rojas Universidad Católica del Maule, Talca, Chile

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the scope of a proposal in favor of intuitions in the philosophical field, particularly with respect to the referential topic, without this leading to a strong modal rationalism. The notion of reference defended by the so called experimental philosophy questions the relevance of the inputs that traditional philosophy (armchair philosophy) could provide. From an analysis of the competent speaker lay intuition dichotomy will be argued there is a methodological tension with respect to the role played by a non expert intuition versus an expert intuition, and the relevance given to certain non expert competent intuitions versus expert non competent intuitions. It will be argued that asserting certain philosophical expertise does not inevitably lead to an extreme rationalism, proposing a moderate modal rationalism, in which intuitions are not discarded as epistemic access routes, but neither do they claim to be a privileged access route: they fulfill an exemplifier counterfactual role. Finally, we evaluate how this understanding of intuition fits better with the counterfactual and hypothetical character of a thought experiment.


 

Published
2018-11-06
How to Cite
MIRANDA ROJAS, Rafael. Intuition, Experimental Philosophy and Modal Rationalism. Cogency, [S.l.], v. 10, n. 1, p. 53-78, nov. 2018. ISSN 0718-8285. Available at: <http://cogency.udp.cl/index.php/cogency/article/view/311>. Date accessed: 11 dec. 2018.
Section
Artículos