La distinción aristotélica entre Lógica, Dialéctica y Retórica y su lugar en la Teoría de la Argumentación


  • Lilian Bermejo Luque Departamento de Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, España,


Should we consider Aristotle’s work on argumentation as the origins of Argumentation Theory or rather as an obstacle that, at least in part, would explain its late emergence and development? In this article I try to show that, in fact, there are good reasons to defend both views. By doing so, I aim to illustrate a certain way of thinking of the relationships between Logic, Dialectic and Rhetoric. Such conception of the relationships between these disciplines would be more suitable for the goals of Argumentation Theory than the fragmentary view that, for centuries, has been endorsed by most scholars working on each of them. As long as this fragmentary view has been inherited up to our days, our proposed reading of Aristotle’s texts aims to offer someconceptual elements for current developments, mostly regarding the conceptions of Logic as the normative theory of inference and of the enthymeme as the rhetorical