How to Solve Paradoxes: A Taxonomy and Analysis of Solution-Types

Abstract

Just as philosophical paradoxes cluster in categories, such as the paradoxes of self-reference, justification, and so on, so too do solutions. And just as paradoxes (e.g., the liar paradox) take on new spins, get strengthened, and reappear from time to time, so too do solutions. Solution-types can be given a fairly complete taxonomy. By “solution-type” I will mean a strategy for analyzing paradoxes.” In this article, a taxonomy for solution-types to philosophical paradoxes is given. Such a taxonomy suggests that, even for the most restricted of solution-types, in which the paradox is taken to expose some kind of fundamental, unresolvable conceptual glitch, all solution types address the underlying intuitions that motivate accepting the parts of the paradox. In addition, an analysis of the taxonomy suggests that only the most shallow of philosophical paradoxes get straightforward solutions.