On the Alleged Failure of Informal Logic

Abstract

In the past 10 years there have been suggestions from several quarters that
informal logic should change its name or at least yield the floor to a successor which, it
has been suggested, might be called ‘philosophy of argument’ (Blair 2009) or ‘semiformal
logic’ (Walton 2008). Behind these suggestions lies the belief that informal
logic has, at it were, failed to penetrate the philosophical establishment (Johnson and
Blair 2000, 101; Woods 2000, 160). In this paper, I want to contend the claim that
informal logic has failed to penetrate the philosophical establishment. With regard to
this alleged failure, I pose a series of questions. First, exactly what does the claim mean?
In order to assess it, it will be necessary to make reference to some conception of informal
logic —and that proves to be difficult because there are many. Accordingly, I propose
the account that I favour. Second,I want to ask: What is the evidence for it? What
sorts of reasons have been offered? Third, if this claim is true, then why is it true?
What explanations can be given? Fourth, I then look at evidence to the contrary, evidence
that suggests that informal logic has not altogether failed to penetrate the philosophical
establishment.