How Should Nature Be Studied Philosophically? A Hegelian Response

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how nature should be philosophically studied within a
Hegelian framework. The focus is epistemological: it examines the relationship between philosophy
and the empirical sciences in the constitution of natural categories. I argue that this relationship is
neither strictly a priori nor strictly a posteriori but unfolds through a speculative interplay between
an a priori philosophical principle of unity and an a posteriori attentiveness to empirical discovery.
To support this view, I engage with prominent positions in the secondary literature – namely, Alison
Stone’s strong a priorism and John Burbidge’s a posteriorism. After addressing two key problems in
these interpretations, I show how both mistakenly attempt to read Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature
through the rigid Kantian dichotomy of a priori and a posteriori, which speculative thought seeks to
overcome. Drawing on the work of Brigitte Falkenburg, Cinzia Ferrini, and Sebastian Rand, I
propose that natural categories should be understood as the result of empirical content that is
reorganized, a posteriori, in accordance with an a priori principle of systematic unity. This
interpretation not only aligns with Hegel’s own texts but also highlights the dynamic and active
character of his philosophy.