La notación conceptual como lenguaje universal y la idea fregeana de demostración

Abstract

In my contribution I sought to show that Frege is obliged to logicism for certain changes to the classic notion of proof he originally defends. Henceforth, after a minimal characterization of such a notion, I will look after it in Begriffsschrift (1879) in order to show that it is in strong connection with fregean worry about confidence in mathematical proofs. Afterwards, I analyze the relationship between the language Frege designs (the Concept-script) and his goal of supplying the defects other languages as natural language, arithmetic language and other logic systems have. I show how this inevitably conducts him to a notion of proof which is nearer to formalism; although one is to concede he still defends a classic idea of proof, at least on regards of its epistemic aspect. This entire, close related with the so sharp augmentation of knowledge problem in deductive proofs. I end up with a switch between these results and the underlying idea of logic Frege himself supports.